The Eastern Muslims Of Sri Lanka

The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka Special Problems and Solutions

Journal of Asian and African Studies Copyright © 2009 SAGE Publications www.sagepublications.com (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC) Vol 44(4): 407–427 DOI: 10.1177/0021909609105092

A.R.M. Imtiyaz Temple University, USA

J A A S

Abstract Conflict in Sri Lanka between the Tamils and the Sinhalese brought the Eastern Muslims into the crossfire. Muslim elites and politicians generally cooperate with the Sinhalese ruling class. Such cohabitation irritated the Tamils. Since 1985, relations between the Tamils and the Muslims in the Eastern region have become strained, and Muslims claimed that they have some problems to be solved. This study attempts to identify some special problems of the Eastern Muslims. A questionnaire on the special problems of the Eastern Muslims was distributed to the Eastern youth, students, unemployed Muslims and farmers. The population of the target group was selected randomly. More than 150 questionnaires were issued with a 75 percent response rate. Interviews were also conducted on the phone with an educated section of the Eastern Muslims. This study also suggests solutions to the protracted ethno-political conflict based on power-sharing. Keywords consociationalism • divided societies • ethnic relations • mobilization • modernization • power-sharing

Introduction Sri Lanka (known as Ceylon until 1972) gained global attention in recent years, particularly for its deadly ethnic civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), commonly known as the Tamil Tigers and the state security forces controlled by the Sinhalese, the majority ethnic group, and the tsunami that swept the shores of Sri Lanka on 26 December 2004 killing over 30,000 people. Both events victimized the Muslims of Sri Lanka, particularly the Eastern Muslims. Muslims, Sri Lanka’s second-largest minority after ethnic Tamils, share close linguistic and cultural ties with Tamils and speak Tamil; however, they prefer to be recognized by their religious and cultural identity.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1438382

408

Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

By and large, the Muslims of Sri Lanka oppose the Tamil Tigers and cooperate with the Sri Lankan government dominated by the majority Sinhalese to win their share in divided polity. Muslims believe that the Tamil Tigers, who claim that the Tamils are discriminated against by the State and its institutions since the island’s independence in favor of the majority Sinhalese (Balasingham, 2004), carried out systematic killings of Muslims, including a massacre in August 1991 (Hasbullah, 2000; Mohideen, 2002; Nuhuman, 2002). Thus, Muslims claim they have the special problems in term of security and existence in the Eastern region. This article will review many of these factors that led to the special problems of the Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka who comprise only 25% of the 1.5 million Muslims in the country. To understand the problems of the Eastern Muslims, this piece of study will address the following questions: What are the special problems of the Muslims of the Eastern Province? Could an arrangement of devolution of powers acceptable to the Muslims of the Eastern province be arrived at in the present political context? What are the negative consequences of the special problems of the Eastern Muslims? Theoretical Understanding There are several theories to understand the causes of the group tension and conflict. This article, however, employs constructive, modernization and political mobilization theories to examine the special problems of the Eastern Muslims. Constructive Approach Constructivists view ethnic identities as a product of human actions and choices. They are constructed and transmitted, not genetically inherited, from the past (Taras and Ganguly, 2002). Max Weber was one of the theorists who stressed the social origin of ethnic identity. Weber viewed each ethnic group as a ‘human group’ whose belief in a common ancestry leads to the formation of a community (Stone, 1995). This led to the conclusion that ethnic identity is not primarily a genetic phenomenon, but forms under the right circumstances by appropriate political actions (Stone, 1995). Thus, political actors construct both identity and problems in order to gain and hold power. Ismail (1997) shares similar understanding in a study of the Muslims of Sri Lanka. According to him, Muslim political elites well before independence had succeeded in constructing identity based on Islamic faith to maintain a distinct group identity from the Tamils.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1438382

Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka

409

Modernization In this theory, greater political and economic interaction among people, coupled with widespread education and mass communication networks, would collapse parochial identities of ethnic and religious groups and replace them with loyalty to larger communities. However, political developments of the 1980s and 1990s in both the post-colonial and the western worlds have clashed with this prediction. Ted Robert Gurr (1993) maintains that ethno-religious movements throughout the world in recent decades provide strong networks that form the basis for political mobilization. Gurr, in his work on the mobilization of minorities, clearly identifies modernization as a threatening source of ethno-political and religious mobilization. He maintains that the global processes of economic development, state building and the communication revolution have increased ethnic tensions everywhere (Gurr, 1993). This comes from the fact that dominant groups want to build nations on their own cultural values, triggering a minority reaction for increased autonomy and separate development. In Sri Lanka, modernization exerted enormous pressure on the different ethnic groups. Politicians use such pressure for their quest for power by formulating special policies in order to win the support of particular ethnic groups (de Votta, 2004). Such, commonly considered as pro-Sinhalese, policies led to the ethnic civil war between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. On the other hand, Muslims, particularly the North and East Muslims complain about the Tamil oppression and discrimination against them. Mobilization A sense of insecurity emerges among the members of a group when they feel that they are deliberately and systematically beleaguered by the dominant group of the society. The group that is methodically targeted by the dominant group due to its ideas, beliefs, lifestyle and/or identity tends to mobilize against the oppressors in all available ways, theoretically both in non-violence primarily by the moderate democratic leadership and violently by radical groups, if it thinks the former’s strategies make no sense to win its rights. This punch line theory on mobilization facilitates the understanding of the process of group mobilization either against the State or dominant group or both (Gurr, 1993). In Sri Lanka, Muslim elites’ willingness to build ‘distinct’ identity from the Tamils and the Tamil violence persuaded the North and East Muslims to be identified as separate ethnic group based on the Islamic faith which has played a significant role in shaping their ideas, values and lifestyle, and eventually led to the emergence of Muslim religo-nationalism in a corner of the Eastern province.

