Legis (61-63), Exec (1-5).docx

Constitutional Law 1 Case Digest (Partial) LEGISLATIVE CASES (Nos. 61 – 63) ...........................................................................................2 TAÑADA, JR. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 708 SCRA 188 , OCTOBER 22, 2013 .........2 DUEÑAS, JR. VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL ...................3 BONDOC VS. PINEDA 201 SCRA 792 , SEPTEMBER 26, 1991 ............................................4 EXECUTIVE CASES (Nos. 1 – 5) ................................................................................................5 LAUREL VS. DESIERTO 381 SCRA 48 , APRIL 12, 2002 ......................................................5 GUDANI VS. SENGA 498 SCRA 671 , AUGUST 15, 2006 .....................................................6 GONZALES VS. ABAYA 498 SCRA 445 , AUGUST 10, 2006 ................................................7 DAVID VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO 489 SCRA 160 , MAY 03, 2006 ....................................8 INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ZAMORA 338 SCRA 81 , AUGUST 15, 2000 ..........................................................................................................................................9

LEGISLATIVE CASES (Nos. 61 – 63)

TAÑADA, JR. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 708 SCRA 188 , OCTOBER 22, 2013 FACTS: Petitioner, Wigberto Tanada and Alvin John Tanada were both candidates for the position of Congress Representative for the 4thDistrict of Quezon Province in May 2013 National Elections. Preceding the elections, the former filed two separate petitions before the COMELEC to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of the latter for false representations and to declare him as nuisance candidate. The COMELEC First Division dismissed both his petitions; however, on the Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc on April 13, 2013 granted the cancellation of the COC of Alvin John for false representations. Petitioner again filed Motion for Reconsideration on the basis of a newly discovered evidence for Alvin John to be declared as a nuisance candidate. The name of Alvin John that remained printed on the ballot, prompted again Wigberto to file a motion with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Quezon Province (PBOC) to consolidate the votes garnered by Alvin John with the votes he garnered and due to mistakes concerning the cancelled candidacy of the former. The Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) denied consolidating the votes because Alvin John is not a nuisance candidate and after the election, proclaimed Angelina Tan as the winning candidate, placing Wigberto only second. A supplemental petition was filed again by Wigberto before the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of Tan, after which it was granted and affirmed by the COMELEC en banc. However, past noon time of June 30, 2013, Angelina had taken her oath and assumed office, therefore the adverse resolution on her proclamation became moot. On the certiorari filed by Wigberto before the SC assailing the April 2013 COMELEC en banc’s ruling declaring Alvin John not a nuisance candidate and an election protest for fraud was executed. Since the proclaimed candidate has already assumed office, Supreme Court dismissed the election protest and directed Wigberto to file the protest before the proper tribunal which is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

ISSUE: Whether or not Alvin John Tanada is a nuisance candidate.

RULING: The petition must fail. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members. In the foregoing light, considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province on May 16, 2013, as she has in fact taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, the Court is now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. As they stand, the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina as herein discussed are matters which fall under the scope of the terms "election" and "returns" as above-stated and hence, properly fall under the HRET's sole jurisdiction.

DUEÑAS, JR. VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL 593 SCRA 316, JULY 21, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner Henry “Jun” Dueñas, Jr. and private respondent Angelito “Jett” P. Reyes were rival candidates for the position of congressman in the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. After the canvass of the votes, petitioner was proclaimed the winner, having garnered 28,564 votes as opposed to private respondent’s 27,107 votes. Not conceding defeat, private respondent filed an election protest, praying for a revision/recount, alleging that he was cheated in the protested 170 of 732 precincts through insidious and well-orchestrated electoral frauds and anomalies which resulted in the systematic reduction of his votes and the corresponding increase in petitioner’s votes. In an order dated September 25, 2008, the HRET directed the continuation of the revision and appreciation of the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts pursuant to Rule 88 of the HRET Rules. Instead of complying with the order, petitioner filed an urgent motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts on October 27, 2008. This was denied by the HRET, reiterating its order directing the continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts and recalling its order requiring petitioner to augment his cash deposit. The Tribunal instead ordered the use of its own funds for the revision of the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts. On November 27, 2008, the HRET issued a resolution under Rule 88 of the HRET Rules and settled jurisprudence, ruling that it had the discretion either to dismiss the protest or counter-protest, or to continue with the revision if necessitated by reasonable and sufficient grounds affecting the validity of the election. This was with the end in view of ascertaining the true choice of the electorate. It was the HRET’s position that the mere filing of a motion to withdraw/abandon the unrevised precincts did not automatically divest the HRET of its jurisdiction over the same. Convinced that it could not determine the true will of the electorate of the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City on the basis alone of the initial revision of the 100% protested precincts and the 25% counter-protested precincts, it had no other recourse but to continue the revision and appreciation of all the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.

ISSUE: Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008.

RULING: The petition has no merit. We base our decision not only on the constitutional authority of the HRET as the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of its members but also on the limitation of the Court's power of judicial review. So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court, the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal x x x excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same. Guided by this basic principle, the Court will neither assume a power that belongs exclusively to the HRET nor substitute its own judgment for that of the Tribunal. Petitioner's position disregards, or at least waters down, Rules 7 and 88 of the HRET Rules. If the Court will dictate to the HRET on how to proceed with these election protest proceedings, the Tribunal will no longer have "exclusive control, direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation." It will constitute an intrusion into the HRET's domain and a curtailment of the HRET's power to act of its own accord on its own evaluation of the evidentiary weight and effect of the result of the initial revision.

BONDOC VS. PINEDA 201 SCRA 792 , SEPTEMBER 26, 1991 FACTS: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members,3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that the was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that party's representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein.

RULING: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

EXECUTIVE CASES (Nos. 1 – 5) LAUREL VS. DESIERTO 381 SCRA 48 , APRIL 12, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner is the Chair of the National Centennial Commission (NCC), tasked to “take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.” Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created and Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer. An investigation of the anomalies in the construction and operation of the centennial projects was effected and the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final Report recommending for “the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, in violation of the anti-graft law.” The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a resolution finding “probable cause to indict petitioner before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1594.” Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because he, both as chairman of the NCC and of the EXPOCORP was not a “public officer.”

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, is a public officer.

RULING: YES. The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office . The court hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power “is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.” The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law. The NCC was precisely created to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and non-government or private organizations and to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries and to carry them into effect.Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.

GUDANI VS. SENGA 498 SCRA 671 , AUGUST 15, 2006 FACTS: The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING: Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commanderin-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize. The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

GONZALES VS. ABAYA 498 SCRA 445 , AUGUST 10, 2006 FACTS: In relation to the celebrated Oakwood mutiny where a total of 321 soldiers including petitioners herein declared their withdrawal of support to the Commander-in-chief, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declared a state of rebellion and ordered the arrest of the said soldiers. Pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation. On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information for coup d'etat against those soldiers, On August 13, 2003, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 (otherwise known as "The Articles of War"), as amended, against the same military personnel. The Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d'etat before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War. For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court martial against the accused . . . are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners' applications for bail. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d'etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction. ISSUE: 1.Whether the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been criminally charged of coup d’état before the regular courts. 2. Whether the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable. HELD: 1. Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same — dismissal from the service — imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline. Hence, there is no merit in petitioners' argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void. 2. No. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes' is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.

DAVID VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO 489 SCRA 160 , MAY 03, 2006 FACTS: On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency. On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence." David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING: PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest. Are these conditions present in the instant cases? The Court said, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP1017. Owing to her office’s vast intelligent network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country. The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII, to wit: "x x x The President can only issue Executive Orders, Administrative Orders, Proclamations, Memorandum Orders, Memorandum Circulars, General or Special Orders." President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution. This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the

powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress. WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ZAMORA 338 SCRA 81 , AUGUST 15, 2000 FACTS: Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, as commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence in Metro Manila in the light of the escalating cases of crime and lawlessness in the city. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. Subsequently, the IBP filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the “Marines”) to join the Philippine National Police (the “PNP”) in visibility patrols around the metropolis.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review. (2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

RULING: 1. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. 2. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.