Ny B5 Civilians Fdr- General Info- Memo Or Early Draft Section Of Commission Report On Wtc Plane Crashes And Evacuation

Latest NY death toll: 2749 (equal # of death certificates and count kept by Office of Chief Medical Examiner); a little over half have been identified based on remains • 147 victims on planes • 343 FF's • 23 NYPD • 37 PAPD (and 47 civilians PA workers) • leaves 2242 civilians (including PA civilians) ** 69% of total number were deaths occurring on floors at or above plane impact * * 99% of civilians below lived SEPTEMBER 11th When Flight 11 hit the north fa9ade of 1 World Trade Center^the north tower) at 8:46, there were approximately 5,000 to 7,000' people in each of the two towers, as opposed to the possible 25,000 in each (50,000 total) who might have been there as little as fifteen minutes later. Within seconds, 911 calls came in from around the city reporting the event or some version or of it.2 Within minutes, most 911 and FDNY dispatch operators were able to indicate prior awareness of the event.3 The plane sliced through floors [93 or 94]4 to 98, [directly into the offices of Marsh & McClennan and Fred Alger Management]5 killing hundreds of people on impact. [While 1344 people would eventually die at or above the impact floors], a New York Times study of the upper floors7 of the towers estimates that approximately eight hundred people survived the initial crash.8 Due to a combination of the angle at which the plane Estimates vary. No certain way to determine. Mostly general reports of a plane crash, explosion or fire at the WTC. Several calls identified plane as an AA aircraft and/or a 747 (one incorrectly identified it as a small jet and one operator told a caller that it was a helicopter). Several reported that the hit looked deliberate and speculated that it might be a terrorist attack. Some called to confirm that it was a plane (as apparently being questioned by TV reports). A couple of caller asked operators for confirmation and information. Within minutes most 911 and FDNY dispatch operators were able to indicate prior awareness of the event. 3 "Volunteer" witness Carl Tendler claims to be the first to have reported the incident to 911 on the basis that the operator who received the call expressed surprise; obviously this is not conclusive, as other 911 or FD dispatch operators may have had this info, which is likely considering Ladder ? actually witnessed the event with the French documentary crew from across the street. 4 Reports vary, though there should be an answer to this. 5 Do we want to identify companies/people by name? 6 This number, which is only an estimate to begin with, varies from report to report. As there is no way to determine it with certainty, may be better to leave out or state more generally, e.g., approximately 1400. 7 NYT source; based on interviews, videotapes, photograph This 8 It is theorized that that is because the damage from the plane crash was fairly localized, unlike that from bomb which is designed to trigger wider spread destruction. It is theorized that the plane was absorbed by the building as its nose was split by the inner concrete slabs. Contrary to common assumptions, much of the jet fuel, often attributed with causing the majority of the destruction, was actually burned off by the 1

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hit and certain construction features9 of the building, the building's stairways are theorized to have been blocked on the 92nd floor, trapping everyone alive on that floor and above. It is likely that most of the initial survivors above the crash were on the higher floors, further from the points of impact, which is supported by the relative dearth of 911 calls and news reports of personal communications from people floors at or near the crash10. While there were some communications from offices between the 93rd and 100th floors,11 most communications came from floors within the 100's, particularly the 104th through 107th. With regard to these floors, the Times reports that conditions were worse on the uppermost floors, e.g., 106th and 107th12 than on the ones directly below13. In support this claim, it cites a call from an employee in a northwest conference room on the 104th floor, shortly after the crash, reporting that he and approximately fifty colleagues were okay.14 It also cites calls from other employees on the 104th and 105th floors who apparently expressed a lesser state of urgency than those on floors above.15 However, 911 calls explosion; however thousands of gallons of fuel still poured into elevator shafts and air ducts, erupting into lethal fires and fireballs]8 [see below for lobby fireball]. 9 "Drywall" (commonly known as sheetrock) was blown off many essential areas on impact, diffusing its ability to contain fires and physically blocking passage points. 10 This appears to be true, however I have not read all news stories and books; also I will need to confirm the claim about 911 calls after receiving summaries John F and George. 11 See below. 12 The 106th and 107th floors of the north tower were occupied by Windows on the World; on September 11*, the 107th floor had regular restaurant activity and the 106th floor was being used for a large telecommunications conference. 13 The 104th and 105th floors, as well as space between the 101st and 103rd floors, were occupied by the offices of Cantor Fitzgerald. 14 According to the Times, this call was made by Andrew Rosenblum of Cantor Fitzgerald to his wife, Jill. He actually gave her phone numbers for other CF employees in the room so that she could have made calls to their loved ones letting them know that they were all right. 15 Because of restrictions on interviews, I will probably not be able to obtain too much 'first-hand' (really second-hand) information from these floors. So far, I have a meeting set up with the boss of a company who received several emails from employees at the WOW conference, and first-hand information from 911 calls as follows above. I'd also like to get as much information as possible from the PA employees who answered calls from these floors at the fire command center in the lobby. However, if we do not feel that the information from these sources is sufficient, I know of the following people who received calls from loved ones: 1) Jill Rosenblum, from husband Andrew, described above; Andrew also spoke with his golf partner Barry Kornblum; Times story has them mostly describing conditions, vs. contact with emergency personnel, but not clear whether Times report presents entire conversations or just selected excerpts; 2) Cheryl Schneider; call from husband Ian, on western side of 105th floor; reported somewhere that Ian, a '93 survivor, led people to the 105th floor to try to get on the roof; there is a 911 call from him on the 105th floor but no mention of trying to get on roof; an absent colleagues also mentions names of many people in that group, who may have made phone calls to loved ones, if we need to follow up; 3) Karen Lee, received call from husband Richard YC Lee, on the southern side of the 105th floor, asking her to call 911 or WTC security because he needed to know what to do; the call was then disconnected; 4) Mary Ellen Cherry, call from husband Stephen, also on southern side, no info on content; these CF employees also made contact with a female trader in their Chicago office via a national "squawk box"; 5) Sophie Pelletier, call from husband Mike from 105th floor, who does not know what to do. 6) Glenn Vogt, general manager of WOW; wife received call from his ass't Christine Olender 20 mins after crash saying they had no info on what to do; he was standing outside; he could be a good point of contact for WOW stories, as there were a number of other communications from here which appeared to be generally asking for advice but may have

