Judiciary Cases.docx

JUDICIARY CASES 5. 171 SCRA 408 (1989) CHURCH ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, INC. VS SIBULO FACTS: Two cadastral lots situated in Daraga, Albay used to be covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. RO15434 (17622) and RO-15435 (2270) in the names of predecessors-in-interest of the Llorente Group. In 1971, upon a petition filed in the cadastral case, the OCTs were cancelled, and replaced by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-29762 and T-29763 in the name of the Alcala Group, based on the finding that the predecessors-in-interest of the Llorente Group had previously sold the two lots to the Alcala Group. Thereafter, the Alcala Group sold the two lots to the Spouses Maturgo, who were then issued TCT Nos. T30744 and T-30746. On January 18, 1972, the Llorente Group filed before the then Court of First Instance of Albay a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 4564. Named defendants were the Alcala Group and the Spouses Maturgo. The Llorente Group alleged in their complaint that there was fraud committed by the Alcala Group when the latter had the OCTs cancelled, and TCTs issued in their name; and that there was fraud also in the transfer of the two lots to the spouses Maturgo. Petitioner filed a Special Appearance questioning the respondent Court's jurisdiction over its person contending in essence that the court did not and cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by mere order of September 25, 1986 which cannot take the place of summons, much less, when there is as yet nothing in the records or any pleading asserting a claim against the petitioner herein by any party in interest. On the same occasion counsel for petitioner questioned verbally the precipitate issuance of the amended order and the writ of execution, both of which including the order of September 25, 1986, were allegedly issued without any written motion, notice or hearing which not only contravenes the requirements of law but also renders inutile the directive of this Court for conduct of a hearing to determine the rights and obligations of the petitioner. Thus, herein petitioner, on November 26, 1986 filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition or declaratory relief with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit. RULING: Foremost, a careful perusal of the instant petition would disclose that the petitioner tries to convince this Court to set aside the pronouncement earlier made, also by this court, through its First Division in the civil case entitled Fe Madrideo and Narciso Maturgo v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 62091. Such cannot be done. There is nothing in law nor in jurisprudence that sanctions such a proceeding. We need not emphasize the fact that the Supreme Court by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is. It is the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearing.

Consequently, We cannot and should not review a case already passed upon by the Highest Tribunal. It is only proper to allow the case to take its rest having attained finality. Finally, it is worth noting that this Court's earlier resolution provided for the reinstatement of the judgment by the lower court. Thus, the Orders in question were issued by the public respondent pursuant to the said pronouncement of reinstatement. Public respondent did not have a choice but to issue the same. Established is the rule that the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right, to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof is the court's ministerial duty compellable by mandamus. (Borja v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 37944, June 30, 1988; Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, G.R. 45825, Julie 30, 1988; Zansibarian Residents Association v. Municipality of Makati, 135 SCRA 235; Garcia v. Echiverri 132 SCRA 631). 6. 17 PHIL 756 ( 1966) – Di gyud nako Makita sa net. 7. 154 SCRA 77 (1987) ANG PING VS. RTC OF MANILA FACTS: Respondents Julio and Zenaida Ko filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the temporary restraining order of the ejectment case ordered by the metropolitan trial court of Manila or the preliminary injunction to stop such implementation of the said case by the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 40. Contradictory decisions where rendered by the lower courts concerned regarding the disputed premises involving the Camp of Ang Ping and Pimentel, the new owner of the disputed property acquired from a sale by T&L Development Corporation, previous owner of the property and is occupied by Julio and Zenaida Ko of which they were lessees even before the sale was done. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila ordered the camp of Julio Ko to vacate the disputed premises in favor of the petitioners and pay the latter a monthly rent of 5,000 pesos from March 1, 1981 until after they vacate the area less the other payments that were settled. However, RTC granted partially a motion for reconsideration by respondents lowering the ruled amount to be paid by them. The petitioners then, filed a motion to reconsider the decision of the RTC; however, their petition were denied so it resorted them to go back to MTC of manila and filed a motion for execution of the judgement rendered by the said court regarding the case. Thus, respondents opposed the motion because of the grounds that the RTC decided to nullify the previous sale of the property, of which is said to be contrary to Article 19 of the Civil Code, ordered the petitioners to sell the 190 square meters of land they had purchased from respondents upon paying them 190,000 Pesos by Julio Ko. However, the said grounds by the respondents were denied by MTC manila and still ordered the execution of the ejectment case. Moreover, a petition was filed, of which is still pending by the camp of Ang Ping in the Court of Appeals regarding the nullification of the sale ISSUE: Whether or not an execution of a judgment ordering to vacate a disputed property will be superseded by a decision rendered by a superior court ordering the nullification of sale and granting the legal redemption in favor of the respondents. HELD:

No, such decision of a superior court will not in any case supersede the decision of an inferior court for the reason that both decisions are tackling an entirely different matter. Unlawful detainer is a case concerning material possession while an action for reconveyance of a property is an issue of ownership. However, the court reiterated that a lower court has no capacities to interpret or reverse a decision of a higher court. Wherefore, the Supreme Court deemed that they have the final say in the matters of any justifiable controversy. On the other hand, the court said that the issue here is to settle the execution of the decision in the ejectment case and that on the matters of the nullification of sale and reconveyance of property should be decided by the proper courts and both parties have equal chances of winning. Moreover, they found that such decision of the RTC was improperly issued and that they side the petitioners. The court have ruled to immediately execute the decision of the ejectment case, sets aside the orders concerning the injunction of such and deemed that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration regarding this matter. 8. 148 SCRA 382 (1987) IN RE: WENCESLAO LAURETA FACTS: Eva Maravilla Ilustre, in her fourth case before the Supreme Court, has been held in contempt due to the letters she sent to individual Justices, her efforts to disparage the SC in the media, and her complaint against them with the Tanodbayan. Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, her counsel, is judged to have committed acts unbecoming of an officer of the Court, and has been suspended indefinitely. Incriminating acts of Eva Maravilla Ilustre: wrote threatening letters to the Justices of the Supreme Court; filed an Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan that completely disregarded facts, circumstances, and legal considerations; instigated the circulation of false headline implying graft and corruption charges against Justices Involvement of Atty. Wenceslao Laureta: likely wrote the threatening letters sent to the Justices in Ilustre’s name; likely encouraged Ilustre’s pursuit of her Affidavit-Complaint with the Tanodbayan and her disparaging remarks regarding the Justices in her letters and comments to the media; was responsible for all the acts of his clients ISSUE/S: WoN the Justices of the First Division acted in bad faith RULING: NO. Ilustre has lost three times in court, and by virtue of res judicata, theEscolin Decision and the Javellana Resolution, which bar her from acquiringMaravilla’s properties, serve as final judgment of the case. SC gave ample time and consideration to her petitions, but ultimately held that they had no merit (as stated in their Banc Decision) Justice Yap clarified that he was not aware that his former partner Atty. SedfreyOrdoñez was the counsel for the respondents, and inhibited himself immediately upon finding out. Court is not duty bound to issue signed Decisions all the time, if it deems it unnecessary.

9. 199 SCRA 405 (1991) PHIL. VETERANS INVESTMENT DEV CORP. VS VELEZ FACTS: On September 8, 1987, the respondent, Philippine Veterans Assistance Commission (PVAC), filed in the Regional Trial Court a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the petitioners –– the Philippine Veterans Investment Development Corporation (PHIVDEC) and PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority (PIA). The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 11157 and raffled to Branch XX, presided over by respondent Judge Alejandro M. Velez. On November 20, 1987, PHIVIDEC and PIA filed an answer with counterclaim. They alleged lack of jurisdiction by the trial court over the case for it is allegedly covered by the arbitration powers of the Government Corporate Counsel under Presidential Decree No. 242 of July 9, 1973, Sections 3-b and 6 of which prescribe the procedure for the administrative settlement and adjudication of disputes, claims, and controversies between or among government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, Sections 1, 3-b and 6 of P.D. 242 In an order dated March 15, 1988, Judge Velez denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that P.D. No. 242 is "unconstitutional for being an act that amounts to an emasculation and impairment of the judicial power of review of this court and of the Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution ISSUE: Whether or not the P.D No. 242 is unconstitutional RULING: P.D. No. 242 is not unconstitutional.1âwphi1 It does not diminish the jurisdiction of courts but only prescribes an administrative procedure for the settlement of certain types of disputes between or among departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, so that they need not always repair to the courts for the settlement of controversies arising from the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or agreements. The procedure is not much different, and no less desirable, than the arbitration procedures provided in Republic Act No. 876 (Arbitration Law) and in Section 26, R.A. 6715 (The Labor Code). It is an alternative to, or a substitute for, traditional litigation in court with the added advantage of avoiding the delays, vexations and expense of court proceedings. Or, as P.D. No. 242 itself explains, its purpose is "the elimination of needless clogging of court dockets to prevent the waste of time and energies not only of the government lawyers but also of the courts, and eliminates expenses incurred in the filing and prosecution of judicial actions. P.D. No. 242 is a valid law prescribing an administrative arbitration procedure for certain disputes among offices, agencies and instrumentalities under the executive control and supervision of the President of the Philippines. Since PVAC filed Civil Case No. 11157 against PHIVIDEC and PIA without first passing through the administrative channel, the judicial action was premature for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, hence, dismissible on that account (Chia vs. Acting Collector of Customs, 177 SCRA 755). 10. 213 SCRA 640 (1992) MALAYAN INTEGRATED INDUSTRIES, CORP VS CA

