Consolidated Cases (legislative, Executive, Judiciary).docx

Legislative Jose Angara v. Electoral Commission, Et. Al. G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936 Facts: Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution. On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935. Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion. Issue: Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly? Held: NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly. The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ensue against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests entrusted to its cognizance should be filed. Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

The Government of the Philippines vs Milton Springer, Et. Al. G.R. No. 26979 April 1, 1927 Facts: This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands against three directors of the National Coal Company who were elected to their positions by the legislative members of the committee created by Acts. Nos. 2705 and 2822. The purpose of the proceeding is to test the validity of the part of section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, which provides that "The voting power of all such stock (in the National

Coal Company) owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: “The voting power … shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the GovernorGeneral, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.” In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker. However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC. Issue: Whether or nor EO no. 37 is invalid. Held: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch. Maria Carolina P. Araullo, Et. Al. vs Benigno Simeon C. Aquino, III, Et. Al. G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014 Facts: When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court). Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA. Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators. This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc. This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively). Issues: I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution). II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive. III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional. IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional. V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable. Held: I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP. II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds. III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies. Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis. On the issue of what are “savings” These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM. IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith. Cesar Bengzon, Et. Al. vs Franklin N. Drilon, Et. Al. G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992 Facts: Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition. It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication, thus there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect. Issue: Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid. Held: The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed. The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid and subsisting. Greco Antonious B. Belgica, Et. Al. vs Paquito N. Ochoa, Et. Al. G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 Facts: This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251. The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA). Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:

a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.); b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects; c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects. The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned. Presidential Pork Barrel The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983. Pork Barrel Scam Controversy Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (nongovernment organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al. Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system. Issue: I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional. II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional. Held: I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles: a. Separation of Powers As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go). This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned. b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution. Exceptions to the rule are: (i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters; (ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress. c. Principle of Checks and Balances One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.” d. Local Autonomy As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators. II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid. The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation. The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit: (i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct;

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects. These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869. Metrobank vs Antonio Tobias, III G.R. No. 177780 January 25, 2012 Facts: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon charged Tobias with estafa through falsification of public documents in relation to his loan with petitioner Metrobank. He filed a motion for re-investigation but the City Prosecutor of Malabon still found probable cause against him, and recommended his being charged. Tobias appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ) which issued a resolution directing the withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias. METROBANK moved to reconsider but the same was denied. METROBANK challenged the adverse resolutions through certiorari with the CA which dismissed the same. The CA stressed that the determination of probable cause was an executive function within the discretion of the public prosecutor and, ultimately, of the Secretary of justice, and the courts of law could not interfere with such determination; that the private complainant in a criminal action was only concerned with its civil aspect; that should the State choose not to file the criminal action, the private complainant might initiate a civil action based on Article 35 of the Civil Code. In the eventuality that the Secretary of Justice refuses to file the criminal complaint, the complainant, whose only interest is the civil aspect of the case and not the criminal aspect thereof, is not left without a remedy. Issue: Whether or not CA has decided a question of substance not in accord with law. Held: NO. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. For instance, in Balanganan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, the Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice exceeded his jurisdiction when he required "hard facts and solid evidence" in order to hold the defendant liable for criminal prosecution when such requirement should have been left to the court after the conduct of a trial. Carmen Planas vs Jose Gil G.R. No. 46440 January 18, 1939 Facts: The case stemmed from a statement made by petitioner which was published in a newspaper (La Guardia) wherein he criticized certain government officials acts as well as the election of Assemblyman in 1938. Petitioner was a member of the municipal board of Manila. An investigation directed by the authority of the President was conducted by the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service. Hence this petition for prohibition where petitioner contends that respondent lacks the jurisdiction to investigate him and that it violates Art. 7, Sec.11 (1) of the Constitution, as it seeks to remove or suspend him.

Issue: Whether or not the President has the legal authority to order the investigation. Held: YES. Provided the investigation should be in accordance with law. The constitution grants to the President the powers of control and supervision. The power to exercise general supervision over all local governments and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed authorizes him to order an investigation of the act or conduct of the petitioner herein. Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation. The President in the exercise of the executive power under the Constitution may act through the heads of the executive departments. The heads of the executive departments are his authorized assistants and agents in the performance of his executive duties, and their official acts, promulgated in the regular course of business, are presumptively his acts. The power of removal which the President may exercise directly and the practical necessities of efficient government brought about by administrative centralization easily make the President the head of the administration. ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC vs Commission on Elections G.R. No. 192803 December 10, 2013 Facts: Petitioner, ARARO was a duly accredited party-list garnered a total of 147,204 votes in the May 10, 2010 elections and ranked 50th. The COMELEC En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers initially proclaimed twenty-eight (28) party-list organizations as winners involving a total of thirty-five (35) seats guaranteed and additional seats. The petitioner questioned the formula used by the COMELEC and filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the Commission on Elections is flawed because votes that were spoiled or that were not made for any party-lists were not counted. According to the petitioner, around seven million (7,000,000) votes were disregarded as a result of the Commission on Elections’ erroneous interpretation. 7,112,792 (Total number of disregarded votes according to petitioner ARARO) On the other hand, the formula used by the Commission on Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers is the following: Number of seats available to legislative districts_x .20 =Number of seats available to party-list representatives .80 Thus, the total number of party-list seats available for the May 2010 elections is 57 as shown below: 229__x .20 =57 .80 The National Board of Canvassers’ Resolution No. 10-009 applies the formula used in Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC18 to arrive at the winning party-list groups and their guaranteed seats, where: Number of votes of party-list ______________________________= Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list Total number of votes for party-list candidates The Commission on Elections through the Office of the Solicitor General took the position that invalid or stray votes should not be counted in determining the divisor. The Commission on Elections argues that this will contradict Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) v. COMELEC22 and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC.23 It asserts that: Neither can the phrase be construed to include the number of voters who did not even vote for any qualified party-list candidate, as these voters cannot be considered to have cast any vote "for the party-list system."24 Issue:

I. Whether the case is already moot and academic II. Whether petitioners have legal standing III. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in its interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC25 to determine the party-list groups that would be proclaimed in the 2010 elections HELD: 1. This case is moot and academic but the Court discussed the issues raised by the petitioner as these are capable of repetition yet evading review and for the guidance of the bench, bar, and public. 2. The computation proposed by petitioner ARARO even lowers its chances to meet the 2% threshold required by law for a guaranteed seat. Its arguments will neither benefit nor injure the party. Thus, it has no legal standing to raise the argument in this Court. 3. The Court agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined to be invalid due to no cause attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the divisor. In other words, votes cast validly for a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as part of the divisor. To do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good faith that that ballot contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included in the divisor. Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for the party-list system shall be considered in the computation of the percentage of representation: 1. (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the partylist systemshall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and interpreted in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC, is MODIFIED as follows: Number of votes. of party-list Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list The divisor shall be the total number of valid votes cast for the party-list system including votes cast for party-list groups whose names are in the ballot but are subsequently disqualified. Party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included in the divisor. The divisor shall also not include votes that are declared spoiled or invalid.

9.Veterans Federation Party vs. Commission on Elections 342 SCRA 244 (2000) Facts: Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065; and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said disposition. On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. The proclaimed winners were as follows: 1. APEC – two seats (5.5%), 2. ABA (3.51%), 3. ALAGAD (3.41%), 4. VETERANS FEDERATION (3.33%), 5. PROMDI (2.799%), 6. AKO (2.61%), 7. NCSCFO (2.60%), 8. ABANSE! PINAY (2.57%), 9. AKBAYAN (2.54%), 10. BUTIL (2.36%), 11. SANLAKAS (2.13%), and 12. COOP-NATCCO (2.07%). The Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED was entitled

to one party-list seat for having 2.04% of the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, it was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list. On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives as the 20% of the total number of the representatives. Issue: Whether or not the twenty percent constitutional allocation is mandatory. Ruling: No, the twenty percent constitutional allocation is not mandatory hence it merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides: “(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the partylist. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." In this case, if there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent them. The assailed Resolutions of the Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED. 10. Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs Commission on Elections 694 SCRA 477 (2013) Facts: The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections. Thirteen (13) petitioners were denied, were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court and was excluded in the printing of the official ballot. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the 39 groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections but they were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, their names was included in the printing of the official ballot. Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 2013 party-list elections.

Ruling: No, the COMELEC did not committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 2013 party-list elections. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that, “The House of Representative shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.” In the case at bar, the COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. The 54 petitions were remanded to the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision. 11. 342 CRA 244 (SEE NO. 9) 12. Abang Lingkod Party-List vs. Commission on Elections 708 SCRA 133 (2013) Facts: This is a petition for certiorari filed by Abang Lingkod challenging the May 2013 resolution issued by COMELEC cancelling the Abang Lingkod's party-list registration. ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant fanners and fisherfolks. It participated in the May 2010 elections, but failed to obtain the number of votes needed for a seat in the House of Representatives. On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate in the May 2013 elections. ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC's Resolution, filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941. After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc in a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group. The COMELEC En Banc pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc further opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent. ABANG LINGKOD then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list system. Issues: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s registration under the partylist system. Ruling: Yes, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s registration under the party-list system. Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 however provides, “Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.” In the case under consideration, three of the five nominees of ABANG LINGKOD are farmers and, thus, are not required to present a track record showing their active participation in activities aimed to promote the sector which ABANG LINGKOD represents, i.e. peasant farmers and fisherfolk. That two of ABANG LINGKOD's nominees do not actually belong to the sector it represents is immaterial and would not result in the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group. This is clear from the sixth parameter laid down by the Court in Atong Paglaum which states that "national,

regional and sectoral organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified." At the very least, ABANG LINGKOD has three (3) qualified nominees, being farmers by occupation. 13. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections 618 SCRA 32 (2010) Facts: Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals, as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application. Issue: Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list. Ruling: Yes, Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list. Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution provides that, “No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” In this case, the Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society. The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionality vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should be apply in equal force. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere. 14. Fajardo vs. Court of Appeals 302 SCRA 503 (1999) Facts: In 1981, Petitioner was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, and at the time he committed the offense, Presidential Decree No. 968 allows an accused who appeals his conviction to still apply for probation. In 1988, the trial court convicted Petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of 8 months imprisonment. At the time of his conviction, Presidential Decree No. 1990 amending Presidential Decree No. 968, became effective (1986), providing that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. Petitioner, however, still appealed his conviction. When he lost the appeal, he filed motion for probation before the trial court The trial court denied Fajardo’s motion for probation and so did CA. Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1990 is null and void, considering Petitioner’s contention that at the time of its issuance, President Marcos could no longer exercise legislative powers as the Batasan Pambansa was functioning and exercising sole legislative powers. Ruling: No, Presidential Decree No. 1990 is not null and void. In Legaspi vs. Minister of Finance, 115 SCRA 418, it was held that the legislative authority vested in the Batasan Pambansa by Amendment No. 2, read together with Section 1, Article XVII and Section 1, of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, is subject to the external concurrent legislative prerogative that Amendment No. 6 vests on the "President (Prime Minister)." In this case, at the time of the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1990, President Marcos was vested with legislative powers concurrently with the Batasan Pambansa. Therefore, Petitioner’s contention is without merit.

15. Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice 297 SCRA 74 (1998) Facts: Petitioner, who was convicted for the crime of rape and was imposed of death penalty for the said crime, assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8177, or the Lethal Injection Law, on the ground that it unduly delegates legislative power to Respondents Secretary of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections and filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin said Respondents from carrying out the execution by lethal injection of Petitioner. Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative powers to the Respondents in Republic Act No. 8177. Ruling: No, there is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the Respondents in Republic Act No. 8177. Under the law, the separation of power is a fundamental principle in the Philippine’s system of government and each department has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. There are however exceptions to this rule and one of the recognized exceptions is “Delegation to Administrative Bodies”. Furthermore, the reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. In this case, the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection. Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al vs Commission on Elections 270 SCRA 106 (1997) FACTS: In this case, petitioners sought to amend certain provisions of the Constitution, specifically lifting the limit of terms of elective officials, through people’s initiative. Santiago opposed on the ground that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. There is no law passed yet and RA 6735, which provides for initiative on statues and local legislation but not initiative on the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether RA 6735 adequately provided for people’s initiative on Constitution RULING: RA 6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. However, contrary to the assertion of public respondents COMELEC, Sec. 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. Thus, RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by “empowering” the COMELEC “to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.” The rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest has recognized exceptions which are as follows: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President; (2)

Delegation of emergency powers to the President; (3) Delegation to the people at large; (4) Delegation to local governments; and (5) Delegation to administrative bodies. Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, RA 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid. Blas Ople vs Ruben Torres, et al 293 SCRA 141 FACTS: On December 12, 1996, A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos for the Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. It was published in four newspapers of general circulation. Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, on the grounds that it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate and that it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy. ISSUES: Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Whether the issuance of the President of AO No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress. HELD: The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of the said order. The broadness, vagueness, and overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger. In the case at bar, the threat comes from which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Furthermore, A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Moreover, even assuming that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially, it violates the right to privacy. The act of promulgating AO no. 308 is an act of legislation rather than enforcement of a law, thus, should be struck down as unconstitutional exercise of legislative power. Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional.

Arnel Misolas vs Hon. Benjamin Panga 181 SCRA 648 (1990) FACTS: The Philippine Constabulary raided a suspected "underground house"after receiving information from an unidentified informant that members of NPA were resting therein. Three persons were inside the house, Arnel Misolas and two women, but the women were able to escape. The house was searched and the raiders found in a red bag under a pillow

allegedly used by Misolas a Remington shotgun and 4 live rounds of ammunition. Petitioner was arrested and brought to the PC headquarters. The State charged him with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition used in furtherance of subversion under PD No. 1866. Petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging that the law was unconstitutional for violation of the due process clause. ISSUE: Whether PD 1866 constitutes a bill of attainder and thus, unconstitutional. RULING: The Court defined a bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. The element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most essential. PD 1866 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a corresponding punishment. What the decree does is to define the offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the qualifying circumstances that would aggravate the offense. Before a statute may be declared unconstitutional it must be shown tat the statute violated the constitution clearly, palpably and in such manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court. Absent a clear showing that the challenged measure ousts the courts from the function of passing upon the question of guilt or innocence of the accused and an unequivocal demonstration that PD No. 1866, by legislative fiat, declares the petitioner guilty of a crime and imposes directly the penalty prescribe thereunder, the challenge will have to be rejected. The Court dismissed the petition. Solicitor General Rodolfo Malapira,et al vs Metropolitan Manila Authority 204 SCRA 837 (1991) FACTS The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1992 authorizing itself to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. Later on, the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles and confiscation of drivers license for traffic violations were not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605.Several complaints were filed before the Court as to the said confiscations by police authorities or traffic enforcers as sanction/s for traffic violations. In defense, one of the defendants justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code authorizing the said confiscations for traffic violations. ISSUE Whether the exercise of Metro Manila Authoritys delegated power is valid. RULING The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. The decision shows that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions. In fact, its provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila.The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature.They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. The following are the

requisites of a valid delegation, completeness of the statute making the delegation and the presence of a sufficient standard. The Court granted the petition and declared the ordinance as null and void.

People of the Philippines vs Hon. Judge Auxencio Dacuycuy 173 SCRA 90 (1989) FACTS: Private respondents, public school officials were charged for violating Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). The respondents pleaded not guilty and petitioned for certeriori and prohibition with preliminary injuction before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VII alleging that the Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the case and that Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1) the term of imprisonment is unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government. The petition was transferred to Branch IV where the respondent Judge, Judge Dacuycuy ruled that R.A. No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts. ISSUES: Whether Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional. Whether the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case. RULING: Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional. Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power by vesting in the court the responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment of imprisonment, as if the courts were the legislative department of the government. The municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act. No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, considers crimes punishable by fine of not more than Php 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of municipal courts. The Court granted the petition and reversed the decision of the CFI. Abakada Guro Party List vs Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al 469 SCRA 14 (2005) FACTS: Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not connected with VAT. Petitioners reiterate that R.A. No. 9337’s stand- by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right. Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove. ISSUES: Whether there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution. Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the Constitution.

Whether there is a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution. RULING: Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness. Maximo Calalang vs A.D. Williams, et al 70 Phil 726 (1940) FACTS: The National Traffic Commission, in pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads, the Director of Public Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission, prohibiting the passing of animal drawn vehicles in certain streets in Manila. Petitioner questioned this as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. ISSUES: Whether there is a undue delegation of legislative power. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. RULING: There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act. The delegated power is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. Social justice is the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.

