Executive #38-44.docx

#38. 615 SCRA 666 G.R. No. 191002 March 17, 2010 DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO BERSAMIN, J.: FACTS: These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that "vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof" from a "list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy." On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, therefore, the JBC passed a resolution where the JBC unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice Honorable Reynato S. Puno. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation. On February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the candidates to invite the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy being yet unresolved. In the meanwhile, time is marching towards May 17, 2010 when the vacancy occurs upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno. ISSUES: 1. WoN petitioners have locus standi. 2. WoN the incumbent President can appoint a Chief Justice during the election ban period? RULING: 1. Yes. The Court rules that the petitioners have each demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of the controversy as to vest them with the requisite locus standi. The issues before us are of transcendental importance to the people as a whole. Indeed, the issues affect everyone because they concern great doubt about the authority of the incumbent President to appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but also others who may serve in the Judiciary. The Court holds that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The challenges to the authority of the JBC to open the process of nomination and to continue the process until the submission of the list of nominees; the insistence of some of the

petitioners to compel the JBC to submit the short list to the incumbent President; the strong position that the incumbent President is already prohibited under Section 15, Article VII from making any appointments, starting on May 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010 are only some of the real issues for determination. 2. Yes. Prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Section 14, 15, and 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. WHEREFORE, the Court dismisses the petition for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002.

#39. 380 SCRA 49 G.R. No. 149036 April 2, 2002 MATIBAG v BENIPAYO CARPIO, J.: FACTS: On February 2, 1999, COMELEC appointed petitioner as Acting Director of the Education and Information Department (EID for brevity). On February 15, 2000, the appointment of petitioner was renewed as Director of EID in a Temporary capacity and then again on February 15, 2001. On March 22, 2001 President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason[ as COMELEC Commissioners, all expiring on February 2, 2008. On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and for the same term, expiring on February 2, 2008. Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions. In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum addressed to petitioner as and to Cinco, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department but was denied. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution; 2. Whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution; 3. Whether or not Benipayos removal of petitioner from her position as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department is illegal and without authority, having been done without the approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body; RULING: 1. No. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows: The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process. An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. An ad interim appointment in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. In the instant case, Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately. While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC shall be independent, this provision should be harmonized with the Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to make ad interim appointments. 2. No. Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides as follows: The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. X x x. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The same ad interim appointments and renewals of appointments will also not breach the seven-year term limit because all the appointments and renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on February 2, 2008. The continuing renewal of the ad interim appointment of these three respondents, for so long as

their terms of office expire on February 2, 2008, does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. 3. No. Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman, and has full authority to exercise all the powers of that office for so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective. The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with the Civil Service Law. In the exercise of this power, the Chairman is not required by law to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. The COMELEC en banc, in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the election period. Thus, Benipayos order reassigning petitioner from the EID to the Law Department does not violate Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code. For the same reason, Benipayos order designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID is legally unassailable.

#40. 298 SCRA 408 A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998 In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta NARVASA, CJ.: FACTS: Referred to the Court are the appointments by the President of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Bago and Cabanatuan City, respectively. The issue was first ventilated at the meeting of the Judicial and Bar Council on March 9, 1998, to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the "constitutionality of *** appointments" specifically, in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. Attention was drawn to Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. On the other hand, appointments to fill vacancies in the Supreme Court during the period mentioned in the provision just quoted could seemingly be justified by another provision of the same Constitution, Section 4(1) of Article VIII. The view was then expressed by Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, that the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. This hypothesis was accepted, and was then submitted to the President for consideration, together with the Council's nominations for eight (8) vacancies in the Court of Appeals. The Chief Justice received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from the Executive Secretary transmitting the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly signed on the day immediately before the commencement of the ban on appointments, which implies that the President’s Office did not agree with the hypothesis. The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the transmission of the “list of final nominees” for the vacancy. Chief Justice sent his reply to the President stating that no session has been scheduled after the May elections for the reason that they apparently did not share the same view. It would appear that the Justice Secretary and the regular members of the Council had already taken action without awaiting the Chief Justice's response to the President's letter. Chief Justice received a letter where the President expressed his view that Article 7 Sec 15 only applied to executive appointments. On May 12, Chief Justice received the appointments of the 2 Judges mentioned. Considering the pending proceedings and deliberations, the Court resolved by refraining the appointees from taking their oaths. However, Judge Valenzuela took oath in May 14, 1998 claiming he did so without knowledge on the on-going deliberations. ISSUE: WoN during the period of the ban on appointments, the President is required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII. RULING: No. During the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein. Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared elections offenses in the

Omnibus Election Code. The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called “midnight” appointments. The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban. To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case should the membership of the Court be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the voting on a particularly important question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a case, however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.

