Thayer Australia's Proposal For New Security Architecture

This pdf file contains an extract of a proposal for European countries to seriously consider the proposal by the Australian Prime Minister to upgrade regional architecture. Other publications by Carl Thayer on Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s Asia Pacific Community Proposal: Carlyle A. Thayer, “A Sense of Community,” Australasia ASEAN Business (Sydney: Palamedia), 1(1), May 2009, 149-150. www.aanzbusiness.com _____. “Kevin Rudd’s multi-layered Asia Pacific Community initiative”, East Asia Forum, June 22, 2009. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/06/22/kevin-rudds-multilayered-asia-pacific-community-initiative/ _____. “Kevin Rudd’s Asia-Pacific Community Initiative: Suggestions and Insights for the Future Process of East Asian Regional Cooperation,” Paper presented to International Conference on East Asia and South Pacific in Regional Cooperation, sponsored by The Shanghai Institutes of International Affairs, Shanghai, People’s Republic of China, September 9-10, 2009. These may also be located on Scribd.com and then searching for Thayer and Asia Pacific community.

The German Journal on Contemporary Asia

Nr. 110 I Januar 2009

Impacts of Rapid Social Change in Southeast Asia· Culture, Identity and Conflict in Asia and Southeast Asia Repoliticisation of Islam in Southeast Asia Regional Economic Integration and Cultural Change Multilateral Cooperation and Building Trust: Ideas for EU-Asian Relations

C 13206 ISSN 0721-5231

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Deutsche Gesellschaft £til' Asienkunde e.V. German Association for Asian Studies

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ASIEN 110 (J.nu., 2009). S. 73-97

Multilateral Co-operation and Building Trust: Ideas for EU-Asian Relations Carlyle A. Thayer

Summary This paper considers the relationship between the European Union and Asia with the purpose of developing new ideas for multilateral co-operation and building of trust in the area of comprehensive security. Specifically, this paper focuses on cooperation between Europe and Asia in three multilateral institutions: Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process. The paper notes that Asia is a contested concept and that none of the institutions is universal in its membership. Next, the paper reviews the recent history of Europe-Asia relations and notes that extensive areas of cooperation have already been mapped out. The paper therefore argues that Europe must prioritize immediate and long-term challenges to Asian regionalism and regional security. Six major issues are then highlighted: the ASEAN Charter and community building, Australia's proposal for the creation of an Asia Pacific Community, the situation Myanmar, conflict resolution in regional hot spots, mitigation of the impact of climate change and developing safe nuclear energy. The paper way to address these issues and build trust is through the cluster where individual European and Asian states take the lead on issues of particular concern.

Keywords: Asia, European Union, multilateral co-operation, comprehensive security, ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEM, regionalism, regional security

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Introduction

This paper focuses on multilateral co-operation and building of trust between Europe and Asia with a specific focus on cooperation ill multilateral security inslitutions. Three major institutions are considered: the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Europe Meeting process (ASEM). The concept of security is considered in its broadest or most comprehensive sense to include both traditional and non-traditional security challenges and threats. This prescntation is one of three comprising Scssion 3, "Ideas for an EU-Asian Agenda". Previous sessions have addressed the drivers and impact of glubalization and change on Southeast Asia. Suffice it to say that globalization generates both cemripetal and c~lltrifugai forces. Globalization. for example, has created a chain of production networks and economic linkages than span East Asia. Globalization has also accelerated the spread of democratic n0ll11S and universal values of human

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Significanrly, the Charter (ASEAN 2008: 23) states "ASEAN shall maintain and establish a dispute settlement mechanisms in aU fields of ASEAN Cooperation" and "in case of a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance, the matter shall be referred to the ASEAN Surrunit for decision." This implies that if ASEAN reaches agreement on human rights, for example, members that are found non compliant could be referred to the ASEAN Summit for action. The ASEAN Charter gives special consideration to economic disputes. The Charter (ASEAN 2008: 23) enjoins all members "to resolve peacefully all disputes in a timely manner through dialogue, consultation and, negotiation." The Charter then makes provision for the involvement of third parties through the provision of good offices, conci lialion and mediation by the ASEAN Chair or Secretary General. Disputes that are referred to good offices. conciliation, or mediation must be resolved "within an agreed lime limil."