24. G.R. Nos. 209287,209135 etc. 3 February 2015 Araullo vs. Aquino III Facts: When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World

Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc. This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was: DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively). Issue: Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution). Ruling: No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP. 25. 235 SCRA 506 (1994) Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive. In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañada and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Tañada et al contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA). ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid. HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is constitutional. In the Tañada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others. Veto on special provisions

The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered

“inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation. 26. 21 SCRA 496 (1967) Lidasan vs. Commission on Elections Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato. ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province – Cotabato – to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”? HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790. Nos. 27-29 (Exact Same Cases) – 235 SCRA 630 – 249 SCRA 628 Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.) ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm. HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

30. 196 SCRA 322 (1991) Reyes vs. Almanzor FACTS: Petitioners JBL Reyes et al. owned a parcel of land in Tondo which are leased and occupied as dwelling units by tenants who were paying monthly rentals of not exceeding P300. Sometimes in 1971 the Rental Freezing Law was passed prohibiting for one year from its effectivity, an increase in monthly rentals of dwelling units where rentals do not exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00), so that the Reyeses were precluded from raising the rents and from ejecting the tenants. In 1973, respondent City Assessor of Manila re-classified and reassessed the value of the subject properties based on the schedule of market values, which entailed an

increase in the corresponding tax rates prompting petitioners to file a Memorandum of Disagreement averring that the reassessments made were "excessive, unwarranted, inequitable, confiscatory and unconstitutional" considering that the taxes imposed upon them greatly exceeded the annual income derived from their properties. They argued that the income approach should have been used in determining the land values instead of the comparable sales approach which the City Assessor adopted. ISSUE: Is the approach on tax assessment used by the City Assessor reasonable? HELD: No. The taxing power has the authority to make a reasonable and natural classification for purposes of taxation but the government's act must not be prompted by a spirit of hostility, or at the very least discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Consequently, it stands to reason that petitioners who are burdened by the government by its Rental Freezing Laws (then R.A. No. 6359 and P.D. 20) under the principle of social justice should not now be penalized by the same government by the imposition of excessive taxes petitioners can ill afford and eventually result in the forfeiture of their properties. 31. 298 SCRA 83 (1998) Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals Don Andres Soriano (American), founder of A. Soriano Corp. (ASC) had a total shareholdings of 185,154 shares. Broken down, the shares comprise of 50,495 shares which were of original issue when the corporation was founded and 134,659 shares as stock dividend declarations. So in 1964 when Soriano died, half of the shares he held went to his wife as her conjugal share (wife’s “legitime”) and the other half (92,577 shares, which is further broken down to 25,247.5 original issue shares and 82,752.5 stock dividend shares) went to the estate. For sometime after his death, his estate still continued to receive stock dividends from ASC until it grew to at least 108,000 shares. In 1968, ASC through its Board issued a resolution for the redemption of shares from Soriano’s estate purportedly for the planned “Filipinization” of ASC. Eventually, 108,000 shares were redeemed from the Soriano Estate. In 1973, a tax audit was conducted. Eventually, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment against ASC for deficiency withholding tax-at-source. The CIR explained that when the redemption was made, the estate profited (because ASC would have to pay the estate to redeem), and so ASC would have withheld tax payments from the Soriano Estate yet it remitted no such withheld tax to the government. ASC averred that it is not duty bound to withhold tax from the estate because it redeemed the said shares for purposes of “Filipinization” of ASC and also to reduce its remittance abroad. ISSUE: Whether or not ASC’s arguments are tenable. HELD: No. The reason behind the redemption is not material. The proceeds from a redemption is taxable and ASC is duty bound to withhold the tax at source. The Soriano Estate definitely profited from the redemption and such profit is taxable, and again, ASC had the duty to withhold the tax. There was a total of 108,000 shares redeemed from the estate. 25,247.5 of that was original issue from the capital of ASC. The rest (82,752.5) of the shares are deemed to have been from stock dividend shares. Sale of stock dividends is taxable. It is also to be noted that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Tax Code presumes that every distribution of corporate property, in whole or in part, is made out of corporate profits such as stock dividends. It cannot be argued that all the 108,000 shares were distributed from the capital of ASC and that the latter is merely redeeming them as such. The capital cannot be distributed in the form of redemption of stock dividends without violating the trust fund doctrine — wherein the capital stock, property and other assets of the corporation are regarded as equity in trust for the payment of the corporate creditors. Once capital, it is always capital. That doctrine was intended for the protection of corporate creditors. 32. Basco vs PAGCOR (197 SCRA 52) May 14, 1991 Facts: Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter -- PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because it constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and license fees,

which is recognized by law. For the same reason, the law has intruded into the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees. This is in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy. Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid. Ruling: 1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Their charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power, otherwise the municipality cannot assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax.” The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress”, which has the power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over the Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. 2. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked by P.D. No. 771 and vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue “license or permits” for the operation of gambling. 3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local Government. 4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. No. 1869. Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution: “Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.”

SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject to “limitations” which Congress may provide by law. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It does not make local governments sovereign within the state. Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED. 33. PAGCOR vs BIR (645 scra 338) March 15, 2011 Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by P.D. No. 1067-A in 1977. Obviously, it is a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC). In 1998, R.A. 8424 or the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC) became effective. Section 27 thereof provides that GOCC’s are NOT EXEMPT from paying income taxation but it exempted the following GOCCs: 1. GSIS 2. SSS 3. PHILHEALTH 4. PCSO 5. PAGCOR. But in May 2005, R.A. 9337, a law amending certain provisions of R.A. 8424, was passed. Section 1 thereof excluded PAGCOR from the exempt GOCCs hence PAGCOR was subjected to pay income taxation. In September 2005, the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) for R.A. 9337. In the said IRR, it identified PAGCOR as subject to a 10% value added tax (VAT) upon items covered by Section 108 of the NIRC (Sale of Services and Use or Lease of Properties). PAGCOR questions the constitutionality of Section 1 of R.A. 9337 as well as the IRR. PAGCOR avers that the said provision violates the equal protection clause. PAGCOR argues that it is similarly situated with SSS, GSIS, PCSO, and PHILHEALTH, hence it should not be excluded from the exemption. ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCOR should be subjected to income taxation. HELD: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 9337 is constitutional. It was the express intent of Congress to exclude PAGCOR from the exempt GOCCs hence PAGCOR is now subject to income taxation.

PAGCOR’s contention that the law violated the constitution is not tenable. The equal protection clause provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The general rule is, ALL GOCC’s are subject to income taxation. However, certain classes of GOCC’s may be exempt from income taxation based on the following requisites for a valid classification under the principle of equal protection: 1) It must be based on substantial distinctions. 2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law. 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only. 4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. When the Supreme Court looked into the records of the deliberations of the lawmakers when R.A. 8424 was being drafted, the SC found out that PAGCOR’s exemption was not really based on substantial distinctions. In fact, the lawmakers merely exempted PAGCOR from income taxation upon the request of PAGCOR itself. This was changed however when R.A. 9337 was passed and now PAGCOR is already subject to income taxation. Anent the issue of the imposition of the 10% VAT against PAGCOR, the BIR had overstepped its authority. Nowhere in R.A. 9337 does it state that PAGCOR is subject to VAT. Therefore, that portion of the IRR issued by the BIR is void. In fact, Section 109 of R.A. 9337 expressly exempts PAGCOR from VAT. Further, PAGCOR’s charter exempts it from VAT. To recapitulate, PAGCOR is subject to income taxation but not to VAT. 34. 34. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Metro Star Superama Inc. (637 SCRA 633) December 08, 2010 Facts: In January 2001, a revenue officer was authorized to examine the books of accounts of Metro Star Superama, Inc. In April 2002, after the audit review, the revenue district officer issued a formal assessment notice against Metro Star advising the latter that it is liable to pay P292,874.16 in deficiency taxes. Metro Star assailed the issuance of the formal assessment notice as it averred that due process was not observed when it was not issued a pre-assessment notice. Nevertheless, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue authorized the issuance of a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy against the properties of Metro Star. Metro Star then appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA Case No. 7169). The CTA ruled in favor of Metro Star. ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed in the issuance of the formal assessment notice against Metro Star. HELD: No. It is true that there is a presumption that the tax assessment was duly issued. However, this presumption is disregarded if the taxpayer denies ever having received a tax assessment from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In such cases, it is incumbent upon the BIR to prove by competent evidence that such notice was indeed received by the addressee-taxpayer. The onus probandi was shifted to the BIR to prove by contrary evidence that the Metro Star received the assessment in the due course of mail. In the case at bar, the CIR merely alleged that Metro Star received the preassessment notice in January 2002. The CIR could have simply presented the registry receipt or the certification from the postmaster that it mailed the pre-assessment notice, but failed. Neither did it offer any explanation on why it failed to comply with the requirement of service of the pre-assessment notice. The Supreme Court emphasized that the sending of a pre-assessment notice is part of the due process requirement in the issuance of a deficiency tax assessment,” the absence of which renders nugatory any assessment made by the tax authorities. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. But even so, it is a requirement in all democratic regimes that it be exercised reasonably and in accordance with the prescribed procedure. 35. Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete (155 SCRA 421) November 05, 1987 Facts: In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of NORECO II (Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) – Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the SP and they alleged that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP such power. The SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt. HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional

or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body. 36. PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS (324 SCRA 689) February 3, 2000 FACTS: Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. Jalosjos, filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge his duties of a Congressman including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having convicted in the first instance including of a non-bailable offense. Jalosjos argument is the mandate of sovereign will which he states that he was re-elected as Congressman of First District of ZAmboanga del Norte by his constituents in order that their voices will be heard and since the accused-appellant is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos, be allowed to discharge his mandate as member of the House of Representatives. HELD: No. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators or members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution and shows that this privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. It is true, that election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, the rights and privileges from being elected as public official may be restricted by law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position, the higher the rank the greater the requirement of obedience rather than exemption. The accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11 Article 6 of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the abuse is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman with a crime punishable with imprisonment by more than (6) six months is not merely authorized by law, has constitutional foundations. Allowing Jalosjos to attend in Congressional sessions and meetings for five (5) days in a week which will make him a free man with all the privileges and would make his status to that of a special class, it also would be a making of the purpose of the correction system. 37. POBRE vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO (597 SCRA 1) August 25, 2009 FACTS: Petitioner Antero Pobre made aware to the court the contents of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the senate floor. The following excerpts are the ones in question: XXX “I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am humiliated, debase, and degraded. And I am not only that I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position (of Chief Justice) if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of Idiots. XXX. According to Pobre, the words of the lady senator were disrespectful and requested that the latter be disbarred or be subjected to disciplinary action. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago argued that the statements she made were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its

committee. She claims to have made those comments to expose anomalies with regard to the selection process of the Judicial Bar Council for the next Chief Justice. The argument of the respondent is based on the Article VI Section 11 which states that: “A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for an speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.” ISSUE: Whether or not Miriam Defensor-Santiago can be charged for her comments on the Judiciary HELD: The Court ruled in favor of Defensor-Santiago in this case. The plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. Despite this, the court feels that the lady senator has gone beyond the limits of decency and good conduct for the statements made which were intemperate and highly improper in substance. The court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on her, but the factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Petition dismissed. 38. Jimenez vs Cabangbang (17 SCRA 876) August 3, 1966 Facts: On November 14, 1958, defendant Cabangbang published an open letter to thePresident in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The publication talkedabout the alleged operational plans of the then Secretary of National Defense to launch hispresidential career in 1961 elections. Cabangbang's letter mentioned the names of Nicanor Jimenes and his comrades as subordinates to the 'Planners' behind the alleged operation. Theysued Cabangbang for the crime of libel and sought financial compensation for the damagescaused by the letter. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that theletter was a privileged form of communication and that it was not libellous. Issue: Whether the contested publication could be classified as a privileged form of communication under the provisions of sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution. Held: No. Under the provisions of sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution, "speech or debate therein" only refers to the utterances made by Congress members in the performance of their official duties, such as delivering speeches, making statements, or casting votes in the Congressional hall while the same is in session. It could also refer to the introduction of bills in Congress, whether it is session or not, and other acts performed by Congress members in their official capacity whether there was a session or not, whether inside or outside the premises of one's office. In the case at bar, the Court ruled that Cabangbang's letter cannot be classified as a privileged form of communication because it was published during a time when the Congress was not in session. Moreover, the defendant was not performing his official duty as either a member of Congress when he intended the letter to be published. Therefore, the open letter was not privileged. Because of these reasons, Cabangbang's open letter cannot be classified as a privileged form of communication. #39 LEGISLATIVE CASE 57 SCRA 72 ( 1974) - ‘di ko mahanap either eSCRA or CDasia. #40. LEGISLATIVE CASE Dela Paz vs. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 579 SCRA 521 , February 13, 2009 Topic: Inquiry in Aid of Legislation – Jurisdiction and Publication FACTS: In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to attend an Interpol GA. De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the scheduled GA, de la Paz is also scheduled to retire. After the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the departure area for he was carrying with him €105,000.00 (P6,930,000.00). He was also carrying with him €45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He failed to declare in writing that he is carrying such an amount and this is in violation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against

Transnational Organized Crime. De La Paz and his group was later released but the €s were confiscated by the Russians. Upon arrival to the Philippines, De La Paz was issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the investigation it was to conduct involving the Moscow incident. De La Paz averred that the said committee does not have jurisdiction of the case. De La Paz argued that the Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to state relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules). They further claim that respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest without the required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent Committee. They likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation involving them relative to the Moscow incident. ISSUE: Whether or not the said Committee has jurisdiction over the matter. HELD: The SC ruled against De La Paz. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:”Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.” This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question. Also, the signatures were properly obtained as evidenced by the approval of the Senate president and it is shown that the gathering of the signatures is in accordance with the Rules. It is also shown that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation were also published in two newspapers of general circulation. #41 LEGISLATIVE CASE Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations 549 SCRA 77 , March 25, 2008 Topic: The Legislative Department – Inquiry in aid of legislation – Executive Privilege Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers FACTS: In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege. HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.

1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. 2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And 3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. #42. LEGISLATIVE CASE Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita 488 SCRA 1 , April 20, 2006 Topic: Legislative Branch – Question Hour – Constitutionality of E.O. 464 FACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s approval. The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional. HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members

of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. #43. LEGISLATIVE CASE Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee 203 SCRA 767 , November 20, 1991 Topic: The Legislative Department – Inquiry in Aid of Legislation – When not Allowed FACTS: It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious. Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea.

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC. ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted. HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.

#44. LEGISLATIVE CASE Adaza vs. Pacana, Jr. 135 SCRA 431 , March 18, 1985 Topic: Legislative Branch/ Congress – Singularity of Office/Position FACTS: Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor’s office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament. ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor. HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows: “Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .” The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office.

Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner’s election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that “governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.” Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. #45. LEGISLATIVE CASE Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr. 113 SCRA 31 , March 25, 1982 Topic: The Legislative Department – Appearance in Court FACTS: In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted – hence he filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene. ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies? HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of interest – which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly. #46. LEGISLATIVE CASE Fariñas vs. The Executive Secretary 417 SCRA 503 , December 10, 2003 Topic: The Legislative Department – How a Bill Becomes a Law – Bicameral Conference Committee – Enrolled Bill Doctrine Equal Protection Clause – Valid Classification Election Law – Appointive Officials vs Elective Officials FATCS: In 2001, Republic Act No. 9006 or the Fair Election Act was signed into law. Section 14 thereof repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code which states that an elective official, except the President and the Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Hence, under RA 9006, an elective official shall no longer be deemed resigned if he files his certificate of candidacy for an elective office while he is still in office. Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that an appointive official hall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy, was however retained by the Fair Election Act.

Rodolfo Fariñas, then a Congressman belonging to the minority group, questioned the constitutionality of Section 14 on the ground that it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. He averred that the repeal of Section 67 gave elective officials undue advantage over appointive officials (discrimination). The Fariñas group also questioned the validity of RA 9006 in its entirety. They contend that irregularities attended to the creation of the said law. Fariñas explained that RA 9006 originated as House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1741; that there were contrasting provisions between the two bills hence a Bicameral Conference Committee was created; that in fact two subsequent BCCs were convened which is irregular already in itself; that only the 1st BCC had its record and the compromise bill from said 1st BCC was never subjected to a conference with the lower house; that in the 2nd BCC, it appeared that another compromised bill was agreed upon even though there was no meeting at all and that the Report as to how said compromise bill was reached was instantly made and made to be passed around for signing – all these irregularities made the law unconstitutional for being procedurally infirm. ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 is constitutional. HELD: Yes, RA 9006 is constitutional. On Equal Protection The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. In this case, substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Further, appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote; while elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. On the Enrolled Bill Doctrine The contention that irregularities attended the creation of RA 9006 is overridden by the enrolled bill doctrine. Under this doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The Supreme Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. Whatever irregularities there may have been in the Bicameral Conference Committee involve internal rules which cannot be inquired into by the Court. 47 Francisco, Jr. V. Nagmamalasakit na mga Mananananggol ng mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc. G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003 CARPIO MORALES, J.: Facts: On June 2, 2003, former President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide, Jr. and seven Associate Chief Justices of the Supreme Court for ´culpable violation if the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes. Such complaint was grounded on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund.-The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first complaint was ´sufficient in formµ but ´insufficient in substance.µ Committee Report was not sent to the House in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.-A second impeachment complaint was filed four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint, by Teodoro, Jr. and Fuentebella. Such complaint was grounded on the alleged results

of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.-Instant petitions arose against the HOR, most of which contend that the filingof the second impeachment is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section of Article XI of the Constitution. Issues: WON the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary. Held: Yes.This issue is far from the validity of the second impeachment complaint. The resolution of the said issue would require the SC to form a rule of constitutional law touching on, the separate matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of the consolidated cases. However, one argument is worth mentioning. Alfonso, et al. argues that the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it resulted from a Resolution calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF. This is unconstitutional for being: a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigation in aid of legislation, b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers, c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary. D) an assault on the independence of the judiciary. 48 Arroyo v. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997 MENDOZA, J.: Facts: An amendment to the National Internal Revenue Code was introduced to the House of Representatives involving taxations on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. This was later passed accordingly and brought to the House of Senate. Upon the interpellation on the second reading, herein petitioner moved for adjournment for lack of quorum which is constitutionally needed to conduct business. Petitioner’s motion was defeated and was railroaded. The bill was then signed into law by President Fidel Ramos. Issue: Whether or not the law was passed on violation on the constitutional mandate. Held: There is no rule of the House concerned that quorum shall be determined by viva voce or nominal voting. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only on the following instances ± upon the last and the third readings of the bill, at the request of 1/5 of the Members present and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. Second, there is obviousness on the part of the petitioner to delay the business of the House, thus eliminating the alleged skullduggery on part of the accused.Third, the enrolled bill doctrine states that enrolled bills are in itself conclusive thus legally binding provided it is in harmony with the constitution. Lastly, the court upheld principle of separation of powers, which herein, is applicable for the legislative branch for it has exercised its power without grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 49 Santiago v. Guingona (1998) G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998 PANGANIBAN, J.: Facts: The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer, convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Ople nominated Fernan for Senate President and Defensor-Santiago nominated Tatad for said position by a vote of 20-2, Fernan won. In agreement with Santiago, Tatad manifested that he would be the minority leader since those who did not vote for him constituted the minority. However, majority leader received from Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators a letter stating they had elected Guingona as minority leader. Guingona assumed position.

Santiago now filed a petition for quo warranto against Guingona. Issues: 1.WON SC has jurisdiction 2.WON there was a violation of Constitution Held: 1.SC has jurisdictionSec. 16(1), Art. VI states the Senate shall elect its Senate President and the HoR its Speaker by a majority vote of all its member. By virtue of Art. VIII, Sec. 1 it is within jurisdiction of SC to determine if there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the members of the Senate. * DOCTRINE: jurisdiction will be decided by the allegations of the complaint or petition regardless of whether plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief sought. 2.No violation of the ConstitutionMajority means more than half of any total; the Consti says the Senate President will be elected by a majority vote but does not say that the minority leader will be decided by those who did not vote for him. There is no Consti provision about the manner in which other officers shall be elected each house shall choose other officers as it may deem necessary the method then may be prescribed by Senate but its not in the Rules of Senate- the Court thus has no basis upon which to determine a grave abuse of discretion. CONGRESS HAS POWER AND PREROGATIVE TO PROVIDE FOR SUCH OFFICERS AS IT MAY DEEM 50 Astorga vs. Villegas G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974 MAKALINTAL, C.J.: Facts: In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065). Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said “law” passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted. HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the

President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body 51 Osmena vs. Pendatun G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960 BENGZON, J.: Facts: In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house. Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members. ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated? HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed 52 Guingona v. Gonzales G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993 Campos, Jr., J. Facts: After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKASNUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation.