FACTS: In 1977, a reclamation project was sought to be undertaken by the City of Mandaue. It signed a contract with Malayan Integrated Industries Corporation to actualize the project. The Justice Secretary opined that only the national government can undertake reclamation projects however the Public Estates Authority (PEA) can delegate such function to Mandaue. The Sanggunian of Mandaue then authorized its mayor to enter into a Memorandum of Agreement with the PEA to validate the contract with Malayan. The project however remained hanging until after the EDSA Revolution. The contract was re-indorsed to then president Corazon Aquino who referred the contract back to PEA. After this, the mayor of Mandaue chose to open a new contract with another company (F.F. Cruz & Co.) since he deemed that the Office of the President has some reservations against the contract with Malayan. The mayor submitted the new contract before the PEA which endorsed it to the Office of the President which approved the same and rescinded the earlier contract between Mandaue and Malayan. The recommendation was however signed by the Executive Secretary and not the president herself. ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation was validly approved. HELD: Yes. Although the letter to the PEA advising it of the approval of the reclamation contract between the City of Mandaue and F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. and the disapproval of the earlier agreement between the City of Mandaue and MALAYAN, was signed by the Executive Secretary, “by authority of the President,” and not by the President’s own hand, the Executive Secretary’s action is presumed to be valid and to have been regularly performed in behalf of the President and thus should be accorded due respect. As head of the Executive Office, the Executive Secretary, is an alter ego of the President. One of his myriad functions is “to exercise primary authority to sign papers `By authority of the President,’ attest executive orders and other presidential issuances unless attestation is specifically delegated to other officials by him or by the President; assist the President in the administration of special projects; and perform such other functions as the President may direct”, his personality is in reality “but the projection of that of the President,” his acts, “performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” The approval by the Office of the President of the reclamation contract in favor of F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. and the rejection of the contract with MALAYAN, is not subject to review by the courts in view of the principle of separation of powers which accords co-equal status to the three great branches of the government, absent any showing that the President, in doing so, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

11. 202 SCRA 844 (1991) LLAMAS VS ORBOS Facts: Governor Ocampo of Tarlac was found guilty of graft and corruption. He was suspended for office for 90 days; hence his vice-governor, Llamas, assumed office. Less than two months, however, Executive Secretary Orbos, without ruling on Ocampo's Motion for Reconsideration, issued a Resolution granting executive clemency. Thus, Ocampo re-assumed the governorship of the province. Llamas filed a petition questioning said Resolution. He contends that executive clemency could be granted

by the President only in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases. According to the him, the qualifying phrase "after conviction by final judgment" in Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution applies solely to criminal cases. He also contends that the pardon granted was premature since Ocampo's motion for reconsideration has abated the running of the reglementary period for finality of judgment and that his constitutional rights to due process were violated since he was not notified of the pardon.

Issues: 1. May the president grant executive clemency in administrative cases? 2. Has there been a final judgment? 3. Was petitioner's constitutional rights to due process violated when he was not notified of the pardon?

Held: 1. Yes. The president can grant executive clemency based in Art. VII sec. 19 of the constitution. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. If the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. If executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses. Also a number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize the exercise of executive clemency in administrative cases. One example of which is Sec. 43 of PD 807 which provides that in meritorious cases, the president may commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and employees in disciplinary cases. Moreover, the intent of the constitutional commission is to give the president the power to grant executive clemency and is not to be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the constitution.

There is no reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. If the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.

2. Yes. There has been a final judgment because upon acceptance of the presidential pardon, the grantee is deemed to have waived any appeal which he may have filed. Consequently, Ocampo's acceptance of the presidential pardon "serves to put an end" to the motion for reconsideration and renders the subject decision final. 3. No. Pardon has been defined as "the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. Thus, assuming that petitioner was not notified of the subject pardon, it is only because said notice is unnecessary.

12. 283 SCRA 211 (1997) MORALES VS CA Facts: Petitioner was charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He then filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground the penalty for the offense charged should not exceed prision correccional or six years’ worth of imprisonment and that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the case.In denying this motion, the RTC reasons out that, while MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over caseswith penalties of not more than six years of imprisonment, an exception is provided in the said Act. It provides the Court of First Instance (currently, the RTC) shall have “concurrent original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable under the Act.”Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction over the case.Hence, this petitionIn raising the same to SC, petitioner furthers that, since only about 0.5 gram of shabu was involved, the imposable penalty would not exceed prision correccional. Therefore, RTC doesn’t have jurisdiction over his case. Issue: Whether RTC has jurisdiction to try petitioner’s alleged violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, but only insofar as the issue of jurisdiction of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670 is concerned. The Resolutions of 8 August and 13 September 1996 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE, while the challenged orders in Criminal Case No. 96-8443 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 116, are AFFIRMED. The trial court is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 96-8443 with all reasonable dispatch.