Legislative Cases 54-60.docx

54. TARROSA VS. SINGSON 232 SCRA 553 MAY 25, 1994 FACTS: Gabriel Singson, respondent, was appointed as Governor of the Bangko Sentral by then President Fidel Ramos on July of 1993. The petitioner, Jesus Tarrosa in his capacity as a taxpayer files a petition of prohibition questioning the above appointment on grounds that such appointment was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. He seeks to remove Singson from office until he is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. He also questions Salvador Enriquez, then Secretary of Budget and Management for disbursing public funds to pay salaries and emoluments to Singson while in office. Tarrosa grounds his claims upon Section 6 of RA 7635 “The governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas shall be head of a department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.” The respondent’s defense is that Congresss has exceeded its legislative power in RA 7635 and that the appointment of Singson in not one of those that need confirmation by the Commission on Appointments as provided in Section 16 of Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution “The President shall nominate and with consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this constitution. Respondents also say that the BSP has its own budget and is not subject to the provisions of the General Appropriations Act. ISSUE: Whether or not Tarrosa has the capacity to challenge the appointment Whether or not the appointment of Singson is valid HELD: The petition in nature is a quo warranto in that it seeks to oust Singson from public office. However, a quo warranto proceeding can only be instituted by the Solicitor General or by a person claiming to be entitled to a public office. In the case at bar, Tarrosa has no capacity to file such claim whatsoever. If such is granted, then it encourages every disgruntled citizen to come to court over any appointment they do not seem fit. Because Tarrosa has no legal capacity, his whole case crumbles and there is no need to question the disbursement of salaries.

55. BAUTISTA VS. SALONGA 172 SCRA 160 April 13, 1989 FACTS: The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments. ISSUES: Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment. RULING: No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive officials without confirmation of CoA. The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.

56. SARMIENTO III VS. MISON 156 SCRA 549 December 17, 1987 FACTS: This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA. Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed by the COA.

58. ROBLES VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL G.R. No. 86647 February 5, 1990 FACTS Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1st District of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987. Rep. Virgilio Robles elected to 1st District of Caloocan. Romeo Santos then filed an electoral contest with House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET electoral fraud and irregularities) and called for re-counting of votes. Santos filed a Motion to Withdraw Contest but later filed Urgent Motionn to Recall/Disregard his previous motion. The first motion was not acted upon by HRET and the second motion was granted. Robles claimed that the first motion divested HRET of jurisdiction. ISSUE Whether or not HRET acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion thus giving the supreme jurisdiction over the subject matter

RULING The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. It is an established doctrine that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost at the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Certainly, the tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired. Petition is dismissed.

59. MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS G.R. NO. 88211, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989

FACTS: Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. RULING: Yes. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23). The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

60. VILANDO v. HRET G. R. No. 192147 & 192149 August 23, 2011 FACTS: Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Because of this, her opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases againstLimkaichong. They alleged that Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mother, lost her Filipinocitizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s father. During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, election daycame and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras.COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Few days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspendingthe proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong assailed Paras’ petition arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, it should be the HRET which hasthe jurisdiction over the matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong. ISSUES: Whether Limkaichong is qualified to hold a position in the government. HELD: YES. Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he refers to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichong’s father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. Under Philippine law, an attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. Records also disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959.The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary. Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.