Judiciary Cases Nos. 21-28.docx

1. In re Atty. Marcial Edillon 84 SCRA 554, August 03, 1978

Facts: On November 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) unanimously recommended to the Court the removal of the name of Respondent, a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines, from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP notwithstanding multiple due notices sent to him.

Issue: Whether or not the provision of the court rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void.

Ruling: No, the provision of the court rule requiring payment of a membership fee is not void. Sec. 5 of Art. X of the 1973 Constitution provides that “The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and.inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. xxx” In this case, nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the

Philippine Bar from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.

2. Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs Court of Appeals 329 SCRA 314, March 31, 2000

Facts: Petitioner Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedo dependent upon prescriptions or limitations to be issued by local optometrists. Petitioner basically is not allowed to practice optometry within the city (but may sell glasses only). Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under the permit. Private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI), Iligan Chapter, lodged a complaint against the petitioner before the Office of the City Mayor, alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. Acting on such complaint, then City Mayor conduct an investigation through the City Legal Officer on the matter. Respondent City Legal Officer submitted a report to the City Mayor finding the herein petitioner guilty of violating all the conditions of its business permit and recommending the disqualification of petitioner from operating its business in Iligan City. ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police power. RULING: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in

the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege – estoppel does not apply.

3. Fontanilla vs Maliaman 194 SCRA 486, February 27, 1991

Facts: On December 1, 1989, the Court rendered a decision declaring National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency performing proprietary functions. Like an ordinary employer, NIA was held liable for the injuries, resulting in death, of Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose and Virginia Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or negligence of NIA’s driver employee Hugo Garcia; and NIA was ordered to pay the petitioners damages. The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains, however, that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special agent. For this, they have filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 1990.

Issue: Whether or not NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused by its driver, who was not its special agent.

Ruling: Yes, NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. Under the law, the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves

the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. Furthermore, NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. In this case, the National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. NIA was created for the purpose of “constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects.” The court concluded that the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.

4. Santiago vs Guingona, Jr. 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998

Facts: During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto. Issue: Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure Ruling: Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its

work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.

5. Philippine Judges Association vs Prado 227 SCRA 703, November 11, 1993

Facts: Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to withdraw franking privileges, a privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of charge, from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

Issue: Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

Ruling: No, Sec 35 of RA 7354 is not constitutional. Sec. 1, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that “No person shall be deprived of the equal protection of laws." In this case, the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions. In

lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

6. Zansibarian Residents Asso. Vs Municipality of Makati 135 SCRA 235, February 28, 1985

Facts: Petitioner Zansibarian Residents Association, through the instant petition for "Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction" prays that respondents be ordered (a) to cease and desist from subdividing the land in question and distributing them to beneficiaries or persons other than the members of petitioner association; (b) to restore its members to the possession and occupancy of their respective lots, rebuilding their houses and restoring them to their condition prior to their demolition at the expense of respondent Municipality of Makati; and (c) to permanently subdivide the land in question and award them to its members pursuant to law. Petitioner further prays that a temporary restraining order be issued against the respondents Municipality of Makati, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and the National Housing Authority, ordering them to cease and desist from subdividing the land in question and distributing them to beneficiaries or persons who are not listed in their petition. This petition is not the first case filed by petitioner and/or its members against respondents, particularly respondent Municipality of Makati. As early as October 1978, the same residents of the area in question filed actions for INJUNCTION. The cases were docketed as Civil Case No. 31141 and 38811 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, Makati, Metro Manila.

On motion of defendants, the said cases was dismissed in an Order dated March 31, 1982 on ground of res judicata.

Issue: Whether or not, the dismissal of the case by the court was appropriate on ground of res judicata Ruling: This present action is already barred by the prior judgments rendered in Civil Case No. 31146 and Civil Case No. 38811, both for injunction principally to enjoin or restrain defendants from ejecting petitioner-members and/or demolishing their houses. There is "bar by prior judgment" when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case which is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case A plaintiff who deliberately selects his forum and then unsuccessfully presents his proofs is bound by such adverse judgment. To hold otherwise, would allow repeated litigation of identical issues. Litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issues raised therein should be laid at rest. 6 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is DISMISSED.

7. Peralta vs COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30, March 11, 1978

Facts: Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa Elections. He, along with others, assailed the constitutionality of PD 1269 or the 1978 Election Code. Secs140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to 28, of the 1978 Election Code, grants the voter the option to vote either for individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by simply writing in the space provided for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation (office-block ballot). Peralta was vehement in contending that the optional block voting scheme is violative of this provision of the Constitution: “Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.” He sought the shelter of its protection for himself and other independent candidates who, according to him, would be thus made to suffer if the assailed provision is not nullified. Essentially, in terms of individual rights, he would raise a due process and equal protection question. The main objection of Peralta against the optional straight party voting provided for in the Code is that an independent candidate would be discriminated against because by merely writing on his ballot the name of a political party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an advantage which the independent candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it is contended that the candidate who is not a party-member is deprived of the equal protection of the laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to Sec 9 of Article XII, of the 1973 Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the 1978 Election Code is violative of equal protection.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the 1978 Election Code is valid. Before a voter prepares his ballot, the voter will be able to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will receive more than one vote, whether he is voted individually or as a candidate of a party group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. The choice is his. No one can compel him to do otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion. Certainly, before filing his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the advantages under the law accruing to candidates of a political party or group. If he wishes to avail himself of such alleged advantages as an official candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a political party group or aggrupation. In other words, the choice is his. In making his decision, it must be assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and considered the relative advantages and disadvantages of either alternative. So long as the application of the rule depends on his voluntary action or decision, he cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was the victim of discrimination.

8. Nestlé Philippines, Inc. vs. Sanchez 154 SCRA 542 , September 30, 1987 Facts: During the period July 8-10, 1987, Union of Filipino Employees, and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia, intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since 17 June 1981 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loudspeakers. These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Thus, on 10 July 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino, Lito Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on 14 July 1987 at 10:30 a.m. and then and there to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with. On the appointed date and time, the individuals appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, who was still

recuperating from an operation. Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that he had explained to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances. He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about 75 unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor Union. To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the citation and that they will abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on 17 July 1987.

Issue: Whether the respondents should be cited for contempt for their continued picketing at the Supreme Court’s premises. Ruling: The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies." Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have

justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." The acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of the Court, but equally a violation of the right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. Still, the individuals cited, who are non-lawyers, are not knowledgeable in the intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. The incident should therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.