47 Francisco, Jr. V. Nagmamalasakit na mga Mananananggol ng mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc. G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003 CARPIO MORALES, J.: Facts: On June 2, 2003, former President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide, Jr. and seven Associate Chief Justices of the Supreme Court for ´culpable violation if the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes. Such complaint was grounded on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund.-The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first complaint was ´sufficient in formµ but ´insufficient in substance.µ Committee Report was not sent to the House in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.-A second impeachment complaint was filed four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint, by Teodoro, Jr. and Fuentebella. Such complaint was grounded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.-Instant petitions arose against the HOR, most of which contend that the filingof the second impeachment is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section of Article XI of the Constitution. Issues: WON the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary. Held: Yes.This issue is far from the validity of the second impeachment complaint. The resolution of the said issue would require the SC to form a rule of constitutional law touching on, the separate matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of the consolidated cases. However, one argument is worth mentioning. Alfonso, et al. argues that the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it resulted from a Resolution calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF. This is unconstitutional for being: a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigation in aid of legislation, b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers, c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary. D) an assault on the independence of the judiciary.
48 Arroyo v. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997 MENDOZA, J.: Facts: An amendment to the National Internal Revenue Code was introduced to the House of Representatives involving taxations on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. This was later passed accordingly and brought to the House of Senate. Upon the interpellation on the second reading, herein petitioner moved for adjournment for lack of quorum which is constitutionally needed to conduct business. Petitioner’s motion was defeated and was railroaded. The bill was then signed into law by President Fidel Ramos. Issue: Whether or not the law was passed on violation on the constitutional mandate. Held: There is no rule of the House concerned that quorum shall be determined by viva voce or nominal voting. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only on the following instances ± upon the last and the third readings of the bill, at the request of 1/5 of the Members present and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. Second, there is obviousness on the part of the petitioner to delay the business of the House, thus eliminating the alleged skullduggery on part of the accused.Third, the enrolled bill doctrine states that enrolled bills are in itself conclusive thus legally binding provided it is in harmony with the constitution. Lastly, the court upheld principle of separation of powers, which herein, is applicable for the legislative branch for it has exercised its power without grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
49 Santiago v. Guingona (1998) G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998 PANGANIBAN, J.: Facts: The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer, convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Ople nominated Fernan for Senate President and DefensorSantiago nominated Tatad for said position by a vote of 20-2, Fernan won. In agreement with Santiago, Tatad manifested that he would be the minority leader since those who did not vote for him constituted the minority. However, majority leader received from Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators a letter stating they had elected Guingona as minority leader. Guingona assumed position. Santiago now filed a petition for quo warranto against Guingona. Issues: 1.WON SC has jurisdiction 2.WON there was a violation of Constitution Held: 1.SC has jurisdictionSec. 16(1), Art. VI states the Senate shall elect its Senate President and the HoR its Speaker by a majority vote of all its member. By virtue of Art. VIII, Sec. 1 it is within jurisdiction of SC to determine if there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the members of the Senate. * DOCTRINE: jurisdiction will be decided by the allegations of the complaint or regardless of whether plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief sought.
petition
2.No violation of the ConstitutionMajority means more than half of any total; the Consti says the Senate President will be elected by a majority vote but does not say that the minority leader will be decided by those who did not vote for him. There is no Consti provision about the manner in which other officers shall be elected each house shall choose other officers as it may deem necessary the method then may be prescribed by Senate but its not in the Rules of Senate- the Court thus has no basis upon which to determine a grave abuse of discretion.
CONGRESS HAS POWER AND PREROGATIVE TO PROVIDE FOR SUCH OFFICERS AS IT MAY DEEM
50 Astorga vs. Villegas G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974 MAKALINTAL, C.J.: Facts: In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065). Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said “law” passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted. HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved
by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body
51 Osmena vs. Pendatun G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960 BENGZON, J.: Facts: In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed
52 Guingona v. Gonzales G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993 Campos, Jr., J. Facts: After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation. Issue: whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the Commission on Appointments Held: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.
53 Daza vs. Singson G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989 CRUZ, J.: FACTS: After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party. On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on Appointments HELD: At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.