indicate reports of bad smoke and fire from all floors between 104 and 107 fairly evenly within the first ten minutes of the crash. This may be explained by the fact that people in perceived pockets of safety of did not feel the need to call 911, or possibly that callers were more restrained in describing the urgency of their situation to loved ones than they were to 911 operators. One employee16 who reportedly made a call to his wife from the 105th floor also called 911 from there indicating increasing smoke and objecting to the fire dispatcher's direction to stay put, as he believed there was too much fire in the hallways for firefighters to reach them. In general, calls to 911 from these floors indicate that callers were confused about what happened, unsure of what to do, and in many cases physically struggling from smoke conditions. Because of the volume of calls and chaotic circumstances of the day, transfers to relevant dispatchers (FDNY or EMS) were often unsuccessful and many calls were cut off on either the 911 operator's or the caller's end, terminating crucial exchanges of information. Where contact was made to FDNY or EMS dispatch, callers were generally given SOP advice, e.g., to stay low, remain where they were, and wait for emergency works to come and assist them. One caller, in a group of a hundred people, was told that he should leave if he could17 and several are informed that it is all right to break open windows. 911 operators were also confused, confronted with questions they did not have the answers to, and often losing callers before the appropriate connections could be made. One operator actually told a caller that the incident was in the other building, right as the other building was hit.19 (See below for effect of 911 disorganization). 10

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Another means of obtaining authoritative information was from the fire command center in the lobby, which fire wardens could contact by a special phone located in the center of the floor, where they were instructed, as per building fire drills, to lead others to await instruction . News reports indicate that many calls were made by this method from at

contained more info; he may have some info about Doris Eng, WOW's manager, and apparently a fire warden, who reportedly made repeated calls down to the fire command center. 16 Ian Schneider of Cantor Fitzgerald, 911 call at 8:54. 17 8:52:20 AM call from Howard Kane, Comptroller, WOW; transferred to FDNY 461. 18 8:50:30 AM call to 911 from caller Hanley, WOW, 106th floor, reporting bad smoke; 8:56:20 AM call to 911 from north east side of 105th floor with group of 12 to 15 people, reporting smoke everywhere, transferred to FDNY 408. 19 9:03:00 AM 911 call from CF employee on 104th floor. 20 According to Brian Clark, a fire warden on the 84th floor in 2 WTC, fire wardens were never given any uniform evacuation or emergency instructions, e.g., always evacuate up or down, but were instructed to use the phone to obtain directions specific to the event. There were approximately four fire wardens per floor who were given safety equipment such as whistles, flashlights. Some companies gave their fire wardens additional equipment, such as Euro Brokers where Brian Clark worked, which gave theirs walkie-talkies. After a fire drill, which were conducted about every six months, several floors at a time, the fire wardens on the floor would meet with the Port Authority security officials conducting the drill. The procedure was put in place as part of the post-1993 security updates. However, no evacuation drills were done. If I happen to interview other company fire wardens, I will question them on this as well. However, I believe that the Port Authority will or has confirmed the general procedures (except that Sam mentioned that occupants were instructed always to evacuate down: we need to get clarification on this, as it relates to a crucial issue mentioned later).

least from the 106th floor21. However, even according to Port Authority security officials themselves, callers who called the fire command desk were not given much information beyond a reiteration of the general policy to evacuate the fire floor and the floor above and to leave only when directed or "when conditions dictate such actions."22 [Insert information on the Public Announcement system]23. 911 tapes indicate that they building's fire and/or evacuation alarms were going off.24 Communications from people on slightly lower floors (e.g., at or nearer the point of impact) are anecdotal compared to the much greater volume which came from above, implying that fewer people survived the initial crash in any meaningful way on these on these floors. At 9:01, a 911 call came from the northwest corner of the 102nd floor reporting eight people caught in bad smoke; at 8:54, one came from northeast corner of the 100* floor reporting thirty people caught in bad smoke and having difficulty breathing. Both of these calls were made fairly soon after the impact, though at 9:15 a 911 caller reported seeing a person leaning out a window, waving, from around the 100th floor (though this could easily have been higher up). Most surprisingly is a 911 call indicating that a group of eight people were alive as late as 9:47 in the southwest corner of 93r floor, in which they had sealed the doors and broken one window25. Fires were reported to have been seen immediately on the 96th, 97th, and 98th floors, most intense on the eastern side, where dozens of people were seen falling or jumping into the plaza area at the center of trader center complex.26 On the 92nd floor, however, one floor below the impact, many people remained alive but trapped. A 911 call reports bad conditions on that floor as early as 8:58; however, as late as 10:26, less than three minutes before the building would collapse, people were still reported alive but trapped.27 Reportedly everyone on this floor died. On the other hand, most of the thousands of people below this point lived. [Insert ABS evacuation story; survivors from 91st floor and which stairway they used, C?] Some people were initially trapped, but rescued either by emergency personnel or their own

