T3 B5 Nsc-eop Fdr- Emails And Memos Re Issues- Access- Document Requests- Interviews- Commission Deadline

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley [[email protected]]

Sent:

Friday, November 21, 2003 12:50 PM

To:

frontoffice®9-11commission.gov; teams® 9-11commission.gov; chealey®9-11commission.gov; [email protected]

Subject: EOF Issues

Thought you'd want to know about a few issues arising from the Lisa Gordon-Hagerty interview Nov. 20 at OEOB, as well as some follow-on points from the Zalrnay Khalilzad interview on Nov. 21. On substance, both interviews went very well. Some procedural and documentary matters, however, raise worrisome questions. INTERVIEW NOTES. Bryan Cunningham took all of our notes at the end of the Gordon-Hagerty interview, saying EOF would have to review them before they were returned to Commission space. This came as a surprise to Dana and Warren, who hadn't heard that we'd agreed to anything of this sort. They pushed back, arguing that since Cunningham had been in the room to approve aM of Gordon-Hagerty s comments, notes on her remarks could not possibly violate EOP guidelines. But Cunningham refused to let the notes leave the building. Cunningham said that the argument that EOP shouldn't get to see our notes because they hinted at our thinking, in effect were our "work product", was a notion that we might pursue. He asked whether to review the notes to return them ASAP or whether to keep them under wraps. Dana and Warren said he should hold onto them while we consulted with Dan and Steve. It was a short and fairly frosty conversation. We need to decide whether we're willing to have EOP lawyers review our interview notes of White House officials (including a former NSC official like Gordon-Hagerty). John Bellinger let Mike and Warren walk out with our Khalilzad notes this morning, although he did make clear that the White House reserved the right not to do so in the future. We think the notion of reviewing our work-product notes from interviews done with minders present serves no useful White House purpose and is unacceptably burdensome to us. We would appreciate it if you would request that the NSC return the Gordon-Hagerty notes immediately. TAPING. Gordon-Hagerty was not taped, per a Cunningham conversation with Mike beforehand. Cunningham did not say whether that arose because it was her preference, whether we had no right to tape NSC officials, or whether the White House was advising Gordon-Hagerty to assert her right not to be taped. This morning, Bellinger said that it was White House procedure that EOP officials would not be taped. We don't recall the details of our agreements, if any, regarding taping EOP officials, as opposed to other sensitive interviews at other agencies. Is Bellinger accurately stating the agreement? We're curious about where we stand on this, and about whether there's anything we can do to help ensure these interviews get taped. COMMISSION STAFF IN INTERVIEWS. We had only two Commission staff in the room at a time; when Dana entered for the last half hour of the Gordon-Hagerty interview, Mike stepped out. We're concerned about setting a precedent that two staffers is the limit, not the minimum. Is this a hard and fast rule? Or a guideline? MINDERS. Cunningham was helpful to us on a number of occasions when he encouraged GordonHagerty to be direct with us, saying that the Commission had a right to raise the issue in question. He did,

11/21/2003

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however, repeatedly warn her against quotations from principals. It seems quite likely that she had quotations or other more specific first-hand knowledge of senior officials' views that she did not pass along to us because of the minder's presence. Moreover, since she's still a DOE employee now contemplating next moves after her long NSC detail stint, it's also quite possible that she was concerned that candor in the interview might hurt her career. Gordon-Hagerty is no shrinking violet, but we still found the minder's effect on the interview troubling. NSC MEETINGS. Gordon-Hagerty said there had been several full NSC meetings on al-Qa'ida threats in the summer of 2001, some chaired by the president. We have no record of such meetings, although we requested these documents in EOF 2, dated June 4,2003, with a production deadline of June 25. Cunningham said they'd looked for these documents but not found them. He said they would look again. If such documents exist, of course, they're essential. It's important to follow up vigorously here. WESTFIELDS MINUTES. Gordon-Hagerty was unsure if there was an SOC of this March 2001 conference, which has been reported in the press to have assessed UBL's WMD capabilities. The overall Westfields assessment of UBL's WMD programs would be extremely useful and was captured by our earlier EOF document requests. We hope we can prod the White House again to ensure no Westfields documents are still floating around. SIT ROOM NOTES. Gordon-Hagerty said she took notes in the Sit Room on 9/11 itself. Those notes seem not to have been covered by our document requests; we'll have to file a new document request to get them. EOP/OVP. Alexis raised an interesting point; it'd be good if the Front Office could assure us that the White House understanding of our EOF documents requests is that they should also capture OVP documents. EOF 3 requested Clarke communications and policy memos circulated to OVP, but there may be OVP documents of interest that EOF 3 didn't capture. If you concur, we will add this to a new EOF request we are drafting. NSC NOTES. Over at NEOB Thursday morning, Warren printed out a cut-and-pasted set of document notes to use in the Khalilzad interview Friday. (These were a smaller subset of his already approved Bush NSC notes, so all the notes in question have already been deemed kosher.) Warren asked Colin, the day's NEOB minder, to have the notes couriered back to K Street this afternoon to use in interview preparation; Dylan Cors called at 6:45 p.m. to say the notes wouldn't be coming back but would be brought to the Friday interview. They were in fact delivered just as the interview began, but we didn't have them in advance for thorough preparation. This isn't the end of the world, but it underscores the costs of our arrangements at NEOB. RECOMMENDATION BRIEFING. Gordon-Hagerty's brain holds a wealth of technical information about WMD preparedness and other homeland security measures. We'd strongly suggest having her brief Chris Healey or die rest of our homeland security crew on her recommendations, which none of today's crew had the background to intelligently assess. Given the gravity of some of her warnings, her thoughts might even lead to interim Commission recommendations. Hope that brings you up to speed. We continue to be concerned that the cumulative effect of some of these interactions is hampering the quality of our work We'll look forward to following up with you. Thanks for your help. Mike, Dana, and Warren

11/21/2003

Nov. 17,2003 My first glance through the Clinton EOF 3 documents this afternoon made it clear we face several problems here. First, the documents are a mess. Beyond the disorganization, the story they tell is still fragmentary. Small Group and other meetings are alluded to but not memorialized. We can do some inventive stitching, and I hope it'll become clearer in the writing, but we're still going to have gaps. Second, the documents raise serious questions about access to information that went directly to President Clinton. Dylan Kors, one of the White House lawyers, told me today that many memoranda to the president were removed since they represented "the heart of the privilege." But these documents also represent the heart of our inquiry. These memoranda— some draft, some not— come from both NSC staffers responding to presidential queries scrawled on PDBs and from both Berger and Clarke. They speak directly to our mandate, and to the core question of presidential leadership in fighting al-Qa'ida. Among the documents that our current arrangements have not yet secured access to are several memoranda related to the Oct. 2000 attack on the USS Cole— including one to President Clinton that specifically mentions response options. These are, by far, the best documents we've heard of about the Cole; we lack SOCs, options papers, or any other significant documentation of Clinton administration meetings considering the Cole. Any account we produce of the Cole will be gravely compromised if we don't get access to these documents. And frankly, on the basis of the documents we currently have in hand, I'm not sure there's much intelligent I can write about the Cole. Even good interviews are no substitute for documents— particularly ones lying tantalizingly close to our grasp. Moreover, I continue to believe that we cannot tell the 9/11 story properly if we don't have relevant documents from the national security adviser or vice president to the president. Surely now is the time to ask for them. Here's a few unsolicited thoughts about the options we might use to prise these documents loose, which would include vintage Marcus/Dunne silver-tongued lawyering, the threat of subpoenas, or actual subpoenas. On these particular documents, we may have another creative tactic at hand: getting President Clinton, via Sandy Berger or Bruce Lindsay, to say, as it were, "Let my records go." All of this may mean a looming fight, but I'm not sure I see any way to avoid it. Our strategy has gotten us to the banks of the Jordan; now we need to get into the Promised Land. Hope that's helpful. Warren

