Executive Department Cases No. 59-65.docx

59. Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago vs. Commission on Elections GR No. 190793 June 19 2009 Sereno, J: FACTS: Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the Respondent Commission on Election (COMELEC), seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 2010 National and Local Elections. It was represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV (Trillanes), and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo). Taking cognizance of the Oakwood incident, the COMELEC denied the Petition, claiming that MAGDALO’s purpose was to employ violence and unlawful means to achieve their goals. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means. HELD: Yes. In view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the members of the MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the context of disqualifications from party registration.

60. Kapunan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals G.R. Nos. 148213-17 March 13, 2009 TINGA, J.: Facts: The petitioners, Edgardo Kapunan and Oscar Legaspi charges with the killing of KMU Chairman Rolando Olalia and his driver Leonor Alay-ay. On June 1986 Olalia and Alay-ay dead bosy was found. The murder case of Olalia is a controversial case during that time, Olalia is a profile individual being the chairman of the KMU at the time of his death. On November 1998, private respondents Feliciano Olalia and Perlina Alay-ay, filed a complaint letter to Department of Justice for the alleged complex kinapping and killing of Olalia and Alay-ay against Edgardo Kapunan and Oscar Legaspi and other men and officers of National Police and AFP. Secretary Serafin Cuevas, the Secretary of Department of Justice, created a panel that were tasked to conduct a preliminary investigation of Olalia case. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss in Department of Justice on the ground that the Amnesty granted to them by the National Amnesty Commission extinguishes their criminal liability under Proclamation 347 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos entitled “Granting of Amnesty to the rebels, insurgents and all other persons, who may or may be committed crimes against public order and crimes committed in furtherance of political ends. Issues: Whether or not the amnesty granted to Kapunan and Legaspi, extinguishes their criminal liability in Olalia case. Held: No. The Panel created by the Department of Justice refused to consider the defense of Amnesty of the petitioners on the ground that the document presented pertaining to the Amnesty failed to show that the Olalia murder case was one of the crimes for which the amnesty was applied for. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition, finding no grave of abuse of discretion on the Panel created by the DOJ, the Appelate Court refused to rule on the applicability of amnesty issued to Kapunan and Legaspi. Finally, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the Amnesty granted to Kapunan and Legaspi pertains only to the crimes against rebellion and not covered the crime of murder of Olalia and Alay-ay case.

61. People vs. Casido G.R. No. 116512. March 7, 1997 DAVIDE, JR., J.: Facts: In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin applied for pardon, as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission. They were granted conditional pardon during the pendency of their appeal. Their applications for amnesty were also favorably acted upon. Issue: Whether or not the pardon and amnesty was valid Held: The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them and not by the pardon. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress.

62. MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS GR NO September 15, 1989 177 SCRA 668

Facts: After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. Issue: Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines? Ruling: The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national interest. This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate more chaos. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government. The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.

63. Marcos vs. Manglapus G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989 EN BANC:

FACTS: Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING: Yes According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not dene what is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and oces (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit nes and forfeitures, after conviction by nal judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23). The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the specic powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

64. In re: Rosalie L. Paraguas 72 SCRA 1, July 6, 1976 PER CURIAM: FACTS: Rosalie Llorente Paraguas was appointed as Municipal Judge. Record shows that she was not among those who were admitted to the Bar examination,took the Bar,failed or passed the Bar Examination whether under her maiden name Rosalie Llorente or her married name Rosalie Llorente Paraguas. Acting Judicial Consultant required her in writing to prove her qualifications as a member of the Philippine Bar, she submitted an affidavit asserting that she took the Bar examination in 1956 under the name of ROSA C. BACULO which was the name registered in school and also the name she used when she took the oath. It is a fact, that there exists a person by the name of Rosa C. Baculo who passed the Bar Examinations in 1956 and was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1957. According to the Acting Judicial Consultant’s Report, Judge Paraguas admitted that it was indeed Rosa C. Baculo who advised her to use that name and to lay claim to her Bar record. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Rosalie L. Paraguas is a bona fide member of the Bar? HELD: No. The fact remains that despite the opportunity given her, Judge Rosalie Paraguas has failed to submit any positive proof or documentation of her ever been duly admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar, and without such qualification, which is an essential requirement for appointment as Judge under the Constitution and the law she cannot be permitted to stay one day longer in the Office of Municipal Judge. In the light of the certification of the Bar Division of this Court, that she is not a member of the Philippine Bar.

65. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. Commission on Elections G.R. 161265, Feb. 24, 2004 TINGA, J.: FACTS: Prior to the May 2004 elections, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) has been divided because of a struggle of authority between Party Chair Edgardo Angara and Part Secretary General Agapito Aquino, both having endorsed two differentsets of candidates under the same party, LDP. The matter was brought to the COMELEC. The Commission in its resolution, has recognized the factions creating two sub-parties: LDP Angara Wing and LDP Aquino Wing. ISSUES: 1. Whether the ascertainment of the identity of political party and its officers within COMELEC jurisdiction? 2. Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in recognizing the two sets of nominations and endosements by the same party? HELD: 1. YES. The court ruled that the COMELEC correctly stated that "the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers" is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample "wherewithal" and "considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections." 2. YES. The COMELEC erred in its resolution. Only those Certificates of Candidacy (COC) signed by the LDP Party Chairman Angara or his duly authorized representative/s shall be recognized