T3 B7 Hurley Monograph Fdr- All Emails- Memos- Notes- Outlines And Withdrawal Notices (3) In Folder 107

Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley From:

Barbara Grewe

Sent:

Monday, May 10, 2004 3:05 PM

To:

Front Office; Mike Hurley; Warren Bass; John Raidt; Susan Ginsburg

Subject: Ongoing saga of July 5 meeting.

To date we have confirmed that Cofer Black attended the meeting. He would appear to have been the most senior attendee. We are working on the remaining possible names. The one item that Clarke claims came out of the meeting — a meeting of the federal building security committee — may have happened. There was a meeting of the committee on July 9. We will be receiving from the FBI tomorrow documents regarding the July 9 bldg sec. meeting, including the sign in sheet. Do not yet have confirmation that this meeting was explicitly a result of the July 5 Clarke meeting. It may have been a regularly scheduled meeting. Barbara

5/10/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Saturday, May 08, 2004 3:09 PM

To:

Team 3

Cc:

Philip Zelikow

Subject: Status Report on FR Chapter III

Team 3: I just spoke with Philip in C-Ville. He confirmed that he has received Sections 3.1 - 3.5 and the additional piece that Warren drafted on Friday. Philip asked me to tell you that he is very happy with the high quality of your work which, he said, lifts his spirits. He asked me to pass along his appreciation. Well done to all of you and thanks for your hard work. Mike

5/8/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Sunday, May 02, 2004 4:35 PM

To:

Dan Marcus

Cc:

Mike Hurley

Subject: Mike Hurley's Sections Dan: Please take the following text and paste it (or some Marcusian version of it) into an email from you to Philip, so that he'll know what's going on with my sections. When you send your note forward, please cc Stephanie and me on it. Thanks, Mike

Philip: Mike Hurley is working on the draft of section 9.2: Initial war planning and the invasion of Afghanistan. He'll have it to Stephanie by Monday and she'll cue it up for your review. His other section is 5.4: Change and continuity. As that concerns primarily the transition between the Clinton and Bush administrations, I'll take lead editing responsibility for it. I'll also ensure that Chris is involved in the editing process. Dan

5/2/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Dan Marcus

Sent:

Sunday, May 02, 2004 4:24 PM

To:

Stephanie Kaplan

Cc:

Chris Kojm; Steve Dunne; Mike Hurley

Subject: chapter 5.4 Draft of this chapter - on the transition -- should go to Chris, Steve and me, but not to Philip, pending my review. I'll talk to Philip and Ernest about this.

5/2/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Friday, April 30, 2004 10:05 AM

To:

Stephanie Kaplan

Cc:

Chris Kojm; Dan Marcus; Mike Hurley

Subject: BE: Guidelines on deadlines

Stephanie: I have two sections: 9.2 and 5.4. I've focused on 9.2 this week. I had hoped to have it done by close of business today, but the trip to Tampa cost me a day. I'll work on it on Saturday and Sunday and have it sent to you by Sunday afternoon. 5.4 is on the transition—"Change and continuity". I'll pivot to that on Monday, and will have a decent draft by Friday (May 7). Given that it covers the transition, my understanding is that Chris or Dan will have the lead on editing it. Mike Original Message From: Stephanie Kaplan Sent: Friday, April 30, 2004 9:43 AM To: Chris Kojm; staff Subject: RE: Guidelines on deadlines Colleagues: When you are ready to submit a chapter section, please send it to me via unclassified email or, if you are at K Street, via classified email. If you are not located at K Street and have a classified draft to submit, please consult with Tony as soon as possible to make arrangements for transfer to the K Street classified drive. As Chris mentioned in an earlier email, we will begin the editing process this weekend, and so we look forward to receiving your first drafts. If, for whatever reason, you cannot submit a draft today, send me a quick email just letting me know the status of your section so that I can keep track of where we collectively stand. Feel free to contact me if you have any questions. Thanks and have a good weekend. Stephanie STEPHANIE L. KAPLAN

9-11 COMMISSION 7(202)331-1125 F (202) 296-5545 www.9-11commission.gov

Original Message From: Chris Kojm

4/30/2004

Page 2 of2 Sent: Monday, April 26, 2004 11:51 AM To: staff

Subject: Guidelines on deadlines Importance: High Final Report. To those drafting portions of the Final Report: The two week-target date set by the Front Office for chapter submissions is Friday, April 30th. The more material the Front Office receives early, the more we can work with you in shaping that material, and the less painful the process will be later in the month. In all cases send material to Stephanie Kaplan; she will take care of further distribution. We understand that not everyone will be complete with drafts by that date, but if you can push hard this week to get the first draft done, please do so. We will start the editing process this weekend. The deadline for a first draft final report submission to Commissioners is Monday, May 31st. Monographs. To Team Leaders: We want to clarify priorities on written products. For Team 8, the top priority is staff statements, which will fold directly into the final report. For all other teams the top priority is the final report. The next priority is the monographs. Monographs can take forms that suit the work of your Team; they are of no set length or format, but we believe it is important for every team to complete a monograph. The purpose of the monograph is to memorialize each Team's body of work, and provide the investigative and intellectual underpinning for your contribution to the final report. The outside deadline for monographs is July 1st. What this means is that all work should be complete by that date, subject to final edits by the Front Office and copy editing. Teams will have the month of June to complete monographs while the Front Office is engaged with the Commissioners turning the draft report into the final report by July 1st. Any monographs completed before July 1st would be welcome. The target date for issuing the Final Report, not later than July 26th, is also the target date for issuing monographs.