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Mike Hurley From:

Philip Zelikow [[email protected]]

Sent:

Thursday, November 13, 2003 12:44 AM

To:

[email protected]

Cc:

'Mike Hurley'

Subject: Pair of New EOP Document Requests

Dan and Steve Attached are two documents that I think should be submitted asap as a pair of document requests. I think the requests are self-explanatory. Since we are only now getting Clinton records, and since these are missing or withheld, you can appreciate the urgency. (Steve, consider whether either or both of these requests need to be classified. Not sure.) I think we'll need to brief the Commission on this problem soon. We can also add this to any pending list of outstanding issues for discussion with our EOP counterparts. For your consideration ... Cc: Chris K., Mike H. Philip

11/19/2003

Document Request for Missing Records The Commission has discovered that few records have been found for a number of meetings that apparently occurred at the principals and deputies level on sensitive counterterrorism policy issues between early 1998 and the end of 2000. This includes meetings of the Principals Committee, the Deputies Committee, the "Foreign Policy Team," the "UBL Small Group," the "UBL/Khobar Small Group", the "Planning Group," or the "Restricted CSG." These records should apparently have been produced in response to EOF Document Request #2 or, failing that, EOP Document Request #3. The records appear to have been handled outside the normal NSC records management system. The Commission therefore requests that the Executive Office of the President and the National Archives exert special efforts to locate agendas, briefing papers, summaries of conclusions, or other records of such meetings. These efforts may require direct searches of the office files of Richard Clarke and Sandy Berger. Particular attention should be given to files with papers marked with the codeword "Delenda." Provided below are some of the meetings (or particular papers) for which no records, or almost no records, have been produced to date: 1. Tenet and Berger, 1 May 1998, on CIA's UBL operation and killings of Americans in Karachi. 2. Principals meeting on UBL, held on 4 or 6 June 1998. 3. Principals Committee meeting on UBL, 22 June 1998. 4. Restricted CSG in late July or early August 1998. 5. Principals Committee meeting on Embassy bombings, 8 August 1998. 6. All meetings at the principals or deputies level concerning responses to Embassy bombings or Operation Infinite Reach that occurred, practically every day, from 11 August 1998 to 19 August 1998. 7. All meetings that discussed possible MONs on UBL in 1998 and 1999. 8. Principals Committee meeting on aftermath of US strikes, 21 August 1998. 9. Principals Committee meeting on aftermath of US strikes, 24 August 1998. 10. "Planning Group" meeting, 25 August 1998. 11. Small group meeting, 28 August 1998.

12. A "four pager" prepared by Clarke for Berger, referred to in an e-mail sent on 8 September 1998. 13. Possible small group meeting on UBL, 17 September 1998. 14. Memo to Berger replying to article in New Yorker (Hersh) piece of early October 1998 criticizing the August 1998 strikes. Memo was requested on 6 October 1998. No memo was produced. 15. UBL small group meeting, 22 October 1998. 16. Apparent small group meetings in November 1998. 17. Apparent small group meeting on UBL, 4 December 1998. 18. Principals Committee meeting on UBL, 17 December 1998. 19. UBL/Khobar small group meeting, 6 January 1999. 20. Missing "out of cycle memo" on UBL, including discussion of U-2, written on or about on 11 February 1999. 21. Small group on UBL meeting, 2 March 1999. 22. UBL small group meeting, 19 April 1999. 23. UBL/Khobar small group meeting, 21 May 1999. 24. UBL small group meeting, 25 June 1999. 25. Deputies Committee meeting on Pakistan, 10 November 1999 (including discussion of terrorism, Taliban, and UBL issues). 26. UBL small group meeting, NSC and CIA only, 3 December 1999 (briefing paper found). 27. Small group meeting, 22 December 1999 (briefing paper found.) 28. UBL small group meeting, 29 June 2000 (agenda and briefing paper found). 29. Terrorism Update for POTUS. We have found a Clarke cover note, dated 30 September 2000, enclosing two memos. The note is on the first of the two (on Predator). The second memo, described as a very sensitive terrorism update for POTUS, is missing.

30. Records of all White House meetings on response to the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole are missing. 31. All records of meetings in December 2000, referenced in various sources and interviews, are missing.

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Subject:

[email protected] Friday, October 31, 2003 4:58 PM [email protected] More docs

Here's two quick mop-up items for documents we'll need to do our job. Mike, hope you can follow up with these when I'm out. 1. We must have PDBs that deal with not only briefings about airplane hijackings and domestic AQ threats but also foreign AQ threats. That's essential context for the way POTUS saw the AQ threat. 2. We must have documents moving between POTUS and the national security adviser. Both, I think, are simply essential. We haven't asked yet for the latter, which was left out of EOP 5, and I'm not sure yet what we're asking for in our PDB negotiations. On PDB stuff, we'll have to push hard and fast, perhaps with other teams, to get heard before a deal is closed. Warren

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

[email protected] Friday, October 31, 2003 4:54 PM [email protected] [email protected] NSC notes update

