T3 B5 Analysis 1 Of 2 Fdr- Emails And Memos Re Policy Recommendations And Withdrawal Notice Re Policy Findings 012

Mike Hurley Daniel Byman Sunday, February 15, 2004 4:19 PM Mike Hurley Policy recommendations

From: Sent: To: Subject:

Policy mmendation Thoug

Mike,

I've tried to do some hard "big" thinking and have come up with a few thoughts (attached). Even the better ideas are rough, some are just placeholders, and I'm sure a few are wrong. That said, I've tried to grab on to some of the more interesting things we've talked about. I tried to group it by different headings, so we can put some of our better small ideas under a bigger framework. I wasn't sure if you wanted this shared with the team, or if you wanted to get a bunch of ideas together and take your own cut. Happy to discuss or discard or expand ... let me know, and I'll go to whatever next step you want. Dan

Unclassified: Commission Sensitive Some Policy Recommendations ... Again (Byman) Al-Qa'ida and other radical Islamist groups pose a long-term challenge to U.S. security, even if many of the current cadre are killed, arrested, or otherwise disrupted in the coming years. To meet this challenge, the United States needs to take on terrorism as well as terrorists, fundamentally reorient its foreign policy, change government institutions, and improve domestic capabilities. A proper comparison is the remaking of U.S. institutions and foreign policy in the early years of the Cold War, as the United States adjusted to meet the Soviet struggle. Combating the sources of terrorism Combating the sources of terrorism, as opposed to disrupting existing cells, is often seen as unrealistic or as someone else's job. However, long-term success requires decreasing the number of terrorist recruits as well as stopping existing cells. One essential effort is to "drain the swamps" where terrorists breed. This should have both an economic and a coercive component. Although the relationship between terrorism and poverty may be inverse, terrorism overall - particularly Islamist radicalism - appears at least somewhat correlated with poor governance. True reform, including political reform as well as economic changes, are essential. Successful political reform, however, requires developing the rule of law, building social and legal institutions, fostering education, and otherwise creating a society where democracy can flourish — otherwise elections will fail or produce illiberal results. So far, U.S. spending treats these issues as an afterthought, a process that can be prodded but not driven. Massive increases in spending would make this far more possible. The war of ideas is also vital. As has been recently noted, U.S. public diplomacy is poor. However, the effort must not simply be to portray the United States as friendly to Islam. It must also directly engage in the battle of ideas, seizing on many aspects of the Islamist agenda that are highly unpopular. Publicizing the misrule of the Taliban is one obvious place to begin. Much of this influence campaign should also be covert. The United States should covertly fund anti-Islamist voices, particularly in the Muslim religious establishment, and build up secular educational institutions. Open U.S. support would discredit these initiatives. Draining the swamp also has a strong coercive element. The United States should develop its own special operations forces and improve its counterinsurgency capability. Much of al-Qa'ida's rule is serving as a quartermaster for Islamist insurgencies. Ending al-Qa'ida and similar groups requires stopping these movements. This involves both a strong U.S. capability and, perhaps more important, helping allies build their capability. Bringing Policy Back In The creation of specialized counterterrorism shops with all government departments and agencies was valuable when terrorism was a relatively minor concern. Even after September 11, many policy decisions are made by policymakers focusing largely on a geographic region with little concern for terrorism. Several steps would help reintegrate foreign policy back into counterterrorism deliberations:

Unclassified: Commission Sensitive

Unclassified: Commission Sensitive

•

Every Assistant Secretary in the State Department and every combatant commander should have counterterrorism be an express responsibility. When decisions are made over important regional issues (e.g. military basing in Iraq or Arab-Israeli peace talks) the counterterrorism perspective must be present within the regional bureaus as well as from the more technical counterterrorism shops, such as S/CT at State or SOLIC at the Pentagon.

•

The CSG or a similar body should have a subgroup that meets on foreign policy, discussing such key issues as Arab-Israeli tensions, Kashmir, policy toward Indonesia, and so on. These issues are often seen independently of their impact on terrorism.

Counterterrorism policy must also take on issues beyond its traditional confines. One example is helping combat the sources of terrorism. Supporting peace in Algeria, for example, was long considered a strategically irrelevant (if rather sweet) U.S. policy initiative. Given the large (and perhaps increasing) number of Algeria jihadists joining al-Qa'ida, reducing their anger is vital. Counterterrorism policy may also involve changing what we demand of allies. For example, many radicals in Europe appear to be motivated by a lack of assimilation and economic opportunities. Thus, how European states treat their Muslim minorities is a U.S. national security problem, and demands U.S. attention. Counterterrorism policy may also require changing the relative importance of various allies. Although NATO allies remain essential for some aspects of U.S. security, new allies such as Jordan or Kenya may prove even more important in the war on terrorism. Similarly, the battlegrounds may be Indonesia, Nigeria, or other places where the U.S. government is not currently well-postured for the struggle. New and Stronger Capabilities Abroad Several U.S. institutions, notably the U.S. military and the State Department, are not well-positioned for a long-term struggle against terrorism. •

Currently, defense officials are debating whether special operations forces should be "doorkickers" (i.e. direct action units), as reportedly favored by Secretary Rumsfeld, or should serve their original role as liaison forces to help other governments fight terrorism and insurgency while collecting additional intelligence. This is a false choice. Both functions are vital for effective counterterrorism, and far more attention is needed to given special operations forces additional personnel and capabilities.

