Executive Cases 14 - 21 (maggie Greene).docx

EXECUTIVE CASES 14 – 21 # 14

692 SCRA 359

ATTY. MA. ROSARIO MANALANG-DEMIGILLO, Petitioner, vs. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (TIDCORP), and its BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Respondents. G.R. No. 185571 March 5, 2013 BERSAMIN, J.: Facts: Issue: Ruling #15

206 SCRA 290 Antonio Carpio vs The Executive Secretary G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992

Facts: In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law as he averred that it only interferes with the control power of the president. He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power “to administrative control” over the PNP thus, “control” remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local executives choose local police heads also undermine the power of the president. Issue: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975. Ruling: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”

#16

202 SCRA 844 RODOLFO D. LLAMAS, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and MARIANO UN OCAMPO III, respondents. G.R. No. 99031 October 15, 1991 PARAS, J.:

Facts: Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him. The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases. They say that the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been “convicted in an administrative case, allegedly because the word “conviction” refers only to criminal cases. Issue: Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases. Ruling: Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the

Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses. They do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the court’s considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses. The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government. In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision.

#17

178 SCRA 457 CESAR R. DE LEON, petitioner, vs. J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, Director, National Bureau of Investigation, respondent. G.R. No. 85243 October 12, 1989 Cruz, J.:

Facts: Estavillo and de Leon are two NBI agents terminated by then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales. Upon appeal to the Review Committee, the said body declined to act on their petitions for reconsideration on the ground that it had lost its jurisdiction with the ratification of the new Constitution. They were advised instead to seek relief from the Civil Service Commission. The Merit Systems Protection Board of CSC held that their dismissals were invalid and unconstitutional, having been done in violation of their security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the Board ordered their reinstatement. However, respondent Carpio, as Director of NBI, returned the orders issued by the Secretary of Justice to CSC “without action,” claiming that they were null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not the Director of the NBI can disobey an explicit and direct order issued to him by the Secretary of Justice. Ruling: It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined in the Constitution and honored not in the breach but in the observance, that all executive departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the President of the Philippines.

The President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. The constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. Theoretically, the President has full control of all the members of his Cabinet and may appoint them as he sees fit or shuffle them at pleasure, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and replace them in his discretion. Once in place, they are at all times under the disposition of the President as their immediate superior. “Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Hence, their acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior) In the case at bar, there is no question that when he directed the respondent to reinstate the petitioners, Sec. Ordonez was acting in the regular discharge of his functions as an alter ego of the President. His acts should therefore have been respected by the respondent Director of the NBI, which is in the Department of Justice under the direct control of its Secretary. As a subordinate in this department, the respondent was (and is) bound to obey the Secretary’s directives, which are presumptively the acts of the President of the Philippines.

#18

178 SCRA 582 JOSE LUIS MARTIN C. GASCON, et al, petitioners, vs. The Hon. JOKER T. ARROYO, et al, respondents. G.R. No. 78389 October 16, 1989 PADILLA, J.:

Facts: Petitioners seek to annul and set aside the “Agreement to Arbitrate” entered into by and between the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Executive Secretary Joker T. Arroyo, and ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its President, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., dated 6 January 1987, to settle the claims of ABS-CBN for the return of radio and television stations (TV Station Channel 4), and to enjoin the Arbitration Committee created under the aforesaid agreement from adjudicating the claims of ABS-CBN. Issue:

Whether or not the Executive Secretary had the power and authority to enter into the “Agreement to Arbitrate” with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation.

Ruling: Yes. Under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines also known as the Freedom Constitution), which was in force and effect when the “Agreement to Arbitrate”

was signed by the parties thereto on 6 January 1987, the President exercised both the legislative and executive powers of the Government. As Chief Executive, the President was (and even now) “assisted by a Cabinet” composed of Ministers (now Secretaries), who were appointed by and accountable to the President. In other words, the Members of the cabinet, as heads of the various departments, are the assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person, or where the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the heads of such departments performed in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Respondent Executive Secretary had, therefore, the power and authority to enter into the “Agreement to Arbitrate” with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation, as he acted for and in behalf of the President when he signed it; hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding upon the Republic of the Philippines, as a party thereto. #19

21 SCRA 895

LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO, et al., defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-27811 November 17, 1967 SANCHEZ, J.:

Facts: Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner. Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paño’s request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President. Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter. Issue: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary.

Ruling: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional powers in person. However, the president may delegate certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president may delegate powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to perform personally. The reason for this allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that “under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order” that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue. The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall remain valid until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case, no reprobation was made hence the decision granting the land to Paño cannot be reversed. #20

212 SCRA 768

Facts: Issue: Ruling

#21 Facts: Issue: Ruling

104 PHIL 125