Judiciary Cases.docx

Hacienda Luisita vs PARC Case Digest GR 171101 July 5 2011 Nov 22 2011 Facts: In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing public and private agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands covered by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed an expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the government’s case against TADECO. The CA dismissed it, but the dismissal was subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure its implementation. Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative modes in distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers. After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989. From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the farmworkers. Such claim was subsequently contested by two groups representing the interests of the farmers – the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote letter petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of the SDOA. They claimed that they haven’t actually received those benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms, and that their lives haven’t really improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the SDOA. The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of the SDOA and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec recommended to the PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-12-2 and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through compulsory

acquisition scheme. Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered by the SDP to the mandated land acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule 65. On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution. Administrative Law Issue 1: W/N PARC has the authority to revoke the Stock Distribution Plan or SDP

Constitutional Law Issue 2: W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA 6657

Held: No. First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenged the constitutionality of RA 6657, Sec 31 at the earliest possible opportunity. It should have been raised as early as Nov 21, 1989, when PARC approved the SDP of HLI or at least within a reasonable time thereafter. Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lis mota of this case. Before the SC, the lis mota of the petitions filed by the HLI is whether or not the PARC acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking the SDP of HLI. With regards to the original positions of the groups representing the interests of the farmers, their very lis mota is the non-compliance of the HLI with the SDP so that the the SDP may be revoked. Such issues can be resolved without delving into the constitutionality of RA 6657. Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon the constitutionality of acts of the executive or legislative departments have not been met in this case.

* The SC, through a resolution dated Nov 21 2011 of the motion for reconsideration filed by HLI, affirmed the revocation of HLI’s SDP and the placing of Hacienda Luisita under the compulsory land distribution scheme of the CARP law. It was also held that the date of taking was Nov 21 1989, when the PARC, by Resolution 89-12-2, approved the SDP of HLI. ##

J. Joya v. PCGG Facts: The PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas wrote on 09 August 1990 to President Corazon Aquino regarding the scheduled sale between the Republic of the Philippines and Christie’s of 82 Old Masers Painting housed in Metropolitan Museum of Manila and 7 boxes of antique silverware in the custody of Central Bank. This was approved on 14 August 1990 and the consignment was signed the following day. On 26 October 1990 the Commission on Audit submitted audit findings to the President – the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance and thereby prohibited by law. As Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists, petitioners Dean Jose Joya et al contended that they have legal personality to restrain respondent from acting contrary to preserving artistic creations pursuant to Sec 14-18 Article XIV of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing. Decision: Petition for prohibition and mandamus dismissed for lack of merit. Legal standing means a personal and substantial interest on the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The paintings legally belongs to the foundation or the members of thereof and the silverware are gifts to the Marcos couple. When the Marcos administration was toppled and the said objects were confiscated it did not mean that ownership has passed to the government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these were already acquired, any defect in the acquisition must be raised by the true owners. Petitioners failed to show that they are the legal owners of the said objects that have become publicly owned.

Bankers Association of the Phils v. Comelec Facts: This was a petition for the issuance of a status quo to enjoin theimplementation of the Money Ban Resolution issued by COMELEC. The said ban prohibits the withdrawal of cash, encashment of checks and conversion of any monetary instrument into cash from May 8 to 13, 2013 exceeding One Hundred Thousand pesos (P 100,000.00) or its equivalent in any foreign currency per day in banks finance companies quasi/banks, pawnshops remittance companies and institutions performing similar functions. However all other non/cash transactions are not covered. For this purpose, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and other financial agencies of the government are hereby deputized to implement with utmost dispatch and ensure strict compliance with this resolution without violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended, and Republic Act No. 6426.

Issue: Whether or the COMELEC’s resolution was exercised in excess of its duty. Held: The Court held to dismiss the case, as it became moot and academic. The Court has issued a Status quo Ante on May 10, 2013, thus the Money Ban Resolution was not in force during the most critical period of the elections. In addition, nothing in the exceptions of “moot and academic” principle relates to the case at bar. The Court considers it significant that the BSP and the Monetary Board continue to possess full and sufficient authority to address the COMELEC’s concerns and to limit banking transactions to legitimate purposes without need for any formal COMELEC resolution if and when the need arises. Likewise, the Congress should take note of the Money Ban Resolution and the evil it sought to prevent in application of its plenary power for future elections, thus rendering unnecessary further action on the merits of the assailed Money Ban Resolution at this point.

BENGZON VS. DRILON G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133 Gutierrez, J.: FACTS: Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition. It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication, thus there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid.

HELD: The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed. The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid and subsisting. Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

Nicos Industrial Corp. V. CA FACTS: (1) The order is assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground that it violates the aforementioned constitutional requirement of Article 8 Section 14 of the Constitution. The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court. Petitioners complain that there was no analysis of their testimonial evidence or of their 21 exhibits, the trial court merely confining itself to the pronouncement that the sheriff's sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the derivative suit. There was therefore no adequate factual or legal basis for the decision that could justify its review and affirmance by the Court of Appeals. (2) January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of P2,000,000.00 from private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank and to secure payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land located at Marilao, Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for the supposed non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff's sale was held on July 11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the original date for the auction was changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor. (3) CA decision: We hold that the order appealed from as framed by the court a quo while leaving much to be desired, substantially complies with the rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court’s decision is unconstitutional HELD: WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10, for revision, within 30 days from notice, of the Order of June 6, 1986, conformably to the requirements of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution, subject to the appeal thereof, if desired, in accordance with law. RATIO: (1) The questioned order is an over-simplification of the issues, and violates both the letter and spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution. (2) It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. (3) Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it should not and cannot be substituted for substance. As the ruling on this second ground was unquestionably a judgment on the merits, the failure to state the factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to the order. (4) Kilometric decisions without much substance must be avoided, to be sure, but the other extreme, where substance is also lost in the wish to be brief, is no less unacceptable either. The ideal decision is that which, with welcome economy of words, arrives at the factual findings reaches the legal conclusions renders its ruling and having done so ends.

Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. CA G.R. No. 127682 April 24, 1998 Regalado, J. Issue: whether or not issuance of Minute Resolutions is valid under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution Held:

“Resolutions” are not “decisions” within the above constitutional requirements; they merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained. And the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ decision. The constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases “submitted for decision,” i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due course, with the resolution therefor stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the Supreme Court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent court’s decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

Valdez vs CA Facts: A complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio andVenida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella. Without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot. The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, ordering private respondents to vacate the property. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to show that they had given the private respondents the right to occupy the premises Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINTCLEARLY MADE OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER. Held: It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception. Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. An examination of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional allegations that will support an action for ejectment are lacking.