Civil Procedure Motion.docx

XIII.

Motions (Rule 15)

RULE 15 MOTIONS

Section 1. Motion defined. A motion is an application for relief other than by a pleading. Sec. 2. Motions must be in writing. All motions shall be in writing except those made in open court or in the course of a hearing or trial. Sec. 3. Contents. A motion shall state the relief sought to be obtained and the grounds upon which it is based, and if required by these Rules or necessary to prove facts alleged therein, shall be accompanied by supporting affidavits and other papers. Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. Sec. 6. Proof of service necessary. No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof. Sec. 7. Motion day. Except for motions requiring immediate action, all motions shall be scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the afternoon of the next working day. Sec. 8. Omnibus motion. Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived. Sec. 9. Motion for leave. A motion for leave to file a pleading or motion shall be accompanied by the pleading or motion sought to be admitted. Sec. 10. Form. The Rules applicable to pleadings shall apply to written motions so far as concerns caption, designation, signature, and other matters of form. RULE 49 ORAL ARGUMENT Sec. 3. No hearing or oral argument for motions.chanrobles virtual law library Motions shall not be set for hearing and, unless the court otherwise directs, no hearing or oral argument shall be allowed in support thereof. The adverse party may file objections to the motion within five (5) days from service, upon the expiration of which such motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution.chanrobles

RULE 56-A ORIGINAL CASES

Sec. 2. Rules applicable. The procedure in original cases for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution, laws, and Rules 46, 48, 49, 51, 52 and this Rule, subject to the following provisions: a) All references in said Rules to the Court of Appeals shall be understood to also apply to the Supreme Court; b) The portions of ssaid Rules dealing strictly with and specifically intended for appealed cases in the Court of Appeals shall not be applicable; and c) Eighteen (18) clearly legible copies of the petition shall be filed, together with proof of service on all adverse parties. The proceedings for disciplinary action against members of the judiciary shall be governed by the laws and Rules prescribed therefor, and those against attorneys by Rule 139-B, as amended.

1. Republic v. Peralta, G.R. No. 150327, June 18, 2003 COMPLAINT: Complaint for Recovery and Ownership of Real Property in the RTC of Davao. PLAINTIFF: Peralta DEFENDANT: Republic (OSG) DEFECT OF MR: No Notice of Hearing given to Peralta SC RULING: The OSG’s negligence is fatal FACTS: 1.

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Peralta et al are the heirs of one Benedicto Alonday. a. Alonday was granted a Homestead Patent by the DENR over a lot in Davao. Title was thereafter issued in his name. b. In 1969, Bureau of Forest Development sought permission to use a portion of said property. Instead, BFD constructed a building on it. c. Benedicto’s lawyer demanded for the BFD to vacate. Failing this, Peralta filed a Complaint for Recovery and Ownership of Real Property in the RTC of Davao. a. RTC ruled in favor of Peralta and orded the Republic to vacate the property and remove all improvements thereon. Days before the expiration of the period to appeal, on May 30, 1997, Republic filed through registered mail a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC decison. a. However, the RTC expunged the MR on the ground that it failed to incorporate any notice of hearing as required by the Rules. b. From this decisión, Republic filed a Notice of Appeal. c. In opposition, Peralta et al filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the MR was a mere scrap of paper and thus did not toll the running of the reglementary period. Pending all this, the RTC judge retired. a. The new judge issued an order giving due course to Republic’s Appeal but was again reversed in light of jurisprudence brought to its attention. b. Peralta et al then moved for the execution which was granted. Republic filed an MR assailing the dismissal of it Appeal as well as the granting of the Writ of Execution. c. MR denied. On certiorari in the CA, Republic’s petition was again dismissed. a. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE: The Court agrees with the CA that the OSG was negligent when it filed on May 30, 1997 the defective motion for reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party. Such written notice is that prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 4, paragraph 2 of said rule, a notice of hearing on a motion shall be served by the movant to all the parties concerned at least 3 days before the date of hearing. Section 5 of the same rule requires that the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the hearing of the motion. The requirements, far from being merely technical and procedural as claimed by the petitioners, are vital elements of procedural due process. Since the Rules of Court do not fix any period within which the said party may file his reply or opposition, the trial court would have no way of determining whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion and, if he objects, to hear him on his objection. Hence, the need for the movant to set the time and place of hearing of its motion. The requirements entombed in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and noncompliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma—a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon. In cases of motions for a new trial or for the

reconsideration of a judgment, the running of the period for appeal is not tolled by the mere filing or pendency of said motion. In this case, the petitioners, through the OSG, received on May 20, 1997 the decision of the RTC; hence, they had until June 4, 1997 within which to file their motion for reconsideration or for a new trial or to perfect their appeal from said adverse decision. Although the petitioners filed the motion for reconsideration dated May 30, 1997 within the reglementary period , said motion failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The records show that there is no proof that Peralta et al were actually served with a copy of said motion, as required by Section 10, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. The OSG did not bother to file an amended motion for reconsideration containing the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

GIST: OSG filed its MR but without any notice of hearing to the adverse party. The negligence is fatal. It renders the motion pro forma.