Team3mates-Just a quick update: on Oct. 30, 2001, Dan Marcus and I went over to NEOB to review my notes on the NSC and White House documents found there. We also made some trims and modifications. Dan and I agree that the notes in their current form fall within our agreement with the White House: they do not contain unreasonably lengthy quotations, and they do not effectively recreate the documents. We conveyed that understanding in a useful meeting later yesterday afternoon with Brian Cunningham, as well as flagging some potential snags mentioned below. Per Dan and Chris Kojm's OK today, I've had those notes sent forward to the White House for approval and transfer to 2100 K St. This includes my notes on EOF 2 documents in the Clinton period (1998, 1999, 2000-01), and my integrated notes of EOF 2 and 3 documents in the pre-9/11 Bush period. This latter set of pre-9/11 Bush material includes notes on several particularly sensitive "Special Access Documents," which the White House can approve now but will keep in EOF custody pending a specific showing of need for them by the Commission (i.e. to write or use in a way related to our interviews). Dan and I have agreed that the White House should have my Clinton EOF 2 notes and my Bush EOF 2 and 3 notes (minus Special Access Document notes) back here by the time I return on Nov. 17. For the record, it's clear from our meeting that the White House does not entirely buy our view of the guidelines. Dan noted a few particular areas of concern amid the notes, which we discussed with Brian Cunningham: 1. An unusually lengthy quotation in a non-NSC-generated document, related to a sensitive issue of particular importance to Team 1. We believe that the slightly lengthier-than-usual quotation is justified by the issue's importance. Moreover, the horse is out of the barn--that same quote has already been cleared by the White House in an earlier round of handwritten notes and is already sitting in our safe. 2. Another non-NSC-generated document, produced at NSC request but originated by the State Department, involving a historical chronology of particular interest to Scott. This document is factual, not deliberative, and it's not particularly sensitive. If the White House for some reason feels compelled to give us a hard time here, we can simply get it from State. 3. Drafts of NSPD-9. Dan agrees that my notes here do not effectively reproduce the documents, but they do contain significant detail on a draft document—an obvious area of executive-privilege concern. If the White House contains to feel ginger here, as they well may, perhaps we can just stick a pin in this issue—leave it to the lawyers to work out, have the White House black out those sections of my NSPD-draft notes they find worrisome, and just get the rest of the notes back here for us to start working on. I've suggested this tactic to both Dan, Chris, and Cunningham. 4. "Sound bites." Among our Special Access Documents are some particularly vivid notes offered by one of our more candid protagonists, and Brian Cunningham expressed a White House unease about letting us have such "sound

bites" (his term). I was powerfully unconvinced. These documents are among the best we have, and I recommend in the strongest possible terms that we ensure we ultimately get back the notes on them. I've taken a few more direct quotations here than usual, simply because the documents are so important and, well, quotable. Again, this isn't a fight we necessarily have to have now; this a Special Access Document issue, so we wouldn't have those notes over here until we make a particularized showing of need anyway. One last point about the end of the saga: upon the notes' return, the White House may wish to arrange with us some guidelines about access. Dan was obliging on this score and is planning on drafting some thoughts in the near future. For now, the old operative guidance holds; Team 3 may see my notes, and we can discuss them among ourselves, but we should continue to be acutely sensitive about keeping an eye on them and avoid making copies. Notes will be shared with other Team Leaders on a need-to-know basis, possibly approved by the Front Office. Per Chris, Dan, and Steve, I've passed some terrorism- financing excerpts from my 2000 Clinton EOF 2 notes to John Roth but done nothing further. (More Team 4 material from 1998-99 should be arriving here shortly.) Hope that's useful. Warren

Mail:: INBOX: Interviews of High-Level Officials

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112.83MB / 476.84MB (23.66%) Date: From: To: Subject:

Fri, 24 Oct 2003 12:25:39 -0400 "" <£ "" <[email protected]>4f Interviews of High-Level Officials

we have agreed with the white House on a procedure and set of principles/guidelines that will apply to interviews of CURRENT high-level officials (defined as Asst Secy or above and senior white House staff) where — AND ONLY WHERE -- we anticipate interview will include questions about (a) NSC meetings in which the witness particpated; or (b) conversations between the witness and the President, VP, Natl Security Advis9r, or Deputy NSA. In such cases, we have agreed that the interviewer will meet with the agency POC a few days bef9re the interview to discuss the NSC meetings or C9nversations we plan to inquire about, and whether we intend to ask the witness about positions taken by various participants in those meetings. (This is in addition to our normal undertaking to give the agency POC, on request, a general idea of the subjects we plan to cover and any documents we want the witness to review before the interview.) we have also agreed that we will keep the following general principles in mind in conducting these interviews: in inquiring about NSC Principals and Deputies meetings and other highlevel white House meetings, we should generally limit our questioning to seeking information that is not already available to us from documents. Our questioning should seek the substance of the discussion, the options considered, and the arguments presented — rather than a "blow-by-blow" account of the meeting. We should limit our questioning about particular agencies' or individuals' expressed positions at these meetings to instances where it is important to understanding the significance of a poistion taken at the meeting - e.g., what was the Defense Deptrs position on the use-of-force option. Obviously, these are broad principles the application of which will have to be determined case-by-case, but we have agreed to use them as guides in an effort to minimize potential conflict between us and agency reps (particularly WHouse reps) at high-level interviews, if disputes with minders arise at highlevel interviews, feel free to call Steve or me for instant advice and commiseration! Steve and I will be prepared to discuss these principles and procedures at next Tuesday's staff meeting.

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE TO: FROM: DATE: RE:

Mike Hurley Gordon Lederman October 16, 2003 Review of Documents Produced in Response to EOF Document Requests

As you will recall, over the summer Team 2 gave you the questions set forth below concerning Executive Branch oversight of the Intelligence Community ("1C"). Please let us know - consistent with access restrictions for documents produced in response to the Commission's EOF document requests - whether you have reviewed any relevant material produced by the EOF. Also, please let us know whether you have learned relevant information via interviews. Thank you. (1) The IC's Mission. What is the role of "intelligence" in national security policymaking? What are policymakers' expectations regarding the IC's mission, capabilities, and products? And what is the role of specific 1C representatives (e.g., the DCI and the DDCI) in policymaking? (2) Formal and Informal Oversight Processes. How did the NSC conduct oversight of the 1C? What formal and informal processes did NSC institutional bodies and individual officials employ? (3) The IC's Priorities. How did the NSC set priorities for the 1C, and where did counterterrorism rank? (4) Management of 1C Resources. How did the NSC manage 1C resources, including: • allocating resources among the IC's various priorities; and • mediating the DCI's and the Secretary of Defense's shared authority over 1C resources? (5) Counterterrorism. How did the NSC assess the IC's counterterrorism activities, including: • reviewing the IC's strategy for counterterrorism; • determining whether the 1C had sufficient resources to succeed in counterterrorism; and • analyzing whether the 1C could realistically provide tactical warning?

cc:

Teams 2, 3

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Mail:: INBOX: Endgame

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106.43MB / 476.84MB (22.32%) Date: From: To: Cc: Subject:

Mon, 29 Sep 2003 10:38:31 -0400 "" <wbass@9-11 commission.gov>^ "" <[email protected]>^ "" ^ Endgame

A few thoughts on the Front Office and the endgame:

