T5 B5 Yates- Bill Fdr- Withdrawal Notice And All Emails And Notes In Folder 174

WITHDRAWAL NOTI&E :

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Series: Team 5 Files Folder: Yates, Bill: Briefing Materials - CIS Date: n.d. Pages: 2 Description: Notes re: name checks and immigration

Reason for withdrawal: law enforcement sensitive; national security classified

Box 3 Withdrawn by: kw, 12/23/2008

QUESTIONS FOR BILL YATES Director of Operations for CIS March 19, 2004 National Commission on September 11 Stated mission of CIS: eliminate the backlogs, while improving national security and customer service. What overall principals guide these stated missions? DHS organization on immigration • What are the benefits of the current organization of DHS on benefits? The costs? • Is the policy shop separation between BTS and CIS working? Would it be helpful to have a policy shop in the deputy secretary's office? What issues would you put there? (Business plan; oversight of overlapping issues; risk assessments; interface with the White House.) U.S. Visit • We understand you have been given the green lite to develop biometric applications. What will the CLAIMS III interface be with U.S. Visit on biographical information (what data elements to be shared)? On the biometric fingerprint will you use the same readers as used at POEs? Will these applications provide a seamless interface with US Visit? • U.S. Visit office has a notion that the processes they are building should enable consular officers, inspectors, agents, and adjudicators real time access to immigration histories. Does CIS agree with that concept of being part of a team building immigration histories? Do you think that is an achievable, practical objective? • Will U.S. Visit data be available upon application of a benefit, with the biometrics taken at the border available to the benefit adjudicator to be matched with the biometric on the benefit? • Is CLAIMS data now being automatically fed back into State's CLASS system, so pending and completed benefit adjudication information is available at consular offices abroad for the purpose of better adjudicating requests for visas? Fingerprints and biometrics • What is your view of the value of adding real time biometrics to the benefits adjudication process? (Hijackers had 255 variations of their names and spellings. Running these variations v. the automated caseload it was determined that 3.2 million files needed to be reviewed to see if they related to the hijackers.) • What is being done with all the fingerprints taken on index cards over the years? • Will there be an attempt to digitize prints going back to a certain date? • E-filings. What biometric? Will it be compatible with IDENT? IAFIS? • What other biometrics is CIS using? • Are you working with Dept Labor on getting them to require digital signatures on their E-filings? • According to your recent House testimony on the FY05 budget, only some applications are subject to background checks and fingerprinting. Last year the applications subject to background checks and fingerprinting amounted to 35 million. (We assume the "some" applications you are referring to are the immigrant applications.) Is there consideration being given to amending these procedures so that a full background and biometric is conducted on every application? Backlog • Wasn't the backlog in the nineties at least in part due to the amnesty of the mid-80s, when many aliens became eligible to apply for citizenship? • How is the guest worker program proposed by the President any different in terms of the application burdens placed on CIS? • What are the estimates for the numbers of applications? Is there a business plan in place to deal with the President's proposal? Fraud

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Secure documents. What travel documents do you consider ripe for security review? Do you have a rotating schedule for updating and changing security features on travel documents? Criminal Penalties. Are the penalties for document fraud sufficient? (In 2001, Pat Fiztgerald in Chicago claimed the highest sentence ever for document fraud of 5 yrs.) No data. In 1999, Michael Bromwich, the DOJ Inspector General testified that in the past five years one quarter of its investigatory resources were spent on INS document fraud corruption at the INS.

"We did not find comprehensive data related to NIV fraud. In fact, there is very little hard data available t gauge the magnitude of visa fraud, a point noted by GAO in its reports on this subject. For example, the State Dept does not track visa refusal rates by visa type. Simliarly, INS told us that individuals made 42,229 attempts to enter the US between Oct '92-May '93 with fraudulent or altered documents. While INS produced statistics for this audit report, they are unable to update these figures because they do not maintain centralized statistics on fraudulent altered documents. This lack of comprehensive statistics hinders the ability of the State Department and INS to appropriately respond to visa fraud." Are you able to produce statistics today, by visa type and by the type of fraud? Are any studies underway that we should be aware of on fraud patterns? •

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Religious worker visas. In a study done by GAO in the late 1990s, GAO found that 85 percent of individuals requesting religious worker visas are already in the U.S. and are attempting to adjust status, such as from student visa to religious worker visa. Many of these individuals are requesting visas through unaffiliated storefront churches. These persons are not only using fraud, but abusing the visa process. What is the role of CIS in the adjudication of religious worker visas? Is there an MOA between the State Department and DHS on this type of visa? What measures have CIS and the State Department taken to address this type of problem? 44 fraud detectors. We've been told that CIS only has 44 fraud detectors, or intel research specialists, and that contractors will come from a new fee. Apparently Ridge has said that he wants to make 200 of 9600 FTEs and convert them to fraud detection. Are you going to do this? Are fees sufficient to make that happen? What happens to the backlog if you pull 22 FTEs?