Issue: whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the Commission on Appointments Held: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.

53 Daza vs. Singson G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989 CRUZ, J.: FACTS: After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party. On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on Appointments HELD: At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes

must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. 54. TARROSA VS. SINGSON 232 SCRA 553 MAY 25, 1994 FACTS: Gabriel Singson, respondent, was appointed as Governor of the Bangko Sentral by then President Fidel Ramos on July of 1993. The petitioner, Jesus Tarrosa in his capacity as a taxpayer files a petition of prohibition questioning the above appointment on grounds that such appointment was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. He seeks to remove Singson from office until he is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. He also questions Salvador Enriquez, then Secretary of Budget and Management for disbursing public funds to pay salaries and emoluments to Singson while in office. Tarrosa grounds his claims upon Section 6 of RA 7635 “The governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas shall be head of a department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.” The respondent’s defense is that Congresss has exceeded its legislative power in RA 7635 and that the appointment of Singson in not one of those that need confirmation by the Commission on Appointments as provided in Section 16 of Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution “The President shall nominate and with consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this constitution. Respondents also say that the BSP has its own budget and is not subject to the provisions of the General Appropriations Act. ISSUE: Whether or not Tarrosa has the capacity to challenge the appointment Whether or not the appointment of Singson is valid HELD: The petition in nature is a quo warranto in that it seeks to oust Singson from public office. However, a quo warranto proceeding can only be instituted by the Solicitor General or by a person claiming to be entitled to a public office. In the case at bar, Tarrosa has no capacity to file such claim whatsoever. If such is granted, then it encourages every disgruntled citizen to come to court over any appointment they do not seem fit. Because Tarrosa has no legal capacity, his whole case crumbles and there is no need to question the disbursement of salaries.

55. BAUTISTA VS. SALONGA 172 SCRA 160 April 13, 1989 FACTS: The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved

Bautista's alleged ad interim appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments. ISSUES: Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment. RULING: No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive officials without confirmation of CoA. The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments. 56. SARMIENTO III VS. MISON 156 SCRA 549 December 17, 1987 FACTS: This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA. Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment. ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. HELD:

No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed by the COA. 58. ROBLES VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL G.R. No. 86647 February 5, 1990

FACTS Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1st District of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987. Rep. Virgilio Robles elected to 1st District of Caloocan. Romeo Santos then filed an electoral contest with House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET electoral fraud and irregularities) and called for recounting of votes. Santos filed a Motion to Withdraw Contest but later filed Urgent Motionn to Recall/Disregard his previous motion. The first motion was not acted upon by HRET and the second motion was granted. Robles claimed that the first motion divested HRET of jurisdiction. ISSUE Whether or not HRET acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion thus giving the supreme jurisdiction over the subject matter RULING The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. It is an established doctrine that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost at the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Certainly, the tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired. Petition is dismissed. 59. MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS G.R. NO. 88211, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989

FACTS: Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. RULING: Yes. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23). The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

60. VILANDO v. HRET

G. R. No. 192147 & 192149 August 23, 2011 FACTS: Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Because of this, her opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases againstLimkaichong. They alleged that Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mother, lost her Filipinocitizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s father. During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, election daycame and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras.COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Few days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspendingthe proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong assailed Paras’ petition arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, it should be the HRET which hasthe jurisdiction over the matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong. ISSUES: Whether Limkaichong is qualified to hold a position in the government. HELD: YES. Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he refers to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichong’s father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. Under Philippine law, an attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. Records also disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959.The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary. Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. LEGISLATIVE CASES (Nos. 61 – 63)

TAÑADA, JR. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 708 SCRA 188 , OCTOBER 22, 2013 FACTS: Petitioner, Wigberto Tanada and Alvin John Tanada were both candidates for the position of Congress Representative for the 4thDistrict of Quezon Province in May 2013 National Elections. Preceding the elections, the former filed two separate petitions before the COMELEC to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of the latter for false representations and to declare him as nuisance candidate. The COMELEC First Division dismissed both his petitions; however, on the Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc on April 13, 2013 granted the cancellation of the COC of Alvin John for false representations. Petitioner again filed Motion for Reconsideration on the basis of a newly discovered evidence for Alvin John to be declared as a nuisance candidate. The name of Alvin John that remained printed on the ballot, prompted again Wigberto to file a motion with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Quezon Province (PBOC) to consolidate the votes garnered by Alvin John with the votes he garnered and due to mistakes concerning the cancelled candidacy of the former. The Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) denied consolidating the votes because Alvin John is not a nuisance candidate and after the election, proclaimed Angelina Tan as the winning candidate, placing Wigberto only second. A supplemental petition was filed again by Wigberto before the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of Tan, after which it was granted and affirmed by the COMELEC en banc. However, past noon time of June 30, 2013, Angelina had taken her oath and assumed office, therefore the adverse resolution on her proclamation became moot. On the certiorari filed by Wigberto before the SC assailing the April 2013 COMELEC en banc’s ruling declaring Alvin John not a nuisance candidate and an election protest for fraud was executed. Since the proclaimed candidate has already assumed office, Supreme Court dismissed the election protest and directed Wigberto to file the protest before the proper tribunal which is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Alvin John Tanada is a nuisance candidate. RULING: The petition must fail. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members. In the foregoing light, considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province on May 16, 2013, as she has in fact taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, the Court is now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. As they stand, the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina as herein discussed are matters which fall under the scope of the terms "election" and "returns" as above-stated and hence, properly fall under the HRET's sole jurisdiction.

DUEÑAS, JR. VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL 593 SCRA 316, JULY 21, 2009 FACTS: Petitioner Henry “Jun” Dueñas, Jr. and private respondent Angelito “Jett” P. Reyes were rival candidates for the position of congressman in the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. After the canvass of the votes, petitioner was proclaimed the winner, having garnered 28,564 votes as opposed to private respondent’s 27,107 votes. Not conceding defeat, private respondent filed an election protest, praying for a revision/recount, alleging that he was cheated in the protested 170 of 732 precincts through insidious and wellorchestrated electoral frauds and anomalies which resulted in the systematic reduction of his votes and the corresponding increase in petitioner’s votes. In an order dated September 25, 2008, the HRET directed the continuation of the revision and appreciation of the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts pursuant to Rule 88 of the HRET Rules. Instead of complying with the order, petitioner filed an urgent motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts on October 27, 2008. This was denied by the HRET, reiterating its order directing the continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts and recalling its order requiring petitioner to augment his cash deposit. The Tribunal instead ordered the use of its own funds for the revision of the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts. On November 27, 2008, the HRET issued a resolution under Rule 88 of the HRET Rules and settled jurisprudence, ruling that it had the discretion either to dismiss the protest or counter-protest, or to continue with the revision if necessitated by reasonable and sufficient grounds affecting the validity of the election. This was with the end in view of ascertaining the true choice of the electorate. It was the HRET’s position that the mere filing of a motion to withdraw/abandon the unrevised precincts did not automatically divest the HRET of its jurisdiction over the same. Convinced that it could not determine the true will of the electorate of the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City on the basis alone of the initial revision of the 100% protested precincts and the 25% counter-protested precincts, it had no other recourse but to continue the revision and appreciation of all the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts. ISSUE: Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008. RULING: The petition has no merit. We base our decision not only on the constitutional authority of the HRET as the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of its members but also on the limitation of the Court's power of judicial review. So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court, the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal x x x excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same. Guided by this basic principle, the Court will neither assume a power that belongs exclusively to the HRET nor substitute its own judgment for that of the Tribunal.

Petitioner's position disregards, or at least waters down, Rules 7 and 88 of the HRET Rules. If the Court will dictate to the HRET on how to proceed with these election protest proceedings, the Tribunal will no longer have "exclusive control, direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation." It will constitute an intrusion into the HRET's domain and a curtailment of the HRET's power to act of its own accord on its own evaluation of the evidentiary weight and effect of the result of the initial revision. BONDOC VS. PINEDA 201 SCRA 792 , SEPTEMBER 26, 1991 FACTS: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members,3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that the was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET. ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that party's representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein. RULING: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

EXECUTIVE CASES (Nos. 1 – 5)

LAUREL VS. DESIERTO 381 SCRA 48 , APRIL 12, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner is the Chair of the National Centennial Commission (NCC), tasked to “take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.” Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created and Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer. An investigation of the anomalies in the construction and operation of the centennial projects was effected and the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final Report recommending for “the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, in violation of the anti-graft law.” The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a resolution finding “probable cause to indict petitioner before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1594.” Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because he, both as chairman of the NCC and of the EXPOCORP was not a “public officer.” ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, is a public officer. RULING: YES. The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office . The court hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power “is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.” The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law. The NCC was precisely created to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and non-government or private organizations and to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries and to carry them into effect.Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.

GUDANI VS. SENGA 498 SCRA 671 , AUGUST 15, 2006 FACTS: The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer. ISSUE:

Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry. RULING: Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize. The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

GONZALES VS. ABAYA 498 SCRA 445 , AUGUST 10, 2006 FACTS: In relation to the celebrated Oakwood mutiny where a total of 321 soldiers including petitioners herein declared their withdrawal of support to the Commander-in-chief, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declared a state of rebellion and ordered the arrest of the said soldiers. Pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation. On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information for coup d'etat against those soldiers, On August 13, 2003, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 (otherwise known as "The Articles of War"), as amended, against the same military personnel. The Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d'etat before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War. For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court martial against the accused . . . are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners' applications for bail.

The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d'etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction. ISSUE: 1.Whether the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been criminally charged of coup d’état before the regular courts. 2. Whether the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable. HELD: 1. Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same — dismissal from the service — imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline. Hence, there is no merit in petitioners' argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void. 2. No. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes' is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case. DAVID VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO 489 SCRA 160 , MAY 03, 2006 FACTS: On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency. On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence." David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General. ISSUE: Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional. RULING: PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest. Are these conditions present in the instant cases? The Court said, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP1017. Owing to her office’s vast intelligent network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country. The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII, to wit: "x x x The President can only issue Executive Orders, Administrative Orders, Proclamations, Memorandum Orders, Memorandum Circulars, General or Special Orders." President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution. This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress. WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ZAMORA 338 SCRA 81 , AUGUST 15, 2000

FACTS: Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, as commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence in Metro Manila in the light of the escalating cases of crime and lawlessness in the city. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. Subsequently, the IBP filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the “Marines”) to join the Philippine National Police (the “PNP”) in visibility patrols around the metropolis. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review. (2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP. RULING: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP. [6] MITRA ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 104 SCRA 59 April 4, 1981 FACTS

Petitioners Mitra et al. questioned the validity of the 1973 constitution and filed a petition to the Supreme Court to hold a plebiscite where the people can either vote to ratify or reject it. In the event that it is rejected, the petitioners pray that the 1935 Constitution be restored with the lifting of Martial Law on January 17, 1981. Doctrine The petition to hold a plebiscite cannot be granted because it is founded on the erroneous notion that the present constitution is not valid. Given that the court has previously ruled in favor of the validity of the 1973 Constitution, it remains legitimately in force and effect even with the lifting of Martial Law. Hence, the petition for a plebiscite has no merit. ISSUE Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is valid RULING Yes. Even without valid ratification, a new Constitution could come into force and effect by the acquiescence of the. The fact that the people went to the polls would be indicative of their acquiescence in the present Constitution. Nor could petitioners be unaware that two elections have been held under the present Constitution. In the face of the above clearly manifested recognition of the force and effect of the present Constitution, by the people, including those in the opposition, it would seem that any argument to the contrary should be consigned to a well-merited limbo.

[7] CONSTANTINO, JR. v. CUISIA 472 SCRA 505 October 13, 2005 FACTS To reduce the country’s external debt, the Aquino administration resorted to was to incur foreign debts. The spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino, as a taxpayers, and in behalf of their minor children, together with FFDC (Freedom From Debt Coalition) averred that the programs were onerous and they do not constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution. The further argue that the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President, hence, the respondents herein, Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia et al, cannot incur debts for the Philippines. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the submission that not respondents but the President “alone and personally” can validly bind the country ISSUE Whether or not the President of the Philippines can validly delegate her debt power HELD Yes. The President can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. The President cannot personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, a welter of time-consuming detailed activities. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government. The act of the Cuisia et al are not unconstitutional.

[8] AGUINALDO v. SANTOS 212 SCRA 768 August 21, 1992 FACTS Petitioner Rodolfo Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. Shortly after the December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed, the Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos sent a telegram and a letter to petitioner requiring him to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic. In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers. The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. While the case was pending before the SC, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan. As petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan. ISSUE Whether or not the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials RULING Yes. Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Petitioner was re-elected as governor of Cagayan province. As held by this Court in Aguinaldo v. Comelec, the rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local government of officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The President the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local governments, and by the doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.

[9] KILUSANG BAYAN v. DOMINGUEZ 205 SCRA 92 January 13, 1992 FACTS Petitioners question the validity of the order of then Secretary of Agriculture Hon. Carlos G. Dominguez which ordered the take-over by the Department of Agriculture of the management of the petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntilupa, Inc. (KBMBPM). He also ordered the creation of a Management Committee which shall assume the management of KBMBPM upon receipt of the order, the disbandment of the Board of Directors, and the turnover of all assets, properties and records of the KBMBPM to the Management Committee. The said order unerringly indicates that its basis is the alleged petition of the general membership of the KBMBPM requesting the Department for assistance in the removal of the members of the Board of Directors who were not elected by the general membership of the cooperative and that the ongoing financial and management audit of the Department of Agriculture auditors shows that the management of the KBMBPM is not operating that cooperative in accordance with P.D. 165, LOI 23, the Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the provisions and by-laws of KBMBPM. It is also professed therein that the Order was issued by the Department in the exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D. 165, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No.113. Issue: Whether or not the Order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture is legal Held: No. Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing P.D. No. 165) provides the procedure for the removal of directors or officers of cooperatives. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 165 which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give him that right. An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may to necessary for their just and reasonable execution.

[10] KULAYAN v. TAN 675 SCRA 482 July 3, 2012 FACTS A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping of Red Cross members in Patikul Sulu. The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. ISSUE Whether or not a governor exercise the calling-out powers of a President RULING No. Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution provides that executive power is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and exercised the calling-out powers. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President.

[11] OROSA v. ROA 495 SCRA 22 July 14, 2006 FACTS Orosa, a dentist by profession, filed with the Pasig City Prosecution Office a complaint-affidavit charging respondent Roa, also a dentist, with the crime of libel. The complaint stemmed from an article written by respondent insinuating Orosa topped the dental board examinations because his father was an examiner. After preliminary investigation, the city prosecutor issued a resolution, dismissed the petitioner's complaint, stating that the publication was a bona fide communication on matters of public concern, and made without malice. Acting on the appeal, the Chief State Prosecutor issued a Resolution, setting aside the findings of the City Prosecutor and directing the latter to file an Information for libel against respondent. Respondent appealed to the Secretary of Justice. Secretary Serafin Cuevas reversed the Resolution and directed the City Prosecutor of Pasig to withdraw the Information earlier filed with the RTC. The petitioner went to the CA on a petition for review under Rule 43. The CA dismissed petitioner's petition for review, reasoning that the Pasig City Prosecution Office and the Department of Justice are not among the quasi-judicial agencies included in Section 1 of Rule 43 whose final orders or resolutions are subject to review by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal in this case RULING No. The Court affirms the decision the Court of Appeals. As may be noted, the DOJ is not among the agencies expressly enumerated under Section 1 of Rule 43. There is reason to believe that the exclusion is deliberate, being in consonance with the constitutional power of control lodged in the President over executive departments, bureaus and offices. Being thus under the control of the President, the decision of the Secretary of Justice is subject to review of the former.

[12] RUFINO v. ENDRIGA 496 SCRA 13 July 21, 2006 FACTS Two groups of appointed members of the Board of Trustees of CCP are contesting each other’s appointment. The Endriga group, sitting as current members, was appointed by then-President Ramos and is assailing the appointment of the Rufino group, replacing all 7 members of the Endriga group, by then-President Estrada. Endriga group avers that the appointment into the Board of the Rufino group transgressed PD 15, creating of Board of Trustees of CCP. As stated in PD 15, specifically Section 6, appointment into the Board shall only be made by a majority vote of the trustees; presidential appointments can only be made when the Board is entirely vacant to uphold the CCP’s charter of independence from pressure or politics. Meanwhile, Rufino group stands by their appointment since the provision on appointments stated in Section 6, PD 15 is violative of Section 16, Article 7 of the Constitution. The Board cannot invoke the charter of autonomy to extend to appointment of its members. ISSUE Whether or not PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments made by trustees of their fellow members is constitutional RULING No. PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments of members by the trustees themselves is unconstitutional. While it is stated that appointing powers may be delegated by the President, such power is limited in scope to include only ranks lower than the appointing authority. In the case, an appointment of a member made by a fellow member transgresses Article 7, Section 16 (1) since both positions are equal in nature. CCP cannot invoke autonomy prescribed in its charter as an exemption from the limitation of delegative appointing power because such invocation puts CCP outside the control of the President.

[13] DENR v. DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES 409 SCRA 359 August 19, 2003 FACTS DENR Region 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional Exec. Director of DENR, directed the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary. ISSUE Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office. RULING Yes. The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same. EXECUTIVE CASES 14 – 21 # 14

692 SCRA 359

ATTY. MA. ROSARIO MANALANG-DEMIGILLO, Petitioner, vs. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (TIDCORP), and its BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Respondents. G.R. No. 185571 March 5, 2013 BERSAMIN, J.: Facts: Issue: Ruling #15

206 SCRA 290

Antonio Carpio vs The Executive Secretary G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992

Facts: In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law as he averred that it only interferes with the control power of the president. He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power “to administrative control” over the PNP thus, “control” remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local executives choose local police heads also undermine the power of the president. Issue: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975.

Ruling: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”

#16

202 SCRA 844

RODOLFO D. LLAMAS, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and MARIANO UN OCAMPO III, respondents. G.R. No. 99031 October 15, 1991 PARAS, J.: Facts: Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him. The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases. They say that the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been “convicted in an administrative case, allegedly because the word “conviction” refers only to criminal cases. Issue: Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases. Ruling: Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses. They do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the court’s considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government. In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision.

