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Team #2: Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Management, Oversight and Resources Key Questions of the Investigation effective intelligence collection
Intelligence Collection (1985 to 2003): strategy for global terrorism?
1. How did global terrorism rank among competing collection priorities and who identified these priorities?
What was the Intelligence Community's collection strategy for counterterrorism? Who had responsibility and authority for the strategy? Was this strategy approved by the DC^and when? How and when was it reviewed for its effectiveness? What w^s the rojje<JfHhe N^3^5eputies^n^J*rthcipals' committees, the Secretary of State, the^^cretaiY,0^eferisefanllsU^DSIin reviewing and approving this strate. GiverKthat the Community's large technical intelligence agencies reside within the Department of Defense, what steps did the Secretary of Defense take to ensure that colle)mon was appropriately focused on the priorities identified by the DCI, particujarly'counterterrorism? How did the IC's HUMINT. SK3INT, MINT-and Opcif Somee collectors implement the counterterrorism collection strategy? How were 'these ' •implementation strategies for each discipline managed and who was accountable -for their execution? Which collection assets have proven effective? How and when was collection focused on al Qaeda? What specific intelligence triggered the establishment of the Usama bin Laden (UBL) Task Force at CIA in 1996? How did this improve collection on this target? What was the collection ^ strategy on UBL? . , 1^ Q L - fJ^L °J yAA.o.(K
Watch in Iraq, Rwanda, the Middle East, and peacekeeping missions worldwide impact the IC's collection strategy against global terrorism? Intelligence Analysis (1985 to 2003): Was there an effective intelligence analysis strategy for global terrorism? A V] 1--. 'How did global terrorism rank among competing analytic topics and who made /~r
these decisions?
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DRAFT 2. What has been the Intelligence Community's overall analytic approach during the period to identify and analyze global terrorist organizations and individual terrorists? H(j H ( w wa.T"roi naming" c m l o C T f r f r What was the role of the Rational Intelligence Council and the National Intelligence Estimate process? A -J telli
DCI's declaration of "war" on al Qaeda have on analytic
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guiu^uiajJHiupnaie support lor mation did the DCI request the Department of Justice, the FBI,\he Fedefal Aviation Administration, the Department of Treasury, the Secret S\rvj«fe, etc. regarding terrorist activities against the United States? Was this ipKJrmation provided and how was it used in the analysis of the Intelligence Co One of theDd'sJjasic responsibilities is to warn of attaclp
telligence Management (1985 to 2003): Who has the responsibility, authority and accountability for the collection, analysis and warning of global terrorist threats in .-___ the government? \m was one 1.
Clinton in 1995 tha\reefuired specific intelligence collection efforts. How did the ^ I 1C implement this A&>"^~~ *"—*~ the **-> •o~.~iA*.~,t \1 :tion from President? / / 2. -What--has-eecn-the lole of ihe Naiional Securliy Advisor in overseeing ihat the
DRAFT priorities? What role did hc/iihc play in reviewing and acting upo rrmrLt^rtgrrnrir.m i n t n l l i g n n n n nn.l u y . i i n i i i u n f M I I M r l 1 ?
3. What are the respective roles of the Secretary of Defense, rf-Stah and the DCI regarding to counterterrorism intelligence? How has the bifurcated nature of the Intelligence Community's chain of command affected its management of counterterrorism? -Howufien did the NSC Deputies Committee and/or Principals' Committees update PDD-35 and what policy or management recommendations did they-fiiakc to thc-Sirector of Central Intelligent in hi; -management of counter tegemm intelligence efforts?What were the conclusions of the DCFs "Hard Target" study on terrorism? Who icrformed the study? Who was responsible for implementing its recommendations and taking specific action? What follow-up was performed? hat were the respective leadership roles of the DCI, DDCI, DDCI for Community Management, the Assistant DCI for Collection, and the Assistant DCI rJor Analysis and Production in the conduct of the Intelligence Community's counterterrorism programs and in management? How were their management direction implemented and reviewed? What were their recommendations during this period and how were they implemented? How was the management of tejrGrism intelligence changed/improved after the World Trade CentV bombingm 1993? After the FBI arrests of eight individuals \ reatening to attaclcsNew^York landmarks? The bombing of Khobar Towers? he UBL call for iihaVagainst the US? The Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embass / /\? And tle events oLSeptember 2001? [_bp Intelligence Oversight (1985 to 2003): How did congressional oversight affect the Executive Branch's ability to conduct effective counterterrorism-programs2 What priority didjhe Congressional leadership give to coimterterrorism efforts ot -the"governmenF?
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2. What priority did the six congressional oversight committees give to counter terrorism activities of the Intelligence Community? How was this priority manifested in program direction in their report language (and classified annexes) and in their budget marks? 3. How effective were the House and Senate Intelligence Committees in overseeing US Intelligence from 1985 to 2991, particularly in regards to counterterrorism? 4. What findings and recommendations resulted from congressional investigations into the Intelligence Community's counter terrorism efforts prior to the Joint Inquiry investigation? How were these recommendations implemented? What specific direction was given to the DCI, the DDCI, the DDCI for Community Management, the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations and the director of the CTiC? „
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DRAFT 5. How did the Intelligence Community keep Congress aware of the threats to the United States from terrorism, and how did Congress respond? How was warning intelligence provided to the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate and what actions resulted? Intelligence Resources (1985 to 2003): Did the Intelligence Community have sufficient resources to conduct effective counter terrorism activities? 1. Is there an effective budget process within the Intelligence Community to ensure that resources are allocated to the highest priorities identified by the President, the NSC, the DCI and the Secretary of Defense? 2. What has been the analytic basis for requesting intelligence funding for counter-terrorism activities in the intelligence community from 1985 to 2003? How have counterterrorism programs been examined and audited for their effectiveness over the period? What adjustments have been made to improve them? 3. What efforts have been made by the DCI and SecDef to properly balance resources across the Intelligence Community to place align resources for the greatest impact, particularly after the DCI had declared \G2yon al Qaeda in 1998? ^U> a*^.
4. How have intelligence budget requests for counter terrorism been scrutinized by the Office of Management and Budget? What has been the impact of this scrutiny on the programs? What are the roles of other Executive Office of the President oversight entities? 5. How has counterterrorism funding changed and why? How have CT resources been invested in human source collection? Signals collection? Imagery collection? Open source collection? CT analysis? 6. Did the relevant House and Senat^Authorizations and^/fppropriations Committees uphold the President1^ request for counterterrorism funding? If not, \vhy? Did the Congress add funding to the President's request for resources? If so, why? 7. Why did the Intelligence Community receive supplemental funding for counterterrorism efforts and not request these funds through the normal budget process? 8. Have rps6urcfcx requested byj&e'lritelligfe^ce Community for^otffiterterroJ Cities been dVieq^-ifso, why and by winch QyjSFStghtentitv?
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