ICE Enforcement of fraud cases • How close is an MOA on referral to ICE of fraud cases? What will happen if there is an initial refusal of ICE to take the case, but then CIS develops further incriminating information? If a denial of the benefit results from the incriminating information, is there another referral back to ICE to place the individual in removal proceedings? How would that work? • How do you plan to deal with the every day cases, the single cases of fraud that permeate the system? How do you do this under the existing language of the Homeland Security statute which doesn't give you any enforcement power? Do you support a change in the statutory language? • Another Bromwich quote from 1999, and whether the problem identified here, that the aliens who benefit from the fraud schemes have little or no repercussions for filing fraudulent applications, is still a problem today, and if so, why. "Our inspection found that in successful document fraud investigations the government generally prosecutes the vendors of the documents, the middlemen who paid bribes, and any corrupt INS employees who accepted bribes. If the vendors and middlemen are illegal aliens, INS usually initiates deportation proceedings. What was less clear was what INS did with the aliens who obtained immigration documents by fraudulent means." "Our inspection found that INS took no action against these aliens. Not only did INS fail to prosecute or deport these aliens, it had no method of even flagging the names or alien numbers (A-numbers) in INS's record systems to alert INS officers who subsequently came into contact with these aliens. Consequently, these aliens were free to continue to reap benefits from an illegal scheme and even use one illegally obtained benefit to obtain additional benefits."

Is there a record system now that flags such aliens? Is there an operational plan in place to deal with such aliens? Even if such aliens are flagging, what recourse is there to denying that alien a benefit under a new application? Does there need to be a change to the regulatory system in place? (Both ICE and Mr. Yates have told us that ICE's interest in pursuing fraud cases is in the large cases involving many applicants. However, as these cases are pursued, prosecutions occur and convictions obtained, only the scammers are affected, not the underlying applicants.) Breeder documents • How does the U.S. breeder document problem affect adjudications of benefit forms? • Bromwich delineated two types of fraud, one from altered documents, and the other from fraudulent underlying documents supporting a legitimate document. What role do you see for your office in weighing in on the problems caused by breeder documents and shaping administration policy on the subject? Would you support a standardization of types of paper, inks and stamps used by entities issuing breeder documents? Compliance with schools • Why did CIS turn over all compliance issues to ICE, including SEVIS management, SEVIS student compliance, and SEVIS school certifications? • What effect has the requirement in Bl/B2s ONLY apply for student status abroad affected CIS? CIA information on document fraud • CIA intel on document fraud. Right now applications only require copies of the passport visa page and title page. If you had information that indicated that other pages may be of use to determine fraud, would you require copies of these pages be submitted as well? Naturalization of terrorists • Internal namecheck systems. We understand that with the namecheck systems, only about 1.2 applications can be adjudicated per hour. So what priority is it for you to clean up namecheck databases? What control do you have over improving the technology within the rubric of DHS? • How many people de-naturalized as a result of subsequent knowledge of terrorist or criminal activity? • CIA "target emigre" unit doing namecheck process. Have you resolved the outstanding issue regarding the required national security vetting of applicants, and switching the vetting from the CIA over to the TSC? (No case where CIA info has amounted to a denial of an application.) • FBI wants and warrants. What is your view on obtaining FBI the criminal histories and investigations portfolios that FBI holds, but won't permit CIS to run checks against as required under the Patriot Act, under the auspices that CIS is not in the business of law enforcement? Does this problem require a statutory resolution? Guest worker program • What affect on CIS with an already 5.6 million backlog? • Are you being consulted on how to make this program work? What do you see as the solution if it gets enacted into law? Electronic filings • Do you support e-filings? What are the pros and cons from CIS vantage point. Confirmed security or criminal threat matches • Your recent FY05 budget testimony states that 2% of six million immigration benefit applications had confirmed security or criminal threat matches last year, or 120,000 applications. What happened to those applications? How many were confirmed terrorist related?

Do you receive reporting from the intelligence community on travel documents that may be terrorist-related or fraudulent that may be used in support of benefits applications? If you do receive such information, how do you disseminate it to the field?

