Ny B5 Civilians- Extra Notes Fdr- 2-19-04 Summary- Gershon Wtc Evacuation Study 746

The WTC Evacuation Study Dr. Robyn Gershon Principal Investigator 212-305-1186

February 19, 2004

Qualitative Data Findings: More than 100 hours of transcribed interview and focus group tapes were analyzed to assess the factors associated with the evacuation of workers from the WTC Towers 1 and 2 on 9/11/2001. A summary of findings are as follows: Individual Factors: 1. Evacuation time and failure to evacuate appears to be associated with disabilities. Individuals with health problems (e.g., obesity, asthma) and/or ? poor physical condition were similarly disadvantaged. , . ^ A^a 2. The evacuation pace in stairwells was affected by disabled individuals. Vr' 3. Inappropriate/inadequate footwear and clothing reportedly increased time T7 to evacuate and even led to fatalities. ,.A f^1"^ 4. Delaying evacuation to collect personaJJtemsandA3f-cQmplete workrelated tasksjjppearstphaye length^ed_eyacuation time> , , 5. Remaining "calm and focused throughout the evacuation process ' •"*' facilitated evacuation at both the group and individual levels. 6. Direct exposure (i.e., felt building shake, saw impact and/or fire) to the - x ^, ^ impact provided cues regarding the magnitude of the disaster and seems ft & to have prompted decisions to evacuate. ^ 7. Prior experience with building fires and other emergencies, including the oc 1993 WTC bombing, prompted rapid decision-making. ^ 8. Lack of knowledge regarding the magnitude of destruction helped to mipjmizejjanic. . Groupleaders who emerged were often individuals with prior experience ir){u" /} in emergency situations (e.g., EMS, military background). / r^ Xj^v Y 10. Lack of familiarity with the building layout apparently led to delays in the a vUV -p \; AC Nr o 'gjh 1. Lack of information and-direction delayed the initiation of employees' evacuation process. 0^ 12. Employees were unaware of the length of time it would take to navigate the stairs and evacuate the building. 13. Some employees in WTC 2 hesitated leaving immediately after the first place struck out of concern over negative employment repercussions. Organizational Factors: 1. Prior emergency training was generally cursory and almost exclusively provided by the Port Authority of NY/NJ. Training by their employer was „. rarely provided. r=5 =r V? y /'\. Fire drills were limited in scope; entry into stairwells rarely occurred. J" \jL° 3. Knowledge of all 3 stairwell locations was limited, with even the most v ^^/^ seasoned-employees unaware or airstairwell locations. (y 4. Employees were not provided with orientation to the entire building, including the location of all exit points leading out of the building. 5. Employees were not instructed on the safety features of elevators.

The WTC Evacuation Study Dr. Robyn Gershon Principal Investigator 212-305-1186

February 1 9, 2004

6. Some employees hesitated evacuating immediately as they were unsure of employer policy regarding their leave-taking. Y. When senior management recommended rapid evacuation, employees rapidly responded. 8. The presence of uniformed services, especially on the mezzanine and plaza levels, was reassuring. 9. Once outside, there was confusion on how regarding how best to vacate the immediate area. /\. Information on egres^jaccessibility (or inaccessibility i.e., roof doors were |<ept locked) was not communicated to employees. 1 1 .Communication in elevators was severely limited (e.g., pre-recorded messages only). ""' —- ' \~r\^$ 12. Only limited direction was given once on the concourse (mall) level. 13. Service employees reported lack of knowledge of safety procedures and had little or no experience with fire drills. 14. Building visitors (e.g., meeting attendees) were at a disadvantage at all stages of the evacuation and were reliant upon their hosts' for direction. 15. Subway entry and exit points were poorly controlled, with reports of severe crowding on platforms. A general lack of communication throughout the stations was reported.

Structural Factors: 1. Smoke and congestion in stairwells resulted in backtracking up stairs to higher floors in search of other passable stairwells. 2. Debris from WTC 2 (South Tower) as it collapsed backed upjp^er level niWJQJJj^£^h Tower), making exit impossible and a fataities, i\A\. Stairwells at the lower floors (<20th floor) were smo 4. For security reasons, many stairwell doors exiting onto floors were kept locked, thus making stairwell g^'tH-iing fjjffjriiit 5. Debris, water, smoke, and collapsed structured on lower levels impeded street access. 6. Some cell phones and wireless devices remained operational, leading to information sharing and, to a certain extent, spreading of rumors.