T2 B4 Team 2 Workplan Fdr- Draft Outline- Workplan- Intelligence Collection- Analysis And Management Team 581

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

WORKPLAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND MANAGEMENT TEAM Objectives:

(1)

(2) (3)

I.

Assess the performance of the Intelligence Community (1C)1 in collecting and analyzing information related to counterterrorism, both prior and subsequent to the 9/11 attacks; Identify the reasons for such performance; and Recommend ways to improve the IC's future performance regarding counterterrorism.

Compile a notional list of general areas of focus and key questions to answer, with attention to possible overlap with other teams. A.

Consider the extent to which we are focusing on pre-9/11 versus post9/11.

B.

General areas. 1.

2.

3.

The IC's mission(s). a.

What was the IC's intended mission(s), and how did the mission(s) evolve over time? Where has counterterrorism fit into the mission(s)?

b.

What organizing principle(s) governs how the 1C should function in general and conduct counterterrorism in particular?

Intelligence policy. a.

What major policy decisions have guided the 1C? Who made such decisions, and under what conditions?

b.

How did such policy decisions impact the IC's counterterrorism capabilities and efforts, either intentionally or unintentionally?

Organizational structure of the 1C. a.

How was the 1C intended to function, and what were its organizing principle(s)? How has it functioned in reality?

1 I assume that the 1C includes: CIA, DIA, NSA, NRO, NIMA, Army Intel, Navy Intel, Marine Intel, Air Force Intel, Coast Guard Intel, State, Treasury, Energy, and FBI, plus DHS and TTIC.

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL b. 4.

b.

Sources of resources. (i)

Requested by the 1C.

(ii)

Requested by the President and OMB.

(iii)

Appropriated.

(iv)

Spent by the 1C.

What resources were requested for, appropriated for, and ultimately spent on counterterrorism? Were such resources adequate?

Information collection. a.

b.

6.

What are the implications of such functioning for counterterrorism?

Resources allocated to the 1C. a.

5.

DRAFT

Aspects of information collection, (i)

Priorities.

(ii)

Types: HUMINT, SIGINT, open source, etc.

Where did counterterrorism fit in the priorities for collection? What decisions were made regarding the type of counterterrorism information to be collected, and how successful were such collection efforts? What impediments were there to successful collection of counterterrorism information?

Information analysis. a.

b.

Aspects of information analysis. (i)

Priorities regarding what topics are being analyzed and thus what collected information is most important to analysts.

(ii)

Challenges to analysis, such as translation, data mining, and "connecting the dots."

Did the 1C give sufficient attention to analyzing intelligence information for counterterrorism purposes? What challenges did the 1C face regarding analysis of such information and "connecting the dots"?

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 7.

Information-sharing. a.

b.

8.

DRAFT

Venn diagrams depicting information-sharing, (i)

Within the 1C.

(ii)

Between the 1C and other federal agencies (e.g., INS).

(iii)

Between the U.S. Government and other entities (State and local governments, foreign countries, and the private sector).

What policies and procedures govern information-sharing? How has such information-sharing worked in practice, and, more specifically, how has information-sharing impacted U.S. counterterrorism efforts?

Oversight. a.

Types of oversight. (i)

(ii)

(iii)

Executive Branch. (a)

President.

(b)

Senior Presidential advisers.

(c)

NSC.

(d)

OMB.

(e)

SecDef- of agencies within DoD budget,

Congress. (a)

HPSCI and SSCI.

(b)

Armed Services.

(c)

Judiciary.

(d)

Appropriations.

(e)

Other,

Judicial. (a)

FISA court.

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL (b) (iv)

b.

C.

II.

DRAFT Other federal courts,

Other. (a)

Media.

(b)

Other interest groups.

What is the objective of oversight? How has oversight affected the IC's mission(s), structure, self-perception, exploitation of its authorities, and - ultimately performance? More specifically, what role did oversight play in the IC's performance regarding counterterrorism?

Issues of possible overlap with other teams (please note that I am only familiar with three other teams). 1.

Possible overlap with the Al Qaeda team: intelligence collection and analysis of Al Qaeda.

2.

Possible overlap with the law enforcement team: analysis of FBI law enforcement functions (assuming our team will focus on FBI intelligence functions) and FISA.

3.

Possible overlap with the foreign-relations team: relationships with foreign intelligence services.

Initial phase (April 2003): acquire unclassified background information. A.

Review important work done over the past twenty years (Philip's memorandum states " at least five years," but Kevin has suggested going back at least to 1985), and maintain rolling list of key documents. 1.

Congressional hearings and legislation.

2.

Executive Branch documents (e.g., budgets, Executive Orders, and CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence reports).

3.

GAO reports.

4.

Other literature.

B.

Compile list of experts who are not objects of the Commission's inquiry, and conduct interviews as appropriate (at this stage, interviews will most likely be intended to generate recommendations on how to structure our team's investigation and what publications to read).

C.

Prepare chronology of key events since 1985.

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL D.

Prepare organizational charts for the 1C and relevant parts of other entities, with key officials noted, since 1985.

E.

Identify new key issues and key questions, and revise existing list of such topics.

F.

Develop notional list of individuals to interview and documents to request.

G.

Draft plans for briefing the Commission on the IC's history and how the 1C functions.

H. III.

DRAFT

1.

Prepare the outline of a briefing book.

2.

Prepare a notional schedule for one or two days of private briefings or public hearings.

3.

Consider whether the Commission in general should acquire such information publicly or privately, or both.

Liaison with other teams to share information and navigate areas of overlap.

Once personnel receive clearance, begin in-depth research covering both classified and unclassified sources. A.

B.

Factors affecting this phase. 1.

Overlap with other teams, requiring our team to join with other teams in requesting particular documents and/or interviewing particular individuals.

2.

The extent to which the Commissioners, as opposed to the Commission's staff, will receive testimony or otherwise interview individuals.

3.

Whether we will be allowed to make general requests to agencies for categories of documents, as opposed to being permitted to request only specific documents.

4.

The extent to which we have access to the documents submitted to the Joint Inquiry and to the Joint Inquiry's report and whether we feel additional research is needed.

Assessment of what classified documents should be obtained. 1.

Specific documents based on knowledge of team members.

2.

Document requests for general types of documents, to be submitted to relevant agencies (in accordance with Commission procedures).

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL C.

DRAFT

Interviews. 1.

Resolve whether we may have off-the-record conversations.

2.

How many opportunities do we have to speak with a particular individual, particularly policymakers and other current government officials?

3.

Acquire background material on the interviewees in preparation for the actual interviews.

IV.

Draft a report for the Commission with suggested recommendations (based on guidance from the Commission and senior staff).

V.

Draft language and recommendations for the Commission's report. A.

Will the report be classified or unclassified, or both?

B.

What are the length and format strictures?