4/30/2004

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: Team 3, 9/11 Commission NND PROJECT NUMBER:

52100

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/18/2008

BOX: 00003

TAB: 1

FOLDER: 0002

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

DOC ID: 31205825

1

_ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Hurley's Monograph File DOCUMENT DATE: 04/27/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/(Profs Notes)

FROM: Marcus TO: Team 3 SUBJECT:

E-Folder for Our .. Sections

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

4/26 PZ guidance: Feel free to copy as much of Number 5 as needed (leaving the four rendition examples for another area) Put the Sudan expulsion issue in Yoel's 2.1 With 3.3, use a page for pre Aug 1998 policy towards Afghanistan, Pakistan and AQ. Take the Afghan story to Feb 2001; Take the Pak story to Dec 31,1999. In 5.2 present the new Pak policy (i.e. high level diplomatic efforts) and carry through to Feb 2001 In 5.5 discuss Afghan policy and Pak approach, Feb 2001 through Sept. 2001

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Thursday, April 22, 2004 7:56 AM

To:

Dan Leopold

Cc:

Team 3

Subject: Readership of Team 3 Monograph Dan, It's still unclear what shape Team 3's monograph will take, but assuming there is time to produce one after all the work on the Final Report, then: Classification is likely to be Top Secret/Codeword. Given that, its readership will be restricted to a limited number of people in the compartment at CIA, State, NSC, Office of Secretary of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Senior officials in the combatant commands (such as CENTCOM and SOCOM), DoJ, Treasury Department, Senior levels of the FBI, and congressional leadership. Most of the people in the compartment are at CIA, the number of people in the compartment at other agencies is limited. If we can get our work through pre-publication review, then the readership would be broader, and would include interested officials in the major foreign policy and national security departments and agencies, the think-tank community, former government officials, reporters writing on national security, academics, and the families of the victims of 9/11. Mike

4/22/2004

To: Barbara Grewe From: Team 5 (JKR) Re: inserts for chapters 6 and 4: The entry of the hijackers. Date: April 22, 2004 The summer of threat: border lookouts placed on Hazmi and Mihdhar. Primary records of lookouts placed on Hazmi and Mihdhar show that border lookouts were not received by INS and Customs until after Mihdhar had returned July 4, 2001. (It appears that the INS acted quickly to upload the information once the information was received.) •

On August 23, 2001, the CIA sent a classified electronic message to the State Department, FBI, INS and other government agencies, recommending that Mihdhar and al Hazmi be added to TIPOFF and the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) which contained a database accessible to the INS and Customs.

•

On August 24, the State Department's TIPOFF office created a dual record for each terrorist, a classified side with intelligence reporting, and an unclassified record with their name, passport number, and place and date of birth. The unclassified information was entered into the Consular Lookout Support System (CLASS) for use by consular officers running checks on visa applications. The TIPOFF office also transmitted the information to INS.

•

August 24, 2001. Both al Hazmi and Mihdhar are entered into TECS as lookouts, automatically scanned at ports of entry. The lookouts are identical, and warn of "possible travel to the U.S." and instruct inspectors to refer the terrorists to secondary inspection, where both investigations and intelligence divisions at headquarters were to be notified. In addition, passport numbers and travel itinerary were to be recorded in secondary results.

•

August 31, 2001. Mihdhar is listed in TECS as "armed and dangerous", and inspectors are instructed to transport him to secondary inspection.

•

September 4,2001. The State Department revoked Mihdhar's visa under section 212(A)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for his participation in terrorist activities.

•

September 5,2001. The INS entered Mihdhar's notice of revokation into the INS lookout system, NAILS.

•

September 5,2001. Mihdhar is listed in TECS as a potential witness in an FBI investigation, and now inspectors are told not to detain him.

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission NND PROJECT NUMBER:

52100

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/18/2008

TAB: 2

FOLDER: 0002

BOX: 00003

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

DOC ID: 31205826

11 ACCESS RESTRICTEDj_|

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Hurley's Monograph File DOCUMENT DATE: 02/06/2001

DOCUMENT TYPE: Telegram

FROM: SECSTATE TO: SUBJECT:

Options for Dealing with the Afghan Terrorism Problem

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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Mike Hurley From:

Dan Marcus

Sent:

Wednesday, April 21, 2004 4:19 PM

To:

staff

Subject: Classification issues in drafting report chapters Attached is a memorandum from Philip and me setting forth guidelines and procedures to be followed in drafting chapters of the report (which drafts we hope to see from you soon!) to assure that we keep on the right side of the line on treatment of classified or possibly classified material pending executive branch review and clearance of the report as unclassified. The rules are pretty much the same as the ones set forth in my March 22 e-mail re staff statements. Our successful experience in navigating the classification shoals (or rapids?) with staff statements underlines the importance of following the attached guidelines for the report chapters. So please read the attached memorandum carefully.

4/22/2004

April 21,2004 MEMORANDUM To:

Staff

From: Philip Zelikow and Dan Marcus Re:

Classification Issues in Drafts of Report Sections

While we plan for the Commission's final report to be a public, unclassified document, the report—or at least most portions of it—will have to undergo a pre-publication review by the executive branch to assure that result. In addition, many if not most of you will be using information—albeit information we believe should be declassified or regarded as unclassified—that is derived from classified documents or interviews. It is therefore important to adhere to the following guidelines and procedures, similar to those we have followed in preparing draft staff statements, in working on drafts of chapters of the report: 1. Drafts of chapters that rely on any information derived from classified sources must be handled as classified documents based on the highest classification of source documents or interviews. In particular: a) such chapters must be drafted and edited only on classified computers; b) draft chapters derived from material up to the Secret level may be worked on in any Commission office; draft chapters derived from TS/SCI material must be worked on at the K Street office or another SCIF; c) such draft chapters must be transmitted by secure means—e.g., classified fax or lock bag; d) such draft chapters must be stored and transported securely. 2. Drafts of chapters that rely on any information derived from classified sources (documents or interviews) should be marked on each page as "Subject to Classification Review." 3. Draft chapters should include endnotes that set forth both the proposed citation for the actual public report, along with the classification (if any) of the source and additional information (such as Bates numbers) that would facilitate the retrieval of the source. Stephanie Kaplan will circulate citation guidelines for both the final report and monographs later today.

