T3 B5 Analysis 2 Of 2 Fdr- Emails And Memos Re Policy Analysis And Recommendations 017

Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Monday, January 05, 2004 7:47 AM

To:

Dan Byman

Cc:

Mike Hurley

Subject: A Couple of Things

Hi Dan:

Hope you had a good weekend. I've made a little progress pulling my ideas together on our analysis/judgment section and I'll have some additions to the thread you started within a couple of days. I'll let you know so you can look at it, critique it, push it further. • I'd appreciate if you could give Len some ideas for what he should be writing about re FBI and DoJ involvement in CT policy. He came to this exercise a bit late, and I think the overlap with other teams on this issue is bewildering. He's doing the right thing by coordinating closely with Chris Healey and other team leaders that have an interest particularly in the FBI. Still, knowing exactly what is our (Team 3's) slice of all this is murky at best. • I thought some of your Jl experience could help here. What are the 4 or five key questions Len needs to focus on. • Len really wants to do pol mil plans and strategies. That's fine and we'll do a section on that. But he feels less comfortable about the chronology and writing a history of what agencies did. He thinks that's water under the bridge. He thinks our real role is to make sure that our country is safer. Are we doing the right things? Well, he's right about that. Unfortunately, our mandate requires that we investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding 9/11. That will have to be done. Any guidance you could provide him would be helpful. All three of us can talk if you think that's the best way to go. Thanks, Mike

1/5/2004

Pagel ofl

Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Monday, December 29, 2003 9:09 AM

To:

'[email protected]'

Cc:

Mike Hurley

Subject: Our Plan

Dan, Per our conversation this morning, I'd like to work with you on pulling together the lessons of the counterterrorism policy story. Let's get our thoughts down and refine them over the coming weeks. We should also include practical recommendations. Commissioners are going to be looking for this kind of analysis from Team 3. Thanks, Mike

12/29/2003

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission NND PROJECT NUMBER:

52100

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002

FOLDER: 0001

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 23

DOC ID: 31207911

5

_

_

_ RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Analysis & Recommendations [2of2] DOCUMENT DATE: 01/01/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: Briefing Paper

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Policy Findings

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Subject:

Daniel Byman Thursday, January 08, 2004 3:27 PM Mike Hurley Recommendation

Mike, A recommendation for us to consider from a "30,000 feet" point of view is that the USG should engage in a wholesale transformation of institutions to target the jihadist threat. This would include a long-term investment in languages, area expertise, developing a global presence, bolstering the Middle East in particular, and so on. PZ's comparison with our emphasis on Russia, and to a lesser extent China, was instructive in this regard. This may be too vague though. Best, Dan

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To:

Daniel Byman Thursday, January 08, 2004 4:21 PM Mike Hurley

Subject:

Re: Recommendation

We can offer some notional suggestions: LT language training, larger intel presence in the ME, more attention to Islamist issues outside the ME, aggressive aid programs, sustained public diplomacy, making regional cooperation with the ME more important than with other regions. Just some thoughts. Dan

Mike Hurley wrote: >Dan, I think it is a good suggestion. > >Are we approaching this as a 30 year, long-term, Cold War kind of >problem? That's the question? > >Maybe we can make the recommendation more concrete. > >Mike > > Original Message >From: Daniel Byman >Sent: Thursday, January 08, 2004 3:27 PM >To: Mike Hurley >Subject: Recommendation > >Mike, > >A recommendation for us to consider from a "30,000 feet" point of view >is that the USG should engage in a wholesale transformation of institutions to target the jihadist threat. This would include a >long-term investment in languages, area expertise, developing a global >presence, bolstering the Middle East in particular, and so on. > >PZ's comparison with our emphasis on Russia, and to a lesser extent >China, was instructive in this regard. > >This may be too vague though. > >Best, >Dan

Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley From:

Bonnie Jenkins

Sent:

Monday, December 29, 2003 8:59 AM

To:

Team 3

Subject: A Purple Pot Colleagues, A recommendation that is standing out as I reassess the interviews I conducted is the need for there to be a "purple pot" of money dedicated to CT or other areas of national interest to the US. This would be administered by individuals who would develop expertise in administering these funds. I have a couple of good quotes from interviews on this, one from the Secretary of the Air Force who dealt these kinds of money issues on a regular basis. This is an important conclusion from the UAV discussion as well. We've discussed this at some time in the past. I will continue to pursue this and prepare to write something up for your review and assessment when I prepare the monograph. Best, Bonnie