2. Preysler v. Manila Southcoast, G.R. No. 171872, June 28, 2010 COMPLAINT: Forcible Entry in MTC Nasugbu PLAINTIFF: Preysler DEFENDANT: MS ALLEGED DEFECT: Preysler failed to properly observe the 3 Day Notice Rule SC RULING: Substantial compliance suffices because no prejudice was caused to the adverse party FACTS: 1. Preysler Jr. filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against MS. a. It alleged that Preysler’s property in Nasugbu covered by TCT overlapped with MS’ TCT. b. MTC ruled in favor of Preysler and ordered MS to vacate. c. On appeal, RTC reversed and dismissed Preysler’s Complaint. 2. Preysler received the RTC Decision on Feb 9, 2004 and then filed an MR which was set for hearing on Feb 26, 2004. a. Preysler sent a copy of the MR to MS through registered mail on Feb. 23, 2004. b. However, it was only on March 3, 2004, or 6 days after the scheduled hearing that MS received a copy of the MR. 3. During the scheduled hearing, the judge reset the hearing to April 2. Thereafter, it was again rescheduled to April 7. Finally, said hearing was reset to August 6. a. After the hearing, MS filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the 3-Day Notice Rule was not complied with and thus did not stop the running of the period thereby causing the RTC Decision to become final and executory. b. RTC declared that the decision had become final and executory because Preysler’s MR was fatally flawed. c. CA likewise dismissed the petition for certiorari and stated the the 3-Day Notice Rule was mandatory. DOCTRINE: The 3-Day Notice Rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro , the Court held that there was substantial compliance of the rule on notice of motions even if the first notice was irregular because no prejudice was caused the adverse party since the motion was not considered and resolved until after several postponements of which the parties were duly notified. Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, the Court held that despite the lack of notice of hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process where the adverse party actually had the opportunity to be heard and had filed pleadings in opposition to the motion. The Court held: As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the

motion before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard. The TEST is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. In this case, the CA ruled that Preysler failed to comply with the three-day notice rule. However, the CA overlooked the fact that although MS received Preysler’s MR six days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, the said hearing was reset three (3) times with due notice to the parties. Thus, it was only on 6 August 2004, or more than 5 months after MS received a copy of Preysler’s Motion for Reconsideration, that the motion was heard by the RTC. Clearly, MS had more than sufficient time to oppose Preysler’s Motion for Reconsideration. In fact, respondent did oppose the motion when it filed its Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August 2004. In view of the circumstances of this case, we find that there was substantial compliance with procedural due process. Instead of dismissing petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration based merely on the alleged procedural lapses, the RTC should have resolved the motion based on the merits. OMNIBUS MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED Furthermore, the RTC likewise erred in dismissing petitioner’s Omnibus Motion for allegedly failing to comply with the 3-day notice requirement. The RTC found that the notice of hearing of petitioner’s Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12 November 2004 was received by respondent on 9 November 2004. The RTC held that the service of the notice of hearing was one day short of the prescribed minimum three days notice. We disagree. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that “[e]very written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.” Thus, the date of the hearing should be at least three days after receipt of the notice of hearing by the other parties. In this case, the petitioner’s Omnibus Motion was set for hearing on 12 November 2004. Thus, to comply with the notice requirement, respondent should have received the notice of the hearing at least three days before 12 November 2004, which is 9 November 2004. Clearly, respondent’s receipt on 9 November 2004 (Tuesday) of the notice of hearing of the Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12 November 2004 (Friday), was within the required minimum three-days’ notice. As explained by Retired Justice Jose Y. Feria in his book, Civil Procedure Annotated, when the notice of hearing should be given: The ordinary motion day is Friday. Hence, the notice should be SERVED BY TUESDAY at the latest, in order that the requirement of the three days may be complied with. If notice be given by ordinary mail, it should be actually received by Tuesday, or if not claimed from the post office, the date of the first notice of the postmaster should be at least (5) days before Tuesday. GIST: MR was filed by Preysler. Preysler sent a notice of hearing to MS through registered mail. However, MS received the copy 6 days after the scheduled hearing. Substantial Compliance is allowed because no prejudice was caused to the adverse party. Omnibus Motion: 1 day late according to RTC. SC said it was still within the 3 day period

3.

Bacelonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143440, February 11,

COMPLAINT: Damages (Tort) PLAINTIFF: Bolos DEFENDANT: Bacelonia, Roxas-Cu and Carino DEFECT: MR was filed beyond the period (10 days) SC RULING: the period is mandatory. The failure to comply renders the MR as pro forma FACTS: 1.

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Jemelee Bolos, a student of St. Bridget, died in a vehicular accident involving her School Service Vehicle and an Isuzu Truck. a. Initially, the owners of the School Service Vehicle (Bacelonia) sued the owner (Roxas-Cu) and driver (Carino) of the Isuzu Truck for damages. b. However, the case was dismissed after the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement. Subsequently, the parents of Jemelee Bolos filed a Complaint for Damages against Bacelonias, RoxasCu, and Carino. a. As a result, Bacelonia filed a Motion to be Dropped as Defendants on the ground of the Compromise Agreement entered into by the co-defendants previously wherein it was alleged that Roxas-Cu admitted sole responsibility. b. Roxas-Cu opposed and denied having admitted anything and that res judicata does not apply in the present case. RTC denied the Bacelonia’s Motion to be Dropped and scheduled the reception of evidence of the defense on Feb. 3, 2000. a. As such, on Jan 31, 2000, Bacelonias filed an MR and set the hearing on Feb. 15, 2000. b. On the same day, they also filed another motion to Cancel the Hearing for Presentation of Evidence on Feb 3. Sps Bolos opposed both motions. During the hearing on Feb 3, RTC denied the MR. On certiorari, CA dismissed Bacelonia’s petition. a. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE: The CA correctly dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 57455 for the reason that the RTC did not abuse its discretion in denying the Bacelonia’s MR on February 3, 2000. It should be noted that the MR of the RTC’s resolution on January 10, 2000 was filed by Bacelonia on January 31, 2000. The date and time of hearing thereof was set by the petitioners on February 15, 2000 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. In this connection, Rule 15, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court on motions provides: Section 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must NOT BE LATER than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. It is clear then that the scheduled hearing of the said MR was BEYOND THE PERIOD specified by the Revised Rules of Court which was not later than 10 days after the filing of the motion, or no later than February 10, 2000. Significantly, the above provision of Rule 15, Section 5 uses the mandatory term “must” in fixing the period within which the motion shall be scheduled for hearing. A motion that fails to religiously comply with the mandatory provision of Rule 15, Section 5 is pro forma and presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court.

XIV.

MOTION TO DISMISS (RULE 16)

RULE 16 MOTION TO DISMISS

Section 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: (a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party; (b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim; (c) That venue is improperly laid; (d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; (e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; (f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; (h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; (i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and (j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. Sec. 2. Hearing of motion. At the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their arguments on the questions of law and their evidence on the questions of fact involved except those not available at that time. Should the case go to trial, the evidence presented during the hearing shall automatically be part of the evidence of the party presenting the same. Sec. 3. Resolution of motion. After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading. The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable. In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. Sec. 4. Time to plead. If the motion is denied, the movant shall file his answer within the balance of the period prescribed by Rule 11 to which he was entitled at the time of serving his motion, but not less than five (5) days in any event, computed from his receipt of the notice of the denial. If the pleading is ordered to be amended, he shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11 counted from service of the amended pleading, unless the court provides a longer period. Sec. 5. Effect of dismissal. Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based on paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim. Sec. 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. The dismissal of the complaint under this section shall be without prejudice to the prosecution in the same or separate action of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer.

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence.

RULE 33 DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. RULE 15 MOTIONS

Sec. 8. Omnibus motion. Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived. RULE 9 EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

1. Heirs of Loreto Maramag v. Eva Maramag etal, G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009 COMPLAINT: for revocation and/or reduction of insurance proceeds PLAINTIFFS: Heirs (Legitimate) DEFENDANTS: Eva Maramag (Illegitimate) GROUND OF MTD: (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; SC: MTD is granted FACTS: 1.

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The Legitimate Heirs of Loreto seek the reduction and revocation of insurance proceeds of the lllegitimate Heirs. a. They claim that Eva De Guzman was a concubine of Loreto and is suspected of having killed the latter and thus disqualified to receive proceeds from Loreto’s insurance policies with Insural Life and Grepalife. b. Moreover, it is claimed the illegitimate children of Loreto are entitled to only ½ of the legitime of the legitimate children. In their Answer, Insular and Grepalife averred that since Eva was disqualified as beneficiary, the Insurance proceeds should go to the illegitimate children. a. A Motion to Dismiss was likewise incorporated alleging that the Complaint failed to state a cause of action considering that the Insurance Code provides that once a beneficiary has been revoked and disqualified, the proceeds must go to the remaining beneficiaries (illegimate children).