4. Such draft chapters should be treated as classified until you are notified by the front office that the pre-publication review process for that chapter has been completed. We recognize that it may be clear from the outset that some draft chapters contain no material derived from currently classified sources (e.g., the chapters on the immediate response in New York or chapters based solely on material in staff statements that have already been cleared by the executive branch). Such draft chapters may be treated as unclassified from the outset with the consent of the front office. If you have any questions, please talk to Chris, Steve, Stephanie, Graham, or one of us.

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Mike Hurley From:

Philip Zelikow

Sent:

Wednesday, April 21 , 2004 1 0:30 AM

To:

Mike Hurley

Subject: RE: FR Section 9.2 Initial War Planning and the Invasion of Afghanistan Come visit

— Original Message — From: Mike Hurley Sent: Wednesday, April 21, 2004 10:23 AM To: Philip Zelikow; Chris Kojm Cc: Stephanie Kaplan; Mike Hurley; Dan Marcus; Steve Dunne Subject: FR Section 9.2 Initial War Planning and the Invasion of Afghanistan

Philip and Chris: I'm drafting this section. I think it should be fairly straightforward. But I'd like to spend a couple of minutes with both of you to get your thoughts. Mike

4/21/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Friday, April 16, 2004 4:25 PM

To:

Daniel Byman

Cc:

Alexis Albion; Warren Bass; Mike Hurley

Subject: A Few Bullets

Dan, Per your request. This is a start, I'll send more as I think of them. I suggest you speak to John Roth about changes at Treasury that relate to the emerging shape of a war on terror (FR, Section 9.3): • TTIC-established in spring 2003 to consolidate threat reporting and ensure that all relevant info from cia, fbi and other collectors resides in one place and is easily accessible. Unclear, at this point whether individual agencies will cough up their most sensitive info. Tenet is banking that this answers the mail for a new capability.

CIA's management of the war on terrorism is conducted in its daily 5:00 meetings, which bring together reps of all elements within CIA, the 1C, State, DoD, Treasury, etc. to coordinate their efforts. Tenet touts this as a highly effective management mechanism.

The al Qaeda Senior Leadership Group: This is a highly sensitive group of deputies, sometimes including principals, that manages the USG's hunt for bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other a Q high value targets. Chairman Myers runs it.

Task Force 121 now has a new name. But it is the special operations forces group, now under Combatant Commander for CENTCOM, that hunts down UBL and his henchment in the field.

Rumsfeld/Tenet lash-ups: Both Tenet and Rumsfeld say they meet frequently and converse constantly. As DoD and CIA have the leading roles, this close bilateral relationship ensures, they say, that there is no daylight between them on important issues. The question is whether this will be institutionalized, or whether it's personality dependent, i.e., it works because Tenet and Rumsfeld get along.

NSC Office of Combating Terrorism: Stood up in fall of 2001. Has coordinated an overall CT strategy. How much power and authority does it have. In less than three years it has had three different Deputy National Security Advisers for Combating Terrorism: Wayne Downing, John Gordon, now Fran Townsend. Can it really prevail over Rumsfeld and DoD? Tenet and CIA? Powell and State?

• NSC also stood up in summer of 2003 a new directorate for Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. It's now headed by Bob Blackwill who has the title of Deputy National Security Council. What is its role vis-a-vis Townsend's shop? Just a coordinator? Or does it have real authority?

4/16/2004

Page 2 of2 FBI: Mueller says that it is moving in the right direction: emphasis now not just on developing criminal cases, but on collecting domestic intelligence. Problem is that his requires a huge cultural change. Mueller does not want congress, or our commission, to force change on the bureau, so he is doing his best to address concerns and demonstrate he is our in front of the wave. Bureau needs to establish a whole new career track for analysts. These people won't be cops; but they need to know they can rise in the Bureau. Lots of skepticism about whether the Bureau is really capable of making such a dramatic change from how it has done business in the past.

FBI Director briefs President Bush every day. In press interviews, Andy Card makes clear that the Director's access to the president is unprecedented. These daily briefings began on September 14, 2001. According to Card, this channel alone is a huge step forward toward enhancing the country's security. The background is that the FBI for years had stayed away from the White House as a result of the dysfunctional Clinton-Freeh relationship, and concerns that the White House would misuse the FBI in some way (see TravelGate).

4/16/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Friday, April 16, 2004 7:22 AM

To:

'[email protected]'

Cc:

Team 3

Subject: Bonnie

Bonnie, While the FO has the responsibility for Chapter XV, Section 15.3 "Homeland defense," I think you can be very helpful to them on that section, given the research you've done, knowledge you've acquired on steps the military has taken to protect the homeland. You're certainly our expert on this important topic. Mike

4/16/2004

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Co: Subject:

Daniel Byman Friday, April 16, 2004 7:06 AM Kevin Scheid Mike Hurley Re: Help

Kevin, I should also add that I would appreciate your help on how the CIA/1C is contributing to the GWOT today (a minor subject, I know). Are you free to talk this afternoon (Friday)? Dan

Daniel Byman wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >

Kevin, I'd like to ask you or a member of your team for help on my section of the final report. In a rather dubious move, I've been asked to draft on sections on Bringing Foreign Policy Back In. I'd appreciate your thoughts on how multilateral institutions abroad might be used (or should not be) with regard to intelligence. Are there better ways to cooperate with allies? Can we set up new structures? Does this approach work at all for intelligence? Please let me know if you or another teammate can do this and, if so, how you'd like to structure it. I'd particularly appreciate written submissions that I can directly incorporate, but I'll take what I can get. I'd also appreciate thoughts on MFRs/documents/testimony that might be relevant. Best, Dan

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Subject:

Daniel Byman Thursday, April 15, 2004 11:18 AM Team 3 help...

