Legislative Cases No. 1-8 - Khate Alonzo.docx

Jose Angara v. Electoral Commission, Et. Al. G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936 Facts: Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution. On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935. Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion. Issue: Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly? Held: NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly. The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ensue against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests entrusted to its cognizance should be filed. Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

The Government of the Philippines vs Milton Springer, Et. Al. G.R. No. 26979 April 1, 1927 Facts: This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands against three directors of the National Coal Company who were elected to their positions by the legislative members of the committee created by Acts. Nos. 2705 and 2822. The purpose of the proceeding is to test the validity of the part of section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, which provides that "The voting power of all such stock (in the National Coal Company) owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: “The voting power … shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.” In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker. However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC. Issue: Whether or nor EO no. 37 is invalid. Held: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.

Maria Carolina P. Araullo, Et. Al. vs Benigno Simeon C. Aquino, III, Et. Al. G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014 Facts: When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court). Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA. Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators. This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc. This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively). Issues: I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution). II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive. III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional. IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable. Held: I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP. II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds. III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies. Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis. On the issue of what are “savings” These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM. IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used. V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to

the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

Cesar Bengzon, Et. Al. vs Franklin N. Drilon, Et. Al. G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992 Facts: Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition. It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication, thus there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect. Issue: Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid. Held: The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed. The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid and subsisting.

Greco Antonious B. Belgica, Et. Al. vs Paquito N. Ochoa, Et. Al. G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 Facts: This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251. The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA). Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner: a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.); b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects; c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects. The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned. Presidential Pork Barrel The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983. Pork Barrel Scam Controversy Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al. Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

Issue: I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional. II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional. Held: I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles: a. Separation of Powers As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go). This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned. b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution. Exceptions to the rule are: (i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters; (ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress. c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.” d. Local Autonomy As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators. II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid. The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation. The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit: (i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energyrelated ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct; (ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects. These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

Metrobank vs Antonio Tobias, III G.R. No. 177780 January 25, 2012 Facts: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon charged Tobias with estafa through falsification of public documents in relation to his loan with petitioner Metrobank. He filed a motion for reinvestigation but the City Prosecutor of Malabon still found probable cause against him, and recommended his being charged. Tobias appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ) which issued a resolution directing the withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias. METROBANK moved to reconsider but the same was denied. METROBANK challenged the adverse resolutions through certiorari with the CA which dismissed the same. The CA stressed that the determination of probable cause was an executive function within the discretion of the public prosecutor and, ultimately, of the Secretary of justice, and the courts of law could not interfere with such determination; that the private complainant in a criminal action was only concerned with its civil aspect; that should the State choose not to file the criminal action, the private complainant might initiate a civil action based on Article 35 of the Civil Code. In the eventuality that the Secretary of Justice refuses to file the criminal complaint, the complainant, whose only interest is the civil aspect of the case and not the criminal aspect thereof, is not left without a remedy. Issue: Whether or not CA has decided a question of substance not in accord with law. Held: NO. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. For instance, in Balanganan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, the Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice exceeded his jurisdiction when he required "hard facts and solid evidence" in order to hold the defendant liable for criminal prosecution when such requirement should have been left to the court after the conduct of a trial.

Carmen Planas vs Jose Gil G.R. No. 46440 January 18, 1939 Facts: The case stemmed from a statement made by petitioner which was published in a newspaper (La Guardia) wherein he criticized certain government officials acts as well as the election of Assemblyman in 1938. Petitioner was a member of the municipal board of Manila. An investigation directed by the authority of the President was conducted by the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service. Hence this petition for prohibition where petitioner contends that respondent lacks the jurisdiction to investigate him and that it violates Art. 7, Sec.11 (1) of the Constitution, as it seeks to remove or suspend him. Issue: Whether or not the President has the legal authority to order the investigation. Held: YES. Provided the investigation should be in accordance with law. The constitution grants to the President the powers of control and supervision. The power to exercise general supervision over all local governments and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed authorizes him to order an investigation of the act or conduct of the petitioner herein. Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation. The President in the exercise of the executive power under the Constitution may act through the heads of the executive departments. The heads of the executive departments are his authorized assistants and agents in the performance of his executive duties, and their official acts, promulgated in the regular course of business, are presumptively his acts. The power of removal which the President may exercise directly and the practical necessities of efficient government brought about by administrative centralization easily make the President the head of the administration.

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC vs Commission on Elections G.R. No. 192803 December 10, 2013 Facts: Petitioner, ARARO was a duly accredited party-list garnered a total of 147,204 votes in the May 10, 2010 elections and ranked 50th. The COMELEC En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers initially proclaimed twenty-eight (28) party-list organizations as winners involving a total of thirty-five (35) seats guaranteed and additional seats. The petitioner questioned the formula used by the COMELEC and filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the Commission on Elections is flawed because votes that were spoiled or that were not made for any party-lists were not counted. According to the petitioner, around seven million (7,000,000) votes were disregarded as a result of the Commission on Elections’ erroneous interpretation. 7,112,792 (Total number of disregarded votes according to petitioner ARARO) On the other hand, the formula used by the Commission on Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers is the following: Number of seats available to legislative districts_x .20 =Number of seats available to party-list representatives .80 Thus, the total number of party-list seats available for the May 2010 elections is 57 as shown below: 229__x .20 =57 .80 The National Board of Canvassers’ Resolution No. 10-009 applies the formula used in Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC18 to arrive at the winning party-list groups and their guaranteed seats, where: Number of votes of party-list ______________________________= Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list Total number of votes for party-list candidates The Commission on Elections through the Office of the Solicitor General took the position that invalid or stray votes should not be counted in determining the divisor. The Commission on Elections argues that this will contradict Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) v. COMELEC22 and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC.23 It asserts that: Neither can the phrase be construed to include the number of voters who did not even vote for any qualified party-list candidate, as these voters cannot be considered to have cast any vote "for the partylist system."24 Issue: I. Whether the case is already moot and academic II. Whether petitioners have legal standing III. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in its interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC25 to determine the party-list groups that would be proclaimed in the 2010 elections HELD:

1. This case is moot and academic but the Court discussed the issues raised by the petitioner as these are capable of repetition yet evading review and for the guidance of the bench, bar, and public. 2. The computation proposed by petitioner ARARO even lowers its chances to meet the 2% threshold required by law for a guaranteed seat. Its arguments will neither benefit nor injure the party. Thus, it has no legal standing to raise the argument in this Court. 3. The Court agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined to be invalid due to no cause attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the divisor. In other words, votes cast validly for a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as part of the divisor. To do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good faith that that ballot contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included in the divisor. Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for the party-list system shall be considered in the computation of the percentage of representation: 1. (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list systemshall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and interpreted in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC, is MODIFIED as follows: Number of votes. of party-list Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list The divisor shall be the total number of valid votes cast for the party-list system including votes cast for party-list groups whose names are in the ballot but are subsequently disqualified. Party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included in the divisor. The divisor shall also not include votes that are declared spoiled or invalid.