Judiciary #29-35.docx

29. Galvez vs. Eduardo A.M. No. MTJ-94-984. January 30, 1996 KAPUNAN, J.: Facts: an administrative complaint filed by Glady M. Galvez charging respondent Judge Geminiano A. Eduardo of the Metropolitan Trial Court with grave misconduct for issuing a 2 warrant of arrests which included her when in fact, she was not an accused in said criminal case; one for Grave Oral Defamation where she was impleaded as her husbands co-accused; and another for Grave Threats where she was not cited as a defendant. Respondent claimed that such issuance of warrant of arrest was a clerical error. The signature of the judge on the warrant of arrest was done in good faith and without malice. Respondent further averred that the manner by which the warrant was served was beyond his control. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint as the warrant of arrest did not render substantial procedural prejudice to the complainant. Complainant promptly replied that the issuance of two warrants of arrest as respondent belies the claim that this was due to clerical error. The mistake was more out of gross negligence which negates any presumption of good faith. Issue: Whether or not the respondent is negligent although the wrong done was through a mere clerical error. Ruling: Yes. The issuance of a warrant of arrest must not be taken lightly nor should it be considered as one of the usual paperwork of the judge that just pass through his hands for his signature. The Judge cannot simply take refuge behind the inefficiency or negligence of his court personnel as liberty of a person is at stake in these matters. He should supervise his staff in the performance of their duties, observing a high degree of professionalism and efficiency. He is directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions. Court personnel are not the guardians of a judges responsibility.

30. Estoya vs. Abraham-Singson ADM MATTER No. RTJ-91-758 September 26, 1994 PER CURIAM: Facts: A complaint signed by 47 employees and officers of several branches of the RTC Antique was filed with the SC. The signatories allege Judge Singson’s gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. On one case, the judge promulgated on 19 December 1991 an order acquitting the accused in People vs. Resuma although the decision made in said case has not yet been completed, as to the discussion portion and final typing, for the reason of "Christmas season and . . . humanitarian reasons," and releasing later the decision which was made to appear as having been prepared and signed on 10 December 1991. The same also informed on 17 July 1991 in open court acquitting the accused in People vs. Barayoga with pronouncement she considered as the promulgation of the judgment. She then dictated and ordered the Branch Clerk of Court to mail copies each of the decision. She later antedated the judgment to 8 May 1991 Issue: Whether or not the judge’s so called promulgations violated provisions of the constitution Ruling: Yes, the Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution mandates that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, and that under the Rules of Court, a judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him, shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved as admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based, and must be filed with the Clerk of Court. The filing is the rendition of the judgment, as distinguished from the promulgation thereof. As of the respective dates of promulgation as aforementioned, the respondent had not yet rendered her decision; there was then nothing yet to promulgate. Compounding the irregularity was the antedating of the decision subsequently rendered.

31. De Vera vs. Dames II AM No. RTJ-99-1455. July 13, 1999 PANGANIBAN, J.: Facts: Reynaldo De Vera, a school teacher, reported in writing to the schools division superintendent the treasure hunting and excavation that had been made within the premises of the school in which Prosecutor Oscar J. Villafuerte and his Kin were involved. For the said letter made by De Vera, Prosecutor Villafuerte filed 3 cases of libel. The respondent, Judge Sancho Dames II erred by giving due course to said malicious criminal complaint although the letter was a privileged communication in which the law recognizes a private, protected relationship. Furthermore, the said judge unjustly denied motions for inhibition and reconsideration of the complainant and his counsel, and prematurely released a judgment and had the same published in a local newspaper long before the promulgation of his decision. The respondent Judge rendered a Decision dated April 15, 1994 convicting the accused of the 3 charges of libel filed against him; and from the said Decision, the accused appealed and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals in which the decision of the lower court was reversed and the accused-appellant was acquitted. A petition for Removal was filed by Reynaldo de Vera, charging Judge Dames II with serious misconduct, premature release of decision, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Judge failed to adhere to the basic precept enshrined in Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution. Ruling: Yes. The respondent precipitately concluded that the letter was defamatory without sufficiently explaining why. Calling the trial courts Decision baseless, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court ruling on the defamatory nature of the letter was not supported by any factual and legal justification. This statement was echoed by the OCA, which noted that respondents Decision lacked factual and legal basis. In fact, respondent failed to cite any legal principle or authority to support his conclusion. Indeed, a meticulous scrutiny of the said judgment substantiates the observations of the Court of Appeals and the OCA. Indubitably, the respondents Decision was erroneous as it was baseless.

32. Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995 PER CURIAM: Facts: Petitioner, Joaquin Borromeo, filed a complaint for damages and charged several personnel of the Division Clerk of Court, Third Division and Chief of Judicial Records of the Supreme Court with usurpation of judicial functions, for allegedly issuing biased, fake, baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273. This petition is based on the resolution of the Supreme Court through its Third Division which disposed of Borromeo's petition which was noted that the motion merely reiterated the same arguments earlier raised and already passed upon by the Court and was, therefore without merit. The petitioner contends that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not state the facts and the law on which they were based and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore "unconstitutional, null and void. Issue: Whether or not the resolution is unconstitutional violating Section 14, Article VIII, of the Constitution? Ruling: No, the resolution is constitutional. This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against officials of the Court. In several letter-complaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman, Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he "suffered injustices," because of the disposition of the four (4) cases he separately appealed to this Court which were already resolved by minute resolutions Section 14, Article VIII, of the Constitution states that “No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” However, when the Court, after deliberating on an issue and states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, then there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

33. Bernabe vs. Geraldez G.R. No. L-39721 July 15, 1975 FERNANDO, J.: Facts: A procedural point raised in this certiorari proceeding by petitioner Braulio Bernabe. He is appealing from an adverse judgment in a forcible entry case where there was no trial de novo conducted by respondent Judge. The records show that the defendant-appellant appealed this case for not having been satisfied with the decision of the lower court, and in view of his failure to submit a memorandum, he likewise failed to point out the errors, if any, committed by the municipal court. Issue: Whether or not the respondent-Judge violated Article 8, Section 14 of the constitution in denying trial de Novo to petitioner which failed to submit a memorandum. Ruling: No. It cannot be said of respondent Judge's decision that what is ordained by the Constitution had been ignored. A reading thereof suffices clearly to indicate why the action for forcible entry succeeded. There was no failing of sufficient gravity. It is not essential that the language employed states with particularity each and every element that enters into any judgment. It is enough that as long as the party litigants are fully cognizant of the reason of the outcome of the case, considering the facts established and the law applicable, it cannot be alleged with success that there was no deference shown to this provision of the Constitution.

34. Fortich vs. Corona, G.R. No. 131457. August 19, 1999 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Facts: On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President issued a decision converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates for the upcoming 1998 elections intervened on behalf of the farmers. Because of this, the Office of the President re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically motivated”, “win-win” resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory. Issue: May the Supreme Court en banc review a decision that had long become final and executory? Ruling: No. Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers

35. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Butalid A.M. No. RTJ-96-1337. August 5, 1998 PER CURIAM: Facts: Respondent judge Walerico B. Butalid failed to decide within the 90-day reglementary period as (Section 15 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides) a total of 96 cases which had been submitted for decision, and falsified his certificates of service from July 1994 to December 1995 in order to conceal his failure. Respondent contended that the certificate of service is a mere routine requirement, and that in any event, the Court has no basis for disciplining him because neither this Court nor Congress has provided for any sanction for the failure of judges to decide cases submitted within the period prescribed by the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court may discipline the defendant. Ruling: Yes, Under Section 6 of Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has administrative supervision of all courts and the personnel thereof. The Court's power of supervision carries with it the power to discipline and impose appropriate sanctions for the commission of administrative offenses. The Court cannot compromise on the enforcement of the duty of judges to decide cases on time. We have time and again said that judges should be the embodiment of competence and integrity. Respondent judge failed to live up to the honor and responsibilities of his office. His transgression, taken in their totality, justify the imposition of the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service. The Court finds respondent judge's failure to decide 96 cases within the time required by law to be inexcusable as the 90-day period for deciding cases should be observed by all judges, unless they have been granted additional time to dispose of cases. In regards to the contention of the certificate of service, the court gave no merits to it as as a certificate of service is an instrument essential to the fulfillment by the judges of their duty to speedily dispose of their cases as mandated by the Constitution. A judge who fails to decide cases within the prescribed period but collects his salary upon a false certificates is guilty of dishonesty and deserves the condemnation of all right thinking men.