DOCTRINE: The grant of the motion to dismiss was based on the trial court’s finding that the petition failed to state a cause of action, as provided in Rule 16, Section 1(g), of the Rules of Court, which reads — SECTION 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action. A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the 3 elements of a cause of action: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right. If any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground, the ruling thereon should be based only on the FACTS ALLEGED in the complaint. The court must resolve the issue on the strength of such allegations, assuming them to be true. The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. This is the general rule. However, this rule is SUBJECT TO WELL-RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS, such that there is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of the allegations if: (1) the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice; (2) such allegations are legally impossible; (3) the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;

(4) by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or (5) there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties or in the course of the hearings related to the case. In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners’ claim is that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the insurance policies, and that Eva’s children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of the policies. They also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the Insurance Code, Eva’s share in the proceeds should be forfeited in their favor, the former having brought about the death of Loreto. Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of the shares of Loreto’s illegitimate children should be awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes. It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer. Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured. GIST: MTD is granted for lack of COA. There is no COA because the plaintiffs/petitioners were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance.

2. Rebecca Pacana v. Rovila Water COMPLAINT: PLAINTIFFS: DEFENDANTS: GROUND OF MTD: (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; SC: MTD is granted FACTS 1. PLAINTIFF (2): Petitioners Rebecca and Rosalie Pacaña are children of SPS. Pacaña DEFENDANT (5): They filed the present case against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and Marisa for accounting and damages. 2. Plaintiffs claimed they owned Rovila Water Supply, and the defendants tookover the business by forming Rovina Inc to usurp the family business. 3. Plaintiffs filed the complaint in their own names instead of the names of the parents. 4. The parents died. The respondents claimed the substitution of plaintiffs from parents to children was improper LT of plaintiffs: We are the RP in Interest! They sued in their own right because of their substantial interest as heirs or co-owners. LT of defendants: They are not the RP in Interest! They failed to substitute as heir of plaintiffs. ISSUE: WHO are the RP in Interest? The deceased parents, bec. they are indispensable parties. Ratio: 1. Without the inclusion of the indispensable parties, there can be no final determination of the case. both the spouses Pacaña were not impleaded as parties-plaintiffs. The Court notes, however, that they are indispensable parties 2. REMEDY: Sec. 9 Rule 3: implead the indispensable parties. their non-inclusion is merely a technical defect. Failure to implead indispensable parties is a curable error The heirs should be impleaded as indispensable parties because of their hereditary rights RP in Interest includes both indispensable parties and necessary parties. (mas malawak)

3. Manila Banking v. University of Baguio, G.R. No. 159189, February 21, 2007 COMPLAINT: Complaint for Sum of Money PLAINTIFFS: MBC DEFENDANTS: UB, Sps. Bautista and GDI (impleaded) GROUND OF MTD: (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; (loan paid by Dacion and failure to prosecute for unreasonable time) SC: MTD is improper FACTS: 1.

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MBC granted a 14M credit line to UB for the construction of buildings and the purchase of new equipment. a. Vice Chairman Bautista signed in behalf of UB. b. However, the loan was not paid because Bautista diverted the net proceeds of the loan to Group Developers Inc. (GDI). Thus, MBC filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against UB, Bautista, and his wife before RTC of Makati. a. Later, MBC amended the Complaint and impleaded GDI. b. In its Answer, UB claimed that the bank and GDI approved the diversion. c. By way of cross-claim, UB prayed that GDI be ordered to pay UB the amount it owed to MBC. So, MBC and GDI executed a Deed of Dacion en Pago where GDI ceded and transferred to MBC a parcel of land in full settlement of the loan. a. Thereafter, UB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on the ground that there was no more cause of action since the loan had already been settled by GDI and that MBC failed to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. b. RTC denied. c. Likewise, RTC expunged from its record the Deed of Dacion en Pago because no compromise agreement was submitted for approval. d. UB again filed a Manifestation regarding its previous Motion to Dismiss and claimed that it should not have been denied. e. MBC opposed. f. Then, RTC granted the Motion and dismissed the case since MBC no longer had a cause of action.

DOCTRINE: MTD FOR FAILURE TO STATE COA V MTD ON LACK OF COA In Domondon v. Lopez, we distinguished a motion to dismiss for failure of the complaint to state a cause of action from a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action. The first is governed by Section 1 (g), Rule 16, while the second by Rule 33, of the Rules of Court, to wit: MTD FOR FAILURE TO STATE COA The FIRST [situation where the complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action] is raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 before a responsive pleading is filed and can be determined only from the allegations in the initiatory pleading and not from evidentiary or other matters aliunde. The first does not concern itself with the truth and falsity of the allegations

MTD ON LACK OF COA The SECOND [situation where the evidence does not sustain the cause of action alleged] is raised in a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 after the plaintiff has rested his case and can be resolved only on the basis of the evidence he has presented in support of his claim. while the second arises precisely because the judge has determined the truth and falsity of the allegations and has found the evidence wanting.