#17

178 SCRA 457

CESAR R. DE LEON, petitioner, vs. J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, Director, National Bureau of Investigation, respondent. G.R. No. 85243 October 12, 1989 Cruz, J.: Facts: Estavillo and de Leon are two NBI agents terminated by then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales. Upon appeal to the Review Committee, the said body declined to act on their petitions for reconsideration on the ground that it had lost its jurisdiction with the ratification of the new Constitution. They were advised instead to seek relief from the Civil Service Commission. The Merit Systems Protection Board of CSC held that their dismissals were invalid and unconstitutional, having been done in violation of their security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the Board ordered their reinstatement. However, respondent Carpio, as Director of NBI, returned the orders issued by the Secretary of Justice to CSC “without action,” claiming that they were null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not the Director of the NBI can disobey an explicit and direct order issued to him by the Secretary of Justice. Ruling: It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined in the Constitution and honored not in the breach but in the observance, that all executive departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the President of the Philippines. The President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. The constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. Theoretically, the President has full control of all the members of his Cabinet and may appoint them as he sees fit or shuffle them at pleasure, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and replace them in his discretion. Once in place, they are at all times under the disposition of the President as their immediate superior. “Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Hence, their acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior) In the case at bar, there is no question that when he directed the respondent to reinstate the petitioners, Sec. Ordonez was acting in the regular discharge of his functions as an alter ego of the President. His acts should therefore have been respected by the respondent Director of the NBI, which is in the Department of Justice under the direct control of its Secretary. As a subordinate in this department, the respondent was (and is) bound to obey the Secretary’s directives, which are presumptively the acts of the President of the Philippines.

#18

178 SCRA 582

JOSE LUIS MARTIN C. GASCON, et al, petitioners,

vs. The Hon. JOKER T. ARROYO, et al, respondents. G.R. No. 78389 October 16, 1989 PADILLA, J.: Facts: Petitioners seek to annul and set aside the “Agreement to Arbitrate” entered into by and between the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Executive Secretary Joker T. Arroyo, and ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its President, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., dated 6 January 1987, to settle the claims of ABS-CBN for the return of radio and television stations (TV Station Channel 4), and to enjoin the Arbitration Committee created under the aforesaid agreement from adjudicating the claims of ABS-CBN. Issue: Whether or not the Executive Secretary had the power and authority to enter into the “Agreement to Arbitrate” with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation. Ruling: Yes. Under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines also known as the Freedom Constitution), which was in force and effect when the “Agreement to Arbitrate” was signed by the parties thereto on 6 January 1987, the President exercised both the legislative and executive powers of the Government. As Chief Executive, the President was (and even now) “assisted by a Cabinet” composed of Ministers (now Secretaries), who were appointed by and accountable to the President. In other words, the Members of the cabinet, as heads of the various departments, are the assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person, or where the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the heads of such departments performed in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Respondent Executive Secretary had, therefore, the power and authority to enter into the “Agreement to Arbitrate” with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation, as he acted for and in behalf of the President when he signed it; hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding upon the Republic of the Philippines, as a party thereto. #19

21 SCRA 895

LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO, et al., defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-27811 November 17, 1967 SANCHEZ, J.: Facts: Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner. Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paño’s request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President. Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.

Issue: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. Ruling: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional powers in person. However, the president may delegate certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president may delegate powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to perform personally. The reason for this allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that “under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order” that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue. The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall remain valid until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case, no reprobation was made hence the decision granting the land to Paño cannot be reversed. #20

212 SCRA 768

Facts: Issue: Ruling

#21

104 PHIL 125

Facts: Issue: Ruling 22. JOSE MONDANO VS FERNANDO SILVOSA G.R. No. L-7708 May 30 1955 J.: Padilla FACTS: The Assistant Executive Secretory indorsed the complaint for rape and concubinage against Mondano, duly elected and qualified mayor of Mainit, Surigao,to Silvosa, provincial governor of Suriga, for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. Silvosa issued an Administrative Order suspending Mondano from office. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding. ISSUE: Whether or not the order of suspension by the provincial governor is illegal. RULING: Yes. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in Sec. 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the RAC are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. If “general supervision over all local governments” is to be construed as the same

power granted to the Department Head in sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision. 23. In Re: Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998 J.: Narvasa, C. Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making anyappointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments toexecutive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointmentsimposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII Held: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to makeappointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years. The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointmentsduring the period of the ban. 24. HERMOGENES P. POBRE v. MARIANO E. MENDIETA GR No. 106677 July 23, 1993 J.: GRIÑO-AQUINO Facts: These consolidated petitions under Rule 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court ere filed by Hermogenes Pobre to set aside the decision dated August 5, 1992 and writ of prohibitory injunction dated August 19, 1992 issued by Judge Corona Ibay-Somera annulling the appointment extended by President Corazon C. Aquino to the petitioner, Hermogenes Pobre as Commissioner/Chairman of the Professional Regulation Commission and enjoining him from discharging the duties and functions of that office. The controversy began on January 2, 1992 when the term of office of Honrable Julio B. Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second Associate Commissioner of the PRC. ISSUE: Whether the President may appoint as Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC another Associate Commissioner or any person other than the Senior Associate Commissioner. HELD: The power of appointment cannot be restricted to the point that the officer loses the discretion. The Court finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the Commission )except the position of “junior” Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by “succession” or by “operation of law” for that would deprive the President of his power to appoint a new

PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners- “all to be appointed by the President” under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result would be that the only occasion for the President to exercise his appointing power would be when the position of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner becomes vacant. We may not presume that when the President issued P.D. No. 223, he deliberately clipped his prerogative to choose and appoint the head of the PRC and limited himself to the selection and appointment of only the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the ladder in that agency. Since such an absurdity may not be presumed, the Court should so construe the law as to avoid it.

25. Roberto A. Flores vs. Franklin M. Drilon G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993 J.: Bellosillo FACTS

Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.” ISSUES

(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. (2) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. HELD (1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary

functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constitutents. (2) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office.

26. Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. L-65439 November 13, 1985 J.:GUTIERREZ, JR. FACTS: In 1973, Dr. Hernani Esteban was appointed by Dr. Consuelo Blanco as the Vice-President for Administration in the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM). Esteban’s appointment was ad interim in nature (because at that time the PLM Board of Regents was not in session). His appointment was extended in 1975. However, he later discovered that his name was not included among those recommended for permanent appointment. He then requested Blanco to make him a permanent appointee. Blanco, however, appointed Esteban as Professor III instead and his appointment as VP for Admin was terminated. Esteban brought the case before the Civil Service Commission where he got a favorable judgment. The trial court reversed the CSC. The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not Esteban is a permanent appointee. HELD: Yes. Hence, he enjoys security of tenure. The Supreme Court explains that the term “ad interim” as used in the Philippines does not literally translate to “temporary”. In this jurisdiction an ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment. This was explained in the landmark case of Summers vs Ozaeta: …an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that the President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.’ It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course distinguishable from an ‘acting’ appointment which is merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is issued. In other words, if the Board of Regents is in session, the PLM President merely nominates while the Board issues the appointment. But when the Board is not in session, the President is authorized to issue ad interim appointments. Such appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves them. If confirmed, the appointee’s term is converted into the regular term inherent in the position. In the case at bar, apparently, Esteban was confirmed by the Board of Regents in 1975. Blanco however did not relay this confirmation to Esteban. The latter was made to believe (due to souring relationship with Blanco) that his appointment was extended but only as an extension of temporary appointment.

27. Rosalinda Santos vs Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig G.R. No. 94070

April 10, 1992 J.:GRIÑO-AQUINO

Facts: Rosalinda Santos was an ambassadress sent to Geneva for a mission. On her trip, she bought a discounted ticket which provided that she could bring someone with her so she brought with her her adopted daughter. Some of her co-workers complained because they thought that Santos used government fund to finance her daughter’s fare. It was later found out that the cost of the said ticket is actually 50% less than the amount that was given to Santos to be used for her expenses for the trip. Nevertheless, because of her refusal to appear before the disciplinary board, she was found guilty of misconduct. Upon her appeal to the Office of the President and after review, then president Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 122 which declared Santos guilty of dishonesty. She was then removed from her post and was replaced.

ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should reinstated to her office. HELD: No. Even though the Supreme Court found evidence which

showed that Santos was not guilty of misconduct or dishonesty as in fact what she did of securing a ticket which was 50% the cost of what was allotted for her travel expense for tickets and thus was beneficial to the government (for she helped save and lessen the expenses), the SC does not have the power to reverse the recall done to Santos. She cannot be reinstated by the SC to her position for the removal power of the president is solely her prerogative. Further, the position held by Santos is primarily confidential. Her position lasts upon the pleasure of the president. When the pleasure turns into displeasure she is not actually removed from her position or office but rather her term merely expires. Also, her position involves foreign relations which is vested solely in the executive. The SC cannot inquire upon the wisdom or unwisdom of the exercise of such prerogative. Thus, the assignment to and recall from posts of ambassadors are prerogatives of the President, for her to exercise as the exigencies of the foreign service and the interests of the nation may from time to time dictate. 28. QUINTOS-DELES VS COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

G.R. No. 83216 September 4 1989 J.: Bidin FACTS: This is a special civic action for prohibition and mandamus with injunction seeking to compel CoA to allow Quintos-Deles to perform and ischarege her duties as HoR member representing Women's Sector and to restrain respondents from subjecting her appointment to the confirmation process. Quintos-Deles ad three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Art. VII Sec 16 p.2 and Art. XVIII Sec. 7 of the Constitution. ISSUE: WoN the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the HoR to be confirmed by the CoA. RULING: Yes. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the “other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,” referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra). Deles' appointment was made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, p.2 which gives the President ”the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” The records show that Deles’ appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.

29. Ulpiano Sarmiento III vs Salvador Mison G.R. No. 79974

December 17, 1987 J.: Padilla Facts: This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA.

Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed by the COA. Bautista vs. Salonga G.R. No. 86439 April 13, 1989 PADILLA, J. FACTS: In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino designated Mary Concepcion-Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman of Commission on Human Rights. In December 1987, Cory made the designation of Bautista permanent. Bautista then took her oath of office. Later however, Bautista received a letter from the Commission on Appointments (COA) requiring her to submit certain documents for her qualification and for confirmation by the COA. Bautista then wrote a letter to the COA Chairman, Senate President Jovito Salonga, and she explained that her position as chairwoman of the CHR does not require confirmation by the COA as laid down in the case of Sarmiento vs Mison. Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautista’s appointment with the COA, Cory designated Hesiquio Mallilin as the acting chairman of the CHR. In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of Bautista. COA considered Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”. Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COA’s actions. She impleaded Mallillin. Mallillin on his part invoked Executive Order No. 163-A which provided that the appointment of the CHR chair is at the pleasure of the president. Hence, since Cory left the issue with the COA and the latter decided not to confirm Bautista, Mallillin should be allowed to take his seat as chairman of the CHR. ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject to COA’s confirmation. HELD: No. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the COA. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the COA because they are among the officers of government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint.” The law which authorizes the president to make appointments to the CHR is Executive Order No. 163. The act of Cory submitting Bautista’s appointment to the COA for confirmation is merely political in nature and it has no basis in law or in the constitution. Appointment to the CHR should be made without the participation of the COA. Thus, Cory’s act of submitting the appointment of Bautista to the CHR is done without or in excess of jurisdiction. Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit such appointment to the COA for the latter’s approval or rejection, such submission is not valid because at the time of submission, the office of the chairman (chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant – as at that time, Bautista already took her oath and was the incumbent CHR chairperson. There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”. Since the position of chairman and members of the CHR are not subject to COA confirmation, all appointments to the CHR are always permanent and cannot be ad interim.

Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides that the chairman and members of the CHR may be removed at the pleasure of the president, the same is not valid. Thus, EO 163-A is unconstitutional. Note that the earlier EO 163 provides that the chairman and the members of the CHR shall have a term of 7 years. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is guaranteed that they must have a term of office. They can only be removed upon cause and with the observance of due process. Bermudez vs. Torres G.R. No. 131429 August 4, 1999 VITUG, J: FACTS: Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-in-Charge of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Sec. of Justice Guingona for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Private respondent Atty. Conrado Quiaoit had the support of then Representative Yap of the Second District of Tarlac. Quiaoit was appointed by Pres. Ramos to the office. Quiaoit took his oath and assumed office. Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed the duties and functions of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Sec. Of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “all provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the Pres. upon the recommendation of the Secretary.” ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit. HELD: An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective. The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. When the Constitution or the law clothes the Pres. with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. The Pres. is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all “executive departments, bureaus and offices.” Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. The Pres. has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It can therefore be inferred that the Pres. can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations. The phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary” found in Sec. 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code should be interpreted to be a mere advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The Pres., being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority. Flores v Drilon G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993 BELLOSILLO, J FACTS: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IXB, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity

to any public officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint. ISSUE: Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional prescription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. RULING: The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them function without the distraction of other governmental duties. The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives to the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice. GONZALES III vs OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 196231 January 28, 2014 BRION, J. FACTS: Separate charges were filed against Manila Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others for robbery, grave threat, robbery extortion and physical injury. Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers (MOLEO), directed the NAPOLCOM to turn over the records of Mendoza’s case to his office. Mendoza, et al. filed their position papers with Gonzales, in compliance with his Order. Pending Gonzales’ action on Mendoza, et al.’s case, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila City dismissed Kalaw’s complaint against Mendoza, et al. for his failure to substantiate his allegations. Similarly, the PNP-IAS recommended the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against Mendoza, et al. for Kalaw’s failure to prosecute. Gonzales forwarded the entire records to the Office of then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her review. In his draft decision, Gonzales found Mendoza, et al. guilty of grave misconduct and imposed on them the penalty of dismissal from the service. On August 23, 2010, pending final action by the Ombudsman on Mendoza, et al.’s case, Mendoza hijacked a tourist bus and held the 21 foreign tourists and the four Filipino tour assistants on board as hostages. While the government exerted earnest attempts to peacefully resolve the hostage-taking, it ended tragically, resulting in the deaths of Mendoza and several others on board the hijacked bus. In the aftermath, President Benigno C. Aquino III directed the Department of Justice and the Department of Interior and Local Government to conduct a joint thorough investigation of the incident. The two departments issued Joint Department Order No. 01-2010, creating an Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). Accordingly, on October 15, 2010, Gonzales was formally charged before the OP for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in Office. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the office of the president have administrative jurisdiction over the deputy ombudsman and the special prosecutor. (2) Whether or not the dismissal of gonzales as deputy ombudsman by the office of the president correct. RULING: (1) Yes. The ombudsman’s administrative disciplinary power over a deputy ombudsman and special prosecutor is not exclusive. Section 8 of ra 6770 (the ombudsman act of 1989) grants the president the power to remove the deputy ombudsman and the special prosecutor from office after due process. (2) No. His removal must be for any of the grounds provided in the removal of the ombudsman. The alleged ground of betrayal of public trust was not present in his case. Petitioner gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling short of constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust Lacson vs Romero G.R. No. L-3081 October 14, 1949 MONTEMAYOR, J FACTS: Petitioner Lacson was on July 25, 1946, appointed by the President of the Philippines, provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. The appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointment on August 6, 1946. He took his oath of office on August10, 1946, and thereafter performed the duties of that office. Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, on

May 17, 1949, the President nominated petitioner Lacson to the post of provincial fiscal of Tarlac. On the same date, the President nominated for the position of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental respondent Romero. Both nominations were simultaneously confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on May 19, 1949 Lacson neither accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of Tarlac. Respondent Romero took his oath of office (the post of fiscal of Negros Oriental) in Manila on June 16, 1949, notified the Solicitor General of the fact, and thereafter proceeded to his station. Upon arrival at Dumaguete City, capital of Negros Oriental, he notified Lacson of his intention to take over the office the following day, but Lacson objected. Hence this petition ISSUE: Whether or not Lacson is entitled to the position. HELD: The Court ruled that the appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be complete involves several steps. First, comes the nomination by the President. Then to make that nomination valid and permanent, the Commission on Appointments of the Legislature has to confirm said nomination. The last step is the acceptance thereof by the appointee by his assumption of office. The first two steps, nomination and confirmation, constitute a mere offer of a post. They are acts of the Executive and Legislative departments of the Government. But the last necessary step to make the appointment complete and effective rests solely with the appointee himself. He may or he may not accept the appointment or nomination. As held in the case of Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 327,"there is no Power in this country which can compel a man to accept an office." Consequently, since Lacson has declined to accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can compel him to do so, then he continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in said office was created, unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as Such fiscal of Negros Oriental. Manalo vs Sistoza G.R. No. 107369 August 11, 1999 PURISIMA, J. FACTS: In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 was passed. This law created the Department of Interior and Local Government. Said law, under Sections 26 and 31 thereof, also provided on the manner as to how officers of the Philippine National Police are to be appointed. It was provided that the PNP Chief as well as certain police officers including Directors and Chief Superintendents, after being appointed by the President, must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments before said officers can take their office. In 1992, then president Corazon Aquino appointed Pedro Sistoza et al as Directors and Chief Superintendents within the PNP. Said appointments were not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments hence, Jesulito Manalo questioned the validity of the appointments made. He insists that without the confirmation by the Commission, Sistoza et al are acting without jurisdiction, their appointment being contrary to the provisions of R.A. 6975. He then went to the Supreme Court asking the court to carry out the provisions of the said law. Manalo also insists that the law is a valid law, as it enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, and hence, it must be carried out by the courts. ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. No. 6975 are valid. HELD: No. Said provisions are unconstitutional. It is true that prior to this case, as with all other laws, R.A. 6975 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. As such, laws enacted by Congress must be respected by courts and as much as possible, courts must avoid delving into the constitutionality of a law. However, it is also the duty of the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, to see to it that every law passed by Congress is not repugnant to the Constitution. Courts have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit alienated by the fundamental law. When it does the courts will not hesitate to strike down such unconstitutionality. Office of the Pres v Buenaobra GR No. 170021 08 Sep 2006 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman’s Special Prosecution Officer filed an information against Nita Buenaobra, chairman of the Komisyon sa Wikang Pilipino, with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 4(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for allegedly causing

undue injury to the government through gross inexcusable negligence in connection with the unauthorized reprinting of the Diksyunaryo ng Wikang Pilipino. The Sandiganbayan ordered a reinvestigation while the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) conducted a parallel administrative investigation against respondent charging her with the same acts and omissions subject of the Sandiganbayan case. On 11 Apr 2003, petitioner adopted PAGC’s recommendation and dismissed respondent from office. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent being a presidential appointee and a holder of a non-career service position could be removed from service at the pleasure of the President. HELD: NO. Non-career service personnel enjoy security of tenure. They may not be removed without just cause and observance of due process. SANTOS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 94070 April 10, 1992 GRIÑO-AQUINO, J. FACTS: Rosalinda Santos was an ambassadress sent to Geneva for a mission. On her trip, she bought a discounted ticket which provided that she could bring someone with her so she brought with her adopted daughter. Some of her co-workers complained because they thought that Santos used government fund to finance her daughter’s fare. It was later found out that the cost of the said ticket is actually 50% less than the amount that was given to Santos to be used for her expenses for the trip. Nevertheless, because of her refusal to appear before the disciplinary board, she was found guilty of misconduct. Upon her appeal to the Office of the President and after review, then President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 122 which declared Santos guilty of dishonesty. She was then removed from her post and was replaced. ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should reinstated to her office. HELD: No. Even though the Supreme Court found evidence which showed that Santos was not guilty of misconduct or dishonesty as in fact what she did of securing a ticket which was 50% the cost of what was allotted for her travel expense for tickets and thus was beneficial to the government (for she helped save and lessen the expenses), the SC does not have the power to reverse the recall done to Santos. She cannot be reinstated by the SC to her position for the removal power of the president is solely her prerogative. Further, the position held by Santos is primarily confidential. Her position lasts upon the pleasure of the president. When the pleasure turns into displeasure she is not actually removed from her position or office but rather her term merely expires. Also, her position involves foreign relations which is vested solely in the executive. The SC cannot inquire upon the wisdom or unwisdom of the exercise of such prerogative. Thus, the assignment to and recall from posts of ambassadors are prerogatives of the President, for her to exercise as the exigencies of the foreign service and the interests of the nation may from time to time dictate. #38. 615 SCRA 666 G.R. No. 191002 March 17, 2010 DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO BERSAMIN, J.: FACTS: These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that "vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof" from a "list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy." On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, therefore, the JBC passed a resolution where the JBC unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice Honorable Reynato S. Puno. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation.