12/29/2003

Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley From:

Warren Bass

Sent:

Monday, February 09, 2004 4:10 PM

To:

Team 3

Subject: Another Rec from RAG

Here's another suggested rec from Clarke: get rid of the HSC and the homeland security adviser, which he sees as totally artificial. Instead, Clarke would set up a DAPNSA for both CT and homeland security: Rank of assistant to the president Some operational authority Staff Dollars, and control over others' funding Regular meetings with POTUS and the ability to walk in on POTUS Authority to order people to do things, with the only avenue of appeal for the department's head is to go to POTUS His rationale: you need somebody in charge, and you don't have that today. Gordon's not in charge, and neither is Townsend, Clarke's successor. Even at the height of Clarke's influence, he couldn't order anything. The CSG head's authority is much diluted under the current set-up, Clarke argues; there are now more players, not less. I have a bit of a qualm about this—after all, it sounds like Clarke writing up his dream job—but it's certainly worth considering. We heard something similar from Jim Steinberg, who's no particular fan of Clarke's. Warren

,£7 fk M-^

2/9/2004

Page 1 of2

Mike Hurley From:

Len Hawley

Sent:

Saturday, February 07, 2004 9:59 AM

To:

Mike Hurley

Subject: FW: WB recs Mike—just a thought...Dan's recommendation is more about process rather than substance, like Warren's (except for his number 4 below). I suggest we steer clear of recommendations that call for someone to study something, instead we should call for specific changes. Just a thought, Len Original Message From: Daniel Byman Sent: Monday, February 02, 2004 11:54 AM To: Warren Bass Cc: Team 3 Subject: Re: WB recs

Good recommendations. I would propose: "Each relevant agency must design a long-term plan to posture themselves against terrorism and present it to the National Security Advisor. They should note resource changes, training initiiatives, hiring moves, etc. The purpose would be to develop a truly long-term plan, coordinated across agencies, for fighting terrorism." Warren Bass wrote: A few thoughts:

1. A national coordinator at the NSC for WMD proliferation, empowered with a full DC and PC seat on their issue and the ability to call DCs and PCs. A larger staff to match. And the power to involve the homeland security side of WMD terrorism, including radiation screening at ports, consequence management, and so on. 2. Dramatically more effort to control "loose nukes" and inadequately guarded nuclear material, including vastly more spending—billions more—on security procedures in the FSU and Pakistan. I can contact some people who really know this issue for more specific recs if we want to get into this. 3. Measures to pass along institutional memory on CT in transitions, including executive-branch offices for 69 months after inauguration for the outgoing APNSA, DAPNSAs, and most if not all departing OCX staffers. They would be around as resources for the new team and backbenchers at CSGs; they would also have the opportunity to do strategic planning of the sort that nobody gets to do while they're running at an NSC pace. 4. A blue-ribbon commission with a 6-month mandate to offer recommendations on public diplomacy. I'm open to other ideas here rather than the lame mechanism of another commission, but it seems to me that we're getting hammered in the war of ideas, and if we don't start getting into that game in a serious way— which we've so far failed miserably to do—we're continuing to let UBL make hay. We have to start seeing anti-Americanism in the Middle East as a national security menace, not an inconvenience. 5. Immediate, sustained, and serious U.S. intervention to try to tamp down the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. Not only is it dreadful for Israelis and Palestinians, it's an incredible engine for generating anti-Americanism. (Dan, insert your snickers here.) I'd be glad to paddle around to get more ideas on loose nukes and public diplomacy; they're staggeringly important areas, but I'm not sure I have that many good, specific suggestions about how to fix 'em.

2/9/2004

Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley From:

Warren Bass

Sent:

Monday, February 09, 2004 3:51 PM

To:

Team 3

Subject: Another rec?