* we should alter our standard letters asking to set up an interview to request that the interviewee provide the dates that they served. That lets us check our timelines in advance and focus our questioning. It's a mistake to leave this to be done ad hoc; inevitably, it'll get forgotten, and it just becomes one more moving piece for us to keep track of. By far the easiest tactic for us is to just ask for it in writing straight up. * it's very important that we be working WITH the FO while preparing for major interviews, not simply working FOR the FO. we aren't going to have the time to gin up our own list of questions, find out we weren't all on the same page, and nave our lines of questioning summarily rejected. Better by far to sit down with Philip, Chris, and perhaps involved commissioners, and hash it all out together. That method is more time-efficient, congenial, and transparent-affording us all a chance to have input on how we handle critical interviews. * we also continue to need an ongoing interaction between the FO and Team 3 about how they're planning to write related sections of the monograph, for similar reasons. I'd like to see better communication about substance as well as process, if for no other reason than to let us all use our time as efficiently as possible. I still don't know, for instance, if Philip and Chris are working off their own NEOB notes or are planning to use mine to write. * we need to know who's going to be taking the lead in critical interviews. I'm quite sure I'm not going to be interviewing Clarke or Rice, for instance. But I'd like to know who is, so I can give that person as much support as possible. * in cases where the interview lead will be Philip, Chris, Dan, Steve, Gov. Kean, Rep. Hamilton, or other commissioners, we need to know what mechanism we have to press the interviewee or interject important follow-ups. * we also need to know what provision exists for getting witnesses back for more time, as necessary, otherwise, at least some of them are going to just run out the clock. And we need a way to make those requests stick, or busy current officials are never going to be seen again. * And finally, for any of this to happen, we need to be out of NEOB in October, which means we need the dream team of Hurley, Byman, and Bass all hammering away over there on two computers—especially given your and my travel plans and Dan's teaching load.

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Mail:: INBOX: NSC docs

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Fri, 26 Sep 2003 10:32:46-0400 "" <wbass@9-11 commission.gov>4F "" <[email protected]>4P "" 41 NSC docs

Mike,

Per our chat yesterday, I'm writing to urge us to push yet again on our NEOB work arrangements. I fear that w e ' r e now officially at the point at which the white House's pacing is hindering the quality of our report. Given the demanding schedule of interviews and hearings ahead (to say nothing of writing and editing) we need to be out of NEOB as fast as possible—within weeks, not months, it s essential that we be able to finish up there so we can use what we learn to inform our interviews. I don't want to belabor the point, Mike, but it's my job to tell you when we're in danger of doing work that's less than our best—and that's exactly where we are now. It takes real time to take careful notes on the NSC documents. And it takes more time because we have to worry about note-taking limitations and because we don't have copies of the documents handy to refer to if we're in doubt about a note. And it takes even more time because white House lawyers are going to review our notes, which will almost certainly cause significant delays. So this is slow going. I've been beavering away as best I can and am about 2/3 of the way through the pre-9/11 Bush stack; we still have to do the Clinton stack and the 9/11-20 Bush stack, to say nothing of whatever documents do ultimately get produced from EOP 3 (and perhaps EOP 4). The easiest way to double our productivity is to get another computer over there. The white House has long agreed to this—but simply hasn't gotten around to it. I raised this issue in writing in mid-July, it's flatly unacceptable that our investigation should suffer because of this, it takes one phone call to get it done. We should demand that the machine be up and running Monday, Sept. 29, and simply have done with this already. with the new machine, we need an extra set of hands. As I've been arguing for months, Dan Byman's presence there is a necessity, not a luxury. If we have another machine at NEOB by Monday and can have you and Dan joining me in the note-taking, we can get this done, if not, we're going to be doing important Blist interviews unprepared, and it's going to hurt the ability of several staffers--from Team 3 and others—to do their best questioning. we're now at the break point. What we need is simple and clear. I hope we can get it done. Hope that's helpful. Thanks, Mike, warren

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Mail:: INBOX: EOF status

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101.29MB / 476.84MB (21.24%) Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2003 11:15:07 -0400 From: "" <[email protected]>^ To: "" <[email protected]>^ Cc: "" <[email protected]>^l Subject: EOF status

:ust a few thoughts on EOP access, Mike, as we head into the commission meeting and progress report. 1. However we handle the issue, the blunt reality is that EOP is a month late in providing any documents for EOP 3. I'm agnostic about what tactics will be best at coughing those documents up, but a month later, w e ' r e still nowhere-which runs an increasingly major risk of snarling our interviewing and hearings schedule. My complaint is bipartisan; I don't see either administration's compliance as timely or full. On the evidence, i t ' s hard to exclude the possibility that someone is trying to run the clock out on us. if w e ' r e not going public about these concerns on Tuesday, I hope there's good strategic reasons for it. 2. I fear that the note-taking restrictions, particularly on PDDS and NSPDs, are just silly, if we can't take good notes on documents, they're frankly of no use--and the white House ought to be worried that we'll mischaracterize information if we can't memorialize it accurately. 3. I'm also worried about PDBS. You and I don't have to see them, but commission folks do need to actually see those documents as the president saw them in order to fairly and accurately assess the policy responses thereto. Anyway, hope that's helpful to you. Please let me know if I can do to help.

there's anything else

warren

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Mail:: INBOX: Re: Draft EOF Document Request 4

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101.29MB / 476.84MB (21.24%) Date: From: To: Cc: Subject:

Mon, 22 Sep 2003 11:51:47 -0400 "" <wbass@9-11 commission.gov> 9 "" <[email protected]><^ "" 4P,"" <[email protected]>4|' Re: Draft EOP Document Request 4

Just an update on this, gang: draft EOP 4 is with the Front Office. Once we have approved language for them on the "seam issue," I'll pass it along so we can include it in a next round of document requests. Scott and I will add a pre-1998 Sudan item to draft EOP 4, too. if you guys have other bits of unfinished business with your agencies, it might be a good time to draft another document request, once we're sending 'em anyway. And please let me know if you have outstanding EOP issues. Thanks, warren Quoting "" <[email protected]>: > Warren, > > I'll leave my comments on Draft EOP Doc Req 4 with Alexis and Scott. Please > > consider them, and roll them into your text. Then go ahead and send the > request forward to Dan, Steve, Phil, Chris for review, reminding Philip that > > part of it is in response to the gap that he called to our attention. > > Alexis, Scott, Bonnie > > > Check with warren as to which provision in Draft EOP Doc Req You should use > > the basic language of that same clause to fashion parallel language in a new > > doc request for each of your respective agencies, (it's to try to capture > some > documents we think might not be covered in our the big requests we sent to > agencies a couple of months ago.) Bonnie, you can do this for DoD when we > get > back from our junket. > > Thanks, > > Mike

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lail:: INBOX: Confidential FYI: Update on Access Issues

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101.26MB / 476.84MB (21.24%) Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2003 16:55:19-0400 From: Philip Zelikow 4P To: "" <[email protected]>^l,"" ^,"" <jfarmer@911 commission.gov><S,"" 4P' Cc: 'Dana Hyde' 4|,"" ^,"" & Reply-to: "" 4f Subject: Confidential FYI: Update on Access Issues

4^ 2 unnamed text/html 13.46 KB ^| John, Mike, Kevin, Dieter, and Dana -

Below, for you only, is the summary of recent developments on access issues that I relayed on Friday to commissioners. One or more of these issues concerns document requests or topics on which you've been working especially hard. So I wanted each of you to see how the situation has been summarized to commissioners.

The draft interim report is written in a more summary way and does not include much of the information provided below. If you are curious about how we have worded one or another passage in the draft of particular interest to you, let us know.