Hence, a motion to dismiss based on LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION is filed by the defendant after the plaintiff has presented his evidence on the ground that the latter has shown no right to the relief sought. While a MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 16 is based on preliminary objections which can be ventilated before the beginning of the trial, a MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rested his case. In this case, UB’s March 19, 1998 motion to dismiss the amended complaint was improper under Rule 16 because it was filed after UB filed its responsive pleading, its Answer. Also, the motion’s merit could not be determined based solely on the allegations of the initiatory pleading, the amended complaint, since the motion was based on the deed of dacion en pago, which was not even alleged in the complaint. And since the deed of dacion en pago had been expunged from the record, the trial court erred in its finding of payment and lack of cause of action based on the deed. In fact, on January 11, 2002 or just three months before it dismissed the amended complaint, the trial court had even noted petitioner counsel’s manifestation regarding the parties’ initial efforts to enter into a “dacion en pago but not based on the previous offer made but on a new proposal involving new properties”and urged them to pursue further settlement discussions. In addition, the motion alleged that petitioner had “no more cause of action” or lacked a cause of action against the university. Following Domondon, that motion was a motion to dismiss under Rule 33 in the nature of demurrer to evidence and would be proper only after petitioner had presented its evidence and rested its case. In the case at bar, there had been no presentation of evidence yet and petitioner had not rested its case. Therefore, the August 17, 1999 Order properly denied the motion to dismiss for being improper under either Rule 16 or 33. GIST: The MTD filed by UB is improper both under Rule 16 and Rule 33.  Rule 16: must be filed before responsive pleding~UB filed after  Rule 33: must be filed after petitioner presented its evidence and rested its case~UB no presentation yet and had not rested its case.

4. Corales v. Republic, 703 SCRA 623 (2013). COMPLAINT: Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus PLAINTIFFS: Corales and Dr. Angeles DEFENDANTS: Andal (OSG) GROUND OF MTD: Lack of COA, Premature and Non-Exhaustion of Admin Remedies SC: MTD is granted FACTS: 1. Corales was elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for 3 consecutive terms. a. In those 3 terms, he appointed Dr. Angeles as Municipal Administrator. b. In his first term, the appointment was unanimously approved. c. However, in the last two terms, the Sanggunian disapproved on the ground of nepotism and allegedly because of Dr. Angeles’ unsatisfactory performance. d. Despite this, Dr. Angeles still discharged the duties of his office for which he received salary. 2. Thereafter Maximo Andal, as Provincial State Auditor, issued an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) to Corales and asking the latter to comment/reply. a. Instead, Corales and Angeles filed a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus against Andal and the Sanggunian before the RTC of San Pablo. b. In opposition, SolGen, representing Andal, filed a Motion to Dismiss based on lack of cause of action, prematurity, and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. 3. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss by SolGen. a. MR denied. 4. Thus, the Republic went up the CA. a. CA granted the petition in favor of the Republic. b. Hence, this petition. c. Essentially, the CA dismissed Corales’ action for Prohibition. DOCTRINE: PREMATURE As previously stated, petitioners’ action for prohibition was premature. The audit investigative process was still in its initial phase. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. And, even granting that the AOM issued to petitioner Corales is already equivalent to an order, decision or resolution of the Auditor or that such AOM is already tantamount to a directive for petitioner Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for prohibition is premature since there are still many administrative remedies available to petitioners to contest the said AOM. Section 1, Rule 5 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, provides: “[a]n aggrieved party may appeal from an order or decision overruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report, memorandum, letter, notice of disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency under audit.” From the final order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission proper. It is the decision or resolution of the Commission proper which can be appealed to this Court. Clearly, petitioners have all the remedies available to them at the administrative level but they failed to exhaust the same and instead, immediately sought judicial intervention. Otherwise stated, the auditing process has just begun but the petitioners already thwarted the same by immediately filing a Petition for Prohibition. The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail himself of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to the court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.

Also, in The Special Audit Team, Commission on Audit v. Court of Appeals and Government Service Insurance System, this Court has extensively pronounced that: The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. Moreover, courts have accorded respect for the specialized ability of other agencies of government to deal with the issues within their respective specializations prior to any court intervention. DENIAL OF MOTION TO DISMISS AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER (Rule 65) In their futile attempt to convince this Court to rule in their favor, petitioners aver that by filing a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, respondent Republic, in essence, admitted all the material averments and narration of facts stated in the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus. As such, there is no longer any question of fact to speak of and what remains is a pure question of law. The judgment, therefore, of the trial court denying the Motion to Dismiss is no longer subject to any appeal or review by the Court of Appeals. Instead, it is already appealable and reviewable by this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where only pure questions of law may be raised and dealt with. This is in line with the pronouncement in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals (China Road Case). Petitioners’ above argument is misplaced. China Road Case is not at all applicable in the case at bench. Therein, the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was granted. As the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final, as distinguished from an interlocutory order, the proper remedy was an appeal in due course. In the case at bench, however, the Motion to Dismiss was denied. It is well-entrenched that an order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. Therefore, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss is not appealable, not even via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The only remedy for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss is a special civil action for certiorari (Rule 65) showing that such denial was made with grave abuse of discretion.