I would like to ask all of you for help on section 9.3 -- "The emerging shape of the war on terror." Because I am the person who as looked at this the least, I am naturally the one tasked to draft it. I would like to have each of you provide me with about four paragraphs on how your "instrument" has fought the war on terror since September 20, 2001. Can I ask: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Scott -- how is diplomacy helping out? Len -- how is criminal justice working? Bonnie: what is the military/OSD up to? Alexis: whassup at the Agency? Warren: What is the White House plan/strategy now?

Suggestions on MFRs, testimony, and documents are also welcome. If possible, I'd like this soon (say COB Wednesday), so I can go back to you for more (okay, not the best incentive).

Dan

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

Daniel Byman Thursday, April 15, 2004 11:35 AM Kevin Scrieid Mike Hurley; Daniel Byman Help

Kevin, I'd like to ask you or a member of your team for help on my section of the final report. In a rather dubious move, I've been asked to draft on sections on Bringing Foreign Policy Back In. I'd appreciate your thoughts on how multilateral institutions abroad might be used (or should not be) with regard to intelligence. Are there better ways to cooperate with allies? Can we set up new structures? Does this approach work at all for intelligence? Please let me know if you or another teammate can do this and, if so, how you'd like to structure it. I'd particularly appreciate written submissions that I can directly incorporate, but I'll take what I can get. I'd also appreciate thoughts on MFRs/documents/testimony that might be relevant. Best, Dan

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

Daniel Byman Thursday, April 15, 2004 11:26 AM Christine Healey; Mike Jacobson; Caroline Barnes Daniel Byman; Mike Hurley Request for help

Chris, Mike and Caroline, I've naturally been asked to be a lead drafter on several sections of the report for which I've done no research. Can you (or someone from your team ... or someone else (I'm not sure who)) help out on two parts of the report related to the FBI and justice issues? In particular, I'd appreciate your thoughts on: 1. Chapter 9, section 3. How has the FBI changed its activities overseas (and its cooperation overseas with others) to fight the war on terrorism since September 20, 2001? What has it done? What problems have emerged? What remains to be done? 2. Chapter 12, section 3. multilateral institutions? bad idea?

How has DOJ/the FBI tried to work with Is there more that can be done? Is this a

I'd also appreciate your thoughts on relevant documents, MFRs, and testimony. Ideally, I'd like some written thoughts that I can incorporate directly, but I'll take what you have time to give. Thanks .. and please redirect me if there are better people. Best, Dan

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Mike Hurley From:

Daniel Byman

Sent:

Thursday, April 15, 2004 11:14 AM

To:

Scott Allan

Cc:

Dan Byman; Len Hawley; Tom Dowling; Mike Hurley

Subject: Re: chapter 12

You've anticipated me ... would tommorrow (Friday) afternoon work? If not, how "bout 9:00 am on Tuesday?

Dan Scott Allan wrote: Gentlemen: I saw that Dan Byman is listed as the "lead drafter" for Chapter 12 of the F/O's final report. Since we all will have information and insights to add to his section we should try to schedule a brainstorming session next week. Anytime Tues, Thurs, Friday works for me, as does Wed afternoon. I can help with 12.2 (Central Asia and Arabia) and I'm sure Len would have a good amount to say about reinventing multilateral institutions (covered in 12.3). -SNA

4/15/2004

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

Daniel Byman Thursday, April 15, 2004 11:12 AM Tom Dowling Daniel Byman; Mike Hurley Byman request for help

Tom, In a rather dubious move, I've been ask to take the lead on drafting Chapter 12 of the final report: "Bringing Foreign Policy Back In." I would appreciate your help with several sections of this chapter. In particular, I'd like your thoughts on "America in the Muslim World" and on "Reinventing Multilateral Institutions." Can you give me your thoughts on these subjects? In particular, I'd like your ideas on 1. what the problems are; 2. how they contributed to 9-11 or to problems in counterterrorism in general; 3. what is being done, if anything; and 4. recommendations for improvement. I would also appreciate yoru suggestions on any MFRs, testimony, or documents to look at. Of course, this is due in a hurry. the next few days?

Can you get some thoughts to me in

Thanks in advance -- and I'm open to any ideas that aren't above.

Dan

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Thursday, April 15, 2004 11:10 AM

To:

'[email protected]'

Cc:

Mike Hurley

Subject: Final Report Assignment

Hi Bonnie: You've been assigned lead drafting responsibility for Section 3.4 "Military Options". The overall title of Chapter III is "Responses to al Qaeda's Initial Assaults". Section 3.4 is one of 5 sections that come under that chapter. You'll need to submit your draft section to the FO on or before April 30. PZ advised that each section should be more or less 5,000 words, which is equivalent to 10 pages single-spaced, using Times Roman, 12 point typeface. As a lead drafter you should call on any materials (MFRs, documents, notes), held by any staff member or team on the commission. PZ wants very strong footnoting done for each section. The sections must be concise, there can be no wasted sentences or even words. Mike

4/15/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Thursday, April 15, 2004 11:15 AM

To:

Len Hawley

Cc:

Mike Hurley

Subject: Final Report Assignment Hi Len: PZ just gave us our Final Report lead drafting assignments:

You've been assigned lead drafting responsibility for Section 15.1 "Transforming Institutions for Attacking Terrorists". The overall title of Chapter XV is "National Defense". Section 15.1 is one of 3 sections that come under that chapter. You'll need to submit your draft section to the FO on or before April 30. PZ advised that each section should be more or less 5,000 words, which is equivalent to 10 pages single-spaced, using Times Roman, 12 point typeface. As a lead drafter you should call on any materials (MFRs, documents, notes), held by any staff member or team on the commission. PZ wants very strong footnoting done for each section. The sections must be concise, there can be no wasted sentences or even words. Just wanted to give you a heads up. I think this is a good topic for you. You'll have to call on others to get input. But you'll have a good sense of how our institutions are transforming, and what more needs to be done for attacking terrorists. Mike