In cases involving economic agreements, the Charter prescribes the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism as the appropriate instrument (ASEAN 2008: 24). In cases where a dispute instrument is not provided for the conflicting parties are directed to agree on an "appropriate mechanism including arbitration." In cases where a resolution to a dispute cannot be reached, the matter will be referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision. The ASEAN Secretary-General, the ASEAN Secretariat or other designated ASEAN body shall monitor compliance with findings from ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms and report to ASEAN Sununit.

Amendment and Review Chapter 48 of the Charter makes provision for any member state to propose amendments (ASEAN 2008: 33-34). These are submitted to the ASEAN Coordinating Council which, after reaching consensus, shall forward the amendment(s) to the ASEAN Summit for decision. Agreement on amendments OlUSt be ratified by all member states and when this process is completed comes into force thirty days later. Article 50 of the Charter provides for a review five years after the Charter comes into force (ASEAN 2008: 34).

In sum, this is an historic moment for the European Union, through its various offices, to offer the benefit of its experience in regional integration, and the promotion of democracy and human rights, to its Asian partners. Effective multilateral cooperation in this area will lay fiml foundation for community building in Asia. 3.2

Australia and New Regional Architecture

As noted above, .,the ASEAN Way" has hindered effective instimtional development becanse of its lack of compliance mechanisms. Supporting the

Multilateral Co-operation and Building Trust: Ideas for EU-Asian Relations 85 development of an effective ASEAN Charter with viable compliance mechanisms is an important fIrst step in regional community building. This is so because, as the European Union (and other external states) have recognized. ASEAN plays a central role in the development of regional security architecture, particularly the ARf. The Charter only covers the ten members of ASEAN, however. Some consideration needs to be given to expanding the ASEAN community building process (slated for completion by 2020) to the broader Asia region, however defined (eg. East Asia, Asia PacifIc etc.). One suggested way forward is to give consideration to a proposal advanced by Australia's new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, to create an Asia PacifIc Community by 2020. Prime Minister Rudd rust advanced this proposal in June 2008 shortly after coming into offIce. Rudd noted the existence of APEC, ARf, ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asia Summit and the special role each had to play. But. he noted that "at present none of our existing regional mechanisms as currently confIgured are capable of achieving" a genuine sense of commwtity based on habits of cooperation (Rudd, 2008b). Rudd's vision of an Asian Pacillc Community includcd: •

A regional institution which spans the entire Asia-Pacific Region including the United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia and the other states of the region.

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A regional institution which is able to engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic and political matters and future challenges related to secmity.

Rudd '\Iso argued that his proposal for an Asia Paci fic Community would not mean the diminution of any existing regional body. He specifically mentioned APEC, ASEAN, the ARf, APT, and the EAS. These were seen as building blocks. In remarks that Illay seem provocative to Europeans, Prime Minister Rudd declared: "The European Union of course does not represent an identikit model of what we would seek to develop in the Asia Pacific. But what we can learn from Emope is this - it is necessary to take the first step (Rudd, 2008b)." Prime Minister Rudd reiterated his proposal for an Asia PacifIc Community dming an official visit to Singapore in August 2008. In light of widely reported reservations from the region, he called for "regional discussion about the sort of regional architecture we want to see in the next 20 years... Open dialogue and discussion is the first step in planning where we want to be ... We need to make sure that all of the major players are engaged in an open conversation about the region's future - the United States, China, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and olhers - including India (Rudd. 2008a)." Prime Minister Rudd notably omitted the EU as a possible member of his Asia Paci fic Corrullun.ity proposal. As a matter of priority the EU should decide whether it is comfortable with its role in existing regional institutions or whether the EU

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would like to be included in the new Asia Pacific Commttnity along the lines of its membership in either the ARF or ASEM. Either way, the EU should consider how it would like to shape the future multilateral cooperation architecture in the region.