See FN above on Doris Eng. Sam, this was confirmed right? If so, by PA employees or OCS workers? 23 We need to get information of what PA announcements were made in the north tower and at what time(s)? 24 Sam, are these the same things? 25 These were employees of Fred Alger Management, which occupied half of the 93rd floor; apparently these people made calls to family members as well. 26 City In the Sky 27 It seems to be generally accepted that the stairwells were blocked from the 92nd floor down, however, I'd like to find out if any people on this floor actually tried the 3 stairwells and were unable to descend. I have heard specific reference to this in any of the 911 call summaries I've read so far, or in news stories reporting conversations with people on this floor. Again, however, the media might not have been asked this question. I have upcoming interviews with several people (naval architects) who escaped from the floor directly below, and may be able to provide some valuable input of this. In addition to that, I will listen to the remainder of the 911 calls. If neither of these yields any substantive confirmation, and we feel we need to provide more, I have a list of names of family members/ friends of Carr Futures victims. 21

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efforts [INSERT description of general evacuation, particularly which stairways used, from interviews survivors / FD, PD, and PA]. The success of the evacuation has been attributed to the changes made as a result of 1993 bombing. [INSERT info on exit instructions to civilians from lobby, apparently directed through concourse under plaza]. Also, story on helicopters. In 1993, several people were evacuated from the rooftop of tower one, presumably leading some people to believe that a rooftop rescue was a viable option and prompting them to go up to the roof rather than down. However [decision was made, get time, by who and who was it told to]. This presumably would not have made any difference in the north tower if in fact all three stairwells were blocked from the 92" floor down (and most people below there got out) but this did not have to be the case even if it turned out that it in fact was. Emergency personnel may have been advising people to go up, or not discouraging them from doing so, when there could have been a viable way down. This was the case in the south tower where the failure to transmit this information to civilians trapped above the fire either directly over the PA system or via emergency officials with whom they had contact had a much greater actual impact, (see below) It is unclear, and most likely indeterminable, how many people died below the plane crash. A USA Today article from December 2001 put the number at 72, but also reports that 10 bystanders were killed by falling debris, which may be added to the total. This would cohere with the estimate of eighty some-odd people estimated by Erin Hogan, assistant to Dr. Robin Gershon at Columbia, who is leading a study in part on evacuation by interviews with civilians. In terms of specifics, I have come up with the following: • •

At least one death occurred on the 89th floor, e.g., Abraham Ilowitz of Met Life; in a 911 call at 8:56, his wife reported him trapped on that floor and his name shows up on a victim list; there could have been others with him. At least one, and probably several, people died in room 8617 on the 86th floor; James Gartenberg of Julien J. Studley was reported trapped there by his mother in a 911 call at 8:54 and his name appears on a victim list. [I have a friend who knew this person, and reportedly he spoke live to ABC from this room; if there's a transcript of this, it might shed light on the number of

Several groups of people were reportedly rescued by Port Authority workers on the 86th and 89th floors.; I believe that Jim Miller has some information on this. Also, Shirley Dreifus, the owner of Strategic Communications on the 89th floor, who happened to be at home that day, told the media that she directed rescue workers to a group of her employees trapped on in an 89th floor office. 911 calls generally support this; there is one from SD at 9:03 reporting 4 to 5 people trapped and one at 9:21 from the people in the office at 9:21. Reportedly, Frank Lombardi, the PA chief engineer, pried an elevator open on the 72nd floor, allowing people to escape; and a man Jan Demczur pried an elevator door open with a squeegee allowing occupants to kick through drywall and escape on 50th floor. There is also an 8:49 911 call reporting a group of four on the 87th floor with a fire in the hallway; as the caller's name does not appear on any victim list, I assume this group got themselves out. 28

people in the room.] A 9:38 911 call also came from this room; one of the people on this conference call identifies himself [Sam gives name as Geoff Hipschman, in notes, but as this does not appear on a victim list it is probably a different spelling]. This caller reported that the group had spoken with the fire department which had told them to stay put. One of the callers also states that two people told him the exits were blocked with debris. I assume these were people in the building with. If so, this could be a reason for other on this floor. [The caller reports that they are having trouble breathing and asks if they should break a window. The operator wastes time asking if the WTC is between Church and West, the rather leisurely discusses technical job info with the EMS operator to whom she connect. The caller finally breaks in and asks for an answer; meanwhile he tells people near him to get on the floor and get soaking towels. The operator agrees that that's a good idea, but can't tell them to break windows that are not meant to open. She goes to look for an actual firefighter to answer the caller's question but they've all left for the WTC. [Question for Sam: is this EMS dispatch operator actually located in a firehouse?] Because of this, she repeats SOP message, which is to stay low, keep the door closed, and don't go in the hallway. She then says there's an announcement in the building saying this same thing [I want to listen to this because this doesn't make sense] and suggests checking if the vents are closed. I assume that several of the 70 or 80 some odd deaths occurred here. Civilians were able to evacuate from points higher than this via Stairway C [and maybe others] but perhaps the entrances to this or other stairways were blocked at their floor, or they were trapped in this room by fire on the floor or debris.] Reportedly thirteen people from the company General Telecom on the 83rd floor [strangely they do not appear on PA tenant list] were trapped in a corner and apparently died in the collapse.29 It is also backed up by a 911 call from room 8331 at 9:04 or 9:40 [time in Sam's notes says 9:4, will check this] reporting that there are thirteen people trapped, one of whom was very sick. [Caller asks what happened and operator doesn't know. EMS advises them that "best thing I can tell you to do is run" and says she will send will message; first operator says she will transfer call to the fire department but loses the caller. Apparently these people communicated with loved ones, or their office.] Reportedly three people from NY Metro Transportation Council on the 82" floor [no contact listed] died; [Emily can probably confirm this] Also, there is a 911 report of people stuck in an elevator on the 82nd floor at 9:03. This could be related and/or the cause of other deaths near that floor. I have also read a news account by Manu Dhingra of Andover Brokerage who told of being burned by a fireball shooting out of an 83rd floor elevator from which he had just exited. He may have information of deaths on these floors.

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Emily can probably confirm this. If not, COO, Bill Callahan.