Philip

P.S., For John and Dana: The draft report, and my accompanying cover memo, tells the commissioners directly that, on advice of staff, Tom and Lee have concluded that we cannot hold the "NORAD" hearing (at least as envisioned) earlier than January. I don't think Tom and Lee had broken the news to Richard on their own ...

pz

Original Message From: Philip Zelikow [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, September 19, 2003 5:47 PM

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yfail:: INBOX: Confidential FYI: Update on Access Issues

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To: '[email protected] Cc: '[email protected]; '[email protected] Subject: Update on Access Issues

Commissioners -

There were several developments of interest on this front during this past week.

1. On behalf of the Commission, Tom and Lee sent a letter to the White House Counsel replying for the record to a letter he sent last month. A copy of the letter is available to you at our offices.

2. On the issue of notetaking, Tom and Lee discussed this issue with the White House Counsel this week. The White House holds firm to its position that, in dealing with presidential directives, draft presidential directives, or certain other especially sensitive documents, they may ask the Commission not to take notes on those documents. If the Commission finds a particular need to take notes on some of these documents, the White House will be receptive to these requests. The Commission has already requested the rights to take notes on several presidential directives from both the Bush and Clinton administrations. Those requests had been granted. The Commission has a pending request to take notes on the pre-9/11 drafts of NSPD-9. That request has now also been granted.

There are now no requests pending to take notes on any other particular documents.

The staff will work hard to identify any issues of this kind in the future asap in order to identify particular needs and get quick responses to them so that commissioners waiting for these matters to be settled will encounter the least possible delay or inconvenience in their review of the documents.

3. On the issue of access to the PDBs (Presidential Daily Briefs), the White House has agreed to Tom and Lee's proposal that the Commission be briefed about the contents of the PDBs, that the briefing would be to the foil Commission, that commissioners could ask questions which the briefers will try to answer (or take back to give us answers later or in writing), and that the briefing will be followed by requests for further access to this material in a manner to be determined. This White House agreement is being reduced to writing, including a description of the kinds of specific questions the briefing should address.

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The White House is extremely anxious that, at least while the investigation is ongoing, the Commission say as little as possible about its access to information in or about the PDBs. They understand that if the Commission is ultimately not given the information we feel we must have, that will be disclosed.

4. Judge Gonzales also briefed Tom and Lee on White House efforts to respond to EOF #3, the major request for internal White House and NSC documents. Responsive Bush administration documents have been assembled. Judge Gonzales asked for time to review them himself before they are turned over and Tom and Lee allowed him the time to do that in the coming week. The Clinton administration materials are still being assembled and, as we have discussed before, will take at least an additional couple of weeks.

5. The Commission also had some significant concerns about the speed and scope of access to investigative information in FBI files. This was a particular concern for Team 1 A. Earlier this week, with some help from Commissioner Gorelick, this issue was addressed by Director Mueller. He and his aides have now made a set of commitments to us which, if they are implemented successfully, will fully address our concerns. They grant designated Commission staff the ability to conduct their own direct searches throughout the FBI's entire ACS database and see the resulting material in an unredacted form (including the most sensitive information on confidential informants, etc.). They also include the appointment of a special liaison to assist Team 1A with its needs on a daily basis at the top echelon of the Bureau, outside of the usual point of contact system. They also include other special arrangements for immediate sets of interviews with case agents in some field offices of the FBI outside Washington. This was a case where the Commission's needs were exceptional and the Bureau has made an exceptional commitment to address them.

6. With respect to other agencies, the draft report reflects our understanding of the current state of play. There have been repeated questions about document production, especially the highest priority documents, with NORAD and CIA. In both these cases (and in the case of the former INS), we have actually received responses to all the priority document requests and the agencies say the responses are complete. In these cases we are puzzled by the paucity of documents we have received in answer to one or another request, but the agencies say that is all there is. Our response then should be to obtain sworn affidavits or certifications to that effect from responsible officials. That position is noted in the draft report.

If you have questions about the details on these issues, please contact Dan Marcus, Steve Dunne, or me.

Philip

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TO: CC: FROM: DATE: RE:

Philip-ZeJjkow, Chris Kojm, Dan Marcus, Steve Dunne ^JikeHutleyjDan Byman Warren Bass September 16, 2003 Draft EOF 4

Attached please find Team Three's draft of a fourth document request for EOF. We've attempted to cover the "seam issue" identified by Philip, as well as tackle a few other outstanding pieces of business. Once we've settled on language to take care of the seam issue—notes or other documents produced by participants or "plus ones" in CT meetings—our teammates are ready to send out requests along the lines of points 1 and 2 to DOD, State, DOJ, FBI, and CIA. Mike will be back in the office Wednesday, and we'll look forward to talking more at your convenience. Many thanks.

UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE Thomas II. Kean CHAIR

Lee H. Hamilton VICE CHAIR

Richard Ben-Veniste Max Cleland

IDRAFT] EOF DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 4 (U) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "Commission") requests that the Executive Office of the President (EOP or the "respondent") provide the Commission with the following documents and information no later than , 2003 (the "production date"):

Fred F. Fielding Jamie S. Gorelick Slade Gorton John Lehman Timothy J. Roemer James R. Thompson

Philip D. Zelikow E X E C U T I V E DIRECTOR

1. (U) All notes, memoranda, notes for the file, and/or other documentation produced by NSC officials that memorialize or otherwise document Principals' Committee, Deputies' Committee, and/or other interagency meetings related to Usama bin Laden (UBL), al Qa'ida, Afghanistan (including the Taliban and/or the Northern Alliance), Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and/or Sudan, from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001. 2. (U) All notes, memoranda, notes for the file, and/or other documentation produced by NSC officials that memorialize or otherwise document CSG meetings related to UBL, al Qa'ida, Afghanistan (including the Taliban and/or the Northern Alliance), Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and/or Sudan, from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001. This request includes documents that may or may not have been reviewed by the National Security Adviser and/or Deputy National Security Adviser. 3. (U) All agendas, summary of conclusions, background papers, options papers, and other documents related to Principals' Committee or Deputies' Committee meetings that dealt with Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001. 4. (U) All agendas, summary of conclusions, background papers, options papers, and other documents derived from internal discussions or diplomatic exchanges on U.S.-Saudi or U.S.Pakistani relations that reached at least the level of a senior director in the NSC, from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001. 5. (U) All agendas, summary of conclusions, background papers, options papers, notes, memoranda, notes for the file, and all other documents related to the departure of Saudi nationals immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE TEL (202) 331-4060 FAX (202) 296-5545 www.9-11 commission.gov

UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE 6. (U) Agendas, and/or other documentation sufficient to determine the date, subject, and duration of the meeting, for all Principals' Committee meetings (including all "Small Group" meetings involving cabinet-level officials) and all Deputies' Committee meetings, from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001. 7.

(U) All agendas, summary of conclusions, background papers, options papers, and other documents related to CSG meetings on foreign terrorist organizations identified by the United States government as linked to al Qa'ida, including but not limited to the Abu Sayyaf Group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Armed Islamic Group (Algeria), and Jemaah Islamiyah, from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001.