In person interviews • What percentage of application adjudications are conducted at service centers? These applications don't receive personal interviews, correct? Any thought given to requiring more interviews for certain types of applications, like religious workers? Different standards at different centers • DOJ OIG found in reporting on the adjudication of hijackers Atta and al Shehhi's student change of status applications, that INS regulations do not define "documentary evidence of financial support". Nor did the adjudicator's Field Manual. Both Atta and al Shehhi submitted exactly the same supporting documentation. The result was that there were no standards in place for what evidence was sufficient to show financial support for their applications extension of stay, for example. Is there consideration being given to standardize such requirements? Budget • Are fees still sufficient to cover your budget? Identification of the hijackers • How long did it take to identify the hijackers, including verification? • Where did you get the initial information on the identity of the hijackers? (APIS, passenger and flight attendant phone calls?) • Once identified the hijackers, how long did it take to put their immigration histories together? • How many files ultimately searched in how many offices? • What would the benefit of photos being attached to NI change of status requests have been? What about finger prints? NISA •

What was the agreement? Why (what benefit for INS)? (learn to look for fraud indicators)

Bill West memos •

early in the 90s, prior to the first WTC bombing, Bill West wrote you a series of memos making a case for the value of INS in countering terrorism, stating that sooner or later terrorism will come to our shores and INS had the Title 8 authority to be a player. He wanted to pilot a task force out of DC to see how it would go. There are no response memos from you. Why not? What was your response? Were these memos ever forwarded beyond? Did the WTC bombing change your view of the INS role in CT? How about FDD 39? Embassy bombings of '98 where an American citizen was involved?

Chatter of summer of 2001 •

Ever hear about it? Did you receive regular intel?

Prevention

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How many different imm id docs are there? Can the system of imm id cards be simplified? a q^^ c- *~L> -*** ? Is there a biometrics program underway? Why not? When? What time frame is realistic for that? Do you think state drivers' license bureaus should be required to check immigration status with LESC? Who should pay for this? Is this working anywhere? Have you done a study to see? How big a burden is this on the LESC? Do you think state drivers' licenses should be tied to length of stay? Given how backlogged the CIS is, would it be reasonable to try to enforce a rigorous drivers' license regime at this time? What is the single most important anti-fraud measure that could be taken that would reduce national security risks?

Enforcement/Terrorism • Have you or anyone else in DHS done an analysis how terrorists exploit the benefit system? • Do you have a way of knowing on an ongoing basis what preferred types of fraud used by Islamic terrorists? • Current priorities for enforcement? • Types of fraud - most by volume?' • Types of fraud - involvement of oc? National security nexus? • What percentage of your apps do you think should be referred for criminal investigation? • What percentage of ICE cases should be CIS originated? Citizenship • Is there a need to tighten requirements for naturalization (beyond background checks)? Backlog • How realistic is the 2006 goal line? • What are the key elements that will get you there? Budget • How much has your budget (estimated budget for CIS function) increased since 9/11? Have funds available to attack fraud increased since 9/11? • How much is fee and how much general treasury?

Ideas for Benefits Fraud What studies have been done by the INS/DHS or outside organizations to try and assess fraud in immigration benefits? • Which programs have been studied in depth? • Get sufficient details so that we can collect them ow many service centers process immigration benefits? What are the workloads of these centers in terms of the programs they adjudicate and the numbers of applications for each program? / How many people work at each of the centers? How many people are involved in adjudication at each center (versus administration)? What are the workloads of individuals adjudicating applications at each center? What are backlogs in benefits adjudication? By center? By program? How do the centers address the problem of fraud? • Does each center have a fraud strategy? • Are there dedicated fraud investigators in each center? • Does each center have its own process for flagging applications that may involve fraud? • What are the various processes in place to find and interdict fraud at each center? What happens to someone who commits immigration fraud? • Does each center have a policy in place to answer this question? • Is an application simply denied in some instances? • How do we ensure someone does not commit fraud twice? • Are biometrics collected from all applicants to ensure an individual committing fraud is recorded in a system? • What are the mechanisms in place at each center to refer a case for consideration for prosecution? Are there clear standards in place for this? • Do people really get arrested in Maine for a fraud discovered in Texas (or whwrever their application is remotely processed)? What kinds of profiling do fraud investigators do, e.g.. of Middle Easterners? • Doe the centers use the Special Interest Alien concept to profile and screen? j n-is?^*^

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On February 10, 2004, I spoke with a DHS/ICE/Special Agent assigned to the Benefit Fraud Unit (BFU) for the DHS/CISA/ermont Service Center. Here are some of the issues that were discussed. There are five Service Centers, Vermont, Texas, Nebraska, California and the National Benefits Center. The following table shows the figures for applications in September 2003, the most recent month available.

