Ny B5 Wtc Safety Officials Fdr- Entire Contents- Mfrs 752

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Re: North Tower deputy fire safety director Type of event: Interview / Corrrespondence Date: May21 -May24 Special access: None Prepared by: Madeleine Blot Team: 8b Location: By email Participants - Non Commission: Alan Reiss, former Director of Port Authority World Trade Department Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

After the Commission's Eleventh public hearing on May 18-19, Alan Reiss called staffs attention to several news interviews with the deputy fire safety director on-duty in the North Tower on Sept 11 (DFSD 1), whom staff had previously been unable to contact. By this point, DFSD 1 had agreed to speak with Commission staff about his participation in the activation of the repeater system at the North Tower fire command desk. Staff was also interested in a reference made by DFSD 1 in the interview to having "fielded calls" from the upper floors of the North Tower. DFSD's statement suggested that he received calls via the floor warden phones, which staff previously believed were not functioning after the building was hit. Mr. Reiss interpreted DFSD 1's statement in the same way, but pointed out that it was also possible to contact the FCS by landline. Additionally, staff was aware that calls were received at Port Authority police desk in 5 WTC. Staff asked Mr. Reiss, who was at the police desk, whether DFSD 1 might have been answering calls from this location. Mr. Reiss did not recall seeing DFSD 1 at the police desk at any point. Mr. Reiss followed up with Michael Hurley, the former fire safety director for the complex, who had reported to the North Tower fire command desk on the morning of September 11. Mr. Hurley confirmed that calls had in fact been received over the floor warden phones that morning. Mr. Reiss also relayed to staff that, in addition to a sound alarm, a red LED notification was triggered on the panel behind the fire command desk when the handset of a floor warden phone was lifted from its base.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED Staff will explore the issue of floor warden phone calls in interviews with both Mr. Thompson (May 25, 2004) and Mr. Hurley (June 2, 2004).

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Re: South Tower Deputy Fire Safety Director X Type of event: Interview / Correspondence Date: June 14, 2004 Special access: None Prepared by: Madeleine Blot Team: 8b Location: N/A Participants - Non Commission: N/A Participants - Commission staff: N/A

DFSD X was one of nine deputy fire safety directors (DFSDs) on duty at the WTC on the morning of September 11, 2001. Although DFSD X is not reported to have been the DFSD on-duty in the South Tower that morning, he was in South Tower lobby for at least some time between 8:46 (when the North Tower was struck) and 9:03 a.m. (when the South Tower was struck). Staff learned of DFSD X—reportedly one of 3 DFSD's, out of 9, to have survived the attacks—from an interview which he did with Newsday, dated March 3, 2002. DFSD X also spoke with media immediately after the attacks. DFSD X is one of the only people still living to have been in the South Tower lobby during the crucial time period between the strike of the two planes. Staff began attempting to contact DFSD X in February. Staff left at least one message on his home answering machine after obtaining his number through a standard search of the phone book. He did not return the message and staff member Sam Caspersen repeatedly attempted to reach him by phone, but each time Mr. Caspersen got an answering machine. Further measures may have been taken by other staff members to reach DFSD X. After the Commission's Eleventh public hearing on May 18-19 in New York, Newsday was able to reach and conduct an interview with one of the other three living DFSDs who was at the WTC on September 11. Staff had previously attempted to reach

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED this DFSD as well but was unable to do so. This DFSD was not in the South Tower lobby but was also aware of information crucial to staffs investigation. Following this, on Thursday, June 3, staff member Madeleine Blot left a message for DFSD X. DFSD X returned the call within fifteen minutes and left a cooperative message indicating that he could be reached at any time. He was reached soon thereafter and agreed to meet with Madeleine Blot to discuss the events of the day. He explained that he had not discussed his experience that day since shortly after it occurred but was mindful of the importance of the Commission's work and would cooperate to provide whatever information he had. However, he did not want to speak with too many people and stated that he was selective about what groups he shared information with. DFSD X agreed to meet with the following Sunday, June 6 at Commission offices at 26 Federal Plaza. Later that night, DFSD X called staff member Madeleine Blot to ask if she happened to live in his home town; if so, he wondered if they could meet there instead of in Manhattan. Madeleine Blot did not live in DFSD X's hometown, but offered to meet him in a more convenient or less intimidating setting than Commission offices if he preferred. DFSD was reluctant to inconvenience anyone and confirmed that he would be able to meet at 26 Federal Plaza. Even at this point, it was clear to Madeleine Blot that DFSD X was still suffering from tremendous guilt and trauma as a result of his experience on Sept 11th. For this reason, and because of his stated request for confidentiality, staff determined to keep the ., meeting as low-key as possible, only notifying necessary parties, until DFSD X had a chance to speak with them. However, DFSD X did not show up for the scheduled appointment on June 6. He did he call to cancel in advance. Staff was not surprised at this outcome, given| (tenuous state, and its experiences similar outcomes in analogous situations. Staff has found that many people are unable to relive the experience they endured on September 11, especially those who suffer from guilt stemming from either their own perception that they did not do enough to help that day (this is more the case with people who were in responsible positions) or simply from the fact they survived while others did not. Shortly after the time the meeting was supposed to have taken place, staff reached DFSD X at his home. He was perceptibly rattled and very apologetic. He told staff that he had stopped by the WTC on his way to the offices "to say a prayer" and was unable to proceed from there. He asked if he could come in the following Thursday, his day off, to meet with staff. He stated that he would be able to do it if he came up the east side. Staff offered again to meet him in a different location, including his home town. It was left that he would call back on Wednesday, to let staff know if he was up to meeting. He never called again. Staff member Madeleine Blot left a message for him the following week. MB believes that he would go through with the interview if pushed. However, given his state of mind, MB is hesitant to push him to talk about the events without proper backing. Furthermore, MB does not believe that his recollections would be reliable.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Re: Security Guard Duties (vs. fire safety staff) Type of event: Interview / Correspondence Date: July 8, 2004 Special access: None Prepared by: Madeleine Blot Team: 8b Location: By email Participants - Non Commission: Michael Hurley, former Port Authority fire safety director of WTC Participants - Commission staff: Madeleine Blot

As opposed to DFSD's who were stationed at the FCS's and had a fire safety responsibility, WTC security guards handled functions such as access control, checking of ID's. They were not generally involved with fire-related issues, except to the extent that they might be asked to secure an area during an emergency or administering crowd control. Some WTC tenant-companies, generally the larger ones, also employed their own security guards. Mr. Hurley has heard that some of these private security guards were advising tenants in the stairways and/or sky lobbies on September 11. Additionally (as known), WTC security guards were not Port Authority employees, but were employees of an outside company (Summit Security) which was originally contracted to the Port Authority and, as of Sept 11, to SPI.