Executive Cases Nos. 6 - 13 [sales].docx

[6] MITRA ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 104 SCRA 59 April 4, 1981 FACTS Petitioners Mitra et al. questioned the validity of the 1973 constitution and filed a petition to the Supreme Court to hold a plebiscite where the people can either vote to ratify or reject it. In the event that it is rejected, the petitioners pray that the 1935 Constitution be restored with the lifting of Martial Law on January 17, 1981. Doctrine The petition to hold a plebiscite cannot be granted because it is founded on the erroneous notion that the present constitution is not valid. Given that the court has previously ruled in favor of the validity of the 1973 Constitution, it remains legitimately in force and effect even with the lifting of Martial Law. Hence, the petition for a plebiscite has no merit. ISSUE Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is valid RULING Yes. Even without valid ratification, a new Constitution could come into force and effect by the acquiescence of the. The fact that the people went to the polls would be indicative of their acquiescence in the present Constitution. Nor could petitioners be unaware that two elections have been held under the present Constitution. In the face of the above clearly manifested recognition of the force and effect of the present Constitution, by the people, including those in the opposition, it would seem that any argument to the contrary should be consigned to a well-merited limbo.

[7] CONSTANTINO, JR. v. CUISIA 472 SCRA 505 October 13, 2005 FACTS To reduce the country’s external debt, the Aquino administration resorted to was to incur foreign debts. The spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino, as a taxpayers, and in behalf of their minor children, together with FFDC (Freedom From Debt Coalition) averred that the programs were onerous and they do not constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution. The further argue that the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President, hence, the respondents herein, Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia et al, cannot incur debts for the Philippines. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the submission that not respondents but the President “alone and personally” can validly bind the country ISSUE Whether or not the President of the Philippines can validly delegate her debt power HELD Yes. The President can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. The President cannot personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, a welter of time-consuming detailed activities. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government. The act of the Cuisia et al are not unconstitutional.

[8] AGUINALDO v. SANTOS 212 SCRA 768 August 21, 1992

FACTS Petitioner Rodolfo Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. Shortly after the December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed, the Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos sent a telegram and a letter to petitioner requiring him to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic. In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers. The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. While the case was pending before the SC, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan. As petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan. ISSUE Whether or not the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials RULING Yes. Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Petitioner was re-elected as governor of Cagayan province. As held by this Court in Aguinaldo v. Comelec, the rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local government of officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The President the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local governments, and by the doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.

[9] KILUSANG BAYAN v. DOMINGUEZ 205 SCRA 92 January 13, 1992 FACTS Petitioners question the validity of the order of then Secretary of Agriculture Hon. Carlos G. Dominguez which ordered the take-over by the Department of Agriculture of the management of the petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntilupa, Inc. (KBMBPM). He also ordered the creation of a Management Committee which shall assume the management of KBMBPM upon receipt of the order, the disbandment of the Board of Directors, and the turnover of all assets, properties and records of the KBMBPM to the Management Committee. The said order unerringly indicates that its basis is the alleged petition of the general membership of the KBMBPM requesting the Department for assistance in the removal of the members of the Board of Directors who were not elected by the general membership of the cooperative and that the ongoing financial and management audit of the Department of Agriculture auditors shows that the management of the KBMBPM is not operating that cooperative in accordance with P.D. 165, LOI 23, the Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the provisions and by-laws of KBMBPM. It is also professed therein that the Order was issued by the Department in the exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D. 165, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No.113. Issue: Whether or not the Order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture is legal Held: No. Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing P.D. No. 165) provides the procedure for the removal of directors or officers of cooperatives. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 165 which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give him that right. An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may to necessary for their just and reasonable execution.

[10] KULAYAN v. TAN 675 SCRA 482 July 3, 2012

FACTS A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping of Red Cross members in Patikul Sulu. The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. ISSUE Whether or not a governor exercise the calling-out powers of a President RULING No. Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution provides that executive power is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and exercised the calling-out powers. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President.

[11] OROSA v. ROA 495 SCRA 22 July 14, 2006

FACTS Orosa, a dentist by profession, filed with the Pasig City Prosecution Office a complaint-affidavit charging respondent Roa, also a dentist, with the crime of libel. The complaint stemmed from an article written by respondent insinuating Orosa topped the dental board examinations because his father was an examiner. After preliminary investigation, the city prosecutor issued a resolution, dismissed the petitioner's complaint, stating that the publication was a bona fide communication on matters of public concern, and made without malice. Acting on the appeal, the Chief State Prosecutor issued a Resolution, setting aside the findings of the City Prosecutor and directing the latter to file an Information for libel against respondent. Respondent appealed to the Secretary of Justice. Secretary Serafin Cuevas reversed the Resolution and directed the City Prosecutor of Pasig to withdraw the Information earlier filed with the RTC. The petitioner went to the CA on a petition for review under Rule 43. The CA dismissed petitioner's petition for review, reasoning that the Pasig City Prosecution Office and the Department of Justice are not among the quasi-judicial agencies included in Section 1 of Rule 43 whose final orders or resolutions are subject to review by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE Whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal in this case RULING No. The Court affirms the decision the Court of Appeals. As may be noted, the DOJ is not among the agencies expressly enumerated under Section 1 of Rule 43. There is reason to believe that the exclusion is deliberate, being in consonance with the constitutional power of control lodged in the President over executive departments, bureaus and offices. Being thus under the control of the President, the decision of the Secretary of Justice is subject to review of the former.

[12] RUFINO v. ENDRIGA 496 SCRA 13 July 21, 2006 FACTS Two groups of appointed members of the Board of Trustees of CCP are contesting each other’s appointment. The Endriga group, sitting as current members, was appointed by then-President Ramos and is assailing the appointment of the Rufino group, replacing all 7 members of the Endriga group, by then-President Estrada. Endriga group avers that the appointment into the Board of the Rufino group transgressed PD 15, creating of Board of Trustees of CCP. As stated in PD 15, specifically Section 6, appointment into the Board shall only be made by a majority vote of the trustees; presidential appointments can only be made when the Board is entirely vacant to uphold the CCP’s charter of independence from pressure or politics. Meanwhile, Rufino group stands by their appointment since the provision on appointments stated in Section 6, PD 15 is violative of Section 16, Article 7 of the Constitution. The Board cannot invoke the charter of autonomy to extend to appointment of its members. ISSUE Whether or not PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments made by trustees of their fellow members is constitutional RULING No. PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments of members by the trustees themselves is unconstitutional. While it is stated that appointing powers may be delegated by the President, such power is limited in scope to include only ranks lower than the appointing authority. In the case, an appointment of a member made by a fellow member transgresses Article 7, Section 16 (1) since both positions are equal in nature. CCP cannot invoke autonomy prescribed in its charter as an exemption from the limitation of delegative appointing power because such invocation puts CCP outside the control of the President.

[13] DENR v. DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES 409 SCRA 359 August 19, 2003 FACTS DENR Region 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional Exec. Director of DENR, directed the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary. ISSUE Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office. RULING Yes. The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.