4/15/2004

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

CHAPTER 1. The Foundation of an Islamic Army 1 . 1 The fatwa of February 1 998 1.2 Islamist extremism and its appeal in the Islamic world 1 .3 The rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda 1.4 Al Qaeda and the Muslim world 1 .5 Attacking the United States II. Counterterrorism Evolves 2.1 From the old terrorism to the new: The case of WTC I 2.2 Adaptation - or non-adaptation - in the law enforcement community 2.3 ...the intelligence community 2.4 ... the Departments and the Congress 2.5 ...the White House III. 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

Responses to al Qaeda's Initial Assaults Before the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania Crisis Post-crisis diplomacy Military options Clandestine and covert action

IV. 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5

Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland Terrorist entrepreneurs Plans, targets, and requirements Choosing the attackers: recruitment, vetting, and training Seeing aircraft as weapons? A money trail?

LEA D DRAFTER \

May May MacEachin Dowling MacEachin

Tobin FO FO FO FO

Albion Bass Allan Jenkins Albion

Snell De De May Roth

V. From Threat to Threat 5.1 The Millennium crisis 5.2 Post-crisis reflection: an agenda for 2000 5.3 The attack on the U.S.S. Cole 5.4 Change and continuity 5.5 A new strategy?

Linden Albion Grandrimo Hurley Bass

VI. 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6

Snell Jacobson Kim Kim Grewe Grewe

The Attack Looms Arriving, Waiting in California California and Florida Final strategies and tactics Assembling the teams The 'summer of threat' Late leads? Al Mihdhar and Moussaoui

VII. The Four Flights 7.1 The hijacking of AA 1 1 and UA 175 7.2 FAA and NORAD 7.3 Losing AA 77 7.4 Improvising a homeland defense 7.5 The battle for UA 93

Johnstone Farmer Farmer Farmer Raidt

VIII. 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4

Caspersen Caspersen Caspersen Caspersen

Heroism and Horror Emergency plans Agencies and firms implement the plans The World Trade Center Fateful choices in emergency response COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE

IX. 9.1 9.2 9.3

CHAPTER Wartime Crisis management and domestic responses Initial war planning and the invasion of Afghanistan The emerging shape of a war on terror

LEAD DRAFTER Hyde Hurley Byman

X. Problems of Foresight - and Hindsight 10.1 The world of policymakers: appreciations and judgments 10.2 The blinding effects of hindsight 1 0.3 Finding fair verdicts

FO FO FO

XI. National Leadership and National Strategy 11.1 A new world and a new kind of conflict 1 1 .2 Measuring success 1 1 .3 Coordinating a national strategy 1 1 .4 The role of the Congress 1 1 .5 From national strategy to coalition strategy

FO FO FO FO FO

XII.

Bringing Foreign Policy Back In

12.1 12.2

America and the Muslim world Central Asia and Arabia

Byman

12.3

Reinventing multilateral institutions

Byman

Byman

XIII. Intelligence for a Different World 13.1 America's intelligence community: A legacy of the Cold War 13.2 Bridging the f oreign-dom estic divide 13.3 Assessment and warning 13.4 Reforming the Executive and the Congress

Lederman Healey Fenner Lederman

XIV. Protecting Security and Preserving Liberty 14.1 Balancing empowerment and restraint 14.2 Harnessing and regulating the power of the information age 14.3 Terrorist finance

Rundlet FO Roth

XV. National Defense 1 5.1 Transforming institutions for attacking terrorists 1 5.2 Border security (move to Chap. 1 4?) 15.3 Homeland defense

Hawley Ginsburg FO

XVI. Living in a World of Risk 16.1 Assessing vulnerabilities and judging risks 1 6.2 Aviation and transportation security 16.3 Who is protecting us? Public and private partnerships 16.4 Mitigating and managing the consequences of catastrophic attack 1 6.5 Learning to live in a world of risk

FO Dillingham Farmer Team 8 FO

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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V

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Thought Experiment: 1) What are the most important institutional criticisms the commission is finding across the board? Weaknesses in the pre-9/11 posture of the United States. 2) Zelikow's 1998 article, and the Hart-Rudman article 3) To what extent were these weaknesses identified and recognized before 9/11? 4) To what extent were the weaknesses placed on the agenda for national action before 9/11? 5) What is the purpose of national policy coordination? What is the White House uniquely supposed to do? Help define the national agenda for action, draw the entire government together in pursuit of that agenda. 6) How do we define the debate, using our independent analysis? 7) What are the big problems? Criminal investigation vs. intelligence collection; lack of capacity for direct action in Afghanistan; lack of will to use direct action in Afghanistan; diplomatic strategy to deal with Pakistan

McLaughlin on Summer of Threat: But it was a reflection of the degree of frustration he was feeling at the time. Given the fact that policy was proceeding so slowly while the threat warnings were at their height, McLaughlin's feeling at this time was, "what more did you need to know?" (He added that he understands that before 9-11 one could not expect the same consensus as was seen after 9-11). "We were going nuts at this point," McLaughlin explained, and yet it was at exactly this time when CIA was asked whether the warnings it was receiving were, perhaps, disinformation. These questions came mostly from the Pentagon, McLaughlin observed, but they were "from all over." In response, a study was put together by CIA which reported that the warnings were indeed for real. McLaughlin explained that his comments on this matter were not meant to be critical, but "imagine the extra energy that went into that."