On February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the candidates to invite the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy being yet unresolved. In the meanwhile, time is marching towards May 17, 2010 when the vacancy occurs upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno. ISSUES: 1. WoN petitioners have locus standi. 2. WoN the incumbent President can appoint a Chief Justice during the election ban period? RULING: 1. Yes. The Court rules that the petitioners have each demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of the controversy as to vest them with the requisite locus standi. The issues before us are of transcendental importance to the people as a whole. Indeed, the issues affect everyone because they concern great doubt about the authority of the incumbent President to appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but also others who may serve in the Judiciary. The Court holds that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The challenges to the authority of the JBC to open the process of nomination and to continue the process until the submission of the list of nominees; the insistence of some of the petitioners to compel the JBC to submit the short list to the incumbent President; the strong position that the incumbent President is already prohibited under Section 15, Article VII from making any appointments, starting on May 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010 are only some of the real issues for determination. 2. Yes. Prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Section 14, 15, and 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. WHEREFORE, the Court dismisses the petition for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002.

#39. 380 SCRA 49 G.R. No. 149036 April 2, 2002 MATIBAG v BENIPAYO CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: On February 2, 1999, COMELEC appointed petitioner as Acting Director of the Education and Information Department (EID for brevity). On February 15, 2000, the appointment of petitioner was renewed as Director of EID in a Temporary capacity and then again on February 15, 2001. On March 22, 2001 President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason[ as COMELEC Commissioners, all expiring on February 2, 2008. On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and for the same term, expiring on February 2, 2008. Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions. In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum addressed to petitioner as and to Cinco, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department but was denied. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution; 2. Whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution; 3. Whether or not Benipayos removal of petitioner from her position as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department is illegal and without authority, having been done without the approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body; RULING: 1. No. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows: The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process. An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. An ad interim appointment in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. In the instant case, Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately. While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC shall be independent, this provision should be harmonized with the Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to make ad interim appointments. 2. No. Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides as follows: The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. X x x. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The same ad interim appointments and renewals of appointments will also not breach the seven-year

term limit because all the appointments and renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on February 2, 2008. The continuing renewal of the ad interim appointment of these three respondents, for so long as their terms of office expire on February 2, 2008, does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. 3. No. Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman, and has full authority to exercise all the powers of that office for so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective. The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with the Civil Service Law. In the exercise of this power, the Chairman is not required by law to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. The COMELEC en banc, in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the election period. Thus, Benipayos order reassigning petitioner from the EID to the Law Department does not violate Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code. For the same reason, Benipayos order designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID is legally unassailable.

#40. 298 SCRA 408 A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998 In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta NARVASA, CJ.: FACTS: Referred to the Court are the appointments by the President of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Bago and Cabanatuan City, respectively. The issue was first ventilated at the meeting of the Judicial and Bar Council on March 9, 1998, to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the "constitutionality of *** appointments" specifically, in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. Attention was drawn to Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. On the other hand, appointments to fill vacancies in the Supreme Court during the period mentioned in the provision just quoted could seemingly be justified by another provision of the same Constitution, Section 4(1) of Article VIII. The view was then expressed by Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, that the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. This hypothesis was accepted, and was then submitted to the President for consideration, together with the Council's nominations for eight (8) vacancies in the Court of Appeals. The Chief Justice received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from the Executive Secretary transmitting the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly signed on the day immediately before the commencement of the ban on appointments, which implies that the President’s Office did not agree with the hypothesis. The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the transmission of the “list of final nominees” for the vacancy. Chief Justice sent his reply to the President stating that no session has been scheduled after the May elections for the reason that they apparently did not share the same view.

It would appear that the Justice Secretary and the regular members of the Council had already taken action without awaiting the Chief Justice's response to the President's letter. Chief Justice received a letter where the President expressed his view that Article 7 Sec 15 only applied to executive appointments. On May 12, Chief Justice received the appointments of the 2 Judges mentioned. Considering the pending proceedings and deliberations, the Court resolved by refraining the appointees from taking their oaths. However, Judge Valenzuela took oath in May 14, 1998 claiming he did so without knowledge on the on-going deliberations. ISSUE: WoN during the period of the ban on appointments, the President is required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII. RULING: No. During the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein. Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus Election Code. The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called “midnight” appointments. The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban. To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case should the membership of the Court be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the voting on a particularly important question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a case, however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.

#41. 194 SCRA 317 G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991 CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FERNAN, C.J.:

FACTS: In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed the constitutionality of EO 284 on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution. CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8. ISSUE: WoN EO 284 is constitutional. RULING: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof. In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

#42. 659 SCRA 270 G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011 Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines BRION, J.: FACTS: On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes” was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. The history of ARMM instituted first by the provisions of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras wherein the congress promulgated Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 which is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. Following is RA No. 9054 which amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. In these consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153. ISSUES: 1. WoN the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections. 2. WoN the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. RULING: 1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from

the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections. From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government. In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution. 2. No, the passage of RA No. 10153 does not violate Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which refers to the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement. Before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become law or statute they must pass through three readings on separate days, with the exception of when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. The Supreme Court held the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

#43. 658 SCRA 420 G.R. Nos. 156556-57 October 4, 2011 BETOY v. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION PERALTA, J.: FACTS: On June 8, 2001, the EPIRA was enacted by Congress with the goal of restructuring the electric power industry and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC). On November 18, 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of the IRR, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which, among others, resolved that all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003 and shall be entitled to separation benefits. As a result of the foregoing NPB Resolutions, petitioner, Enrique U. Betoy, together with thousands of his co-employees from the NPC were terminated. However, amongst the petitions raised – it is noteworthy that petitioners argued that Section 11, Section 48 and Section 52 of RA 9136 (EPIRA) for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, unconstitutional. ISSUE: WoN Sections 11, 48, and 52 of the EPIRA are unconstitutional for violating Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. RULING: The Court explained that the prohibition contained in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an exofficio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary function of said official's office.

The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the order of importance and thus means chief or principal function. The term is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural. The additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the official's primary functions. The designation of the members of the Cabinet to form the NPB does not violate the prohibition contained in our Constitution as the privatization and restructuring of the electric power industry involves the close coordination and policy determination of various government agencies. Section 2 of the EPIRA clearly shows that the policy toward privatization would involve financial, budgetary and environmental concerns as well as coordination with local government units. As can be gleaned from the foregoing enumeration, the restructuring of the electric power industry inherently involves the participation of various government agencies. Mandating additional duties and functions to Cabinet members which are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices by virtue of their special knowledge, is a practice longrecognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among the different offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting national interest and general welfare and delivering basic services to the people. The production and supply of energy is undoubtedly one of national interest and is a basic commodity expected by the people. This Court, therefore, finds the designation of the respective members of the Cabinet, as ex-officio members of the NPB, valid.

#44. 646 SCRA 567 G.R. No. 191560 : March 29, 2011. General v. Urro BRION, J.: FACTS: On September 20, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) appointed Imelda C. Roces (Roces) as acting Commissioner of the NAPOLCOM. When Roces died in September 2007, PGMA appointed the petitioner as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in place of Roces. On the same date, PGMA appointed Eduardo U. Escueta (Escueta) as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman. Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro (Urro) in place of the petitioner, Constancia P. de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and Escueta as permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners. Urros appointment paper is dated March 5, 2010; while the appointment papers of De Guzman and Escueta are both dated March 8, 2010. On March 9, 2010, Escueta took his oath of office. In a letter dated March 19, 2010, DILG Head Executive Assistant/Chief-of-Staff issued separate congratulatory letters to the respondents.

After being furnished a copy of the congratulatory letters on March 22, 2010, the petitioner filed the present petition questioning the validity of the respondent’s appointments mainly on the ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments. On March 25, 2010 and April 27, 2010, respondents Urro and de Guzman took their oath of office as NAPOLCOM Commissioners. On July 30, 2010, the newly elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, His Excellency Benigno S. Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments. ISSUE: WoN the Court can exercise its power of judicial review. RULING: No. When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3)recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action. In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondent’s appointments is not the lis mota of the case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present petition: a quo warranto against respondent Urro. The Court already held that for a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested office. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment, he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority. Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary (acting) appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office involved. Here, nothing in the enumeration of functions of the members of the NAPOLCOM that would be subverted or defeated by the President's appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner pending the selection and qualification of a permanent appointee. Viewed as an institution, a survey of pertinent laws and executive issuances will show that the NAPOLCOM has always remained as an office under or within the Executive Department. Clearly, there is nothing repugnant between the petitioners acting appointment, on one hand, and the nature of the functions of the NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of the NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the other.

PEOPLE VS SALLE, JR. FACTS: Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity. The appellants seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993, the Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January 1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. They were granted a conditional pardon that with their acceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants will be released from confinement, the appellants impliedly admitted their guilt and accepted their sentence, and hence, the appeal should be dismissed. They were discharged from the New Bilibid Prison on 28 December 1993. Atty. La’o further informed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote left for his province without consulting her. She then prays that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not Mengote’s conditional pardon is valid? RULING: No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect until the person withdraws his appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final and Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal. – “WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into his

custody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of Investigation.”

In re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong-Torres; G.R. No. 122338; 25 Dec 1995; 251 SCRA 709 FACTS: Wilfredo Torres was convicted of two counts of estafa and sentenced to serve a prison term up to November 02, 2000. He was granted pardon on the condition that he will “not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.” Such conditional pardon was later cancelled on the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole after he was charged of multiple counts of estafa. ISSUE(S): Whether or not a convict who breached his conditional pardon may avail of the writ of habeas corpus. RULING: NO. Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person’s liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. The incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his final conviction until November 02, 2000. Petition for habeas corpus is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Monsanto vs. Factoran Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50 The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Issues: 1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay? 2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment? 3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence? Held: 1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. 3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation. (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989)

Not sure if related sa Executive Department ang Case

AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. and/or LESLIE J. MOUAT, President, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER PATRICIO P. LIBO-ON and ROMEO F. DE LEON, respondents. FACTS: On June 6, 1991, private respondents Virgilio Malinao, Rosemilo Gacusan and Dominador Loriaga filed a Complaint for regularization, sick leave pay, vacation leave pay and night shift differential pay against petitioners American Home Assurance Company and/or Leslie Mouat before the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss insofar as private respondents Malinao and Gacusan were concerned. The motion alleged that petitioner and private respondents Malinao and Gacusan have settled the case by way of a compromise agreement.chanrob private respondents Malinao and Gacusan filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. They averred that petitioners, using "undue influence and trickery considering their educational backgrounds," deluded them into signing the compromise agreement. A Supplemental Opposition was subsequently filed by said private respondents on September 2, 1991. Petitioners argue that respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in giving due course to the Motion to Admit Motion

for Reconsideration which was already filed out of time, and in ordering the hearing on the merits of the case despite the presence of supervening events, both in violation of the constitutional rights of herein petitioners.lesvirtua ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF A CASE DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO MOTION TO RECONSIDERATION OR AN APPEAL DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED. RULING Respondent NLRC gravely erred in reinstating the case below with respect to the claims of respondent Gacusan despite the fact that the latter never filed either a motion for reconsideration or an appeal from the order dismissing his complaint. There is nothing to indicate that he sought relief from the order of dismissal. It was, an error for respondent NLRC :to order for respondent NLRC to order the labor arbiter to continue with the hearing of respondent Gacusan’s complaint. In addition thereto, petitioner had already paid Gacusan the amount P50,000.00 as financial assistance by reason of which the latter executed a General Release and Settlement Agreement. However, Gacusan did not amend his complaint for unpaid wages and other benefits, the receipt of payment and execution of quitclaim by respondent Gacusan effectively extinguished petitioners’ liability to him and this necessarily barred the latter from foreteller pursuing his case which is limited to money claims against the former Gacusan’s indifference in the prosecution of his case before the labor arbiter is made evident by his failure to file an opposition to the first Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioners. The opposition he filed to the second Urgent Motion to Dismiss could, at most, be considered as a mere afterthought, the reinstatement of the case with respect to the claim of respondent Loriaga is totally baseless and completely irregular. On his own initiative and upon his own motion, respondent Loriaga’s complaint against herein petitioners was dismissed by the labor arbiter without prejudice to the refiling of the same. Respondent Loriaga never made an appeal either from the Order dismissing the case with prejudice or from the Order which dismissed his claim without prejudice, upon motion of said respondent himself. Respondent NLRC, in blatant insourciance for the rule mandating strict compliance with the reglementary period for appeals, decided to take cognizance of the motion for reconsideration belatedly filed by respondent Malinao on the basis of "substantial justice," which does not exist in this case. The supposed extreme poverty of the client is not a justifiable excuse for the failure of his counsel to file the motion for reconsideration on time under the circumstances.

DRILON VS CA FACTS: Raul Paredes and Rodolfo Ganzon were charged with double murder; the military promulgated a decision acquitting Raul Paredes but sentencing Rodolfo Ganzon to life imprisonment. Paredes was thereupon released from custody. President Marcos gave a conditional pardon of Ganzon's release after six years of imprisonment; although as a condition, Ganzon shall remain under house arrest but apparently, he was free man, he was free to move in and out of his residence. ISSUE: Whether or not Ganzon’s sentence effectively commuted to six years? RULING: Yes. Commutation does not have to be in any specific form. The fact that he was released after six years and the fact that the house arrest is not a penalty leads to the conclusion that the penalty had been shortened. – The Court is of the opinion that if Ganzon's sentence had been commuted, he has therefore served his sentence and if he has served his sentence fully, he can no longer be reinvestigated, or be made to "complete the service of his sentence." He was supposed to have remained under house arrest, not as a continuation of his sentence, but pursuant to Marcos' vast arrest and commitment powers during martial rule.

RODOLFO D. LLAMAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and MARIANO UN OCAMPO III FACTS: Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him. The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases. They say that the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been “convicted in an administrative case, allegedly because the word “conviction” refers only to criminal cases. ISSUE: WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases. HELD: Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses. The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the court’s considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses. The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government. In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision.

TORRES VS GONZALES FACTS: In 1979, Wilfredo S. Torres was convicted of the crime of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term and to pay an indemnity. On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will

be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President of the Philippines informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner who charged with 20 counts of estafa. On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner. On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. Torres claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon. He was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. But the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. The petition is dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the President determines whether the condition has been violated? 2) Whether or not Torres violated the condition of his pardon? RULING: 1) Yes, only the President alone. The current doctrine holds that, by virtue of Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the President may in his judgment determine whether the condition of the pardon has been violated. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. The convict’s acceptance of the conditional pardon carries with it acceptance of the President’s authority. 2) No. Even though Torres is facing a long list of criminal charges, as many as such charges may be, none of them so far has resulted in a final conviction, without which he cannot be recommitted under the condition of his pardon. An allegation merely accuses the defendant of a crime: it is the conviction that makes him a criminal. In other words, a person is considered to have committed a crime only if he is convicted thereof, and this is done not by his accuser but by the judge. A "judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has committed a crime" is necessary before he could properly be adjudged as having violated his conditional parole.

59. Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago vs. Commission on Elections GR No. 190793 June 19 2009 Sereno, J: FACTS: Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the Respondent Commission on Election (COMELEC), seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 2010 National and Local Elections. It was represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV (Trillanes), and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo). Taking cognizance of the Oakwood incident, the COMELEC denied the Petition, claiming that MAGDALO’s purpose was to employ violence and unlawful means to achieve their goals. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means. HELD: Yes. In view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the members of the MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the context of disqualifications from party registration.

60. Kapunan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals G.R. Nos. 148213-17 March 13, 2009 TINGA, J.: Facts: The petitioners, Edgardo Kapunan and Oscar Legaspi charges with the killing of KMU Chairman Rolando Olalia and his driver Leonor Alay-ay. On June 1986 Olalia and Alay-ay dead bosy was found. The murder case of Olalia is a controversial case during that time, Olalia is a profile individual being the chairman of the KMU at the time of his death. On November 1998, private respondents Feliciano Olalia and Perlina Alay-ay, filed a complaint letter to Department of Justice for the alleged complex kinapping and killing of Olalia and Alay-ay against Edgardo Kapunan and Oscar Legaspi and other men and officers of National Police and AFP. Secretary Serafin Cuevas, the Secretary of Department of Justice, created a panel that were tasked to conduct a preliminary investigation of Olalia case. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss in Department of Justice on the ground that the Amnesty granted to them by the National Amnesty Commission extinguishes their criminal liability under Proclamation 347 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos entitled “Granting of Amnesty to the rebels, insurgents and all other persons, who may or may be committed crimes against public order and crimes committed in furtherance of political ends. Issues: Whether or not the amnesty granted to Kapunan and Legaspi, extinguishes their criminal liability in Olalia case. Held: No. The Panel created by the Department of Justice refused to consider the defense of Amnesty of the petitioners on the ground that the document presented pertaining to the Amnesty failed to show that the Olalia murder case was one of the crimes for which the amnesty was applied for. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition, finding no grave of abuse of discretion on the Panel created by the DOJ, the Appelate Court refused to rule on the applicability of amnesty issued to Kapunan and Legaspi. Finally, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the Amnesty granted to Kapunan and Legaspi pertains only to the crimes against rebellion and not covered the crime of murder of Olalia and Alay-ay case. 61. People vs. Casido G.R. No. 116512. March 7, 1997 DAVIDE, JR., J.: Facts: In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin applied for pardon, as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission. They were granted conditional pardon during the pendency of their appeal. Their applications for amnesty were also favorably acted upon. Issue: Whether or not the pardon and amnesty was valid Held: The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them and not by the pardon. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the

concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress.

62. MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS GR NO September 15, 1989 177 SCRA 668 Facts: After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. Issue: Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines? Ruling: The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national interest. This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate more chaos. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government. The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.

63. Marcos vs. Manglapus G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989

EN BANC: FACTS: Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. RULING: Yes According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not dene what is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and oces (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit nes and forfeitures, after conviction by nal judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23). The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the specic powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

64. In re: Rosalie L. Paraguas 72 SCRA 1, July 6, 1976 PER CURIAM: FACTS: Rosalie Llorente Paraguas was appointed as Municipal Judge. Record shows that she was not among those who were admitted to the Bar examination,took the Bar,failed or passed the Bar Examination whether under her maiden name Rosalie Llorente or her married name Rosalie Llorente Paraguas. Acting Judicial Consultant required her in writing to prove her qualifications as a member of the Philippine Bar, she submitted an affidavit asserting that she took the Bar examination in 1956 under the name of ROSA C. BACULO which was the name registered in school and also the name she used when she took the oath. It is a fact, that there exists a person by the name of Rosa C. Baculo who passed the Bar Examinations in 1956 and was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1957. According to the Acting Judicial Consultant’s Report, Judge Paraguas admitted that it was indeed Rosa C. Baculo who advised her to use that name and to lay claim to her Bar record. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Rosalie L. Paraguas is a bona fide member of the Bar? HELD: No. The fact remains that despite the opportunity given her, Judge Rosalie Paraguas has failed to submit any positive proof or documentation of her ever been duly admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar, and without such qualification, which is an essential requirement for appointment as Judge under the Constitution and the law she cannot be permitted to stay one day longer in the Office of Municipal Judge. In the light of the certification of the Bar Division of this Court, that she is not a member of the Philippine Bar.

65. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on Elections G.R. 161265, Feb. 24, 2004 TINGA, J.: FACTS: Prior to the May 2004 elections, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) has been divided because of a struggle of authority between Party Chair Edgardo Angara and Part Secretary General Agapito Aquino, both having endorsed two differentsets of candidates under the same party, LDP. The matter was brought to the COMELEC. The Commission in its resolution, has recognized the factions creating two subparties: LDP Angara Wing and LDP Aquino Wing. ISSUES: 1. Whether the ascertainment of the identity of political party and its officers within COMELEC jurisdiction? 2. Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in recognizing the two sets of nominations and endosements by the same party? HELD: 1. YES. The court ruled that the COMELEC correctly stated that "the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers" is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample "wherewithal" and "considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections." 2. YES. The COMELEC erred in its resolution. Only those Certificates of Candidacy (COC) signed by the LDP Party Chairman Angara or his duly authorized representative/s shall be recognized 66. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT FACTS: In 1986, the Philippine government obtained from the World Bank an Economic Recovery Loan (ERL) in the amount of US$310 million, which was intended to support the recovery of the Philippine economy during that time of financial crisis. As a condition for granting the loan, the World Bank required the Philippine government to rehabilitate the DBP which was then saddled with huge non-performing loans. Accordingly, the government made a policy entitled Policy Statement for the Development Bank of the Philippines which stated in part:" Furthermore, like all financial institutions under Central Bank supervision, DBP will now be required to have a private external audit, and its Board of Directors will now be opened to adequate private sector representation. It is hoped that with these commitments, DBP can avoid the difficulties of the past and can function as a competitive and viable financial institution within the Philippine financial system."Pursuant to said Policy, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 1079 amending the Central Bank's Manual of Regulations for Banks and other Financial Intermediaries, in line with the government's commitment to the World Bank to require a private external auditor for DBP. Former COA Chairman Teofisto Guingona Jr. did not object said provisions and new regulations imposed. So, DBP hired Joaquin Cunanan & Co. as its external auditor for calendar year 1986. However, during a change of its leadership, the new COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo, wrote the Central Bank Governor protesting the Central Bank's issuance of said Circular No. 1124 which allegedly encroached upon the COA's constitutional and statutory power to audit government agencies. Hence, he issued a Memorandum disallowing payments to said auditing firm saying that the services rendered were unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary. ISSUE: Whether the Constitution vests in the COA the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private external auditors under any circumstance.

RULING: The DBP's petition is meritorious. The COA vigorously asserts that under the first paragraph of Section 2, the COA enjoys the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit all government agencies, including the DBP. The COA contends this is similar to its sole and exclusive authority, under the second paragraph... of the same Section, to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, including rules on the disallowance of unnecessary expenditures of government agencies. The bare language of Section 2, however, shows that the COA's power under the first paragraph... is not declared exclusive, while its authority under the second paragraph is expressly declared "exclusive." There is a significant reason for this marked difference in language. The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual... examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit. The inevitable conclusion is that the COA and the Central Bank have concurrent jurisdiction, under the Constitution, to examine and audit government banks.

67. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS FACTS: Valles, Aedia and Ordonez filed with CHR a joint complaint against EPZA for allegedly violating their human rights when EPZA Project Engineer Damondamon along with 215th PNP Company tried to level the area occupied by complainants. The same parcel of land was reserved and allocated for purpose of development into Cavite Export Processing Zone which was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation and was later sold to EPZA. CHR issued an order of injunction for EPZA and company to desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism and harassment until further order. 2 weeks later the group started bulldozing the area and CHR reiterated its order of injunction, including the Secretary of Public Works and Highways to desist from doing work on the area. EPZA filed a motion to life the order with CHR for lack of authority and said motion was dismissed. EPZA filed the case at bar for certiorari and prohibition alleging that CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing a restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private respondents have no clear and positive right to be protected by an injunction; and that CHR abused its discretion in entertaining the complaint. EPZA’s petition was granted and a TRO was issued ordering CHR to cease and desist from enforcing/implementing the injunction orders. CHR commented that its function is not limited to mere investigation (Art. 13, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution). ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of. RULING: In Carino vs CHR, it was held that CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and never derived by implication. Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the

Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court.A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose. EPZA’s petition is granted.

68. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FACTS: The GSIS dismissed six government employees on account of irregularities in the canvassing of supplies. The employees appealed to the Merit Board. Said board found for the employees and declared the dismissal as illegal because no hearing took place. The GSIS took the issue to the Civil Service which then ruled that the dismissal was indeed illegal. The CSC thereafter ordered the reinstatement of the employees and demanded the payment of backwages. The replacements of the dismissed employees should then be released from service.The GSIS remained unconvinced and raised the issue to the SC. SC affirmed the Civil Service ruling saying “The CSC acted within its authority o Reinstatement was proper”. However, the SC modified the requirement of backpay. Said backpay should be made after the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings. Heirs of the dismissed employees filed a motion for execution of the Civil Service resolution so that backwages can be paid. GSIS however denied the motion saying that the SC modified that part of the ruling. CSC nonetheless thumbed its nose to the GSIS and granted the motion. GSIS was made to pay. Backed against the wall, GSIS filed certiorari with the SC asking that the CSC order be nullified. The GSIS contends that the CSC has no power to execute its judgments. ISSUE: Whether the Civil Service has the power to enforce its judgments. RULING: Yes. The Civil Service Commission is a constitutional commission invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices, which rules should not however diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. In light of all the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.

69. BRILLANTES vs. YORAC FACTS: In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his chairmanship of the COMELEC. Yorac was temporarily placed as his substitute. Brillantes then questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution “in no case shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity”. Brillantes claimed that the choice of the acting chairman should not be appointed for such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission. ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of the COMELEC. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions. The designation made by the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on the quote “administrative expediency” to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. Yorac’s designation is null and unconstitutional.

JUDICIARY CASES 1. TATAD vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FACTS:

The petitioner question the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” The deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase and the (b) full deregulation phase through EO No. 372. The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power. RULING: There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

2. GUINGONA,JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: This case is an offshoot of the investigation conducted by the government in the last quarter of 1995, which delved into the alleged participation of national and local officials in jueteng and other forms of illegal gambling. Although the Court of Appeals upheld the admission into the Witness Protection Program of Potenciano A. Roque, who claimed personal knowledge of such gambling activities, the secretary of justice nonetheless challenges the side opinion of the appellate court that the testimony of the witness must, as a condition precedent to his admission into said program, be shown to be capable of substantial corroboration in its material points. The justice secretary claims that such corroboration need not be demonstrated prior to or simultaneous with the witness admission into the program, as long as such requirement can be demonstrated when he actually testifies in Court. However, inasmuch as Roque has already been admitted into the Program and has actually finished testifying, the issue presented by petitioners has become moot.

ISSUE: Whether or not a witness testimony requires prior or simultaneous corroboration at the time he is admitted into the witness protection security and benefit program. RULING: The Court finds the petition fundamentally defective. The Constitution provides that judicial power “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.” Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands the following: 1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; 2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and 3) the person challenging must have “standing”; that is, he has personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury. In the case at bar, it is at once apparent that petitioners are not requesting that this Court reverse the ruling of the appellate court and disallow the admission in evidence of respondent Roque’s testimony; inasmuch as the assailed decision does not appear to be in conflict with any of their present claims. Petitioners filed this suit out of fear that the assailed decision would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to encourage witnesses to come out and testify. But their apprehension is neither justified nor exemplified by this particular case. A mere apprehension does not give rise to a justiciable controversy.

3. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY vs. MONTEMAYOR FACTS: As a regular Traffic Operators at petitioner’s Davao Office, it was the main function of private respondents Totesora and Marcos to process long distance calls. Said respondents were caught passing free long distance calls to Manila. Ms. Totesora stated that it was not altogether a free call; that she just allowed the parties to talk a little longer without timing the entire call. Ms. Marcos admitted placing a free call to her brother in Manila. Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, petitioner terminated their services. With respect to respondent Macabenta, she claimed that she worked continuously for petitioner from April 1985 to August 1986, she should have been regularised long before. Hence, her termination was illegal. Employees and petitioner submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration and be bound by the decision of Voluntary Arbitrator. Petitioner alleged that public respondent erred in rendering assailed resolutions. ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution of public respondent is subject to judicial review. RULING: Apropos of the power of judicial review, while decisions of voluntary arbitrator are given the highest respect and accorded a certain measure of finality, this does not preclude the exercise of judicial review over such decisions. A voluntary

arbitrator, by the nature of his functions, acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. There is no reason why his decisions involving interpretations of law should be beyond the Supreme Court’s review.

4. KALILID WOOD INDUSTRIES CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Jose Briones, Jr. was granted Original Timber License No. 738-62 for a 5,950 hectare forest area in Loreto, Agusan del Sur. On June 29,1962, he applied for renewal of the license, but the Director of Forestry denied his application. While said motion for reconsideration was pending, another timber license, P.B. De Jesus, now Kalilid Wood Industries Corporation applied for the same area. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Lopez approved the application of de Jesus and directed the Director of Forestry to expedite action on the application. The Director of Forestry, instead of acting on the application, recommended renewal of the expired license of Briones. On November 24, 1989, the Minister of Natural Resources Leido, issued two letter orders in accordance with the Reyes decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the Agusan Trial Courts have jurisdiction to enjoin execution of a final judgment of the Manila Court, which is a co-equal and coordinate branch of the same trial court. RULING: The Court ruled among others: that the issue as to the validity of November 24, 1989 letter orders of the Minister of Resources cannot be relitigated; that a final judgment of this Court cannot be altered or modified by the lower courts; and that this Court cannot reverse or set aside its own final and executory decisions simply because the Executive Department flip-flopped and arrived at new resolutions reversing their earlier decisions already bought before this Court and finally adjudicated. Accordingly, it ruled, among others that the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and the Regional Trial Court of Makati pursuant to Mathay decision are reversed and set aside; and the Reyes decision is declared to be final and must prevail over the Mathay decision.

JUDICIARY CASES 5. 171 SCRA 408 (1989) CHURCH ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, INC. VS SIBULO FACTS: Two cadastral lots situated in Daraga, Albay used to be covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. RO-15434 (17622) and RO-15435 (2270) in the names of predecessors-in-interest of the Llorente Group. In 1971, upon a petition filed in the cadastral case, the OCTs were cancelled, and replaced by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-29762 and T-29763 in the name of the Alcala Group, based on the finding that the predecessors-in-interest of the Llorente Group had previously sold the two lots to the Alcala Group. Thereafter, the Alcala Group sold the two lots to the Spouses Maturgo, who were then issued TCT Nos. T-30744 and T-30746.

On January 18, 1972, the Llorente Group filed before the then Court of First Instance of Albay a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 4564. Named defendants were the Alcala Group and the Spouses Maturgo. The Llorente Group alleged in their complaint that there was fraud committed by the Alcala Group when the latter had the OCTs cancelled, and TCTs issued in their name; and that there was fraud also in the transfer of the two lots to the spouses Maturgo. Petitioner filed a Special Appearance questioning the respondent Court's jurisdiction over its person contending in essence that the court did not and cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by mere order of September 25, 1986 which cannot take the place of summons, much less, when there is as yet nothing in the records or any pleading asserting a claim against the petitioner herein by any party in interest. On the same occasion counsel for petitioner questioned verbally the precipitate issuance of the amended order and the writ of execution, both of which including the order of September 25, 1986, were allegedly issued without any written motion, notice or hearing which not only contravenes the requirements of law but also renders inutile the directive of this Court for conduct of a hearing to determine the rights and obligations of the petitioner. Thus, herein petitioner, on November 26, 1986 filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition or declaratory relief with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit. RULING: Foremost, a careful perusal of the instant petition would disclose that the petitioner tries to convince this Court to set aside the pronouncement earlier made, also by this court, through its First Division in the civil case entitled Fe Madrideo and Narciso Maturgo v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 62091. Such cannot be done. There is nothing in law nor in jurisprudence that sanctions such a proceeding. We need not emphasize the fact that the Supreme Court by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is. It is the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearing. Consequently, We cannot and should not review a case already passed upon by the Highest Tribunal. It is only proper to allow the case to take its rest having attained finality. Finally, it is worth noting that this Court's earlier resolution provided for the reinstatement of the judgment by the lower court. Thus, the Orders in question were issued by the public respondent pursuant to the said pronouncement of reinstatement. Public respondent did not have a choice but to issue the same. Established is the rule that the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right, to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof is the court's ministerial duty compellable by mandamus. (Borja v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 37944, June 30, 1988; Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, G.R. 45825, Julie 30, 1988; Zansibarian Residents Association v. Municipality of Makati, 135 SCRA 235; Garcia v. Echiverri 132 SCRA 631). 6. 17 PHIL 756 ( 1966) – Di gyud nako Makita sa net. 7. 154 SCRA 77 (1987) ANG PING VS. RTC OF MANILA FACTS: Respondents Julio and Zenaida Ko filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the temporary restraining order of the ejectment case ordered by the metropolitan trial court of Manila or the preliminary injunction to stop such implementation of the said case by the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 40. Contradictory decisions where rendered by the lower courts concerned regarding the disputed premises involving the Camp of Ang Ping and Pimentel, the new owner of the disputed property acquired from a sale by T&L Development Corporation, previous owner of the property and is occupied by Julio and Zenaida Ko of which they were lessees even before the sale was done. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila ordered the camp of Julio Ko to vacate the disputed premises in favor of the petitioners and pay the latter a monthly rent of 5,000 pesos from March 1, 1981 until after they vacate the area less the other payments that were settled. However, RTC granted partially a motion for reconsideration by respondents lowering the ruled amount to be paid by them. The petitioners then, filed a motion to reconsider the decision of the RTC; however, their petition were denied so it resorted them to go back to MTC of manila and filed a motion for execution of the judgement rendered by the said court regarding the case. Thus, respondents opposed the motion because of the grounds that the RTC decided to nullify the previous sale of the property, of which is said to be contrary to Article 19 of the Civil Code, ordered the petitioners to sell the 190 square

meters of land they had purchased from respondents upon paying them 190,000 Pesos by Julio Ko. However, the said grounds by the respondents were denied by MTC manila and still ordered the execution of the ejectment case. Moreover, a petition was filed, of which is still pending by the camp of Ang Ping in the Court of Appeals regarding the nullification of the sale ISSUE: Whether or not an execution of a judgment ordering to vacate a disputed property will be superseded by a decision rendered by a superior court ordering the nullification of sale and granting the legal redemption in favor of the respondents. HELD: No, such decision of a superior court will not in any case supersede the decision of an inferior court for the reason that both decisions are tackling an entirely different matter. Unlawful detainer is a case concerning material possession while an action for reconveyance of a property is an issue of ownership. However, the court reiterated that a lower court has no capacities to interpret or reverse a decision of a higher court. Wherefore, the Supreme Court deemed that they have the final say in the matters of any justifiable controversy. On the other hand, the court said that the issue here is to settle the execution of the decision in the ejectment case and that on the matters of the nullification of sale and reconveyance of property should be decided by the proper courts and both parties have equal chances of winning. Moreover, they found that such decision of the RTC was improperly issued and that they side the petitioners. The court have ruled to immediately execute the decision of the ejectment case, sets aside the orders concerning the injunction of such and deemed that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration regarding this matter. 8. 148 SCRA 382 (1987) IN RE: WENCESLAO LAURETA FACTS: Eva Maravilla Ilustre, in her fourth case before the Supreme Court, has been held in contempt due to the letters she sent to individual Justices, her efforts to disparage the SC in the media, and her complaint against them with the Tanodbayan. Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, her counsel, is judged to have committed acts unbecoming of an officer of the Court, and has been suspended indefinitely. Incriminating acts of Eva Maravilla Ilustre: wrote threatening letters to the Justices of the Supreme Court; filed an Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan that completely disregarded facts, circumstances, and legal considerations; instigated the circulation of false headline implying graft and corruption charges against Justices Involvement of Atty. Wenceslao Laureta: likely wrote the threatening letters sent to the Justices in Ilustre’s name; likely encouraged Ilustre’s pursuit of her Affidavit-Complaint with the Tanodbayan and her disparaging remarks regarding the Justices in her letters and comments to the media; was responsible for all the acts of his clients ISSUE/S: WoN the Justices of the First Division acted in bad faith RULING: NO. Ilustre has lost three times in court, and by virtue of res judicata, theEscolin Decision and the Javellana Resolution, which bar her from acquiringMaravilla’s properties, serve as final judgment of the case. SC gave ample time and consideration to her petitions, but ultimately held that they had no merit (as stated in their Banc Decision) Justice Yap clarified that he was not aware that his former partner Atty. SedfreyOrdoñez was the counsel for the respondents, and inhibited himself immediately upon finding out. Court is not duty bound to issue signed Decisions all the time, if it deems it unnecessary.