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Another news story reports an elevator that was stuck near the 78th floor, from which some people managed to escape but others apparently died.30 Reportedly 10 PA workers died at a security command post on the 64th floor. Jim may be able to confirm this. Reportedly 4 people died from First Union Bank on the 47th floor; one who stopped because she was tired and apparently died in the collapse; 3 who escaped but died in the collapse of the south tower. Do these count as deaths below the fire or deaths of bystanders, or are these categories indistinguishable? Emily may be able to confirm this. If not, Semi Selita is PA list contact. Reportedly 11 people from Blue Cross died; 1 who stayed behind with a disabled friend; other theorized to be trapped in elevators or rooms. Emily has more info on this. 1 Blue Cross employee (Ken Summers) was burned by a fireball in the lobby that blast through elevators in the lobby when the plane first hit. I believe he survived, but others apparently died this way. Sam has info on this.

This accounts for at least 45 deaths and provides likely circumstances for many more. Another possibility is that people who might have been to evacuate heeded advice of FDNY dispatch operators or other authorities to stay put and wait for help. (See analysis of possible causes of fatalities below). [INSERT exit instructions to civilians from lobby and state of north tower and effect thereon of south tower collapse]. Problems: 911 overload; lack of information for dispatchers, fire command phone operators, PA announcers; ACE elevator people leaving; THE SOUTH TOWER When Flight 11 hit the north tower, occupants in 2 World Trade Center (the south tower) were unsure what to do. At first, many occupants did not even know what had occurred and some who heard the noise believed an incident had occurred in their building. Soon TV's picked up that the incident was in the other building. Still, many people either decided or were encouraged by fire wardens on their floors to begin evacuating. They did so by means of both the elevators and stairs. The question was further complicated by an 8:55 announcement [confirm this] stating, according to one survivor who believes Newsweek 12/31/01, reports Virginia DiChiara, of Cantor Fitzgerald, and Roy Bell had just transferred into local elevator from 78th floor Sky Lobby when plane hit. Doors stayed open enough for them to escape they got out, but badly burned; saw another CF colleague, Ari Schonburn (who apparently died) got them to a security office where there were 2 guards and about a dozen people; 1 guard couldn't get through on office phone and the other had radio but was paralyzed, crying; only screams could be heard over the radio; a fire warden eventually came and got at least some of them down the stairs; others may have remained and gotten trapped, or been unable to get out of the original elevator. 30

he remembers it word-for-word [BC]: "Your attention please. Building two is secure. There is no need to evacuate building two. If you are in the midst of evacuation, you may use the re-entry doors and the elevators to return to your floor." [others] The message was then repeated in full. As a result [many] people who were in the process of evacuating turned back [approx ten from Euro Brokers on the 84th floor] and some were personally encouraged to go back up stairs, by PA security guards in the lobby [will interview this person on Tuesday who happened to have escaped via stairway A later, though others obviously didn't]. Companies? It will be difficult to obtain all numbers in all companies on who stayed, who left, and why, but I plan to question anyone I talk to in the south tower about this, to give a general sense of who stayed, in what companies, and what their reasoning was. I have read that, in the company Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, on the 88th and 89th floors, pretty much the entire investment banking department left and survived and most all traders stayed and died. I will be speaking [hopefully!] to people from Aon, which occupied most upper floors, from which some people got out but many got trapped above; many were also in the 78th floor sky lobby debating the question when the plane hit [see below]. As to lower floors, I have read that all but 6 of 3700 employees of Morgan Stanley, which occupied space between the forty-third and forty-fourth floors were safely evacuated by the company's chief of security with a bullhorn after the first plane hit; 3 of the 6 who died were security people. [Emily could probably confirm this]. Keep Morgan Stanley evac below. Personal motivations, I have also read many accounts of people who called family members in these crucial fifteen minutes (e.g., in between plane crashes). Beverly Eckert apparently got a message from her husband Sean Rooney, in which a PA announcement could be heard in the background which was ambiguous (Times includes quotes: "it's secure here... but if the conditions warrant on your floor you may wish to start an orderly evacuation") but seemed to prompt him to try to leave; it would obviously be valuable to get this recording if she has it or at least to talk with her about this, but I believe she's a friend of Kristen's so I suppose that's unlikely; maybe she could just confirm at least the info she gave to the Times. The Times also reported that Gregory Milanowycz of Aon called his father later and said he regretted listening to the announcement; he was trapped and died. It would also be useful to have this confirmed. I also have a friend whose husband died at Aon, and he made calls to her and his mother. She said they'd both be happy to talk to us (they're private and haven't done many media stories), but she has a very sick son and is hard and is a bit disorganized and hard to pin down.] [At Euro Brokers, which occupied the entire 84th floor, fire wardens got about two hundred of the two-hundred fifty people who were there out and about ten came back up.] Many people were reportedly in the Sky Lobby on the 78th floor deciding what to do when the plane hit [news accounts list people from Aon and the NYS Dept of Taxation and Finance. I have requested interviews with survivors from both.