5. NHA v. Baello, 703 SCRA 333 (2013) COMPLAINT: Action for Recovery of Possession and Damages. PLAINTIFFS: Baello DEFENDANTS: NHA GROUND OF MTD: (f) res judicata SC: MTD is granted FACTS: 1. Pedro Baello and Nicanora Beallo-Rodriguez applied to register a parcel of land. a. CFI confirmed title in their favor. b. The Republic, through the Director of Lands, did not appeal so it became final and executory. c. An OCT were then issued in their names. d. Then, the property was later subdivided into 2 parcels of land with 2 TCTs. 2. During Martial Law, Marcos issued a PD expropriating land and authorizing the NHA to develop the land into a residential area. a. It covered both the Baello and Rodriguez properties. b. Thereafter, a truckload of military personnel forcibly ejected Baello and Rodriguez out of their properties. c. The NHA then took possession thereof. 3. After the EDSA Revolution, the Baellos executed a extrajudicial partition. 4. On August 1987, NHA filed an Action for Eminent Domain against Baello and Rodriguez at the RTC of Caloocan Branch 120 but was dismissed for res judicata and lack of cause of action. a. CA affirmed. b. SC affirmed. 5. Then, in 1993, the NHA filed a Complaint for Nullity of the OCT issued in favor of Pedro & Nicanora in RTC of Caloocan Branch 128. a. The same court, however, dismissed the complaint due to estoppel and res judicata. b. CA affirmed. c. SC affirmed. 6. During the pendency of the case in Branch 128, Baello filed an Action for Recovery of Possession and Damages against NHA. a. RTC ruled in favor of Baello. b. On appeal, CA denied NHA’s appeal. c. MR denied. d. Hence, this petition. DOCTRINE: The doctrine of res judicata has been explained as follows: The rule is that when material facts or questions, which were in issue in a former action and were admitted or judicially determined are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies regardless of the form of the latter. Jurisprudence expounds that the concept of res judicata embraces two aspects: 1. The first, known as “BAR BY PRIOR JUDGMENT,” or “estoppel by verdict,” is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. 2. The second, known as “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT,” otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendent, ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. The Court explained further:

CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT does not require identity of the causes of action for it to work. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit ; but the adjudication of an issue in the first case is not conclusive of an entirely different and distinct issue arising in the second. Hence, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of action. In this case, the NHA’s petition is barred by conclusiveness of judgment which states that — any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. We sustain the CA in ruling that the main issue raised by the NHA, which it alleged in its Answer before the trial court, is the validity of OCT No. (804) 53839. The validity of OCT No. (804) 53839 had long been settled by this Court in G.R. No. 143230. In that case, the Court ruled that the action to annul OCT No. (804) 53839 was barred by the decision in LRC Case No. 520. The Court noted that the Republic did not oppose Pedro and Nicanora’s application for registration in LRC Case No. 520, and neither did it appeal the decision. OCT No. (804) 53839 was issued by the Register of Deeds in 1959 and the Republic did not file any action to nullify the CFI’s decision until the NHA filed a complaint for nullity of OCT No. (804) 53839 on 5 November 1993, the case which was the origin of G.R. No. 143230. As pointed out by this Court in G.R. No. 143230, the NHA was already barred from assailing OCT No. (804) 53839 and its derivative titles.

6. Unicapital v. Consing, 702 SCRA 511 (2013) COMPLAINT:  Consing filed a Complaint for Injunctive Relief against Unicapital and PBI in the RTC of Pasig.  Unicapital filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against Consing and Dela Cruz before the RTC of Makati.  PBI filed a Complaint for Damages and Attachment before the RTC of Manila. TWO MOTIONS: (1) MTD filed by Unicapital and PBI on ground of Failure to State COA (2) M FOR CONSOLIDATION filed by Consing. SC: MTD is granted (there is a COA); MFC not granted (two cases proceed from diff. sources of obl.)