#41. 194 SCRA 317 G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991 CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FERNAN, C.J.: FACTS: In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed the constitutionality of EO 284 on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution. CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8. ISSUE: WoN EO 284 is constitutional. RULING: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof. In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

#42. 659 SCRA 270 G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011 Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines BRION, J.: FACTS: On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes” was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. The history of ARMM instituted first by the provisions of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras wherein the congress promulgated Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 which is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. Following is RA No. 9054 which amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. In these consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153. ISSUES: 1. WoN the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections. 2. WoN the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. RULING: 1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government. In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution. 2. No, the passage of RA No. 10153 does not violate Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which refers to the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement. Before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become law or statute they must pass through three readings on separate days, with the exception of when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. The Supreme Court held the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

#43. 658 SCRA 420 G.R. Nos. 156556-57 October 4, 2011 BETOY v. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION PERALTA, J.: FACTS: On June 8, 2001, the EPIRA was enacted by Congress with the goal of restructuring the electric power industry and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC). On November 18, 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of the IRR, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which, among others, resolved that all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003 and shall be entitled to separation benefits. As a result of the foregoing NPB Resolutions, petitioner, Enrique U. Betoy, together with thousands of his co-employees from the NPC were terminated. However, amongst the petitions raised – it is noteworthy that petitioners argued that Section 11, Section 48 and Section 52 of RA 9136 (EPIRA) for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, unconstitutional. ISSUE: WoN Sections 11, 48, and 52 of the EPIRA are unconstitutional for violating Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. RULING: The Court explained that the prohibition contained in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary function of said official's office. The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the order of importance and thus means chief or principal function. The term is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural. The additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the official's primary functions. The designation of the members of the Cabinet to form the NPB does not violate the prohibition contained in our Constitution as the privatization and restructuring of the electric power industry involves the close coordination and policy determination of various government agencies. Section 2 of the EPIRA clearly shows that the policy toward privatization would involve financial, budgetary and environmental concerns as well as coordination with local government units. As can be gleaned from the foregoing enumeration, the restructuring of the electric power industry inherently involves the participation of various government agencies. Mandating additional duties and functions to Cabinet members which are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices by virtue of their special knowledge, is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among the different

offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting national interest and general welfare and delivering basic services to the people. The production and supply of energy is undoubtedly one of national interest and is a basic commodity expected by the people. This Court, therefore, finds the designation of the respective members of the Cabinet, as ex-officio members of the NPB, valid.

#44. 646 SCRA 567 G.R. No. 191560 : March 29, 2011. General v. Urro BRION, J.: FACTS: On September 20, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) appointed Imelda C. Roces (Roces) as acting Commissioner of the NAPOLCOM. When Roces died in September 2007, PGMA appointed the petitioner as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in place of Roces. On the same date, PGMA appointed Eduardo U. Escueta (Escueta) as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman. Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro (Urro) in place of the petitioner, Constancia P. de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and Escueta as permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners. Urros appointment paper is dated March 5, 2010; while the appointment papers of De Guzman and Escueta are both dated March 8, 2010. On March 9, 2010, Escueta took his oath of office. In a letter dated March 19, 2010, DILG Head Executive Assistant/Chief-of-Staff issued separate congratulatory letters to the respondents. After being furnished a copy of the congratulatory letters on March 22, 2010, the petitioner filed the present petition questioning the validity of the respondent’s appointments mainly on the ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments. On March 25, 2010 and April 27, 2010, respondents Urro and de Guzman took their oath of office as NAPOLCOM Commissioners. On July 30, 2010, the newly elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, His Excellency Benigno S. Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments. ISSUE: WoN the Court can exercise its power of judicial review. RULING: No. When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3)recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action. In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondent’s appointments is not the lis mota of the case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present petition: a quo warranto against respondent Urro. The Court already held that for a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested office. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment, he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its

temporariness

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Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary (acting) appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office involved. Here, nothing in the enumeration of functions of the members of the NAPOLCOM that would be subverted or defeated by the President's appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner pending the selection and qualification of a permanent appointee. Viewed as an institution, a survey of pertinent laws and executive issuances will show that the NAPOLCOM has always remained as an office under or within the Executive Department. Clearly, there is nothing repugnant between the petitioners acting appointment, on one hand, and the nature of the functions of the NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of the NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the other.