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Page 1 of2

Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Tuesday, April 13, 2004 12:39 PM

To:

Front Office

Cc:

Stephanie Kaplan; Mike Hurley

Subject: Team 3 Revised Nominees for Our Portions of the Final Report

Philip/Chris/Dan/Steve: Here are my suggestions for who from Team 3 should have the lead on the sections of the Final Report that concern CTpolicy. Mike

Part II 2.4—The Departments and Congress. Team 3 has part of this. Lead: Hurley 2.5—The White House. Team 3 has part of this. Lead: Bass

Part III 3.1—Before the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Lead: Albion 3.2—Crisis. Lead: Bass 3.3—Post-crisis diplomacy. Lead: Allan (supported by Byman) 3.4—Military options. Lead: Jenkins (supported by Hawley) 3.5—Clandestine and covert action. Lead: Albion

PartV 5.1—The Millennium crisis. Leads: Bass 5.2—Post-crisis reflection: an agenda for 2000. Lead: Albion 5.3—The attack on the USS Cole. Leads: Bass 5.4—Change and continuity. Lead: Hurley 5.5—A new strategy? Lead: Bass

Part VI 4/13/2004

Page 2 of2

6.5—The 'summer of threat'. Team 3 has part of this. Lead: Albion

Part IX 9.2—Initial war planning and the invasion of Afghanistan. Lead: Hurley 9.3—The emerging shape of a war on terror. Lead: Byman

Part XI 11.3—Coordinating a national strategy. Team 3 has part of this. Lead: Hurley

Part XII 12.1,12.2,12.3—Bringing foreign policy back in. Some Team 3 involvement. Lead: Byman

Part XV 15.1—Transforming institutions for attacking terrorists. Lead: Hawley

4/13/2004

Page 1 of2

Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Wednesday, April 07, 2004 10:25 AM

To:

Philip Zelikow; Chris Kojm

Cc:

Mike Hurley

Subject: FW: Mike Hurley nominees for Team 3 portions of Final Report

Philip and Chris: On Monday I sent you the attached email re Team 3 nominees for helping to write sections of the Final Report. On further reflection, I may have confused the issue, and been a bit "off" your guidance, by in some cases designating more than one Team 3'er per section. I'd like to re-submit this to you in a way that more accurately reflects what I think you're looking for. I'll try to get the resubmission to you quickly. Thanks, Mike Original Message From: Mike Hurley Sent: Monday, April 05, 2004 5:20 PM To: Front Office Cc: Warren Bass; Mike Hurley Subject: Mike Hurley nominees for Team 3 portions of Final Report

/ spoke with Chris Kojm last Friday re my ideas for who on Team 3 should have the lead on what I think are Team 3-related sections of the report. Here's what I propose: 2.4—The Departments and Congress. Team 3 has part of this. Leads: Bass and Hurley 2.5—The White House. Team 3 has part of this. Leads: Bass and Hurley 3.1—Before the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Lead: Albion 3.2—Crisis. Lead: Bass 3.3—Post-crisis diplomacy. Leads: Byman and Allan 3.4—Military options. Lead: Jenkins and Hawley

4/7/2004

Page 2 of2

3.5—Clandestine and covert action. Lead: Albion 5.1—The Millennium crisis. Leads: Bass and Hurley 5.2—Post-crisis reflection: an agenda for 2000. Leads: Bass and Albion 5.3—The attack on the USS Cole. Leads: Bass and Hurley 5.4—Change and continuity. Leads: Bass and Hurley 5.5—A new strategy. Leads: Bass and Albion 6.5—The 'summer of threat'. Team 3 has a part of this. Leads: Albion and Bass 9.2—Initial war planning and the invasion of Afghanistan. Lead: Hurley 9.3—The emerging shape of a war on terror. Lead: Hurley 11.3—Coordinating a national strategy. Leads: Zelikow, May, Bass, Hurley XII—12.1,12.2,12.3--some Team 3 involvement 15.1—Transforming institutions for attacking terrorists. Leads: Albion and Hurley

4/7/2004

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY One.

The Foundation of an Islamic Army

Two.

Counterterrorism Evolves

Three.

Responses to al Qaeda's Initial Assaults

Four.

Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland

Five.

From Threat to Threat

Six.

The Attack Looms

Seven.

The Four Flights

Eight.

Heroism and Horror

Nine.

Wartime

Ten.

Problems of Foresight - and Hindsight

Eleven.

National Leadership and National Strategy

Twelve.

Bringing Foreign Policy Back In

Thirteen.

Intelligence for a Different World

Fourteen.

Protecting Security and Preserving Liberty

Fifteen.

National Defense

Sixteen.

Living with a World of Risk

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

I. THE FOUNDATION OF AN ISLAMIC ARMY

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1.1

Thefatwa of February 1998

1.2

Islamist extremism and its appeal in the Islamic world

1.3

The rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda

1.4

Al Qaeda and the Muslim world

1.5

Attacking the United States

II.

COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES

2.1

From the old terrorism to the new: The case of WTC I

2.2

Adaptation - or non-adaptation - in the law enforcement community

•2.3

... the intelligence community

'2.4

... the Departments and the Congress

•2.5

...the White House

• III.

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3.1

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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IV.

ALQAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND

4.1

Terrorist entrepreneurs

4.2

Plans, targets, and requirements

4.3

Choosing the attackers: recruitment, vetting, and training

4.4

Seeing aircraft as weapons?

, 4.5

A money trail?

V. FROM THREAT TO THREAT 5.1 2

The Millennium crisis Post-crisis reflection: an agenda for 2000

5.3

The attack on the U.S.S. Cole

5.4

Change and continuity

5.5

A new strategy?

VI.

THE ATTACK LOOMS

6.1

Going to California

6.2

California and Florida

6.3

Final strategies and tactics

6.4

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6.5

The ' summer of threat'

6.6

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

VII.