As edified in the case of Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro, citing Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Limited v. Catalan (HSBC):

FACTS: 1. Consing and his mother (Dela Cruz) obtained a loan an 18M loan from Unicapital secured by PNs and a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land in Imus, Cavite. a. Interested in developing said property into a residential subdivision, Plus Builders (PBI), through its real estate development arm, URI, negotiated with Dela Cruz and Unicapital to purchase the same. b. Thereafter, Dela Cruz decided to sell to Unicapital and PBI. c. For said purpose, she appointed Consing as her attorney-in-fact. 2. After paying Consing but before the TCTs were transferred to PBI and URI, some Chinese dudes popped up and claimed to be lawful owners. a. Upon investigation, it was found that Dela Cruz’s title was dubious. b. Thus, PBI and Unicapital demanded from Consing to return the money. 3. As a result, the following cases were filed: a. In May 1999, Consing filed a Complaint for Injunctive Relief against Unicapital and PBI in the RTC of Pasig. i. They claimed that due to incessant harassment from Unicapital, his professional and personal life was affected. ii. On the other hand, Unicapital filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of Failure to State a Cause of Action. iii. PBI likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of that the complaint Does Not Have a Cause of Action. iv. RTC denied the motions. v. CA affirmed. b. In August 1999, Unicapital filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against Consing and Dela Cruz before the RTC of Makati. c. Likewise, PBI filed a Complaint for Damages and Attachment before the RTC of Manila. 4. The RTC Manila case was subsequently consolidated with the case in RTC Pasig. a. Then, Consing filed a Motion to Dismiss the case in RTC Makati but was denied. b. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Consolidation of the cases in Makati with the case in Pasig. c. However, RTC of Makati dismissed said motion on the ground that said cases had no identity of rights or causes of action and reliefs sought. d. MR denied. e. On certiorari, CA also refused to consolidate. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

Stated otherwise, the resolution on this matter should stem from an analysis on whether or not the complaint is able to convey a cause of action; and not that the complainant has no cause of action. Lest it be misunderstood, FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION is properly a ground for a motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court (Rules), while the latter (NO CAUSE OF ACTION) is not a ground for dismissal under the same rule.

DOCTRINE: PROPRIETY OF DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is wellsettled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to sufficiently assert a cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Thus, if the allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint can be maintained, then the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.

The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendants.

In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.’s complaint in RTC Pasig properly states a cause of action since the allegations therein sufficiently bear out a case for damages under Articles 19 (harassment) and 26 (libelous statements) of the Civil Code. Records disclose that Consing, Jr.’s complaint contains allegations which aim to demonstrate the abusive manner in which Unicapital and PBI, et al. enforced their demands against him. Accordingly, these specific allegations, if hypothetically admitted, may result into the recovery of damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code which states that “[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” Likewise, Consing, Jr.’s complaint states a cause of action for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code. PROPRIETY OF DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION In the present case, the Court observes that the subject cases, i.e., SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 991418, although involving the same parties and proceeding from a similar factual milieu, should remain unconsolidated since they proceed from different sources of obligations and, hence, would not yield conflicting dispositions. SCA No. 1759 is an injunction and damages case based on the Civil Code provisions on abuse of right and defamation, while Civil Case No. 991418 is a collection and damages suit based on actionable documents, i.e., the subject promissory notes. In particular, SCA No. 1759 deals with whether or not Unicapital and PBI, et al. abused the manner in which they demanded payment from Consing, Jr., while Civil Case No. 991418 deals with whether or not Unicapital may demand payment from Consing, Jr. based on the subject promissory notes. Clearly, a resolution in one case would have no practical effect as the core issues and reliefs sought in each case are separate and distinct from the other.

7. Brown–Araneta v. Araneta, 707 SCRA 202 (2013) COMPLAINT: Petition for Custody filed by Mr. Araneta; Petition for Protection Order filed by Mrs. Araneta GROUND OF MTD: (e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; (Litis Pendentia and Forum Shopping) SC: MTD is granted (there is FS and LP committed) FACTS: 1. Juan Ignacio Araneta and Michelle Brown-Araneta were married in Vegas. a. They bore 2 daughters namely Ara and Ava. b. The spouses separated after 7 years. c. During the separation, the daughters remained in Michelle’s custody. d. In 2007, Juan filed a Petition for Custody in the Makati RTC against Michelle and her mother claiming that they have completely barred him from seeing his daughters. 2. Pending the Petition for Custody, Michelle filed a Petition for Protection Order in the RTC of Muntinlupa claiming that Juan had committed sexual, psychological, and economic abuse on her and their daughters. a. In this petition, it was stated that there was a pending case in the Makati RTC for the custody of the children. b. Muntinlupa thereafter granted the TPO. 3. Later, Juan filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition with Prayer to Lift TPO in the Makati RTC on the ground of litis pendentia and forum shopping since the Makati RTC is competent to grant the very same reliefs sought by Michelle in the Petition for Protection Order. a. Also, he alleged that Michelle’s filing in Muntinlupa amounts to forum shopping. 4. RTC ruled partly in favor of Michelle and partly in favor of Juan. a. So both parties appealed. 5. In the CA, Michelle was found guilty of forum shopping. a. MR denied. b. Hence, this petition. c. Michelle contends that there was no forum shopping when she filed her Petition for Protection Order in Muntinlupa while the Petition for Custody was still pending in Makati. DOCTRINE: A circumstance of forum shopping occurs when, as a result or in anticipation of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari by raising identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Stated a bit differently, FORUM SHOPPING is the institution of two or more actions involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would come out with a favorable disposition. An indicium of the presence of, or the test for determining whether a litigant violated the rule against, forum shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other case. LITIS PENDENTIA, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil suit, refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes vexatious and unnecessary. For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurring requisites must be present: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and