Applications received Approved Denied Pending

617,970 503,335 62, 052 (not all for fraud) 5,510,553

The Service Centers, although similar, are not identical. The Vermont Service Center has a number of ICE Special Agents assigned to it. The Texas Service Center has no ICE Special Agents assigned. The Vermont Service Center uses a large number of adjudicators who telecommute. They pick up the applications and work on them at home. Also the processing times for the Service Centers vary (they are posted on the Internet). For example, a number of the 9-11 hijackers filed INS I-539 forms to change their status from B-1/B-2 visitors to M-1 vocational students. This would enable them to get legal status to obtain flight training without departing the United States. While the applications were pending, they could legally remain in the United States. The California Service Center currently is four months behind on this type of application. At the Texas Service Center, these applications are acted on within one month. In Vermont, these applications take about three weeks. Another type of application to extend a B-1/B-2 takes from four to five months. The processing time is dependant on the number of applications, the number of adjudicators available to process them, the actual processing time, and the priority that CIS places on getting them done. Another factor is related to the availability of visas for some immigrant classes that are over subscribed. For instance at the California Service Center, a U.S. citizen filing an 1-130 petition for a brother or sister must wait at least four to five years before the petition can be approved. This is because there is an excess of applications for available visas. The date that a application gets approved is dependant on the State Department Visa list as this is a quota immigrant class. This does not necessarily mean that the alien being petitioned for is waiting in his or her county for the immigrant visa. Frequently they have entered the U.S. as a non-immigrant and violated their status while waiting for their visa. The workload is staggering as is the amount of immigration benefit fraud. Some CIS managers believe that fraud exceeds 50%, others say as high as 80%. The detection of fraud is considered a high priority at CIS but the actual number of fraud cases detected and investigated is very small. The reasons for this are many. The bottom line at CIS is to reduce the backlog. The delays are what people and Congress complain about. However, CIS management does not want to approve any application that has clear fraud indicators. Therefore CIS is developing methods to identify suspect applications through the use of various computer programs. The next problem is how to handle the large number of potential fraud cases identified. Some of these cases can be cleared by denying the application. If the address used by the applicant is determined by a computer program to be non-existent, the application can be denied. More frequently the address may seem to be fraudulent but the only way to confirm or deny that fact is by having someone actually investigate. Other fraud cases rise to the level of major crimes that should be prosecuted. However, they can only be accepted by the U.S. Attorney if someone presents the case and works with the Assistant United States Attorney. Each of the Service Centers has dedicated personnel to identify fraud. These employees assemble the facts and turn over the suspect cases to the Special Agents assigned to the Service

Center. However, there are some Service Centers with no assigned Special Agents. All Service Centers have to get an ICE Special Agent assigned to the case in the geographic area where the case is located. With only about 2,000 immigration trained ICE Special Agents, the competition for their time is great. CIS is negotiating an MOU with ICE at the HQ level to establish guidelines for the ICE SACs to use when making these assignments. This should ensure that some cases are investigated and prosecuted. Traditionally, benefit fraud cases have been assigned a very low priority by the SACs. CIS does not have any Special Agents of its own. ICE has not been anxious to instruct the field to take on benefit fraud, even large complex cases. CIS has decided to create a lower skilled employee or contractor to do some of the fraud field investigations. How this will be done has not been finalized. The FY'04 budget has over 200 of these funded positions. The Special Agent I spoke with was concerned that benefit fraud was going to remain a low priority with CIS as it was with INS. There have always been press releases on major immigration fraud cases. Many INS employees and agents have done excellent work in prosecuting fraud. In the bigger picture, the impact on the United States is great. When immigration benefits are obtained by fraud, the legal system is undermined. The wrong people get rewarded while those who respect the law have to wait longer. The 9-11 hijackers and other terrorists will use whatever they can to get into and remain in the United States. Travel is critical to their mission and one of the ways of disrupting their activities is through the prevention of benefit fraud. Another real concern is "sleeper cells". The agent I spoke with knows that we can't identify all potential terrorists but those who commit benefit fraud frequently also provide false biographical information. This can impede any national security investigations. The special agent is willing to speak informally with any Team 5 member who is interested in discussing the CIS benefit fraud program.

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