THE FOUR FLIGHTS

7.1

The hijacking of AA 11 and UA 175

7.2

FAAandNORAD

7.3

Losing AA 77

7.4

Improvising a homeland defense

7.5

The battle for UA 93

VIII. HEROISM AND HORROR 8.1

Emergency plans

8.2

Agencies and firms implement the plans

8.3

The World Trade Center

8.4

Fateful choices in emergency response

IX.

WARTIME

9.1

Crisis management and domestic responses

9.2

Initial war planning and the invasion of Afghanistan

9.3

The emerging shape of a war on terror

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

x. 10.1

The world of policymakers: appreciations and judgments

10.2

The blinding effects of hindsight

10.3

Finding fair verdicts

XI.

NATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL STRATEGY

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America and the Muslim world

12.2

Central Asia and Arabia

12.3

Reinventing multilateral institutions

XIII. INTELLIGENCE FOR A DIFFERENT WORLD 13.1

America's intelligence community: A legacy of the Cold War

13.2

Bridging the foreign-domestic divide

13.3

Assessment and warning

13.4

Reforming the Executive and the Congress: Unity of effort, joint missions COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

XIV. PROTECTING SECURITY AND PRESERVING LIBERTY 14.1

Balancing empowerment and restraint

14.2

Harnessing and regulating the power of the information age

14.3

Terrorist finance

XV. NATIONAL DEFENSE 15.1

Transforming institutions for attacking terrorists

15.2

Border security

15.3

Homeland defense

XVI. LIVING IN A WORLD OF RISK 16.1

Assessing vulnerabilities and judging risks

16.2

Aviation and transportation security

16.3

Who is protecting us? Public and private partnerships

16.4

Mitigating and managing the consequences of catastrophic attack

16.5

Learning to live in a world of risk

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY One.

The Foundation of an Islamic Army

Two.

Counter-terrorism Evolves

Three.

Responses to the Embassy Bombings

Four.

Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland

Five.

From Threat to Threat

Six.

The Attack Looms

Seven.

The Four Flights

Eight.

Heroism and Horror

Nine.

Wartime

Ten.

Problems of Foresight - and Hindsight

Eleven.

National Leadership and National Strategy

Twelve.

Bringing Foreign Policy Back In

Thirteen.

Intelligence for a Different World

Fourteen.

Protecting Security and Preserving Liberty

Fifteen.

National Defense

Sixteen.

Living with a World of Risk

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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I. THE FOUNDATION OF AN ISLAMIC ARMY 1.1

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Islamist extremism and its appeal in the Islamic world

1.3

The rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda

1.4

Al Qaeda and the Muslim world

1.5

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AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND

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10.2

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10.3

Finding fair verdicts

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11.4

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13.3

Assessment and warning

13.4

Reforming the Executive and the Congress: Unity of effort, joint missions COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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XIV. PROTECTING SECURITY ANDPRESERVING LIBERTY £ /\SL £

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Balancing empowerment and restraint

14.2

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14.3

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16.3

Who is protecting us? Public and private partnerships

16.4

Mitigating and managing the consequences of catastrophic attack

16.5

Learning to live in a world of risk

;Vi

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley From:

Stephanie Kaplan

Sent:

Saturday, April 03, 2004 12:1 1 AM

To:

Team Leaders

Cc:

Front Office

Subject: Nominees for Final Report

Team Leaders: We've received a few emails nominating staff to draft sections of the final report. If you haven't submitted your nominees, please do so by COB Monday. We'd like to settle on these assignments as soon as possible so as to give those drafting as much time as possible. Also, a reminder to begin to thinking about illustrations (pictures, charts, graphs) and appendixes that you wish to be included in the final report. We will have to be somewhat conservative, so the earlier you weigh in on this, the better. Many thanks, Stephanie STEPHANIE L. KAPLAN 9-11 COMMISSION

T (202) 331-1125 F (202) 296-5545 www.9-11commission.gov

4/4/2004

*

-X

£ /

FDD 63 Overview

Page 1 of 1

FDD 63 Overview On May 22,1998, the President ordered the strengthening of the nation's defenses against emerging unconventional threats to the United States to include those involving terrorist acts, weapons of mass destruction, assaults on our critical infrastructures, and cyber-based attacks. Presidential Decision Directive 63 GSA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OFFICE

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http://csrc.nist.gov/organizations/fissea/presentations/2001/gsa-coop/tsld012.htm

4/1/2004

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: Team 3, 9/11 Commission NND PROJECT NUMBER:

52100

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/18/2008

BOX: 00003

FOLDER: 0002

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 4

DOC ID: 31205828

1

j^CESSRESTOCTEDj The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Hurley's Monograph File DOCUMENT DATE: 02/10/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/fProfs Notes)

FROM: Kara TO: Front Office.. SUBJECT:

ITRAP

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Page 1 of3

Mike Hurley From:

Mike Jacobson

Sent:

Monday, February 09, 2004 6:14 PM

To:

Warren Bass

Cc:

Mike Hurley; Len Hawley

Subject: RE: USS Cole Bombing I agree that this is an important issue. I wonder whether or not there was some legal/policy distinction for the FBI, in its ability to share information with the WH, based on whether the CT investigation was criminal or intelligence. That might explain why the FBI couldn't share information on the progress of the USS Cole investigation (a criminal investigation) versus the developments in its intelligence investigations in the lead up to the Millennium. Not that this should have impacted on the summer of 2001, when the issues in question (Moussaoui, Phoenix EC, and search for Midhar/Hazmi) were all intelligence-related matters. Mike Original Message From: Warren Bass Sent: Monday, February 09, 2004 5:49 PM To: Mike Jacobson Cc: Mike Hurley; Len Hawley Subject: RE: USS Cole Bombing Yep, that sounds like the FBI I've come to know. One important piece of our puzzle (not just for the Cole): how did the FBI share what it knew with the rest of the USG? The image I have is of the FBI sitting mute as Clarke goes around the table at CSG meetings, albeit with Watson sharing info offline. But I'd love to have that picture right; it's quite important for the overall policy story, especially since the FBI (a) seems to have shared a fair bit of info during the Millennium, however unhappily; and (b) seems to have reverted back to clammed-up form during summer 2001, when it might've made a difference. Anyway, curious to hear what you guys are coming up with. There's more FBI stuff in the third Clarke MFR, which should be ready by the end of the week, inshallah. (It's huge, as usual.) Warren Original Message From: Mike Jacobson Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2004 7:29 PM To: Warren Bass Cc: Mike Hurley; Len Hawley Subject: RE: USS Cole Bombing Warren, Just one additional thought on this matter. It seems to me that even if the FBI had concluded that the attack was perpetrated by AQ, that doesn't necessarily mean that the WH was briefed on this development. I recently saw a 1999 DOJ document (produced by DAG Holder's office), which discusses the difficulties that they've had in formulating policies for sharing FBI criminal information with the NSC. In an interview, we were also told that the standing policy at the time was that for the FBI to share this type of information with the NSC required AG approval. We haven't really looked into this issue very closely, so I have no idea whether or not this is all accurate. But it seems like an important issue to explore. Thoughts on how we should proceed

2/9/2004

Page 2 of3 on this? Mike Original Message From: Warren Bass Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2004 9:55 AM To: Mike Jacobson Subject: RE: USS Cole Bombing

Thanks, man—grateful for any light you can shed on this. FYT, we've had several Clinton people—including Berger—say that they couldn't respond until they got a definitive ruling (as it were) on Cole culpability from FBI or CIA. So we're pretty curious about what sort of messages were going up from the FBI—preliminary conclusions with an investigation ongoing, or something pretty blunt. For Watson, we're also curious about how FBI played in the CSG. Did he literally sit mute when they went around the table asking for info on current threats? Did info-sharing change over time—e.g., during the Millennium scare, or the summer of threat in 2001? And why on earth didn't the NSC know about all the info the FBI had? Why didn't SACs tell HQ about Phoenix, Moussaoui, and the two San Diego bastards? Why didn't the NSC know about those data points? I'm just saying. Original Message From: Mike Jacobson Sent: Monday, January 26, 2004 8:08 PM To: Warren Bass Subject: RE: USS Cole Bombing

Hey, We've been asking that question during our latest round of interviews. Haven't gotten the most exact answers. I'll try and round up that document again. Mike Original Message From: Warren Bass Sent: Mon 1/26/2004 7:56 PM To: Mike Jacobson Cc:

Subject: RE: USS Cole Bombing

We're still keenly interested in this, by the way, esp. Len Hawley. —Original Message— From: Mike Jacobson Sent: Friday, December 26, 2003 2:53 PM To: Warren Bass Subject: USS Cole Bombing Warren, I know that your team has been interested in determining when the USG came to the conclusion that AQ was behind the Cole attack. I've located

2/9/2004

Page 3 of3 some possibly relevant FBI documents and would be happy to show those to you (they are secret). Let me know if you're interested. Mike

2/9/2004

Page 1 of 1 9/11 P e r s o n a l Privacy

Mike Hurley From:

Dan Leopold on behatf of Info

Sent:

Monday, February 09, 2004 6:23 PM

To:

Team Leaders

Subject: FW: Questions?

Original Message Sent: Monday, January 26, ZO(W 5:10 PM To: Info Subject: Questions? 1. Where is the video footage off all these hijackers getting on these planes? 2. How do 2 huge buildings fall perfectly straight down? Almost like a demolition? 3. What is being done to investigate the obvious insider trading that took place regarding Airline options right before 9/11? 4. Has the government ever figured out who was on the planes on 9/11? Its my understanding that a few of the people mentioned as terrorist were later found to be alive and well in thier own countries? 5. What was the elevation of the planes at the time that cell phone calls were made to relatives or airline management? 6. How is it that numerous government officials are aware of terrorist threats to airlines, airlines are aware of this threat, are trained to react in case of said threat but for some reason on 9/11 they fail to notify NORAD? Why wasn't the airforce dispatched by somebody so they could see why 4 planes were all way off course? 7. Why was all the debris of the World Trade Center Hauled away overseas without being properly investigated. I think you would be able to determine why the towers fell the way they did. I wonder if any of these questions will ever be properly investigated? I wonder if I will get any type of reply? I wonder sometimes why we all pay taxes? Anyway any reply would be greatly appreciated. Sincerely, Todd Hostad Hinckly, MM.

2/9/2004

Page 1 of 1 9/11 Closed by Statute

Mike Hurley From:

Susan Qinsburg

Sent:

Friday, January 02,2004 9:46 AM

To:

Doug MacEachin; Team 1 A; Mike Jacobson; Yoel Tobin

Cc:

Philip Zelikow; Team 2; Team 5; John Roth; Mike Hurley; Barbara Grewe; Team 6

Subject: question re: today's clips Colleagues, The paragraph below from an article in today's clips caught my eye, since April 21 2001 is within time to watchlist an individual. Is someone looking into this report? Even so, the 9/11 Commission will tip more to redden George W.'s prominent ears and disturb the topiary of Condi's hair if it nails the administration. Including the CIA and the FBI, for some gross mistake, such as failing to act on that April 21, 2001, warning from| [about a terrorist from a Hamburg cell who turned out to be none other than 9/11 death pilot Mohammed Atta. FYI, we have requested a briefing on Al Shehhi from the CIA and I will alert Team leaders when this is scheduled. If someone is not looking into the above report, I would simply supplement my Al Shehhi briefing request to add a discussion of this report. Thanks. Susan

1/2/2004