3.3

Myanmar/Burma

The question of Myanmar, specifically the repression of the pro-democracy movement, oppression of ethnic minorities, and gross violations of human rights (not to mention the continued detention of Daw Aung San Kuu Kyi), has been a major continuing impediment in EU-ASEAN and EU-ASEM relations 6 Quite clearly the behaviour of the State Peace and Development Council carries the potential risk of undermining the ASEAN Charter in promoting democracy, human rights and compliance by ASEAN members. Oppressive conditions in Myanmar also carry the possibility of spilling over and affecting regional stability. The role of the United Nations Secretary General has been stymied by the refusal of Myanmar to agree to substantive change. The new ASEAN Charter offers one potential avenue for political change. For these reasons priority needs to be given to rethinking EU and ASEAN policy towards Myanmar. Present sanctions do not appear to be having any measurable affect. Recently the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (lntemational Crisis Group 2008: i) noted that after the debacle following Cyclone Nargis, the situation in Myanmar has become "a nornlal international relief operation." A report by the International Crisis Group (lCG) observcd that "it is possible to work with the military regime on humanitarian issues. Communication between the government and international agencies has much improved (International Crisis Group 2008: i)" This timc was right, the lCG (2008: i) argued for a vO/ieface: The international commwlity should seize this opportunity to reverse longstanding, cOWlterproductivc aid policies by providing substantial resources for recovery and rehabilitation of the affected areas and gradually, expanding the deepening its engagement in support of sustainable human development countrywide.

In addition, the Myanmar question should become a cluster issue within the ASEM. In accord with the principle that interested parties should assume leadership over specific issues, representatives from Europe and Asia should form a working group on Myanmar to continually monitor the situation there and, as well, seek to engage the military regime and other stakeholders in discussions on sustainable development (to build trust) and Myanmar's role in the fumre architecture of the regIOn.

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became a contentious issues in Europe's relations with Asia in the 19905 until a

compromise was reached in 2004 10 scat Myanmar in ASEM. This compromise did measurable effect on Myanmar's behaviour.

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1 “Kevin Rudd’s Multi-Layered Asia Pacific Community Initiative” Carlyle A. Thayer* Australasia ASEAN Business Journal [inaugural issue May 29, 2009]

In April of this year Thailand was host to the 14th ASEAN and Related Summits, a weekend gathering of government leaders from sixteen regional states. The agenda called for a series of summit meetings, first among the ASEAN ten leaders, then by separate bilateral summits between ASEAN and China, Japan and India, followed by the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) summit involving China, Japan and South Korea, and finally a meeting of all regional states associated with the East Asia Summit (EAS) process. The EAS comprises ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. The ASEAN-related summits was no ordinary leadership gathering. ASEAN and China were scheduled to announce the completion of a Free Trade Agreement after several years of negotiations. Rivals Japan and China were expected to announce major contributions to a regional currency swap arrangement. And equally significant, the ASEAN summits directly followed the meeting of the G20 in London where a global response to the financial crisis was mapped out. The decisions of the G20 were expected to shape a regional response. ASEAN summitry was set back when red shirted supporters of former prime minister Thaksin occupied the conference venue. Thailand was forced to cancel the summit at the eleventh hour. Asian leaders who had already arrived were airlifted to safety by helicopter. Australia’s Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was forced to turn his VIP aircraft around and return home. This marked the third occasion that Thai domestic turmoil has led to the postponement of the ASEAN-related summit meetings. The cancellation of the East Asian Summit denied Prime Minister Rudd a major opportunity to further promote his proposal to create an Asia Pacific Community by 2020. Rudd first announced his initiative in June 2008 in an address to the Asian Society in Sydney. His central premise was that ‘none of our existing regional mechanisms as currently configured’ were capable of engaging ‘in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic and political matters and future challenges to security’. Rudd therefore proposed a regional institution that spanned the entire Asia-Pacific region capable of achieving these objectives. Rudd appears to have been motivated by three major considerations. First, he was consciously following in the footsteps of his Australian Labor Party predecessors in promoting Australia’s engagement with the region. None was more successful than Bob Hawke who promoted Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Second, Rudd sought to promote Australia’s interests as a proactive middle power. Third, he wanted to ensure that both China and