•

The State Department also is in catch-up mode. We must revive U.S. Embassies (and Stations, and so on) in countries that are less vital for standard U.S. foreign policy concerns but essential for counterterrorism. Africa is an important, but often neglected, terrorist nexus. A greater presence in potential hubs such as Nigeria and Indonesia is also vital.

Unclassified: Commission Sensitive

Unclassified: Commission Sensitive A Deeper Domestic Pool The United States has a wealth of untapped resources that would be highly useful in the struggle against terrorism. Most important, as a nation of immigrants, the United States has numerous citizens and residents who speak the world's languages and know its cultures. Individuals from countries where terrorism is a problem should be aggressively recruited into intelligence and law enforcement circles. The United States should also seek to use its universities and other institutions to develop a broader pool of knowledge. Academia neglects both terrorism and area studies of countries where terrorism is prevalent (e.g. Asia outside of Japan and China, Pakistan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and others), and September 11 did little to shake this. Money to give students incentives to take language classes and learn more about the politics and cultures of these countries would help expand overall knowledge. A similar effort was done for the study of Russian and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Budgeting for terrorism also should change. Current procedures make it difficult to determine how much is being spent on terrorism overall and what that money is used for. A detailed terrorism "crosscut" - one that every agency must take seriously - is an obvious first step. Once we know how much is being spent, we need to fundamentally change how we budget for terrorism: •

Fighting the war on terrorism through supplementals carries a host of problems. Long-term training and staffing are hard to plan when the money is given through emergency a supplemental, making it difficult to build capacity.

•

Government spending on counterterrorism should also go beyond the one-year budget cycle. Again, government agencies must plan years ahead to develop the necessary capabilities, building systems and training personnel for contingencies that may occur a decade from now or more.

Long-Term Bureaucratic Reforms Meeting the Soviet threat required creating new institutions such as the CIA and revamping bureaucratic procedures to change how government agencies coordinate their activities. Terrorism poses a radically different challenge, requiring similar sweeping changes. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, small changes to increase CIAFBI integration (e.g. the creation of TTIC). Far more along these lines needs to be done. Examples include: •

Better integration between CIA paramilitary units and U.S. special operations forces.

•

Improved FBI-CIA integration, making TTIC far stronger and able to collect information on its own and task other collectors.

•

The creation of a "terrorism shop" in every embassy that tries to collect on and analyze the terrorism problem in that country and serves as a focal point for this issue.

Unclassified: Commission Sensitive

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Mike Hurley From:

Philip Zelikow

Sent:

Thursday, February 12, 2004 9:33 PM

To:

Team 3

Cc:

Chris Kojm; Chairs

Subject: Policy Recommendations

In thinking about recommendations, one theme that Lee, Chris, and I have been mentioning is to think about bringing foreign policy back into the war on terror. Though written from the perspective of the Democratic party's dilemmas, George Packer has an ably written and suggestive article in the current (Feb 16-23) issue of The New Yorker, on page 100. Philip

2/13/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Thursday, February 12, 2004 5:09 PM

To:

Team 3; Bonnie Jenkins

Cc:

Chris Kojm; Dan Marcus

Subject: Recommendations

TeamSmates: •

In our meeting with the front office yesterday, Philip critiqued the recommendations we sent forward.

•

I think his criticism on a number of our proposals was valid.

•

In particular, we proposed establishing a couple of commissions to implement or follow through on some of our proposals. Such suggestions won't fly.

•

Our task is to come up with stronger recommendations.

•

In that regard, Philip offered a few points to consider in thinking about recommendations: * In general, we should "think big." * What does the government really need to do that it's not doing now? * Do we have a government that has adapted to the new world? (that has adapted to the post-Cold War world?)

•

Please try to come up with some new recommendations with the above guidance in mind. We don't need a boatload of recommendations, just a couple. Please send me your thoughts within the next few days.