9. 199 SCRA 405 (1991) PHIL. VETERANS INVESTMENT DEV CORP. VS VELEZ FACTS: On September 8, 1987, the respondent, Philippine Veterans Assistance Commission (PVAC), filed in the Regional Trial Court a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the petitioners –– the Philippine Veterans Investment Development Corporation (PHIVDEC) and PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority (PIA). The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 11157 and raffled to Branch XX, presided over by respondent Judge Alejandro M. Velez. On November 20, 1987, PHIVIDEC and PIA filed an answer with counterclaim. They alleged lack of jurisdiction by the trial court over the case for it is allegedly covered by the arbitration powers of the Government Corporate Counsel under Presidential Decree No. 242 of July 9, 1973, Sections 3-b and 6 of which prescribe the procedure for the administrative settlement and adjudication of disputes, claims, and controversies between or among government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, Sections 1, 3-b and 6 of P.D. 242 In an order dated March 15, 1988, Judge Velez denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that P.D. No. 242 is "unconstitutional for being an act that amounts to an emasculation and impairment of the judicial power of review of this court and of the Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution ISSUE: Whether or not the P.D No. 242 is unconstitutional RULING: P.D. No. 242 is not unconstitutional.1âwphi1 It does not diminish the jurisdiction of courts but only prescribes an administrative procedure for the settlement of certain types of disputes between or among departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, so that they need not always repair to the courts for the settlement of controversies arising from the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or agreements. The procedure is not much different, and no less desirable, than the arbitration procedures provided in Republic Act No. 876 (Arbitration Law) and in Section 26, R.A. 6715 (The Labor Code). It is an alternative to, or a substitute for, traditional litigation in court with the added advantage of avoiding the delays, vexations and expense of court proceedings. Or, as P.D. No. 242 itself explains, its purpose is "the elimination of needless clogging of court dockets to prevent the waste of time and energies not only of the government lawyers but also of the courts, and eliminates expenses incurred in the filing and prosecution of judicial actions. P.D. No. 242 is a valid law prescribing an administrative arbitration procedure for certain disputes among offices, agencies and instrumentalities under the executive control and supervision of the President of the Philippines. Since PVAC filed Civil Case No. 11157 against PHIVIDEC and PIA without first passing through the administrative channel, the judicial action was premature for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, hence, dismissible on that account (Chia vs. Acting Collector of Customs, 177 SCRA 755). 10. 213 SCRA 640 (1992) MALAYAN INTEGRATED INDUSTRIES, CORP VS CA FACTS: In 1977, a reclamation project was sought to be undertaken by the City of Mandaue. It signed a contract with Malayan Integrated Industries Corporation to actualize the project. The Justice Secretary opined that only the national government can undertake reclamation projects however the Public Estates Authority (PEA) can delegate such function to Mandaue. The Sanggunian of Mandaue then authorized its mayor to enter into a Memorandum of Agreement with the PEA to validate the contract with Malayan. The project however remained hanging until after the EDSA Revolution. The contract was re-indorsed to then president Corazon Aquino who referred the contract back to PEA. After this, the mayor of Mandaue chose to open a new contract with another company (F.F. Cruz & Co.) since he deemed that the Office of the President has some reservations against the contract with Malayan. The mayor submitted the new contract before the PEA which endorsed it to the Office of the President which approved the same and rescinded the earlier contract between Mandaue and Malayan. The recommendation was however signed by the Executive Secretary and not the president herself. ISSUE:

Whether or not the recommendation was validly approved. HELD:

Yes. Although the letter to the PEA advising it of the approval of the reclamation contract between the City of Mandaue and F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. and the disapproval of the earlier agreement between the City of Mandaue and MALAYAN, was signed by the Executive Secretary, “by authority of the President,” and not by the President’s own hand, the Executive Secretary’s action is presumed to be valid and to have been regularly performed in behalf of the President and thus should be accorded due respect. As head of the Executive Office, the Executive Secretary, is an alter ego of the President. One of

his myriad functions is “to exercise primary authority to sign papers `By authority of the President,’ attest executive orders and other presidential issuances unless attestation is specifically delegated to other officials by him or by the President; assist the President in the administration of special projects; and perform such other functions as the President may direct”, his personality is in reality “but the projection of that of the President,” his acts, “performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” The approval by the Office of the President of the reclamation contract in favor of F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. and the rejection of the contract with MALAYAN, is not subject to review by the courts in view of the principle of separation of powers which accords co-equal status to the three great branches of the government, absent any showing that the President, in doing so, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 11. 202 SCRA 844 (1991) LLAMAS VS ORBOS Facts: Governor Ocampo of Tarlac was found guilty of graft and corruption. He was suspended for office for 90 days; hence his vice-governor, Llamas, assumed office. Less than two months, however, Executive Secretary Orbos, without ruling on Ocampo's Motion for Reconsideration, issued a Resolution granting executive clemency. Thus, Ocampo re-assumed the governorship of the province. Llamas filed a petition questioning said Resolution. He contends that executive clemency could be granted by the President only in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases. According to the him, the qualifying phrase "after conviction by final judgment" in Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution applies solely to criminal cases. He also contends that the pardon granted was premature since Ocampo's motion for reconsideration has abated the running of the reglementary period for finality of judgment and that his constitutional rights to due process were violated since he was not notified of the pardon. Issues: 1. 2.

May

the Has

president there

grant

executive clemency in administrative cases? been

a final judgment?

3. Was petitioner's constitutional rights to due process violated when he was not notified of the pardon? Held: 1. Yes. The president can grant executive clemency based in Art. VII sec. 19 of the constitution. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. If the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. If executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses. Also a number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize the exercise of executive clemency in administrative cases. One example of which is Sec. 43 of PD 807 which provides that in meritorious cases, the president may commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and employees in disciplinary cases. Moreover, the intent of the constitutional commission is to give the president the power to grant executive clemency and is not to be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the constitution. There is no reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. If the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.

2. Yes. There has been a final judgment because upon acceptance of the presidential pardon, the grantee is deemed to have waived any appeal which he may have filed. Consequently, Ocampo's acceptance of the presidential pardon "serves to put an end" to the motion for reconsideration and renders the subject decision final. 3. No. Pardon has been defined as "the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. Thus, assuming that petitioner was not notified of the subject pardon, it is only because said notice is unnecessary.

12. 283 SCRA 211 (1997) MORALES VS CA Facts: Petitioner was charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He then filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground the penalty for the offense charged should not exceed prision correccional or six years’ worth of imprisonment and that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the case.In denying this motion, the RTC reasons out that, while MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over caseswith penalties of not more than six years of imprisonment, an exception is provided in the said Act. It provides the Court of First Instance (currently, the RTC) shall have “concurrent original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable under the Act.”Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction over the case.Hence, this petitionIn raising the same to SC, petitioner furthers that, since only about 0.5 gram of shabu was involved, the imposable penalty would not exceed prision correccional. Therefore, RTC doesn’t have jurisdiction over his case. Issue: Whether RTC has jurisdiction to try petitioner’s alleged violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, but only insofar as the issue of jurisdiction of respondent Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 40670 is concerned. The Resolutions of 8 August and 13 September 1996 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE, while the challenged orders in Criminal Case No. 96-8443 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 116, are AFFIRMED. The trial court is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 96-8443 with all reasonable dispatch. No. 13 CIR v. Santos, 277 SCRA 617 (1997) COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioners, vs HON. APOLINARIO B. SANTOS HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: Facts: Guild of Phil. Jewelers, Inc. questions the constitutionality of certain provisions of the NIRC and Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. it is their contention that the present Tariff and tax structure increases manufacturing costs and render local jewelry manufacturers uncompetitive against other countries, in support of their position, they submitted what they purported to be an exhaustive study of the tax rates on jewelry prevailing in other Asian countries, in comparison to tax rates levied in the country. Judge Santos of RTC Pasig, ruled that the laws in question are confiscatory and oppressive and declared them INOPERATIVE and WITHOUT FORCE AND EFFECT insofar as petitioners are concerned.

Petitioner CIR assailed decision rendered by respondent judge contending that the latter has no authority to pass judgement upon the taxation policy of the Government. Petitioners also impugn the decision asserting that there was no showing the tax laws on jewelry are confiscatory. Issue: I. Whether RTC has authority to pass judgment upon taxation policy of the government. II. WON the state has the power to select the subjects of taxation. Ruling: I. The policy of the court is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. This is not to say that RTC has no power whatsoever to declare a law unconstitutional. But this authority does not extend to deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. RTC have the power to declare the law unconstitutional but this authority does not extend to deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. RTC can only look into the validity of a provision, that is whether or not it has been passed according to the provisions laid down by law, and thus cannot inquire as to the reasons for its existence. II. YES. The respondents presented an exhaustive study on the tax rates on jewelry levied by different Asian countries. This is meant to convince us that compared to other countries; the tax rates imposed on said industry in the Philippines is oppressive and confiscatory. This Court, however, cannot subscribe to the theory that the tax rates of other countries should be used as a yardstick in determining what may be the proper subjects of taxation in our own country. It should be pointed out that in imposing the aforementioned taxes and duties, the State, acting through the legislative and executive branches, is exercising its sovereign prerogative. It is inherent in the power to tax that the State be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequalities which result from a singling out or one particular class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation."

No. 14 250 SCRA 500 (wala koy makita) No. 15 Lagmay vs. Court of Appeals 199 SCRA 501 (1991) G.R. No. 84929. July 23, 1991 Facts: Adela Tuason is the owner of a parcel of land. She leased the same to Julio Lagmay and 2 others. Tuason got sick and she needed to sell her land. She then sent letters to each of her lessees advising them of her intention to sell the land and that she is giving them the option to buy what they are occupying. Lagmay et al did not bother to reply. Tuason thereafter did not collect the rentals from each. Lagmay et al bothered not to pay. After 2 years, Tuason’s sisters politely advised Lagmay et al to vacate the land so that Tuason could sell the same. Lagmay et al did not reply not until 3 months and this time they agreed to buy the parcel of land. Tuason however did not reply. Lagmay et al the filed a complaint asserting their right over the land they’ve been occupying for quite some time as guaranteed by PD 1517 or the Urban Land Reform Law. The lower court ruled that Lagmay et al waived their right under the said PD when they refused to reply to Tuason’s initial offer. Lagmay et al appealed before the Court of Appeals. The CA upheld the lower court. The CA additionally pointed out that the parcel of land in question is not declared as an “urban land” under PD 1967. Lagmay et al filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the constitutionality of PD 1967. The CA denied the motion ruling that Lagmay et al cannot raise a question of law since they did not raise the same during the trial of merits. ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutionality of PD 1967 is ripe for judicial determination in this case. HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that they must avoid the issue of constitutionality in this case because the controversy can be decided by other means. The issue of constitutionality of a statute, executive order or proclamation must be the very lis mota presented in a case. The Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case and is necessary to its determination. Although the Court may deem it best for public policy to resolve the constitutional issue considering that numerous persons are affected by the questioned proclamation there are other grounds by which this case may be resolved on a non-constitutional determination.

No. 16 (wala koy makita sa internet) No. 17 Casis vs. Court of Appeals 180 SCRA 732 Facts: The property in question was sold twice by Nenita Suroza, first to defendant and private respondent herein Cielito T. Santos on June 30, 1983 and second, to plaintiff Roderick Casis on July 19, 1983. It appears that the owner's copy of the certificate of title was handed by Nenita Suroza to defendant Santos as early as February 10, 1983, upon payment by Santos of the mortgage redemption amount to a certain Atty. Oscar Reyes as part of the purchase price of the subject property. The deed of sale however in favor of Cielito Santos was executed by Suroza only on June 23, 1983, upon payment of the balance of the purchase price. Defendant Santos did not however register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds even if he took possession of the subject property by his acceptance of the key to the house which he started renovating thru the help of an architect. Meanwhile Suroza requested that she be given 45 days to look for another place in which to reside and for time to remove her personal belongings. Earlier on May 17, 1983, Suroza filed a petition for the reconstitution of her title to the property on the alleged ground that her original title was lost. Having been able to obtain a reconstituted title, Nenita Suroza again sold the same property on July 19, 1983 to plaintiff Roderick Casis who was able to register said sale and was able to obtain a certificate of title to the land in his name thereby cancelling the former certificate of title in the name of Nenita V. Suroza. A complaint for Ejectment with Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Damages was filed with the court a quo or the Metropolitan Trial Court by Roderick M. Casis against Cielito T. Santos. Issue: Who is entitled to the possession of the said property in question. Ruling: To the mind of this Court, it is reasonable to consider defendant to have taken possession of subject property from the time of its sale to him on June 23, 1983, and after the key was handed over to his mother, although Mrs. Suroza might have stayed there for a little while more for the aforecited purpose. And indicative of the fact that defendant was then already possessor of the property in the concept of owner thereof, his mother, according to her undisputed testimony, cause construction materials to be brought to the place for use in renovating subject property. The fact that Mrs. Suroza stayed for a while longer on the property or even for the whole period of 45 days as originally requested by her, for that matter did not detract from defendant's being the true possesser of said property. Mrs. Suroza's extended stay was by mere tolerance of defendant and not by virtue of her being the owner any longer of the property. With the sale of the property in question in favor of the defendant, plaintiff can have no better right of possession, and possibly ownership, for that matter over the property. It must be stressed that as early as February 10, 1983 Nenita Suroza somehow already recognized the right of ownership and possession of the defendant over the property in issue.

No. 18 People vs. Gutierrez 36 SCRA 172 G.R. Nos. L-32282-83 November 26, 1970 PEOPLE vs.HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur REYES, J.B.L., J.: Facts: A group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, several residential houses were likewise burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and in the death of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa. After investigation by the authorities, information charging seventeen private respondents herein, together with 82 other unidentified persons, who allegedly burned several residential houses. Accused Camilo Pilotin and Vincent Crisologo furnished bail, and voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge Gutierrez, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was then set for 27, 28 and 29 July 1970. It appears that on the same day, 15 June, the Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing Judge Lino Anover, of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, with official station at San Fernando, La Union, to hold a special term in Ilocos Sur, from and after 1 July 1970. Three days thereafter, the Secretary further issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, "in the interest of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented by Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274" of the Department of Justice. On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of cases 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the Administrative Orders just mentioned and calling attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal safety, as shown in their affidavits . The accused vigorously opposed such transfer, and the respondent judge declined the transfer sought, on the ground that Administrative Order No. 258 only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for the more expeditious disposal of the cases, and in the cases involved the accused had already pleaded; that the same should have been done right at the very inception of these cases. At petitioners' request this Court enjoined the respondent Judge Gutierrez from proceeding with the trial of the cases until further orders. Issue: (1) W/N RA No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and individual cases; (2) W/N the SC possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a CFI be transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand. Held: (1) No. Any such power, even in the guise of administrative regulation of executive affairs, trenches upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; and while not directly depriving the courts of their independence, it would endanger the rights and immunities of the accused or civil party. It could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases, so as to produce a result in harmony with the Administration's preferences.

The creation by Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance, and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts. (2) Yes. We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced by an impasse of the kind now before Us, are to confess themselves impotent to further the cause of justice. The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts "can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government". One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands While not expressly conferred by Act 136, We find it difficult to believe that the framers' intent was to deny, by silence, to the Philippine Courts, and particularly upon this Supreme Court, the inherent jurisdiction possessed by the English and American courts under their common law heritage to transfer the place of trial of cases in order to secure and promote the ends of justice, by providing fair and impartial inquiry and adjudication.

No. 19 Aguirre vs. Rana 403 SCRA 342, June 10, 2003 Facts: Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled mass oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in an election. On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body. On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate. Issue: Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar Ruling: The Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

No. 20 Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210, September 03, 1991 G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991 Facts: Renato Cayetano questioned Christian Monsod’s nomination by President Corazon Aquino as Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Cayetano stated that Monsod allegedly lacked the necessary requirement of practicing law for at least 10 years. However, despite Cayetano’s objection, the Commission on Appointments (COA) still confirmed Monsod’s appointment. Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming Monsod’s appointment. Held: No. COA’s power to give consent to the nomination of the COMELEC chairman by the President is mandated by the Constitution under Article IX, Section 1 (2), Sub Article C. It provides: “The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.” The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion to whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. Therefore, there is no occasion for the Supreme Court to exercise its corrective power since COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion based on the evidence presented. In re Atty. Marcial Edillon 84 SCRA 554, August 03, 1978 Facts: On November 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) unanimously recommended to the Court the removal of the name of Respondent, a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines, from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP notwithstanding multiple due notices sent to him. Issue: Whether or not the provision of the court rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. Ruling: No, the provision of the court rule requiring payment of a membership fee is not void. Sec. 5 of Art. X of the 1973 Constitution provides that “The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and.inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. xxx” In this case, nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs Court of Appeals 329 SCRA 314, March 31, 2000 Facts: Petitioner Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedo dependent upon prescriptions or limitations to be issued by local optometrists. Petitioner basically is not allowed to practice optometry within the city (but may sell glasses only). Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under the permit. Private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI), Iligan Chapter, lodged a complaint against the petitioner before the Office of the City Mayor, alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. Acting on such complaint, then City Mayor conduct an investigation through the City Legal Officer on the matter. Respondent City Legal Officer submitted a report to the City Mayor finding the herein petitioner guilty of violating all the conditions of its business permit and recommending the disqualification of petitioner from operating its business in Iligan City. ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police power. RULING: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege – estoppel does not apply.