2 the United States were drawn into an effective regional framework designed to cope with current and future economic and strategic issues. Rudd’s proposal was aimed at overcoming the compartmentalisation of existing regional institutions by creating an effective leadership forum where major political, economic and security issues could be dealt with holistically rather than piecemeal. For example, APEC has focused mainly on trade liberalisation, while the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has dealt with confidence-building measures. The APT and the EAS processes overlap in membership and their explicit roles have yet to be clearly defined. There are several major challenges that must be faced if Rudd’s vision is to become a reality. The first concerns what specific organisational form the Asia Pacific Community should take. Nearly a year after it was first proposed, it has become apparent that there is little regional backing for the creation of a new regional institution. But there is support, however, for modifying or expanding existing multilateral arrangements in order to create a more effective regional architecture. Both APEC and the EAS have emerged as the most likely candidates. Either APEC or EAS could be upgraded to serve as the foundation for Rudd’s Asia Pacific Community, or both could be upgraded and assume greater responsibility, respectively, for economic and political-security matters. The second major challenge concerns membership. In 2008, Rudd initially nominated the United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia ‘and other states in the region’ as members. As a result of Australian diplomatic soundings, it is clear that if Rudd’s proposal is to get off the ground ASEAN must be at its core. This means that Myanmar, viewed by many as a pariah state, would be included along with poverty-stricken Laos and Cambodia. The question of membership could be addressed by expanding existing institutions such as APEC, by including India, or the EAS, by adding the United States and Russia. In either case, adding additional members to these institutions raises the complication of deciding what to do with countries that belong to one but not both bodies. APEC includes Hong Kong and Taiwan as well as Mexico, Chile and Peru, none of whom are participants in the EAS. Papua New Guinea, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and the European Union are all members of the ARF and could legitimately claim they should be included in any new regional architecture. Because the EAS has a smaller membership it is viewed as a more suitable candidate for community building in the Asia Pacific than APEC. Russia wants in and the Obama Administration has already signalled it will pursue accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Accession to this treaty is a prerequisite for a seat on the EAS. If a consensus emerged to build on the EAS process, progress is likely to be evolutionary. The EAS could gradually develop from a forum where heads of government and state discuss issues where economic, political and security

3 considerations overlap into a body that provides leadership and direction in addressing these issues. The development of an Asia Pacific Community is more likely to build on existing multilateral institutions and arrangements than be at their expense. For example, ASEAN’s Free Trade Agreements with China and AustraliaNew Zealand would serve as building blocks for future economic integration of the Asia Pacific Region. Rudd’s proposal for an Asia Pacific Community is still a viable proposition because the Prime Minister has not been prescriptive about what shape it should take. The current Global Financial Crisis has driven home the necessity for the Asia Pacific to step up regional cooperation. Although Rudd may have lost an opportunity in April to promote his vision, he will be given another chance when ASEAN reschedules its multi-layered summit process. *Carlyle A. Thayer is Professor of Politics in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra. He first began studying Southeast Asia and its regional institutions in 1967.