Mike

2/12/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Thursday, February 12, 2004 12:37 PM

To:

Daniel Byman

Cc:

Mike Hurley

Subject: From Mike Hurley

Hi Dan: Philip went over staff statement guidance with us yesterday. Gave us some decent direction. He also looked at the recommendations we sent forward and shredded them. Did the demolition job in his usual "genial" style. Though his critique was probably valid. I'd like to speak to you about how we can come up with stronger recommendations. Philip's comments were pretty good but we need to build on them. Basically, he wants us to "think bigger" in terms of what we recommend. Mike

2/12/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Chris Kojm

Sent:

Friday, February 06, 2004 1:21 PM

To:

Team Leaders

Cc:

Front Office

Subject: Recommendations

To All - Just a reminder. As Philip mentioned at last week's staff meeting, we do want to get from you your best shot at the 3 top policy issues in your respective areas. Please get those to the front office by OOB Wednesday, February 11th. Also, below, on a related topic is the Homeland Security Committee's Minority Report (by Rep. Jim Turner, a report criticized, in turn, by Chairman Chris Cox.) The report is mostly a checklist of recommendations. Basically, the purpose here is to make sure you are up to speed on some of the key points of policy discussion in your respective areas. Whether the report is helpful with respect to your thinking in response to the paragraph above ~ that's your call. America at Risk: The State of Homeland Security [PDF]

2/6/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Tuesday, February 10, 2004 6:41 PM

To:

Front Office

Cc:

Team 3

Subject: Team 3 Policy Recommendations

Philip, Per your request, please find Team 3's top three policy recommendations at attachment. Mike

2/10/2004

Top Policy Recommendations Teams Counterterrorism Policy 9/11 Commission Our most important and urgent policy recommendations are: i. Overhaul the current national security structure to better fight the threat of transnational terrorism, both at home and abroad. •

Eliminate the Office of Homeland Security within the White House and roll its responsibilities into the National Security Council, which has been tasked with handling domestic defenses as far back as 1947. The distinction between the HSC and the NSC is artificial when al-Qa'ida targets us both overseas and at home. Our national security structure should recognize this and place one person in charge of coordinating both offensive and defensive counterterrorist measures.

•

Designate a deputy national security adviser for both counterterrorism and homeland security. The historical record makes it clear that only the White House can coordinate the interagency process. A simple structure leading up to one accountable and empowered official can harness the work of agencies, rationalize the USG's overall efforts, and make the difficult trade-offs—such as deciding whether to fund such widely varied programs as monitoring foreign students, establishing CTICs, or expanding translation capabilities. The new deputy national security adviser should have the following tools at his or her disposal: o o o o o o o o o

operational authority a significant and highly skilled staff with a deep policy background a generous budget the rank of assistant to the president a chain of command reporting to the national security adviser and, as appropriate, the president regular meetings with the president and the ability to walk in on him or her a full seat at meetings of the Deputies Committee, Principals Committee, and National Security Council, as a principal rather than a staffer cross-cutting budgetary control over all agencies working on CT and homeland security issues a mandate to strengthen CT capabilities within federal agencies

o a mandate to adapt or transform USG institutions to respond to the al-Qa'ida threat, including ensuring long-term investment in language skills, area expertise, consideration of the effect of U.S. diplomacy on anti-Americanism, and the like o authority to order officials from other agencies to do things, with the only avenue of appeal for the department's head to go to the president. o a standing supplemental fund of several billion dollars that can be immediately applied to the most pressing CT and homeland security issues, to be overseen by the deputy national security adviser. (This would avoid the inefficient bureaucratic fighting that took place over the Predator in spring and summer of 2001.) This fund should not be limited by the restrictions placed on normal supplementals, such as the insistence that such funds cannot be used to hire staff. •

Create a new position at the NSC: a national coordinator for WMD issues, empowered with a full DC and PC seat on their issues and the ability to call DCs and PCs. The national coordinator would have a larger staff to match and the ability to make recommendations to the new deputy national security adviser about budget issues. The national coordinator would also be charged with integrating counterproliferation efforts abroad with the homeland security side of WMD terrorism, including radiation screening at ports, consequence management, and so on.

•

Give the DCI actual strategic management over the Intelligence Community, including the ability to shift funds and resources from one component of the CIA to another, as well as from one agency in the 1C to another.

• Amend the National Security Act of 1947 to make the attorney general, the homeland security secretary, and the FBI director full members of the National Security Council. Their deputies should also join the Deputies' Committee; if departments feel that is too burdensome, they should appoint an additional deputy for counterterrorism and homeland security affairs. •

Task the PFIAB (or establish a commission of limited duration) to identify the "next Afghanistan"—that is, focus on which countries are most likely to become terrorist sanctuaries and recommend steps to buttress them. Particular focus should be given to regions in Africa and Southeast Asia with large Muslim populations, porous borders, social support systems, and central governments that are weak, inept, or corrupt.