when UA 175 hit the [southern] face of the south tower at 9:03, slicing through floors seventy-eight through eighty-four. By this time, reportedly about two-thirds of the people on the upper floors had evacuated (usa) leaving about five to six hundred people at or above the impact floors and about fifteen-hundred below. As with the first plane crash, 911 calls began right away reporting the event. A news interview with Kevin Horan, an OCS security employee reports that the deputy fire safety directors stationed in the lobby of tower two immediately began making urgent and repeated evacuation announcements. [Sam has left a message for an interview with Horan] There is one 911 call at 9:37 from the 97th floor in which the caller says there was "an announcement to go to the stairs". But other than this, I have not heard mention of any PA announcements with advice either way in any of the news accounts I have read. The Euro Broker survivor who I met with does not remember hearing any announcements after the plane hit his building but he was mostly in the stairwell, where Sam says the PA cannot be heard. Most of the interviews I requested are with survivors who would likely have spent their time in the stairwells too. However, an announcement can be heard in the background of a 911 call at 9:19 AM stating the following: This is the fire command station in building two. We are in the lobby. We are holding down here. The conditions seem to have subsided somewhat. Some people in the building have left. If you wish to leave, you may now leave the concourse. You may walk through the concourse on this side [?] of building one. The condition seems to have subsided in the lobby of building two. Some people have left the building. We are here monitoring the situation. The Fire Department has concentrated their efforts on building one. People are leaving..." It is then muffled by the conversation between the caller on the 86th floor and the 911 operator conducting the call. [The best way to get more information on this or other announcements would be from family members or friends who received calls from people up there [of which there are many cited in the Times from KBW, Aon, Fiduciary Trust, though the article does not say that any of these people mentioned announcements specifically, but perhaps the Times did not question them on this. It's like that, if a family member heard or heard tell of a volatile announcement, this would probably have appeared in the article, but they may have information concerning announcements to evacuate, e.g., rather than to stay.] We should first get as much information as we can from the Port Authority on what announcements they claim to have made and when, and then depending on what they say and how important it is to confirm or dispute their accounts, we have think about pursuing family members of victims on upper floors in this tower. Additionally, Sam's 911 notes indicate hearing evacuation / fire alarms in the background of most calls. Are these the same things?] The Times report estimates that approximately three hundred people remained alive at or above the point of impact in the south tower, a much lower number in the north tower because many had evacuated. At least four people were able to descend down Stairway A, the most northwest of the stairwells, three from the eighty-fourth floor and one from the eighty-first floor. One person had just gotten in the elevator when the plane hit the building; the doors did not close and he got out and headed immediately down Stairway A [most likely because of proximity]. A few minutes later, a group of seven employees

from the 84th floor began descending down Stairway A led by a fire warden on their floor [Brian Clark] and met two people on the 81st floor who claimed it was dangerous to continue down because of flames on lower floors; it is guessed that they came from around the 79th floor. While the group debated whether to go up or down, one man heard cries for help coming from the 81st floor. He and another colleague were able to squeeze through the space between the fire escape door frame and the damaged drywall to get onto the floor. As they did so, one man noticed the group, including another fire warden, begin ascending the stairs, with two of his colleagues from the original group assisting the heavy woman in climbing. On their way to find the person calling for help, the second employee, who was using a gym bag as a filtering mask, was overcome by smoke and returned to stairs, which he ascended to as high as the 91st floor in search of air. There [insert his story], (see evacuation below) Before this however his colleague was able to get to a man [whose office the plane crashed into] and assist him in breaking through drywall and helping him over remaining part. They then descended and evacuated (see evacuation below). It is reported to be the only stairwell that survived the crash and, running from top to bottom, and may have been a viable means of evacuation for the approximately three hundred people above. OTHER STAIRWAYS: It is likely given their position that they were damaged at least on the impact floors by the plane crash, as B runs up and down along the core and, while diverts outward, it actually diverts southward in the direction of the crash. Therefore it is likely that they would not have been passable from the 84th floor down. It is possible however that people on other, who could not get to stairway A for any of the reasons mentioned above, but could reach either of these other two staircases, could have begun descending them and then transferred to A near the point of impact. There is no evidence that they might not have been usable at least from some points (see below) however there are no known stories of people who escaped via them except possibly people who transferred to them from Stairway A at much lower points. The four people who evacuated via Stairway A did not do so for any particular reason, e.g., after having found others to be impassable. [I have also heard from a friend that one person made a call to a family member from trapped in Stairway B (the person who she thinks got the call was the victim's twin sister, but unfortunately this father's just died, her mother died shortly before 9/11 and her brother died that day, so maybe not in best state to talk; the victim was from KBW though so maybe other calls from there).] People also survived the crash in the Sky Lobby on the 78th floor and [will interview these] descended presumably down Stairway A. See why they did. The Times reports that approximately three hundred people remained alive at or above the impact floors. Unlike the more concentrated pockets of calls from the north tower, they were scattered among the 80th to 105th floors reporting bad smoke, trouble breathing, groups of people, though appears to be most intense most quickly near impact floors and higher above. Many on floors in between are asking for advice but not necessarily suffering or struggling as much. [Theorized that people did not jump as much or break windows because many fewer people scattered across more floors] Big gap in nineties relatively speaking. However, calls still coming in from 88th floor within fifteen minutes