(U) The Commission requests that the documents requested above be provided as soon as they are available, even though all requested documents may not be provided at the same time, through means of a "rolling" production. (U) If any requested documents are withheld from production, even temporarily, based on an alleged claim of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission requests that the respondent, as soon as possible and in no event later than the production date, identify and describe each such document or class of documents, as well as the alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient specificity to allow a meaningful challenge to any such withholding. (U) If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of any requested documents but has information about where such documents may be located, the Commission requests that the respondent provide such information as soon as possible and in no event later than the production date. (U) If the respondent has any questions or concerns about the interpretation or scope of these document requests, the Commission requests that any such questions or concerns be raised with the Commission as soon as possible so that any such issues can be addressed and resolved prior to the production date. [DATE]

Daniel Marcus General Counsel

UNCLASSIFIED BUT COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Mail:: INBOX: Warren

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95.45MB / 476.84MB (20.02%) Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2003 18:39:50 -0400 From: "" <[email protected]>4| To: "" <[email protected]>^P Cc: "" 4P,"" <[email protected]>^f,"" 9 Subject: Warren Hi warren:

I did finish my comments on your draft EOP Doc Req 4. Alexis has what I suggest. Take a look at what I've done, make it more elegant and move it forward. Please then work with Team 3 colleagues to help them draft parallel language for new requests to their respective agencies. They should feel free to add any other provisions to their requests to obtain documents we have not covered in previous requests. Any new requests to any agencies should be kept brief and concise. Thanks, Mike

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Warren: Here are my comments on Draft HOP Document Request 4: RE Para 1: suggest you move the phrase "all Small Group meetings" to right after the phrase Principals' Committee meetings. So, it should read something like: "for all Principals' Committee meetings, including Small Group meetings and Deputies' Committee meetings from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001." That's because the Small Group was a subset of the Principals' Committee, basically National Security Advisor, Tenet, Chairman JCS, SecDef. Note, there was also a Small Group within the CSG: Clarke, Gofer Black, senior JCS rep, senior OSD rep, but I don't think that's what we are talking about in this Para. I assume this particular Para is designed to give us a pretty good idea of the numbers of PCs and DCs that were held during the period specified. RE Para 2: In this Para, I don't think we can ask for documentation produced by "CSG participants" because the EOP/NSC would not have documents produced by non-NSC members of the CSG when they did not circulate their documents to the White House. This is the Para where we are trying to get at the gap that Philip identified, i.e., documents that may have been produced by a "Plus One" at a PC or DC who did not send the document forward to his Deputy or Principal but rather submitted it as a "memo to a file". I think it should read something like "All notes, memoranda, notes for the file, or other related documentation produced by NSC officials responsible for counterterrorism in connection with attendance at Principals' or Deputies Committee meetings on UBL, al-Qa'ida, Afghanistan (including the Taliban and/or the Northern Alliance), Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and or Sudan from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001. This request includes any documents as specified above whether or not they were ever reviewed by the National Security Advisor, or Deputy National Security Advisor." To capture similar documents related to key CSG meetings suggest a new Para 3 along following lines: 3.

"All notes, memoranda, notes for the file, or other related documentation produced by NSC officials responsible for counterterrorism memorializing key CSG meetings on UBL, al-Qa'ida, Afghanistan (including the Taliban and/or the Northern Alliance), Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and or Sudan from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001. This request includes any documents as specified above whether or not they were ever reviewed by the National Security Advisor, or Deputy National Security Advisor."

Warren, parallel language contained in 2 and 3 above should be used in new document requests to DOJ, FBI, State, CIA, and DoD. Obviously, paragraphs in those requests to different agencies will need to be modified/tailored so that they don't say "documents produced by NSC officials responsible for counterterrorism", but instead will say documents produced by CIA [or FBI, DOJ, State, DoD as the case may be] officials with responsible for counterterrorism who accompanied their department's Principal or

Deputies to PC's or DCs on [our favorite range for topics: ubl, a-Q, afghan, pak, etc., the usual formulation] from January 1, 1998 to September 20, 2001". They should also contain parallel ending language to that in proposed draft of EOF Doc Req 4: This request includes any documents as specified above whether or not they were ever reviewed by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense [Director or Deputy Director of CIA; Secretary or Deputy Secretary of State; AG or DAG DoJ; Director of FBI; Chairman or Vice Chairman of JCS, etc.]" Your PENUMBRA ISSUE, which would now be Para 4: my only comment is that you need to review this language against EOF 2 and EOF 3 to ensure that we are not asking for something we have already asked for. It's a bit unclear to me. Perhaps we've asked for it in those previous requests. I'm just not sure. The main thing for all the points above Warren is that for this new request to EOF, and for the parallel requests to other agencies, we need to have it leap off the page that we are asking for different things than we asked for previously. We don't want to be in the position where Dan Levin and other Points of Contact for agencies are calling Dan Marcus, Steve, Warren or us asking us to clarify because they can't discern that the new requests are fundamentally different—asking for other documents not previously covered—from earlier doc requests. It's got to be clear to them. So, suggest you follow what I've written or come up with something more elegant. Just ensure that what we are asking for is clear and won't muddy the waters further. Work with our colleagues on their respective requests. Share this note with Alexis and Bonnie. Bonnie can do hers after her return from our junket. When you feel it's in good shape move it forward to the front office. Email Philip telling him that we have acted on his request to cover the gap he identified. Thanks Warren, Mike

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89.91 MB / 476.84MB (18.86%) Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2003 14:56:16-0400 From: "" <wbass@9-11 commission.gov>4f To: "" ^ Cc: "" 4f Subject: Interviews of top policy officials

Thanks for this, Dan--and for all your slugging on our behalf. Point 3 is, I fear, problematic throughout. We are explicitly trying to reconstruct the Bush administration's CT policymaking pre-9/11, which entails reconstructing a DC and PC process that was, by its very nature, predecisional. In that context, it's important for us to hear their perceptions of other participants' positions, if only to understand how they came up with their own stances. Policy isn't made in a vacuum. Moreover, in many cases--such as the four key DC meetings and the Sept. 4, 2001 PC meeting—we will be looking for significant detail, including some exact phrasings. God is in the details, after all. It matters whether, say, Armitage said, "We'd like to hurt al-Qaida" or said "We're going to eliminate al-Qaida." Of course, we'd be glad to corroborate such information with other sources, including documents (which I trust more than interviews anyway). I'm not sure I understand point 5, either. But again, the idea that we're limited to asking about generalities rather than specifics is problematic. I see nothing in our statute limiting us to generalities. Serious history takes detail work. I also worry that the dispute-resolution mechanism may hamstring us. What if Hadley's minder objects to some point, we can't resolve it, we defer the line of questioning, and he then never comes back? Or he only comes back so late in the game as to make it impossible for us to follow up on the information he provides? Again, I don't think the statute leaves much doubt about the White House obligation to comply. Just a few quick reactions--hope they're helpful. Best, Warren