2. Create, fund, and implement a massive and effective effort to win the war of ideas against those peddling the fanaticism that underlay 9/11. Over the long term, Islamist terrorism of global reach will be defeated only when its ideas lose their appeal within the Arab and Muslim worlds. Before 9/11, we let UBL and other fanatics posture as heroes for standing up to America; after 9/11, America's image has been tarnished further still. To prevail in the battle for hearts and minds, we must counter the moral and ideological support for bin Ladinism, much as we ultimately defeated Soviet communism by bringing Russians and other Europeans to realize that Marxism itself was bankrupt. Today, rising anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds is not just disagreeable but dangerous. UBL wants to trigger a clash of civilizations; we dare not let him get his wish. We must craft our strategy around a sophisticated understanding of al-Qa'ida's objectives and philosophy. We must then identify states at risk, bolster democratic and moderate Muslim elements, and work cooperatively with frontline states near terrorist sanctuaries. Moreover, we must ensure that our efforts to support states helping us in the fight against terrorism does not come to overshadow our values-driven quest for democracy, open societies, and prosperity around the globe. The State Department should have the lead on an overt public diplomacy effort; the CIA should reinforced those efforts with a worldwide covert action campaign, using cutting-edge psychological techniques to influence public opinion and utilizing a broad range of media outlets to influence Arabs and Muslims to reject UBL's vision of jihad. We should identify voices of moderation in the Muslim world and support them, and we should give robust financial assistance to foreign intelligence services that assist us. The president, executive-branch principals, and the congressional leadership must also engage in ongoing and frank efforts to remind the American public that we are engaged in what President Kennedy called "a long twilight struggle"—a difficult and protracted campaign that will require steady nerves and sacrifice. As the memory of 9/11 fades, our leadership must relentlessly stress the message that terrorism of global reach did not emerge overnight and will not disappear overnight. We must refuse to take shelter in comforting denial and recognize that our country will be attacked again. Only candid leadership can sustain public attention and support for a long-term struggle. Given the importance of the battle of ideas and the excruciating difficulty we have had thus far in waging it, we recommend establishing a blue-ribbon commission with a six-month mandate to offer urgent recommendations on public diplomacy and covert action to support it.

3. Move with the urgency befitting wartime to control "loose nukes" and inadequately guarded CBRN material, including spending billions of dollars more to bring security procedures in the former Soviet Union and Pakistan up to the standards we expect for our own nuclear materials. 4. Produce a comprehensive national strategy for combating terrorism that inventories every capability that the United States and its allies have, draws on all instruments of national and allied power, and directs these capabilities in a focused and long-term approach designed to eliminate terrorism as a threat to our democratic way of life. •

Each relevant agency must design a long-term plan to posture themselves against terrorism and present it to the official accountable for the strategy. They should note resource changes, training initiatives, hiring moves, etc. The purpose would be to develop a truly, long-term plan, coordinated across agencies, for fighting terrorism.

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Mike Hurley From:

Bonnie Jenkins

Sent:

Monday, February 09, 2004 4:26 PM

To:

Warren Bass; Team 3

Subject: RE: Another rec? Warren, I am not a stalwart budget person, but I like the idea and suggested that as one of our policy recommendations. I assume this budget would be able to cover a number of different CT related activities (I am unfamiliar with the details of Clarke's suggestion). For example, would it include paying for joint CT operations that may not be within the existing budget of any of the agencies involved (here I think of the UAVs), or would it be "softer" type CT instruments, such those that support diplomatic efforts? I think the suggestion deserves some thought. Best, Bonnie Original Message From: Warren Bass Sent: Monday, February 09, 2004 3:51 PM To: Team 3 Subject: Another rec? In session III, Clarke suggested having the Commission endorse an integrated CT budget with someone in charge of it. Budget stalwarts—Len, Mike, Dan, etc.—does this make sense? Just a thought, Warren

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• Second and most important, the Bush administration should focus more on Al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that poses an imminent, undeterrable danger. New instability in Afghanistan and the continued spread of jihadist ideology in the Islamic world mean that the prospects for another 9/11 are growing. America has been fortunate in capturing some high-ranking terrorists, but we still lack a comprehensive program to deal with a growing global insurgency and the long-term threat of radical Islam, for which intelligence and law enforcement will not suffice. • Rogue regimes are bad for the world and worse for the people forced to live under them. Over time, we can use diplomacy — including coercion — and deterrence to bring about change. For now, however, the direst threat to Americans comes not from the mullahs of Tehran, but from the mass-murderers of Al Qaeda. Daniel Benjamin, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Steven Simon, an analyst at the Rand Corporation, are authors of "The Age of Sacred Terror."

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission NND PROJECT NUMBER:

52100

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002

FOLDER: 0001

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 21

DOC ID: 31207909

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Analysis & Recommendations [Iof2] DOCUMENT DATE: 01/01/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: Briefing Paper

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Policy Findings

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE