Miami, Florida May 2009
Paul A. Leonovich Associate Director Banking & Financial Services
United States Department of the Treasury Office of Technical Assistance
OTA MISSION
Strengthen public financial management and financial institutions in developing and transition countries
The International Financial Crisis Country Impacts and Appropriate Policy Responses to Systemic Banking Crises
The Perfect Storm World Financial Crisis & Global Economic Recession
The International Financial Crisis First Order Effects Freezing up of credit on the international capital markets and within domestic banking systems; Burgeoning default rates on loans; Difficulty in rolling over domestic and external debt; Widening fiscal deficits; Emerging widespread bank failures; and Devaluating currencies.
The International Financial Crisis Regions Impacted Western Europe Asia United States Emerging Europe Latin America and the Caribbean Southeast Asia Greater Middle East
The Global Economic Recession Second Order Effects Enterprise failures; Rising unemployment; Falling levels of GDP/Economic contraction; and Pervasive economic hardship.
The Global Economic Recession Regions Impacted All
The International Financial Crisis
What has brought us to this point?
The International Financial Crisis
Failures in risk management
The International Financial Crisis Three Catalysts Excessive levels of investment capital Elevated investor expectations Sustained global economic growth
The International Financial Crisis The Liquidity Driver Altered traditional bank funding streams Unmanageable currency mismatches Deterioration of lending practices
The International Financial Crisis The Asset Price Driver Healthy (i.e. excessive) performance Elevated housing prices in multiple markets Lack of appreciation for cyclicality of the sector Overexposure by lenders Fundamentally different from previous downturns
The International Financial Crisis Balance Sheet Driver Excessive leveraging Increasingly crowded environment Assets moved off balance sheet (complex new instruments: CDOs, CDSs) Inadequate regulatory capital provision Segregation of incentives Reputational risk aspect underestimated
The International Financial Crisis Growth Driver Rapid asset expansion Higher risk profile of lending in numerous markets Insufficient institutional capacity
The International Financial Crisis
The Result
The International Financial Crisis Vicious Downward Spiral Asset price deflation Locking up of credit markets (both consumer and commercial) Crisis of confidence, especially between banks
The International Financial Crisis
Where do we go from here?
Road Forward Improved Application of Regulatory Standards Renewed focus on the Basel Core Principles Efforts to Strengthen risk-based supervision Adherence to Safety & Soundness principles Proper assignation of risk Cyclical alignment of capital adequacy standards Use of prompt corrective actions Holistic supervisory approach Use of statistical early warning systems
Road Forward Problem Bank Resolution Approaches Established best practices Early intervention Market-based approaches optimal Replace bank management Recapitalization by government only after full diagnostic of bank viability established Carve out bad (“toxic”) assets if market is viewed to be unrecoverable in near-medium term
Road Forward Problem Bank Resolution Approaches Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) Good Bank/Bad Bank solutions Bridge Banks Purchase & Assumption Transactions (P&As) Problem Bank Units (PBUs)
Road Forward Role of Central Banks Easing of monetary policy Exchange rate challenges Avoiding deflation Need for sound end game strategy Even once the recovery takes hold, it will be hard to detect the improvement
Road Forward Role of Governments Fiscal stimuli Social safety net provision Need for exit strategy
Thank You
Paul A. Leonovich Associate Director for Banking & Financial Services United States Department of the Treasury International Affairs - Office of Technical Assistance 740 15th Street, N.W., 4th Floor Washington, D.C. 20005 Email:
[email protected]