Quoting "" <[email protected]>:

> Forwarded message from "" > Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2003 13:52:40 -0400 > From: "" > Reply-To: "" > 'Subject: Interviews of top policy officials > To: "" , "" <mhurley@9> llcommission.gov>, "" > > > > >

Last night Brian Cunningham called me to propose some general guidelines, set forth below, for asking top policy officials during interviews about "deliberative" or "pre-decisional" discussions. They reflect the WHouse

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Mail:: INBOX: Interviews of top policy officials

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> concern that interviews not be usded to recreate a verbatim record of what > transpired at NSC principals and deputies meetings, and that hard-core exec > privilege concerns be avoided as much as possible. These would apply to > interviews of high-level WHouse and NSC officials, and Dan Levin would like > to > apply them as well to interviews of agency heads about their communications > with WHouse officials or other agency heads. I think the guidelines are > generally OK, but welcome your reactions and comments. I would like to > discuss > them at our staff meeting Tuesday. > > 1. Witnesses may be asked about positions they or their agencies took at NSC > > principals or deputies meetings. > > 2. They may be asked about the general reaction to their position, about > options that were discussed, and about decisions or consensus reached at the > > meeting. > > 3. They should not, however, be asked to characterize positions taken by > other > participants, and they should not be asked to give a blow-by-blow account of > > the meeting or to provide exact quotations. (I reserved on the first > point.) > > 4. Cunningham requests that we give prior notice if we intend to ask a > witness > about his or her conversations with the President, VP, or Natl Security > Advisor. > > 5. Cunningham proposed a "rule of reason" on questions about discussions the > > witness had with other WHOuse officials -- substance of conversation OK, but > > not details. (I told him this distinction would be hard to follow.) > > 6.Cunningham requested that all interviews of top policy officials be > conducted > by staff members who are cleared to review the NSC documents -- PZ, Kojm, > me, > Hurley & Bass. I told him that limitation was not practical, and that we had > > to have the flexibility to use other members of Team 3, Scheid and others who > > are cleared to share what Hurley & Bass have learned. > > Cunningham believes, and I agree, that if we can agree on these general > > principles, it will minimize the need to interrupt interviews to discuss > concerns that the minder has about questions. If such questions do arise, we > > will seek to resolve them on the spot -- by discussion between the > interviewers > and the minder (who in the case of top NSC and other WHouse people will > usually > be Bellinger, Cunningham or Monheim). Steve or I will often be available by

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Mail:: INBOX: Interviews of top policy officials

> > > > > > > > > > >

phone to help resolve the matter.

> > > >

End forwarded message

Page 3 of 3

Brian agrees that interviews should not be

suspended in the event there is an impasse about questioning on deliberative or other sensitive matters; rather, the questioning on that subject will be held, the interview will continue, and they will agree to make the witness avaiable again if it is later determined that the questioning is OK. Reactions/comments?

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89.84MB / 476.84MB (18.84%) Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2003 13:52:40 -0400 From: "" 4f To: "" 4?,"" <mhurley@9-11 commission.gov>41,"" 4P Subject: Interviews of top policy officials

Last night Brian Cunningham called me to propose some general guidelines, set forth below, for asking top policy officials during interviews about "deliberative" or "pre-decisional" discussions. They reflect the WHouse concern that interviews not be usded to recreate a verbatim record of what transpired at NSC principals and deputies meetings, and that hard-core exec privilege concerns be avoided as much as possible. These would apply to interviews of high-level WHouse and NSC officials, and Dan Levin would like to apply them as well to interviews of agency heads about their communications with WHouse officials or other agency heads. I think the guidelines are generally OK, but welcome your reactions and comments. I would like to discuss them at our staff meeting Tuesday. 1. Witnesses may be asked about positions they or their agencies took at NSC principals or deputies meetings. 2. They may be asked about the general reaction to their position, about options that were discussed, and about decisions or consensus reached at the meeting. 3. They should not, however, be asked to characterize positions taken by other participants, and they should not be asked to give a blow-by-blow account of the meeting or to provide exact quotations. (I reserved on the first point.) 4. Cunningham requests that we give prior notice if we intend to ask a witness about his or her conversations with the President, VP, or Natl Security Advisor. 5. Cunningham proposed a "rule of reason" on questions about discussions the witness had with other WHOuse officials -- substance of conversation OK, but not details. (I told him this distinction would be hard to follow.) 6.Cunningham requested that all interviews of top policy officials be conducted by staff members who are cleared to review the NSC documents -- PZ, Kojm, me, Hurley & Bass. I told him that limitation was not practical, and that we had to have the flexibility to use other members of Team 3, Scheid and others who are cleared to share what Hurley & Bass have learned. Cunningham believes, and I agree, that if we can agree on these general principles, it will minimize the need to interrupt interviews to discuss concerns that the minder has about questions. If such questions do arise, we will seek to resolve them on the spot -- by discussion between the interviewers and the minder (who in the case of top NSC and other WHouse people will usually be Bellinger, Cunningham or Monheim). Steve or I will often be available by phone to help resolve the matter. Brian agrees that interviews should not be suspended in the event there is an impasse about questioning on deliberative or other sensitive matters; rather, the questioning on that subject will be held, the interview will continue, and they will agree to make the witness avaiable again if it is later determined that the questioning is OK. Reactions/comments?

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Mail:: INBOX: Team 3 Issue of the Week

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86.34MB /476.84MB (18.11%) Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2003 13:19:53-0400 From: "" <mhurley@9-11commission,gov>4P To: "" 4F Cc: "" 4P Subject: Team 3 Issue of the Week Philip: One matter it would be helpful to have nailed down is EOP's promised provision of a computer (laptop?) for note-taking at the NEOB. Getting that set up and operational would greatly assist us in our work. Is EOF getting close to providing this? Thanks, Mike

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Mail:: INBOX: Re: Redactions: A Few Requests for Reconsideration

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43.23MB / 476.84MB (9.07%) Date: From: To: Cc:

Thu, 31 Jul 2003 19:10:07 -0400 "" <[email protected]>4P "" 4P' "" 4f,"" #,"" <mhurley@9-11 commission.gov><9 Subject: Re: Redactions: A Few Requests for Reconsideration

Philip:

We're reviewing and will get back to you.

John

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*" liiwil:: INBOX: Redactions: A Few Requests for Reconsideration

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42.13MB / 476.84MB (8.83%) Date: From: To: Cc:

Thu, 31 Jul 2003 00:17:55 -0400 Philip Zelikow 4t "" <[email protected]>4?,"" 4?,"" <mhurley@911 commission.gov> 9 Reply-to: "" ^l Subject: Redactions: A Few Requests for Reconsideration ® 2 unnamed text/html 6.37 KB H

John-

Please forward to Bryan Cunningham, whose e-mail address I can't get at this hour.

We understand the redactions in the NSC documents made available so far. We request reconsideration of these redactions for four documents.