before the collapse. Although many of these people presumably could have escaped down at least Stairway A if they could have reached it, there were generally told to stay put (in one case put something under the doors to block smoke, advised not to break windows), [see below] Again, the decision that a rooftop evacuation was not feasible was not communicated to the people in the building. There is reportedly evidence that some people who could have descended decided to go up instead motivated by this possibility. [Request to speak to Vinny Camaj, whose father, a window washer, led a group of about 200 people to 105th floor to get on the roof but couldn't because, although they had a key, it needed to be activated as well by a buzzer at a 22n floor command post which was evacuated or destroyed; want to see if his father indicated he spoke to anyone about this decision;] Check for 9:32 911 call asking that roof be opened. There were many calls to family members looking for stairs, talking about going to roof [add examples] The people in BC's group did not appear to be specifically motivated by the idea of a rooftop rescue, e.g., did not say this, but rather that it was dangerous downstairs, but if they knew with no doubt that the possibility was ruled out, they may have tried to play the odds of getting downstairs. [Describe evacuation from early people] By the time the two people began their descend from the 81st floor, they were the only ones on the stairs. During the entire descent, which spanned from about 9:05 to (;40, they did not encounter any emergency personnel on the stairs. Near the impact floors the stairways were in bad shape. While the innermost layer of drywall, e.g., closest core, appeared to have held, the outer two layers (closest to the stairs) had blown onto the stairs, laying flat in some areas like a slide, and in other place, laying on an angle, propped up by the railing so that you would either have to lift it up and remove or crawl underneath to pass. There was also a lot of water on the stairs. Flames were visible through cracks in the wall around the 78th floor but [BC] could see no roaring inferno. By the 74l floor however it was pretty much normal conditions, e.g., fresh air, lights on, maybe a little water. On the 68th floor, they met another fire warden from their company who was actually ascending the stairs. He had been escorting people down the stairs when the plane hit, and now climbed back up in response to communication he heard over the walkie-talkie from another fire warden who was helping people upstairs (the heavy lady) and went up now to assist. [The company was given walkie-talkies in addition to regular evacuation devices] The pair entered the 44' floor Sky Lobby where they found a security guard (South Asian, about 65 or 70) waiting with a younger, severely injured Caucasian man [SP maybe knows how he was injured?] The guard indicated that he did not have a working phone but asked them to call for help. They stopped no thirty-one, a re-entry floor where they found a workable phone and called 911 at approximately 9:35. (see below) They then continued their descent. On the concourse level, they encountered a female security guard (they believe PA, not FF or PD) who directed them through the concourse and told them specific point to evacuate, near the eastern part of Liberty Street (to Victoria's Secret and come out by Sam Goody). In the concourse there was random activity of firefighters, most getting themselves organized, not giving any specific instructions to civilians. As they exited concourse and came out 4

WTC, a firefighter told them, "If you're going to cross Liberty Street, you've got to go for it" (referring to danger of falling debris). [BC] asked if he should look up to determine appropriate time to go but the firefighter said no, they should just go for it. [BC] looked up anyway and they managed to cross safely, [see below for more] By the time [Ron and possibly Knen?] descended There were deaths below the impact floors in the south tower. Reportedly six people from Morgan Stanley died [heard from friend that one was in WOW, whether this counts as one of six or not]. One of them may have been the man reported by [BC] on the 44th floor where MS had space. There was also a 911 call from the 73rd floor at 9:16, the west side of the building, from a person asking for evacuation procedures, said"idiots" have fire alarms but he can't ?; asks for WTC security because FD told him to stay but he didn't think that was a good idea because he heard an explosion and there's smoke, operator doesn't have that number so she calls the FD which confirms that he should stay, that it is worse in the hallways, that he should stay and put towels under the door, but caller says room is filling with smoke and soon oxygen will be gone. Doesn't indicate that there are other people with them. Meanwhile, outside the building, 911 calls continued throughout the morning from people who were witnesses to one or both incidents, [see where farthest point], some just reporting generally, some very specifically (2 calls identifying the first plane as a A A jet, one thinking it was as 747, 1 identifying second plane as UA 737,several opining that the hit looked intentional and describing its flying course, some speculating that it is a terrorist attack. Some calling to correct inaccurate new reports, e.g., reporting that fire, rather than plane, in WTC. Some offer incorrect identifying features such identifying the second plane as a US Air jet, one specifically saying it was not a commercial plane, but more like a large cargo plane, like a B-17 bomber without the propellers and another describing it as a low flying, military dark plane (perhaps this was after our planes started coming). At least one call from the Marriott thinking a bomb went off there (8:50) Also several calls from relatives trying to get information on loved ones inside towers, but operators can't give this to them, told rescue workers are responding and generally refers to news. SURROUNDING AREA Emergency personnel mostly too involved with WTC to worry about surrounding area. In the WFC across the street, after the first plane hit, a person on the 39th floor (south side) in a motorized wheel chair began evacuating and indicated that others were doing so too, down the stairs, though he took the elevator. Another person (22nd floor, north side) remembers an announcement at about 8:50 saying they had made contact with the WTC, everything was fine in their building and no one should leave. When the second plane hit, people started self-evacuating. Many took the stairs, though some (including his group) took the elevators which he indicates were lightly packed. Both people indicated that there was no real direction from emergency personnel on the street (except that

certain areas were cordoned off), some people stopped to watch but people generally seemed to have sense to get north. Several 911 calls from nearby apartment buildings wondering whether to evacuate, and not given any real answers, mostly told to use their judgment. In one call (at 9:04) reports incident at Broadway and Exchange and operator assumes it is WTC and doesn't seem to allow for possibility that it could indeed be another event. Immediately after exiting her apartment at Battery Park city, one resident was directed south by an emergency worker stationed outside her building, where she was then, to her surprise, evacuated on a ferry to Jersey City, along with many other residents from the complex and office workers from surrounding areas, particularly the World Financial Center. [About injured people, ask Laura Handlin] Ferries were still taking noninjured people to JC at 11 AM when BC was directed by bullhorn while walking on South Street, mostly just office people. In an office building on Maiden Lane, tenants were brought first to stairs, perhaps to be evacuated some time in between the 2nd plane hitting and the first collapse but then sends them into the basement. At some point, person presumes it was after the second collapse but before noon, both the FDNY and the NYPD came to the building, giving conflicting advice, one agency, the person believes the FD said they should stay and the other said they should leave. Some left and some stayed, everyone was fine in the end. One office building (17 State St) was evacuated by building announcement after the first collapse by elevator (though interviewee didn't know it was a collapse). COLLAPSES: At the time of the collapse of the South Tower, [put in Ron info here, in building]. According to [BC] streets seemed to be pretty clear of civilians, mostly people trying to get away from the scene, [apparently Steve Mclntyre was paired with an injured woman and was just getting to escalators when the south tower collapsed; everything went black, FF helps people with flashlight and argues with another rescue workers about which way to go] Few emergency personnel but people knew enough to leave scene. [BC] one of last people out of the south tower were already on Rector Street, on the south side of the church where they ran from and sought refuge in 42 Broadway. Though a person evacuated from his nearby office [John Wilcox] right after the collapse said there were emergency personnel directing traffic firmly, directing people away from scene, walked east and north with hundreds of people, people helping each other. [North tower collapse] ANALYSIS The most obvious question in evaluating the emergency response on September 11th is whether the death toll could have been reduced if different decisions, procedures and conditions had prevailed. In analyzing each factor, however, a distinction must be made between the actual impact it had on that day given the circumstances as they played out and its hypothetical wisdom or appropriateness, in order to distinguish factors which were circumstantial beneficial from those which were per se correct. Only the latter

