Executive Cases 22-29.docx

22. JOSE MONDANO VS FERNANDO SILVOSA G.R. No. L-7708 May 30 1955 J.: Padilla FACTS: The Assistant Executive Secretory indorsed the complaint for rape and concubinage against Mondano, duly elected and qualified mayor of Mainit, Surigao,to Silvosa, provincial governor of Suriga, for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. Silvosa issued an Administrative Order suspending Mondano from office. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of suspension by the provincial governor is illegal.

RULING: Yes. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in Sec. 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the RAC are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. If “general supervision over all local governments” is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision.

23. In Re: Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998 J.: Narvasa, C. Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making anyappointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments toexecutive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice

public

service

or

endanger

public

safety.

Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointmentsimposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII

Held: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to makeappointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This

prohibition

on appointments comes

into

effect

once

every

6

years.

The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating

to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointmentsduring the period of the ban. 24. HERMOGENES P. POBRE v. MARIANO E. MENDIETA GR No. 106677 July 23, 1993 J.: GRIÑO-AQUINO Facts: These consolidated petitions under Rule 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court ere filed by Hermogenes Pobre to set aside the decision dated August 5, 1992 and writ of prohibitory injunction dated August 19, 1992 issued by Judge Corona Ibay-Somera annulling the appointment extended by President Corazon C. Aquino to the petitioner, Hermogenes Pobre as Commissioner/Chairman of the Professional Regulation Commission and enjoining him from discharging the duties and functions of that office. The controversy began on January 2, 1992 when the term of office of Honrable Julio B. Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second Associate Commissioner of the PRC. ISSUE: Whether the President may appoint as Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC another Associate Commissioner or any person other than the Senior Associate Commissioner.

HELD: The power of appointment cannot be restricted to the point that the officer loses the discretion. The Court finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the Commission )except the position of “junior” Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by “succession” or by “operation of law” for that would deprive the President of his power to appoint a new PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners- “all to be appointed by the President” under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result would be that the only occasion for the President to exercise his appointing power would be when the position of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner becomes vacant. We may not presume that when the President issued P.D. No. 223, he deliberately clipped his prerogative to choose and appoint the head of the PRC and limited himself to the selection and appointment of only the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the ladder in that agency. Since such an absurdity may not be presumed, the Court should so construe the law as to avoid it.

25. Roberto A. Flores vs. Franklin M. Drilon G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993 J.: Bellosillo FACTS Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.” ISSUES (1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. (2) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. HELD (1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his

constitutents. (2) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office.

26. Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. L-65439 November 13, 1985 J.:GUTIERREZ, JR.

FACTS: In 1973, Dr. Hernani Esteban was appointed by Dr. Consuelo Blanco as the VicePresident for Administration in the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM). Esteban’s appointment was ad interim in nature (because at that time the PLM Board of Regents was not in session). His appointment was extended in 1975. However, he later discovered that his name was not included among those recommended for permanent appointment. He then requested Blanco to make him a permanent appointee. Blanco, however, appointed Esteban as Professor III instead and his appointment as VP for Admin was terminated. Esteban brought the case before the Civil Service Commission where he got a favorable judgment. The trial court reversed the CSC. The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not Esteban is a permanent appointee. HELD: Yes. Hence, he enjoys security of tenure. The Supreme Court explains that the term “ad interim” as used in the Philippines does not literally translate to “temporary”. In this jurisdiction an ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment. This was explained in the landmark case of Summers vs Ozaeta: …an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that the President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.’ It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the

circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course distinguishable from an ‘acting’ appointment which is merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is issued. In other words, if the Board of Regents is in session, the PLM President merely nominates while the Board issues the appointment. But when the Board is not in session, the President is authorized to issue ad interim appointments. Such appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves them. If confirmed, the appointee’s term is converted into the regular term inherent in the position. In the case at bar, apparently, Esteban was confirmed by the Board of Regents in 1975. Blanco however did not relay this confirmation to Esteban. The latter was made to believe (due to souring relationship with Blanco) that his appointment was extended but only as an extension of temporary appointment.

27. Rosalinda Santos vs Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig G.R. No. 94070 April 10, 1992 J.:GRIÑO-AQUINO Facts: Rosalinda Santos was an ambassadress sent to Geneva for a mission. On her trip, she bought a discounted ticket which provided that she could bring someone with her so she brought with her her adopted daughter. Some of her co-workers complained because they thought that Santos used government fund to finance her daughter’s fare. It was later found out that the cost of the said ticket is actually 50% less than the amount that was given to Santos to be used for her expenses for the trip. Nevertheless, because of her

refusal to appear before the disciplinary board, she was found guilty of misconduct. Upon her appeal to the Office of the President and after review, then president Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 122 which declared Santos guilty of dishonesty. She was then removed from her post and was replaced. ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should reinstated to her office. HELD: No. Even though the Supreme Court found evidence which showed that Santos was not guilty of misconduct or dishonesty as in fact what she did of securing a ticket which was 50% the cost of what was allotted for her travel expense for tickets and thus was beneficial to the government (for she helped save and lessen the expenses), the SC does not have the power to reverse the recall done to Santos. She cannot be reinstated by the SC to her position for the removal power of the president is solely her prerogative. Further, the position held by Santos is primarily confidential. Her position lasts upon the pleasure of the president. When the pleasure turns into displeasure she is not actually removed from her position or office but rather her term merely expires. Also, her position involves foreign relations which is vested solely in the executive. The SC cannot inquire upon the wisdom or unwisdom of the exercise of such prerogative. Thus, the assignment to and recall from posts of ambassadors are prerogatives of the President, for her to exercise as the exigencies of the foreign service and the interests of the nation may from time to time dictate.

28. QUINTOS-DELES VS COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS G.R. No. 83216 September 4 1989 J.: Bidin FACTS: This is a special civic action for prohibition and mandamus with injunction seeking to compel CoA to allow Quintos-Deles to perform and ischarege her duties as HoR member

representing Women's Sector and to restrain respondents from subjecting her appointment to the confirmation process. Quintos-Deles ad three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Art. VII Sec 16 p.2 and Art. XVIII Sec. 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: WoN the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the HoR to be confirmed by the CoA.

RULING:

Yes. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the “other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,” referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra). Deles' appointment was made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, p.2 which gives the President ”the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” The records show that Deles’ appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.

29. Ulpiano Sarmiento III vs Salvador Mison G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987 J.: Padilla Facts: This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA. Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed by the COA.