Fontanilla vs Maliaman 194 SCRA 486, February 27, 1991 Facts: On December 1, 1989, the Court rendered a decision declaring National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency performing proprietary functions. Like an ordinary employer, NIA was held liable for the injuries, resulting in death, of Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose and Virginia Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or negligence of NIA’s driver employee Hugo Garcia; and NIA was ordered to pay the petitioners damages. The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains, however, that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special agent. For this, they have filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 1990. Issue: Whether or not NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused by its driver, who was not its special agent. Ruling: Yes, NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. Under the law, the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. Furthermore, NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. In this case, the National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. NIA was created for the purpose of “constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects.” The court concluded that the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.

Santiago vs Guingona, Jr. 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998 Facts: During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators belonging to the LakasNUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto. Issue: Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure Ruling: Separation

of

powers:

Courts

may

not

intervene

in

the

internal

affairs

of

legislature

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.

Philippine Judges Association vs Prado 227 SCRA 703, November 11, 1993 Facts: Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to withdraw franking privileges, a privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of charge, from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. Issue: Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional. Ruling: No, Sec 35 of RA 7354 is not constitutional. Sec. 1, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that “No person shall be deprived of the equal protection of laws." In this case, the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

Zansibarian Residents Asso. Vs Municipality of Makati 135 SCRA 235, February 28, 1985 Facts: Petitioner Zansibarian Residents Association, through the instant petition for "Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction" prays that respondents be ordered (a) to cease and desist from subdividing the land in question and distributing them to beneficiaries or persons other than the members of petitioner association; (b) to restore its members to the possession and occupancy of their respective lots, rebuilding their houses and restoring them to their condition prior to their demolition at the expense of respondent Municipality of Makati; and (c) to permanently subdivide the land in question and award them to its members pursuant to law. Petitioner further prays that a temporary restraining order be issued against the respondents Municipality of Makati, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and the National Housing Authority, ordering them to cease and desist from subdividing the land in question and distributing them to beneficiaries or persons who are not listed in their petition. This petition is not the first case filed by petitioner and/or its members against respondents, particularly respondent Municipality of Makati. As early as October 1978, the same residents of the area in question filed actions for INJUNCTION. The cases were docketed as Civil Case No. 31141 and 38811 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, Makati, Metro Manila. On motion of defendants, the said cases was dismissed in an Order dated March 31, 1982 on ground of res judicata. Issue: Whether or not, the dismissal of the case by the court was appropriate on ground of res judicata Ruling: This present action is already barred by the prior judgments rendered in Civil Case No. 31146 and Civil Case No. 38811, both for injunction principally to enjoin or restrain defendants from ejecting petitioner-members and/or demolishing their houses. There is "bar by prior judgment" when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case which is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case A plaintiff who deliberately selects his forum and then unsuccessfully presents his proofs is bound by such adverse judgment. To hold otherwise, would allow repeated litigation of identical issues. Litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issues raised therein should be laid at rest. 6 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is DISMISSED. Peralta vs COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30, March 11, 1978 Facts: Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa Elections. He, along with others, assailed the constitutionality of PD 1269 or the 1978 Election Code. Secs140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to 28, of the 1978 Election Code, grants the voter the option to vote either for individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by simply writing in the space provided for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation (office-block ballot). Peralta was vehement in contending that the optional block voting scheme is violative of this provision of the

Constitution: “Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.” He sought the shelter of its protection for himself and other independent candidates who, according to him, would be thus made to suffer if the assailed provision is not nullified. Essentially, in terms of individual rights, he would raise a due process and equal protection question. The main objection of Peralta against the optional straight party voting provided for in the Code is that an independent candidate would be discriminated against because by merely writing on his ballot the name of a political party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an advantage which the independent candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it is contended that the candidate who is not a party-member is deprived of the equal protection of the laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to Sec 9 of Article XII, of the 1973 Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the 1978 Election Code is violative of equal protection. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the 1978 Election Code is valid. Before a voter prepares his ballot, the voter will be able to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will receive more than one vote, whether he is voted individually or as a candidate of a party group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. The choice is his. No one can compel him to do otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion. Certainly, before filing his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the advantages under the law accruing to candidates of a political party or group. If he wishes to avail himself of such alleged advantages as an official candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a political party group or aggrupation. In other words, the choice is his. In making his decision, it must be assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and considered the relative advantages and disadvantages of either alternative. So long as the application of the rule depends on his voluntary action or decision, he cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was the victim of discrimination.

Nestlé Philippines, Inc. vs. Sanchez 154 SCRA 542 , September 30, 1987 Facts: During the period July 8-10, 1987, Union of Filipino Employees, and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia, intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since 17 June 1981 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loudspeakers. These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Thus, on 10 July 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino, Lito Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on 14 July

1987 at 10:30 a.m. and then and there to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with. On the appointed date and time, the individuals appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, who was still recuperating from an operation. Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that he had explained to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances. He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about 75 unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor Union. To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the citation and that they will abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on 17 July 1987. Issue: Whether the respondents should be cited for contempt for their continued picketing at the Supreme Court’s premises. Ruling: The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies." Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." The acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of the Court, but equally a violation of the right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. Still, the individuals cited, who are nonlawyers, are not knowledgeable in the intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. The incident should therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members. 29. Galvez vs. Eduardo A.M. No. MTJ-94-984. January 30, 1996 KAPUNAN, J.: Facts: an administrative complaint filed by Glady M. Galvez charging respondent Judge Geminiano A. Eduardo of the Metropolitan Trial Court with grave misconduct for issuing a 2 warrant of arrests which included her when in fact, she was not an accused in said criminal case; one for Grave Oral Defamation where she was impleaded as her husbands co-accused; and another for Grave Threats where she was not cited as a defendant. Respondent claimed that such issuance of warrant of arrest was a clerical error. The signature of the judge on the warrant of arrest was done in good faith and without malice. Respondent further averred that the manner by which the warrant was served was beyond his control. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint as the warrant of arrest did not render substantial procedural prejudice to the complainant. Complainant promptly replied that the issuance of two warrants of arrest as respondent belies the claim that this was due to clerical error. The mistake was more out of gross negligence which negates any presumption of good faith. Issue: Whether or not the respondent is negligent although the wrong done was through a mere clerical error.

Ruling: Yes. The issuance of a warrant of arrest must not be taken lightly nor should it be considered as one of the usual paperwork of the judge that just pass through his hands for his signature. The Judge cannot simply take refuge behind the inefficiency or negligence of his court personnel as liberty of a person is at stake in these matters. He should supervise his staff in the performance of their duties, observing a high degree of professionalism and efficiency. He is directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions. Court personnel are not the guardians of a judges responsibility.

30. Estoya vs. Abraham-Singson ADM MATTER No. RTJ-91-758 September 26, 1994 PER CURIAM: Facts: A complaint signed by 47 employees and officers of several branches of the RTC Antique was filed with the SC. The signatories allege Judge Singson’s gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. On one case, the judge promulgated on 19 December 1991 an order acquitting the accused in People vs. Resuma although the decision made in said case has not yet been completed, as to the discussion portion and final typing, for the reason of "Christmas season and . . . humanitarian reasons," and releasing later the decision which was made to appear as having been prepared and signed on 10 December 1991. The same also informed on 17 July 1991 in open court acquitting the accused in People vs. Barayoga with pronouncement she considered as the promulgation of the judgment. She then dictated and ordered the Branch Clerk of Court to mail copies each of the decision. She later antedated the judgment to 8 May 1991 Issue: Whether or not the judge’s so called promulgations violated provisions of the constitution Ruling: Yes, the Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution mandates that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, and that under the Rules of Court, a judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him, shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved as admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based, and must be filed with the Clerk of Court. The filing is the rendition of the judgment, as distinguished from the promulgation thereof. As of the respective dates of promulgation as aforementioned, the respondent had not yet rendered her decision; there was then nothing yet to promulgate. Compounding the irregularity was the antedating of the decision subsequently rendered.

31. De Vera vs. Dames II AM No. RTJ-99-1455. July 13, 1999 PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: Reynaldo De Vera, a school teacher, reported in writing to the schools division superintendent the treasure hunting and excavation that had been made within the premises of the school in which Prosecutor Oscar J. Villafuerte and his Kin were involved. For the said letter made by De Vera, Prosecutor Villafuerte filed 3 cases of libel. The respondent, Judge Sancho Dames II erred by giving due course to said malicious criminal complaint although the letter was a privileged communication in which the law recognizes a private, protected relationship. Furthermore, the said judge unjustly denied motions for inhibition and reconsideration of the complainant and his counsel, and prematurely released a judgment and had the same published in a local newspaper long before the promulgation of his decision. The respondent Judge rendered a Decision dated April 15, 1994 convicting the accused of the 3 charges of libel filed against him; and from the said Decision, the accused appealed and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals in which the decision of the lower court was reversed and the accused-appellant was acquitted. A petition for Removal was filed by Reynaldo de Vera, charging Judge Dames II with serious misconduct, premature release of decision, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. Issue: Whether or not the respondent Judge failed to adhere to the basic precept enshrined in Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution. Ruling: Yes. The respondent precipitately concluded that the letter was defamatory without sufficiently explaining why. Calling the trial courts Decision baseless, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court ruling on the defamatory nature of the letter was not supported by any factual and legal justification. This statement was echoed by the OCA, which noted that respondents Decision lacked factual and legal basis. In fact, respondent failed to cite any legal principle or authority to support his conclusion. Indeed, a meticulous scrutiny of the said judgment substantiates the observations of the Court of Appeals and the OCA. Indubitably, the respondents Decision was erroneous as it was baseless.

32. Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995 PER CURIAM: Facts: Petitioner, Joaquin Borromeo, filed a complaint for damages and charged several personnel of the Division Clerk of Court, Third Division and Chief of Judicial Records of the Supreme Court with usurpation of judicial functions, for allegedly issuing biased, fake, baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273. This petition is based on the resolution of the Supreme Court through its Third Division which disposed of Borromeo's petition which was noted that the motion merely reiterated the same arguments earlier raised and already passed upon by the Court and was, therefore without merit. The petitioner contends that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not state the facts and the law on which they were based and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore "unconstitutional, null and void. Issue: Whether or not the resolution is unconstitutional violating Section 14, Article VIII, of the Constitution? Ruling: No, the resolution is constitutional. This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against officials of the Court. In several letter-complaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman, Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he "suffered injustices," because of the disposition of the four (4) cases he separately appealed to this Court which were already resolved by minute resolutions Section 14, Article VIII, of the Constitution states that “No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” However, when the Court, after deliberating on an issue and states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, then there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

33. Bernabe vs. Geraldez G.R. No. L-39721 July 15, 1975 FERNANDO, J.: Facts: A procedural point raised in this certiorari proceeding by petitioner Braulio Bernabe. He is appealing from an adverse judgment in a forcible entry case where there was no trial de novo conducted by respondent Judge. The records show that the defendant-appellant appealed this case for not having been satisfied with the decision of the lower court, and in view of his failure to submit a memorandum, he likewise failed to point out the errors, if any, committed by the municipal court. Issue: Whether or not the respondent-Judge violated Article 8, Section 14 of the constitution in denying trial de Novo to petitioner which failed to submit a memorandum. Ruling: No. It cannot be said of respondent Judge's decision that what is ordained by the Constitution had been ignored. A reading thereof suffices clearly to indicate why the action for forcible entry succeeded. There was no failing of sufficient gravity. It is not essential that the language employed states with particularity each and every element that enters into any judgment. It is enough that as long as the party litigants are fully cognizant of the reason of the outcome of the case, considering the facts established and the law applicable, it cannot be alleged with success that there was no deference shown to this provision of the Constitution.

34. Fortich vs. Corona, G.R. No. 131457. August 19, 1999 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Facts: On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President issued a decision converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates for the upcoming 1998 elections intervened on behalf of the farmers. Because of this, the Office of the President re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically motivated”, “win-win” resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory. Issue: May the Supreme Court en banc review a decision that had long become final and executory? Ruling: No. Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the

decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers

35. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Butalid A.M. No. RTJ-96-1337. August 5, 1998 PER CURIAM: Facts: Respondent judge Walerico B. Butalid failed to decide within the 90-day reglementary period as (Section 15 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides) a total of 96 cases which had been submitted for decision, and falsified his certificates of service from July 1994 to December 1995 in order to conceal his failure. Respondent contended that the certificate of service is a mere routine requirement, and that in any event, the Court has no basis for disciplining him because neither this Court nor Congress has provided for any sanction for the failure of judges to decide cases submitted within the period prescribed by the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court may discipline the defendant. Ruling: Yes, Under Section 6 of Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has administrative supervision of all courts and the personnel thereof. The Court's power of supervision carries with it the power to discipline and impose appropriate sanctions for the commission of administrative offenses. The Court cannot compromise on the enforcement of the duty of judges to decide cases on time. We have time and again said that judges should be the embodiment of competence and integrity. Respondent judge failed to live up to the honor and responsibilities of his office. His transgression, taken in their totality, justify the imposition of the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service. The Court finds respondent judge's failure to decide 96 cases within the time required by law to be inexcusable as the 90day period for deciding cases should be observed by all judges, unless they have been granted additional time to dispose of cases. In regards to the contention of the certificate of service, the court gave no merits to it as as a certificate of service is an instrument essential to the fulfillment by the judges of their duty to speedily dispose of their cases as mandated by the Constitution. A judge who fails to decide cases within the prescribed period but collects his salary upon a false certificates is guilty of dishonesty and deserves the condemnation of all right thinking men. RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THEPROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OFTHE SUPREME COURT A.M. NO. 11-7-10-SC JULY 31, 2012

FACTS: Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of

the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,3 when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98569-A4 dated August 5, 1998. Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources. ISSUE: Whether or not COA’s interference, in this case, violates the judiciary’s autonomy. HELD: Yes. The COA's authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. The Constitution mandates that, in relation to judicial independence, the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary's fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET ORCURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY. A. M. No. 09-8-6-SC June 13, 2012. FACTS: Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN) of the Justices of this Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their database of information on government officials. Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher-writer also of the PCIJ, likewise sought for copies of the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA), for the same above-stated purpose. The special committee created by the Supreme Court to review the request issued a Memorandum recommending the creation of a Committee on Public Disclosure to take over the functions of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with respect to requests for copies of SALN and other personal documents of members of the Judiciary. Several requests for copies of the SALN and other personal documents of the Justices of this Court, the CA and the Sandiganbayan (SB) were also filed. ISSUE: Whether or not the SALN of Supreme Court Justices can be released to the public. HELD: Yes. Article 3, Section 7 of the Constitution states that the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. In the case at bar, the Court held that as custodians of public documents, they must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. However, public officers in the custody or control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the records. Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)vs. Heusdens M. No. P-11-2927 December 13, 2011 FACTS: This was an administrative matter arising from the leave application for foreign travel sent through mail by respondent, Wilma Salvacion P. Heusdens, Staff Clerk IV of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagum City, Davao del Norte. Heusdens

left without waiting for the results of her application. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent to have violated OCA Circular No. 49-2003 for failing to secure the approval of her application for travel authority. It recommended that the administrative complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that be reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated OCA Circular No. 49-2003.

HELD: Yes. Article 8, Section 5, paragraph 6 of the 1987 Constitution states that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. This provision empowers the Court to oversee all matters relating to the effective supervision and management of all courts and personnel under it. Recognizing this mandate, Memorandum Circular No. 26 of the Office of the President considers the Supreme Court exempt and with authority to promulgate its own rules and regulations on foreign travels. Thus, the Court came out with OCA Circular No. 49-2003. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court admonished respondent for traveling abroad without any travel authority in violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely. The Leave Division, OAS-OCA, is hereby directed to act upon applications for travel abroad at least five working days before the intended date of departure. RUBY C. CAMPOMANES vs. NANCY S. VIOLON, Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Oroquieta City M. No. P-11-2983 July 25, 2012 FACTS: Respondent Nancy Violon holds the position of Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Office of the Clerk of Court in Oroquieta City. Respondent borrowed P50,000 from the bank, payable in 12 monthly installments of P3,500 for each installment. The agreement was evidenced in a Disclosure Statement executed between the parties . Respondent also signed a Promissory Note undertaking to pay the obligation on or before 25 January 2006. Ruby C. Campomanes, complainant and Loan Officer I of the Panguil Bay Rural Bank in Ozamiz City wrote a letter to Office of the Deputy Court Administrator with attached Affidavit of Complaint against Nancy Violon for failure to pay an overdue loan contracted in favor of Panguil Bay Rural Bank. Violon purportedly failed to pay this amount because of financial crises in her family and the hospitalization of her son. ISSUE: Whether or not Violon violated Rule 14, Section 22 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. HELD: Yes. The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service penalizes the willful failure to pay just debts or to pay taxes to the government. Section 22, Rule XIV thereof defines just debts as applying only to claims adjudicated by a court of law, or to claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor. Considering respondent’s admission of the loan, the offense in the present case falls under the latter category. A first-time violation of Rule XIV warrants the penalty of reprimand. The Supreme Court reprimanded respondent for willful failure to pay a just debt. Additionally, the Court warned the respondent that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. JORGE B. VARGAS vs.EMILIO RILLORAZA, JOSE BERNABE, MANUEL ESCUDERO, Judges of the People's Court, and THE SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES R. No. L-1612 February 26 1948

FACTS: Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the The People's Court Act, Commonwealth Act 682, which provided that the President could designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judges to sit as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in treason cases without them necessarily having to possess the required constitutional qualifications of a regular Supreme Court Justice. Paragraph 2 of Section 14 of The People’s Court Act states that: “ If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds or disqualification of judges, in Rule 126, section 1 of the Rules of Court, or on account of illness, absence of temporary disability the requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case is not present, the President may designate such number of Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in said section one hereof, as may be necessary to sit temporarily.” ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is constitutional. RULING: No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional. Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any composition of the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members of the Court — as in this case — are replaced by judges of first instance. It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this. And the constitution provides for only one Supreme Court. Grounds for disqualification added by section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and continued by it is not only arbitrary and irrational but positively violative of the organic law. Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that the members of the Supreme Court should be appointed by the President with the consent of the CoA, "Unless provided by law" in Sec 4 cannot be construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition of the Supreme Court, as determined by the Constitution. However temporary or brief may be the participation of a judge designated under Sec. 14 of PCA, there is no escaping the fact the he would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the SC, as the appellate tribunal, and his vote would count as much as that any regular Justice of the Court. "A temporary member" therefore would be a misnomer, as that position is not contemplated by the Constitution, where Sec.4 of Art. VIII only provides A Chief Justice and Associate Justices who have to be thus appointed and confirmed (Sec5).

Judge David Nitafan vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue G. R. No. 78780 July 23 1987 FACTS: Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution." ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes. HELD: No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of

the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.