should be used in making recommendations for situations, as the former could actually hurt in situations that were not sufficiently analogous. I'll start with the south tower since that story contained more variables. The circumstance that most obviously contributed to the most preventable deaths in the south tower (and the WTC in general) was the decision of the Port Authority not to evacuate the building after the north tower was hit, and actually to encourage people to stay. It appears that a firm and timely evacuation announcement could have saved the lives of virtually everyone in the south tower. However, even this straightforward conclusion would have to assume that everyone would have heeded the announcement, which was is a not given31 and that all of the approximately 2,000 people had time to get to a place below the impact in the following fifteen minutes. Given that approximately 1,500 were able to evacuate in this time, it is likely that the remaining five to six hundred would have been able to as well assuming they acted with absolute efficiency. Again, however, this accounts for absolute efficiency and quick reaction time32. On the other hand, such an announcement could have put many people from upper floors in the direct line of impact, between the 78th and 84th floors, including those who chose to take the stairs, which many did33. Some of these people might have remained safely above the impact, able to descend at a safer time down a viable passage. Given the large number of people who ended up dying above the impact, it is fair to say that, even if these variables had prevailed, the decision not to issue a prompt evacuation order contributed to a significant increase in the death toll. This is a prime example of a decision that, while wrong in terms of the actual circumstances of the day, was not per se incorrect or unwise. If the second tower had not been struck, an extra 1,500 people from the upper floors, in addition to thousands extra from the lower floors, would have added to congestion in the lobby and on nearby streets, increasingly the likelihood of civilians being killed by falling people or debris. Or worse, a secondary attack could have occurred on the street, killing thousands who would have otherwise remained safely in the tower. Therefore, is should not be looked upon as a decision that should be made with no analysis going forward. Once the plane hit the south tower, the most significant problem was communication. To begin with, relevant authorities, i.e., 911 operators, FDNY and EMS dispatch operators, and lobby commanders, were physically unable to accommodate the volume of calls and unable to give substantive or relevant advice when calls were successfully received. 911 calls were often cut short, or delayed in answering; 911 operators were often unable to transfer callers to relevant authorities. But most importantly, even when appropriate authorities were reached, they unable to give substantive or relevant advice, but instead Middletown America, by Gail Sheehy, includes the account of a police officer who claimed that many people, particularly traders, refused to evacuate during the 1993 bombing until they were threatened with handcuffs. 32 USA today article reports that fifty express elevators from 78* floor, holding up to 55 people each, could reach the ground in 45 seconds. To get to these, occupants of higher floors had to take local elevators to the 78th floor Sky Lobby. 33 Many people were in fact in the Sky Lobby in the process of evacuating when the second plane hit; however, these did not appear to be people who had decided conclusively to attempt to get out. Many were debating the wisdom of the decision. 31

reiterated standard advice, which was mainly for the caller to stay put and wait for emergency personnel. Although it was not the fault of these operators who did not have the skills or information to give better advice, the lack of or conflicting information from these people did or could have cost many lives. In the north tower, the problem was essentially moot because the stairways were impassable from the 92nd floor up, making the advice given to callers from upper floors essentially irrelevant. There could have been better or worse advice about how to survive while awaiting rescue, but it seems to be agreed34 that, even if the building had not fell, most people on the upper floors would not have survived long enough for firefighters to put out the fires and rescue them (e.g., they would likely have died from smoke, fire, or jumping first). It is more relevant to people who called from lower floors who may have been able to evacuate if not told to stay put. This is somewhat of a tricky determination. While it is clear that were viable means of escape from below the fire, it is hard to determine whether callers were actually trapped or just perceived that they were. If they were actually trapped, it might have been better advice for them to remain where they were, as, if the buildings had not collapsed, it is much more likely that firefighters could have reached them. Therefore, unless it could be determined that they could have safely made it to a staircase, this advice seems reasonable, given that no one expected the tower to collapse. Equally, the fact that they were making calls from floors which so many had no problem exiting bolsters the case that theirs were special circumstance. [Finally, it was reported that 83 elevator mechanics, who might have helped get some of them out before the building collapsed, evacuated after the second plane hit. This might have gotten some people out but turned out to be a wise decision and at the time was surely based on unsafe conditions. To analyze it crudely, they probably would not have saved more than eightythree lives, like the firefighters who did continue to ascend and more died than people they might have saved below the fire.] Where the lack of information was most relevant was concerning people on the upper floors of the south tower, many of whom could have likely escaped down stairway A if they had the information to do so. That they did not involved several possible failures. The most notable is that the [4] survivors were not about their escape routes, even though they descended at later points where the lobby was less crowded and their tattered appearance showed that they had come from affected floors. In their defense, [BC] says he only encountered a couple of emergency personnel, but the more crucial point is that there should have been several people stationed at the bottom of each stairwell specifically for this purpose, this would have been the best use of people. Once this information was determined, it could have been passed to the people at the command center and transmitted over the Public Announcement system, as well as individually to anyone who called down. Optimally, it could have been communicated to dispatch operators as well, in case the PA system was not working, or individuals were unable to hear it. Again, rescue workers may have believed that they could have reached people on upper floors, but it is again unlikely. Most would probably agree that evacuation was their best hope of survival. Some might not have been able to get there. 34

Confirm from FDNY.

