T2 B4 Team 2 Workplan Fdr- Appendix A- Intelligence Collection And Foreign Liaison- Key Questions 587

Appendix A Team #2 Intelligence Collection and Foreign Liaison - Key Questions How does the 1C collect information on global terrorism? 2. Who was in charge (responsibility and authority) of counterterrorism intelligence collection prior to September 11th 2001? 3. How did counterterrorism rank among competing national security threats for collection resources (requested, budgeted, spent) and emphasis? Who made the decisions about priorities and resources? 4. What was the counterterrorism collection strategy? Was the strategy approved by the DCI and the interagency process? 5. How effective was the collection strategy particularly against Al Qaida and UBL during the 1990s? Who was assessing and changing (as needed) collection? 6. How effective was the counterterrorism collection prioritization process? Was it dynamic enough to react to changes in the environment? 7. How did the 1C perform collection of strategic and tactical counterterrorism intelligence for the President and the NSC prior to September 2001? Did the President or NSC provide feedback to direct/request changes in collection? Which collection practices/operations and assets have proven effective? 8. How was the IC's collection strategy coordinated (see also #9 and #10) with traditional foreign reporting conducted by the Department of State, Treasury, Commerce and Justice? Did coordination change collection strategy, priorities, resources or operations? 9. How effective was this strategy in countries such as Pakistan, Germany, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia? Was it at all effective in countries that might not have been immediately implicated in Al Qaida and UBL collection but do have a connection to international drug/slave trade, organized crime, and financial crime as in Latin America, the "Stans", Russia, Eastern Europe, etc.? 10. How did collection and analysis strategies and processes connect or fail to connect? 11. How are collection and warning connected? 12. Did counterterrorism collection policy, strategy, resources, organization or practices/operations change after the Yemen attacks in 1992; the WTC bombing in 1993; the Khobar Towers attack in 1996; the embassy bombings in 1998; the millennium celebrations of 2000; and the USS Cole attack in 2000? Did policy makers (including the DCI)/government leaders request any changes? Did they review/assess changes? 13. Did Intelligence support to military actions/force protection requirements in the Balkans, Turkey, Iraq, Africa, and the Middle East and worldwide peacekeeping missions impact 1C collection against global terrorism positively or negatively? Did strategy, policy, organization, resources, or operations change as a result? 14. Did law enforcement requirements and prosecution of terrorists in the 1980s and 1990s (and publicity on evidence used - sources and methods) impact collection capabilities positively or negatively? As in #13 above were changes made as a result?

15. Have any constitutional strictures, legal issues/laws, or policy directives hampered collection against counterterrorism targets? Were these discussed within the 1C; were changes proposed to facilitate improvement? Were changes made? 16. Was there effective oversight of 1C collection policy, strategy, organization, resource allocation and operations/practices? Who provided or failed to provide oversight?