In session III, Clarke suggested having the Commission endorse an integrated CT budget with someone in charge of it. Budget stalwarts—Len, Mike, Dan, etc.—does this make sense? Just a thought, Warren

\Jf}L -

2/9/2004

Extremely Tentative Policy Recommendations

1. National CT Strategy Formulate a national counterterrorism (CT) strategy that comprehensively focuses on the threat of radical Islamic terrorism to the United States, and on an expedited basis strengthen the CT capabilities of federal agencies to successfully implement the focused national strategy in the near term. 2. Enhancement of the National Security System Integrate law enforcement and homeland security into the national security system by amending the National Security Act of 1947 to include the Attorney General, the Secretary of DHS and the Director of the FBI as full members of the National Security Council. 3. Coherent Management of the National CT Effort Establish robust interagency authorities and coordinating mechanisms to strengthen unified direction of the national CT strategy across the federal government, assure coherency of action among agency CT efforts within U.S. diplomatic missions abroad, and strengthen inter-governmental cooperation among federal, state, and local authorities within the United States. 4. Legal Prohibitions on Religious Terrorist Groups Amend federal law to effectively protect Americans from violence perpetrated by religious fundamentalist groups, including those of radical Islamic terrorists, operating at home and abroad. 5. Effective Domestic Law Enforcement Enhance with substantial additional resources the CT capabilities of the FBI and DHS to deter potential terrorists and protect Americans from further attacks, including those involving CBRN weapons.

Pagel ofl

Mike Hurley From:

Scott Allan

Sent:

Monday, February 02, 2004 4:1 6 PM

To:

Mike Hurley

Cc:

Warren Bass

Subject: SHA Rec's Mike: 1) PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. As for my rec's, public diplomacy is a serious issue as WB points out. His call for a commission is a good one as no agency seems to be taking a serious lead here and a commission could jump start things. Perhaps a commission could propose how to best "get the message out" while at the same time determining what exactly our "message" is. 2) TERRORIST SANCTUARIES. Another area of great concern is the continuing problem of terrorist sanctuaries. With all the focus on Iraq and Afghanistan, I fear thaftthe USG is failing to identify and focus on the "next Afghanistan". Regions in Africa and S.E. Asia, with large Muslim populations, porous borders and inept/corrupt governments with few social support systems (i.e. primary schools) are ripe for problems. 3) WORKING WITH THE INT'L COMMUNITY. While we shouldn't count on having other countries partake in military operations, allies can be very helpful with public diplomacy and humanitarian missions to the regions mentioned above. This said, Washington needs to keepe close pulse on how others view our counterterrorism concerns and efforts. There should be no excuses, or surprises, when we call on our traditional allies to assist in addressing terrorist sanctuaries.

-S

(\4

Page 1 of2

Mike Hurley From:

Bonnie Jenkins

Sent:

Monday, February 02, 2004 5:11 PM

To:

Daniel Byman; Warren Bass

Cc:

Team 3

Subject: RE: WB recs I will pass on to you what I have heard most often and which I think are somewhat credible ideas:

1. "Draining the swamp." The U.S. should develop a comprehensive strategy with the goal of educating those who may one day be recruited by terrorists. Thefocu5=of-tkese^efforts would be Muslim countries where groups like A-Q can sway young minds. Tbe'lelidfederaljigfincy^ould be State but other agencies would play a role in the development and implemCTrtatieft
2.

Education in the U.S.: What is the GWOT? Do Americans truly understand how this war differs from other wars? What can we expect in the future and how is the war going today? While DoS should take the lead in educating potential terrorist abroad so that they do not become enemies of the U.S., a different agency should take the lead in educating Americans at home about the war on terrorism. The GWOT will be with us for a long time.

3. A Purple Pot: As I noted in an earlier email, there should be a "purple pot" of funds that the administration could use for CT efforts. The President would have the authority to administer the funds once they were appropriated by Congress. There should also be a mechanism established that would allow the President to request supplemental funding.

4. Better HUMINT. I am not sure if this is truly a policy idea and Team 2 may capture this idea. However, the GWOT requires specific intelligence that in many cases can only be provided by HUMINT sources. Bonnie Original Message From: Daniel Byman Sent: Monday, February 02, 2004 11:54 AM To: Warren Bass Cc: Team 3 Subject: Re: WB recs

Good recommendations. I would propose: "Each relevant agency must design a long-term plan to posture themselves against terrorism and present it to the National Security Advisor. They should note resource changes, training initiiatives, hiring moves, etc. The purpose would be to develop a truly longterm plan, coordinated across agencies, for fighting terrorism." Warren Bass wrote:

2/2/2004

Page 2 of2 A few thoughts: 1. A national coordinator at the NSC for WMD proliferation, empowered with a full DC and PC seat on their issue and the ability to call DCs and PCs. A larger staff to match. And the power to involve the homeland security side of WMD terrorism, including radiation screening at ports, consequence management, and so on. 2. Dramatically more effort to control "loose nukes" and inadequately guarded nuclear material, including vastly more spending—billions more—on security procedures in the FSU and Pakistan. I can contact some people who really know this issue for more specific recs if we want to get into this. 3. Measures to pass along institutional memory on CT in transitions, including executive-branch offices for 6-9 months after inauguration for the outgoing APNSA, DAPNSAs, and most if not all departing OCT staffers. They would be around as resources for the new team and backbenchers at CSGs; they would also have the opportunity to do strategic planning of the sort that nobody gets to do while they're running at an NSC pace. 4. A blue-ribbon commission with a 6-month mandate to offer recommendations on public diplomacy. I'm open to other ideas here rather than the lame mechanism of another commission, but it seems to me that we're getting hammered in the war of ideas, and if we don't start getting into that game in a serious way—which we've so far failed miserably to do—we're continuing to let UBL make hay. We have to start seeing anti-Americanism in the Middle East as a national security menace, not an inconvenience. 5. Immediate, sustained, and serious U.S. intervention to try to tamp down the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. Not only is it dreadful for Israelis and Palestinians, it's an incredible engine for generating anti-Americanism. (Dan, insert your snickers here.) I'd be glad to paddle around to get more ideas on loose nukes and public diplomacy; they're staggeringly important areas, but I'm not sure I have that many good, specific suggestions about how to fix 'em. Warren

2/2/2004

Team 3 International Counterterrorism Policy Recommendations (Under Consideration)

[Proposed format for recommendation: State recommendation; include your initials; date your entry. Team 3 colleagues should review periodically and add, in "bullet" format, pros and cons as respective research indicates. In instances where the recommendation is substantially similar to one advanced by informed 3rd parties—authors, journalists, counterterrorist experts, etc.—please include citation for future reference. Suggest that each recommendation be placed under one of three categories: near-term, medium-term, long-term. Obviously, the order of the recommendations in each category will change as we learn more and develop a better sense of what should be priorities.]

Near-Term Increase Federal Funds for Education Increase federal funding for programs producing translators capable of working in Arabic and other languages relevant to regions of terrorism-related concerns; increase federal funding for programs producing specialists on the Middle East and terrorism. Increase federal funding for undergraduate and graduate programs in international journalism. Pros: Increase pool of specialists and translators to better understand the Middle East and other hot spots. Increase U.S. public understanding of foreign issues. (WB 6/9/03) Move Urgently to Secure Nuclear Weapons, Scientists, and Materials Abroad With 27,000 nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union, many of them under woefully inadequate control, the US remains vulnerable to the most horrifying of all terrorist scenarios: a nuclear explosion in an American city. Nonproliferation experts virtually unanimously urge more action on "loose nukes," including the Nuclear Threat Initiative. • Throw massive resources against this problem, going far beyond current NunnLugar levels; • work closely with Russia and Pakistan to ensure their nuclear facilities are locked firmly down; • find and fund alternative employment for underemployed or underpaid Russian nuclear scientists; • place radiation detectors and stepped-up security forces at US ports to ensure that nuclear devices can't make it into the country.

Pros: could save, literally, millions of lives; avoids the worst of all low-probability, highimpact events; defends against al-Qa'ida's demonstrated interest in nuclear attacks; avoids a scenario that could forever change America's role in the world. Cons: could cost several billion dollars (a small price, I'd argue). Note: might want to expand to Russian WMD facilities in general; their chemical and biological facilities aren't impressively guarded, either. (WB July 2, 2003)

Medium-Term Understand and Communicate Opposition Parties Identify and understand opposition parties in countries which are or could become terrorist sanctuaries should the current governing structure falter. Attempt to establish minimal contact with these parties to the extent possible. Pros: Allows the USG to quickly and knowledgably select a party to support in the event the ruling structure collapses. Cons: May require USG to deal with undesirable groups and may even create instability within a country should an opposition party become aggressive after misinterpreting USG discussions for outright support. (SA 6/9/03)

Long-Term