36. RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THEPROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OFTHE SUPREME COURT A.M. NO. 11-7-10-SC JULY 31, 2012
FACTS:
Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court.
The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,3 when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A4 dated August 5, 1998.
Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula.
More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA’s interference, in this case, violates the judiciary’s autonomy.
HELD: Yes. The COA's authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. The Constitution mandates that, in relation to judicial independence, the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary's fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government.
37. RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET ORCURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY. A. M. No. 09-8-6-SC
June 13, 2012.
FACTS:
Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN) of the Justices of this Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their database of information on government officials.
Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher-writer also of the PCIJ, likewise sought for copies of the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA), for the same above-stated purpose.
The special committee created by the Supreme Court to review the request issued a Memorandum recommending the creation of a Committee on Public Disclosure to take over the functions of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with respect to requests for copies of SALN and other personal documents of members of the Judiciary.
Several requests for copies of the SALN and other personal documents of the Justices of this Court, the CA and the Sandiganbayan (SB) were also filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SALN of Supreme Court Justices can be released to the public.
HELD: Yes. Article 3, Section 7 of the Constitution states that the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. In the case at bar, the Court held that as custodians of public documents, they must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. However, public officers in the custody or control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion does not carry
with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the records.
38. Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)vs. Heusdens A. M. No. P-11-2927
December 13, 2011
FACTS: This was an administrative matter arising from the leave application for foreign travel sent through mail by respondent, Wilma Salvacion P. Heusdens, Staff Clerk IV of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagum City, Davao del Norte. Heusdens left without waiting for the results of her application. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent to have violated OCA Circular No. 49-2003 for failing to secure the approval of her application for travel authority. It recommended that the administrative complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that be reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
HELD: Yes. Article 8, Section 5, paragraph 6 of the 1987 Constitution states that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. This provision empowers the Court to oversee all matters relating to the effective supervision and management of all courts and personnel under it. Recognizing this mandate, Memorandum Circular No. 26 of the Office of the President considers the Supreme Court exempt and with authority to promulgate its own rules and regulations on foreign travels. Thus, the Court came out with OCA Circular No. 49-2003. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court admonished respondent for traveling abroad without any travel authority in violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely. The Leave Division, OAS-OCA, is hereby directed to act upon applications for travel abroad at least five working days before the intended date of departure.
39. RUBY C. CAMPOMANES vs. NANCY S. VIOLON, Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Oroquieta City A. M. No. P-11-2983 2012
July 25,
FACTS:
Respondent Nancy Violon holds the position of Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Office of the Clerk of Court in Oroquieta City.
Respondent borrowed P50,000 from the bank, payable in 12 monthly installments of P3,500 for each installment. The agreement was evidenced in a Disclosure Statement executed between the parties .
Respondent also signed a Promissory Note undertaking to pay the obligation on or before 25 January 2006.
Ruby C. Campomanes, complainant and Loan Officer I of the Panguil Bay Rural Bank in Ozamiz City wrote a letter to Office of the Deputy Court Administrator with attached Affidavit of Complaint against Nancy Violon for failure to pay an overdue loan contracted in favor of Panguil Bay Rural Bank.
Violon purportedly failed to pay this amount because of financial crises in her family and the hospitalization of her son.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Violon violated Rule 14, Section 22 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. HELD:
Yes. The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service penalizes the willful failure to pay just debts or to pay taxes to the government. Section 22, Rule XIV thereof defines just debts as applying only to claims adjudicated by a court of law, or to claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor. Considering respondent’s admission of the loan, the offense in the present case falls under the latter category. A first-time violation of Rule XIV warrants the penalty of reprimand. The Supreme Court reprimanded respondent for willful failure to pay a just debt. Additionally, the Court warned the respondent that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
40. JORGE B. VARGAS vs.EMILIO RILLORAZA, JOSE BERNABE, MANUEL ESCUDERO, Judges of the People's Court, and THE SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES
G. R. No. L-1612
February 26 1948
FACTS:
Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the The People's Court Act, Commonwealth Act 682, which provided that the President could designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judges to sit as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in treason cases without them necessarily having to possess the required constitutional qualifications of a regular Supreme Court Justice.
Paragraph 2 of Section 14 of The People’s Court Act states that:
“ If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds or disqualification of judges, in Rule 126, section 1 of the Rules of Court, or on account of illness, absence of temporary disability the requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case is not present, the President may designate such number of Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in said section one hereof, as may be necessary to sit temporarily.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is constitutional.
RULING: No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional. Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any composition of the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members of the Court — as in this case — are replaced by judges of first instance. It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this. And the constitution provides for only one Supreme Court. Grounds for disqualification added by section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and continued by it is not only arbitrary and irrational but positively violative of the organic law. Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that the members of the Supreme Court should be appointed by the President with the consent of the CoA, "Unless provided by law" in Sec 4 cannot be construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition of the Supreme Court, as determined by the Constitution. However temporary or brief may be the participation of a judge designated under Sec. 14 of PCA, there is no escaping the fact the he would be participating in the
deliberations and acts of the SC, as the appellate tribunal, and his vote would count as much as that any regular Justice of the Court. "A temporary member" therefore would be a misnomer, as that position is not contemplated by the Constitution, where Sec.4 of Art. VIII only provides A Chief Justice and Associate Justices who have to be thus appointed and confirmed (Sec5).
41. Judge David Nitafan vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue G. R. No. 78780
July 23 1987
FACTS: Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.
HELD: No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.