(3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other. Thus, it has been held that there is forum shopping: (1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before the CA since in such case said party deliberately splits appeals “in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open”; or (3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to obtain it from the original court. The evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant confusion, the Court adheres to the rules against forum shopping, and a breach of these rules results in the dismissal of the case. FORUM SHOPPING WAS COMMITTED; IN ANTICIPATION OF AN ADVERSE RULING IN MAKATI RTC, MUNTINLUPA RTC WAS SOUGHT FOR A FAVORABLE OPINION As discussed above, the presiding judge of the Makati RTC, in the custody case, made of record that she was not inclined to issue a protection order in favor of Michelle because she did not bother to appear in Court and that the allegations against Juan Ignacio cannot, per se, prevent him from exercising visitation rights over his children. After this adverse ruling, Michelle sought the favorable opinion of the Muntinlupa RTC by filing an independent Petition for Protection Order. IDENTICAL PARTIES The Petition for Custody and the Petition for Protection Order have the same parties who represent the same interests. The fact that Ava and Ara, who are parties in the Petition for Protection Order, are not impleaded in the Petition for Custody is of no moment because they are precisely the very subjects of the Petition for Custody and their respective rights are represented by their mother, Michelle. In First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, it was held that forum shopping exists even in cases like this where petitioners or plaintiffs in one case were impleaded as respondents or defendants in another. Moreover, this Court has constantly held that the fact that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case or vice versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia. IDENTITY IN RIGHTS ASSERTED AND RELIEFS PRAYED FOR Further, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in Petition for Protection Order are practically based on the same facts and are so intertwined with that in Petition for Custody, such that any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which party is successful, will amount to res judicata. ELEMENTS OF LITIS PENDENTIA ARE PRESENT

Any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata. Consider: If the Makati RTC were to grant Juan Ignacio’s Petition for Custody, this would necessarily mean that it would be in the best interest of the children if he were allowed to visit and spend time with them and that granting Juan Ignacio visitation rights would not pose any danger or threat to the children. On the other hand, a grant by the Muntinlupa RTC of Michelle’s prayer for a permanent protection order would presuppose at the minimum that it would be to the children’s best interest if Juan Ignacio is directed to keep away from them, necessary implying that he is unfit even to visit Ara and Ava. Conversely, if Juan Ignacio’s Petition for Custody were denied, then it would mean that the Makati RTC gave weight and credence to Michelle’s allegations of abuse and found them to be in the best interest of the children to bar Juan Ignacio from visiting them. Thus, the Muntinlupa RTC should have no ground to deny Michelle’s Petition for Protection Order pending before it.

8. Rebecca Pacana v. Rovila Water COMPLAINT: PLAINTIFFS: DEFENDANTS: GROUND OF MTD: (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; SC: MTD is granted FACTS 5. PLAINTIFF (2): Petitioners Rebecca and Rosalie Pacaña are children of SPS. Pacaña DEFENDANT (5): They filed the present case against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and Marisa for accounting and damages. 6. Plaintiffs claimed they owned Rovila Water Supply, and the defendants tookover the business by forming Rovina Inc to usurp the family business. 7. Plaintiffs filed the complaint in their own names instead of the names of the parents. 8. The parents died. The respondents claimed the substitution of plaintiffs from parents to children was improper LT of plaintiffs: We are the RP in Interest! They sued in their own right because of their substantial interest as heirs or co-owners. LT of defendants: They are not the RP in Interest! They failed to substitute as heir of plaintiffs. ISSUE: WHO are the RP in Interest? The deceased parents, bec. they are indispensable parties. Ratio: 3. Without the inclusion of the indispensable parties, there can be no final determination of the case. both the spouses Pacaña were not impleaded as parties-plaintiffs. The Court notes, however, that they are indispensable parties 4. REMEDY: Sec. 9 Rule 3: implead the indispensable parties. their non-inclusion is merely a technical defect. Failure to implead indispensable parties is a curable error The heirs should be impleaded as indispensable parties because of their hereditary rights RP in Interest includes both indispensable parties and necessary parties. (mas malawak)