1 “Kevin Rudd’s Multi-Layered Asia Pacific Community Initiative” Carlyle A. Thayer* In a speech delivered to the Shangri-la Dialogue in late May, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd once again advanced his proposal for an Asia Pacific Community this time calling for a one and a half track conference to be held in Australia later this year. There has been widespread academic and diplomatic scepticism of the proposal since it was first promoted in an address to the Asia Society in Sydney in June last year. Veteran Singaporean diplomat Barry Desker declared the proposal ‘dead in the water’ shortly after Rudd spoke. More recently, the retired ABC foreign correspondent Graeme Dobell, writing in a Lowy Institute blog, argued that the Prime Minister had cut his losses and ‘moved on’ by demoting the ‘c’ in community from upper to lower case. And, as the East Asia Forum has revealed, The Australian got it wrong when it asserted that Kurt Campbell, in his confirmation hearing for appointment as Assistant Secretary of State, had opposed the idea. Before throwing the baby out with the bath water it is worth considering what a conference on the Asia Pacific Community might consider. Rudd’s central premise was that ‘none of our existing regional mechanisms as currently configured’ were capable of engaging ‘in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic and political matters and future challenges to security’. He therefore proposed a regional institution that spanned the entire Asia-Pacific region capable of achieving these objectives. Rudd’s proposal was aimed at overcoming the compartmentalisation of existing regional institutions by creating an effective leadership forum where major political, economic and security issues could be dealt with holistically rather than piecemeal. For example, APEC has focused mainly on trade liberalisation, while the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has dealt with confidence-building measures. The ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asia Summit (EAS) processes overlap in membership and their explicit roles have yet to be clearly defined. There are several major challenges that must be faced if Rudd’s proposal is to become a reality. The first concerns what specific organisational form the Asia Pacific Community should take. Nearly a year after it was first proposed, it has become apparent that there is little regional backing for the creation of a new regional institution. But there appears to be some support for modifying or expanding existing multilateral arrangements in order to create a more effective regional architecture. Both APEC and the EAS have emerged as front runners. Either APEC or EAS could be upgraded to serve as the foundation for Rudd’s Asia Pacific Community, or both could be upgraded and assume greater responsibility, respectively, for economic and political-security matters.

2 The second major challenge concerns membership. In 2008, Rudd initially nominated the United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia ‘and other states in the region’ as members. As a result of Australian diplomatic soundings, it is clear that if Rudd’s proposal is to get off the ground ASEAN must be at its core. This means that Myanmar, viewed by many as a pariah state, would be included along with poverty-stricken Laos and Cambodia. The question of membership could be addressed by expanding existing institutions such as APEC, by including India, or the EAS, by adding the United States and Russia. In either case, adding additional members to these institutions raises the complication of deciding what to do with countries (or ‘economies’ as in the case of APEC) that belong to one but not both bodies. APEC includes Hong Kong and Taiwan as well as Mexico, Chile and Peru, none of whom are participants in the EAS. Papua New Guinea, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and the European Union are all members of the ARF and could legitimately claim they should be included in any new regional architecture. Because the EAS has a smaller membership, and includes all ASEAN members, it might be a more suitable candidate for community building in the Asia Pacific than APEC. The EAS brings together heads of government and state. Russia wants in and the Obama Administration has already signalled it will pursue accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Accession to this treaty is a prerequisite for a seat on the EAS. If a consensus emerged to build on the EAS process, progress is likely to be evolutionary. The EAS could gradually develop from a forum where heads of government and state discuss issues where economic, political and security considerations overlap into a body that provides leadership and direction in addressing these issues. The development of an Asia Pacific Community is more likely to build on existing multilateral institutions and arrangements than be at their expense. Rudd’s proposal for an Asia Pacific Community is still a viable proposition because the Prime Minister has not been prescriptive about what shape it should take. The current Global Financial Crisis has driven home the necessity for the Asia Pacific to step up regional cooperation. Before pronouncing Rudd’s proposal dead on arrival it would be prudent to wait for regional reactions to the Prime Minister’s advocacy at ASEAN-sponsored summits and the outcome of Rudd’s one and a half track conference later in the year. *Carlyle A. Thayer is Professor of Politics in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra. This article was adapted from ‘A Sense of Community’, published in the inaugural edition of the Australasia ASEAN Business journal published by the Australia ASEAN Business Council in May.