Several callers indicated that it would be hard to get to the stairs, one call from John (Jack) Andreacchio from Fuji Bank at 9:18 on the 80th floor says the stairwells are blocked and the hallways are very hot and hard to breathe, (86th floor pitch black, Jeremiah Ahern at 9:19 from the NYS Dept of Taxation and Finance, so might have made it hard); George Bishop from Aon on 1051 floor says his group can't go any lower because the floors are hot at 9:34; 9:36 call from a woman whose husband can't get out from the 103rd floor (not clear whether because actually trapped or struggling and doesn't know how to). On the other hand, at least several people asked specifically about stairway escape and were directed to not to try this. One caller on the 88th floor at 9:[15?] told to block doors, stay low, basically SOP, don't break windows because probably just as much smoke out there, caller at first agrees that there is more smoke outside office in stairwell but then specifically asks to be connected to someone who knows where the stairwells are, he does not know where more than one is, and specifically told by FD dispatch not to go to the stairwells because it is worse there, caller says doesn't know where more than one stairwell is and FD person can't help with this, tells person about planes and tells to put on AM radio; a caller at 9:17 says stairway C is locked on floor 78 (though caller is apparently from 82nd floor originally, how did he get down?), he wants the door opened and is told by FD to get back in his office; another caller at 9:26 in NW corner of 88l floor (nearest to functioning stairway, A), when asks if should go up or down, is told to "stay where you're at. You don't want to be wandering around that building", asks how long it take for help to come and FD cannot say. Call at 9:17 on 84th floor with bad conditions disconnected. At least the people who didn't specifically feel they could not reach the floors or leave there are could likely have gotten out okay via stairway A, especially on these floors, 88 and 78. They seemed to be in ok physical condition to do so. Having the information that an actual stairway was working might have given people who perceived the situation to be hopeless a goal. But having a goal might have motivated them and sent them on a particular mission rather than a wild goose chase. [ To determine whether it would have in fact provided an escape route for everyone over the fire, it must be determined not only whether it was passable from top to bottom, e.g., conditions in the stairs were conducive to people getting down them, but also whether it was accessible from floors on which people were trapped, e.g., did locks, debris or damage prevent them from actually getting to it. As to the first question, we know that the staircase was passable at least from ninety-one down because one person descended from this point. As to above [insert RD]. Accessibility is a trickier inquiry. We know that it was accessible from at least one area on the 84th floor, because [BC and his group] and [RD] got into it. We know that the two people they met accessed it from some point below, either the 79' or 80* floors. We know that eventually it was accessible from the 81st floor, because [BC] was able to squeeze through the door frame to rescue [SP] and they, along with [RD] who went up for air were able regain entry into it. However [structure]. And on floors where there was entry, the doors could have been locked, there could have been damage to the doorframe (much like the 81st floor door). It would seem likely that most of that type of damage would occur at or nearer to the floors of impact. However, in some sense fortunately on those floors, the staircase diverted out from the core, bringing it northward away from the crash site to divert heavy machinery which had

the added benefit of perhaps shielding it from the impact [see diagram]. Therefore, the stairs had additional protection in terms of their location and perhaps shelter on the floors that counted most. Above the 82nd floor stairway ran back along the core, however, by this floor, the actual damage from the crash should have been negligible compared to that of lower floors. Therefore, it is likely that the actual stairway was passable all the way to the top and that the doorframes accessing it were still in tact and passable too, undisturbed by the actual crash. This is still not conclusive evidence that everyone above this point could have used it to escape if there were no structural barriers to entering this staircase, people on floors even where others actually entered, like the eighty-fourth floor, could have been prevented by fire from reaching the point of entry. Also, they may have been disoriented by smoke etc to have gotten out. There is also the question of the other stairways.] The second piece of crucial information that could have saved lives was the fact that a rooftop evacuation had been ruled out. [edit: As we saw, groups of people went to the roof in hopes of rescue, and other headed up. Even those not specifically motivated by this possibility would likely not have walked up if they knew in no uncertain terms that there would be no rescue from above. Because it turned out there was a way down (discussed later), they would have succeeded in getting out. Some might have simply remained and even gone up in search of clearer air [like RD], feeling it unsafe to descend, and hope to be rescued by emergency personnel which might have been a possibility if the building had not collapsed. But it is not unreasonable to conclude that, if it was a choice between descending, even if conditions looked bad, and being trapped, many would have tried harder to find a way down and taken their chances with it. At the very least they should have had this information to factor into their decision-making process. There was absolutely no downside to alerting people to this. The decision was made soon after the event [find out time for south tower] and the PA system appeared to be working. Even if it made people go down and they died as a result of this, they were going to die anyway.] The failure to circulate this life-saving information, or the general lack of coordination, centralization and dissemination of information, is a per se problem and cannot be fixed by establishing hard and fast rules or standard procedures but rather allowing for a flexible and dynamic emergency response based on the best and most up-to-date information. The way best seems to be from one physical location, like OEM, in a safe location. In an emergency, a sufficient number of FDNY, PD, and EMS with requisite skills to receive and advise should physically go there, from where they would receive information about conditions, obtained by civilians etc from people at the site. All 911 calls should be directed there and there should be back up 911 operators to accommodate calls. However, people should be encouraged not to call 911. Instead, information from this dispatch should be conveyed to authorities directing the evacuation, in this case, people at command center, so that they can make announcements at the site (or answer calls). Callers would be told to listen to this advice and not to call 911 if they could hear it, unless to report a specific situation, e.g., not for general evacuation advice, or to convey crucial information, e.g., that a particularly stairway is open that is not commonly known. In order for civilians to comply with this, they would have to trust the people

making announcement, which they would if they knew the information they were getting was the most tk and up to date.

OTHER TOPICS: 1) Changes since 1993: individual companies procedures, devices, and deaths by floors etc.