Three involve the wider policy context for decisions on relations with a particular country. I've consulted on this with Tom and Lee. We all agree that there are some cases where such context is needed, partly to see the tradeoffs involved in the choices. Also, to be fair to the US and foreign officials, we need to understand - as they had to - all the other issues that had to be taken into account when counterterrorism was just one part of a difficult agenda.

So we would like to remove all the redactions in NSC document 30124, on page 4 of the overview paper in document 30137, and in all of document 6321.

In making this request I'm authorized to make clear that we accept the process being put in place to consider these issues. We do not consider these decisions a precedent for all future cases. We like the idea of our - and your - being able to consider such problems on a case by case basis. In these three documents we think a combination of factors tip the balance in favor of accepting our request: the broad scope of the decisions being made; the salience of the tradeoffs/context point made above in the case of these documents; the significance of the country to our story; and the timing of the US meetings.

There is a final set of requests concerning document 30180.

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.ill:: INBOX: Redactions: A Few Requests for Reconsideration

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On pages 1 and 2 of the document, we believe the redactions should be removed because of the significance of this material for understanding general counterterrorism policy.

On page 10, the Nairobi material.

On page 14, the Jordan material.

You will note that we accept the legitimacy of various other redactions in this document, including for Middle East-related material.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Philip

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Mail:: INBOX: Reagan NSDD on terrorism

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34.60MB / 476.84MB (7.26%) Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2003 16:47:32-0400 From: "" # To: "" 4P,"" 4P,"" 9 Subject: Reagan NSDD on terrorism

Someone suggested this morning that we request from the EOF a copy of NSDD 138, the 1984 terrorism policy document. When I informally raised this with one of our WHouse contacts this morning, I learned that it is declassified and publicly available on the Internet at, among other possible sites, www.fas.org, which I am told is also a rich source of other documents in this area.

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Mail:: INBOX: EOF Request 3

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30.78MB / 476.84MB (6.45%) Date: From: To: Cc: Subject:

Fri, 18 Jul 2003 10:58:55 -0400 "" 4P "" 4P ""4f,"" <[email protected]>4P,"" 4P EOP Request 3

Team 3, Mike and I discussed this morning press reports of a 1999 trip by NSC o f f i c i a l s , including NSC CT Director William Wechsler, to Saudi Arabia for a high-level meeting on terrorist financing. There also was apparently another trip in 2 0 0 0 , which did not include Wechsler but most likely included other NSC personnel. Documents related to these trips are very important to Team 4. Mike and I agree these documents are repsonsive to one of the broad items in EOP Request 3. He asked I send this email to flag the issue, so you can ensure these documents are produced and ask for them specifically if they are not. Thanks. Doug

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Mail:: Sent Items: Fwd: Will Wechsler and Delegation to Saudi Arabia

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30.79MB / 476.84MB (6.46%) Date: From: To: Cc: Subject:

Fri, 18 Jul 2003 11:13:35 -0400 "" <[email protected]>4J "" 4J,"" <[email protected]>4P "" 4f,"" 4P Fwd: Will Wechsler and Delegation to Saudi Arabia

Dan and Steve,

My reading of EOF Doc Request 3 is that paras 7 and 10 should cover the documents/memoranda that Doug Greenburg and Team 4 are interested in (see below). Is that your opinion as well? Thanks, Mike Forwarded message from "" <[email protected]> Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2003 10:59:52 -0400 From: "" <[email protected]> Reply-To: "" <[email protected]> Subject: Will Wechsler and Delegation to Saudi Arabia To: "" <wbass89-llcommission.gov> Warren: Just spoke to Doug Greenburg (Team 4). He called my attention to an article in today's Press Clips entitled "U.S. met secretly with Saudis over al-Qa'ida funding . . . " In 1999 the NSC's Will Wechsler was part of the U.S. delegation sent to Saudi Arabia to press the issue. Doug's question was whether our EOF Request 3 will capture memoranda from that delegation. I quickly reviewd the Request and it seems clear that paras 7 and 10 cover it. But we will need to confirm that those documents are actually produced. If not, we will need to ask our EOF POC, or if necessary specify them in the next doc request. End forwarded message

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il:: INBOX: Press Clips for July 18, 2003

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10) U.S. met secretly with Saudis over al-Qaida funding; 1999 meeting set up by Vice President Gore failed to stop flow of money, experts say

BY TONY BARTELME Charleston Post and Courier Long before the Sept. 11, terrorist attacks, officials in the White House learned that Islamic charities and wealthy Saudi Arabian businessmen were bankrolling al-Qaida. By 1999, the evidence was so clear that Vice President Al Gore contacted Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah to set v up a secret meeting between U.S. counter terrorism experts and high-ranking officials in Saudi Arabia and / United Arab Emirates. < If ' "We wanted to show how seriously we took the issue, and requesting the meeting through the vice president was one way to do that," said William Wechsler, a former counterterrorism director with the National Security Council.

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Wechsler was a key member of the delegation that flew to the Gulf. He said many details of the trip remain classified but described the talks with the Saudis as "substantive ... We left hoping that we had started something." Afterward, however, the Saudis did little to turn off the money spigot to al-Qaida. "In the long run, the trip was of marginal utility." Gore's help arranging the secret 1999 meeting, which has not been disclosed until now, sheds new light on how top U.S. government officials grappled with the threat from al-Qaida before Sept. 11, 2001, and how powerful bureaucratic and diplomatic currents worked against them. The 1999 trip also underscores how the U.S. and its longtime ally Saudi Arabia knew a great deal about alQaida's organizational structure long before the Sept. 11 attacks. What the government knew about the attacks, and whether it could have done more to prevent them, is a debate that's likely to become more vigorous. One high-profile congressional commission is expected to release its final 800-page report about the attacks next week. Former U.S. Rep. Tim Roemer, a Democrat who served on the House Intelligence Committee, told The Miami Herald last week that it contains information that is "highly explosive." Other lawmakers who have read the report have said it is highly critical of U.S. intelligence lapses and that classified sections focus on Saudi Arabia's links to terrorism. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, which also is investigating the Sept. 11 attacks, is expected to wrap up its work early next year. In hearings held this week, one al-Qaida expert said the United States allowed Afghanistan to become a "terrorist Disneyland" in the 1990s. "You didn't do what was necessary to prevent your country from being humiliated," Rohan Gunaratna, a former United Nations investigator based in Singapore, told the panel. Meanwhile, the Gore-brokered meeting in 1999 with Saudi officials may get some attention in another arena -the courts. Lawyers suing on behalf of nearly 4,000 Sept. 11 victims say that, because of that trip, the Saudis knew or should have known that their banks and charities were sending money to terrorists. "After the trip in 1999, they were put on notice, so that trip is a critical component in the case," said Mike Eisner,

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7/18/03

EOP/NSC Rules Reading Room is set up at NEOB 3235 POC's are Jennifer Neustadt - White House Counsel KarenMarmoud - NSC Staff Security: Brian Cunningham

2 Conditions pending further discussions Philip Zelikow and Dan Marcus will have: -

Must leave notes there

- You can only discuss what you've learned there with limited staff here