410

Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

One may consider the origin of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) led by the late M.H.M. Ashraff in this theoretical light. Special Problems of the Muslims of the Eastern Province Ethnic Relations: Will Security and Existence Matter? Despite the political confrontations among the elites, masses of Tamils and Muslims lived peacefully since the independence. Sri Lanka Muslims, particularly North and East Muslims in the 1960s and 1970s proudly identified themselves as Tamil-speaking Muslims, and shared some of the genuine grievances of the Tamil community. According to Ameerdeen (2006: 7), Eastern Muslims ‘offered refuge to the Tamils who were displaced by the onslaught of the security forces. They protected the Tamils, their belongings and even the fighters in times of danger.’ Further, studies on the Sri Lanka Muslims maintained that Muslims even subscribed to the Tamil militant ideology and joined the Tamil Tigers’ military wing. The Tamil Tigers enjoyed some good support from the Muslim villages and opened branch offices and eventually won the popularity among certain sections of the Muslims (Ali, 1997). During the mid-1980s a large number of Muslims joined the ranks of the Tamil from Eravur to fight the Sri Lanka state (Hoole, 2001), and continued to support the Tamil Tigers even after Tamil Tigers ‘murdering over a hundred surrendered Muslim policemen’ (Hoole, 2001). However, Tamil–Muslim riots broke out in April 1985, apparently over an incident in the town of Mannar in the north where three Muslim worshippers were said to have been gunned down by Tamil militants inside a mosque, which ruined the Tamil–Muslim cordiality. According to Ali (1986: 155), ‘the UNP which was in power at that time exploited this incident to the maximum and utilized every means at its disposal to create a permanent rift between the LTTE and the Muslims.’ Following the 1985 riots, particularly in 1990, Ali (1986: 158) notes, the Tamil Tigers: lost its patience with the Muslims, changed its compromising approach towards them and unleashed some of its most ferocious acts of savagery on the innocent Muslims of Polonnaruwa, Kattankudy and Eravur in the Eastern provinces. Tens and hundreds of Muslim men, women and children were massacred in their homes, fields, markets, and mosques. The entire Muslim population of Jaffna in the north were evicted from their homes at gun point and turned into refugees overnight.

On the other hand, the Muslim cadre of the Tamil Tigers feared that they would become a next target of the Tamil Tigers and most of them deserted and

Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka

411

surrendered to the Sri Lankan forces (Hoole, 2001). Continuous violence and threat persuaded the Muslims of the East to approve the political appeals of charismatic Mr Ashraff who founded the SLMC. Tamil violence against the Eastern Muslims raises the key question: Why did the Tamils target the Muslims? The majority of Sri Lanka Muslim scholars do not present any logical answer to the question. The truth is that Muslim elites since independence regularly cooperated with the ruling Sinhala political elites regardless of who occupied the powers in Colombo to consolidate their commercial interests. In addition to the commercial interests, according to Ismail (1997), is a fear of physical security or protection on the island had persuaded the Muslim elites to maintain good relations with the Sinhalese political class. Muslim leaders are well aware that their community would face the risk of unfriendly attitudes from the Sinhalese leaders by denying state support for business activities and possibly would face violent opposition as the Tamils met in the early independence period. Such concerns made the Muslim political establishment dominated by the Southern Muslims seek an accommodative approach and to support the unitary state structure. The Muslim decision to accommodate the Sinhalese generated two immediate results: (1) ministerial portfolios and concessions; and (2) the revival of Tamil animosity against the Muslims, particularly the North and East Muslims. However, Muslim cooperation with the Sinhala political class irritated the Tamil polity, particularly the militants. Tamil militants targeted both Muslim masses and political class: they intimidated the Eastern Muslims and outlawed the activities of the SLMC and listed Mr Ashraff in its hit list (Ameerdeen, 2006). However, Mr Ashraff, an adroit Muslim politician, tactfully utilized the threats of the Tamil Tigers with religious rhetoric for electoral gains: If the LTTE is killing us, if the LTTE is leaving us out of our homes, simply because we happen to be Muslims, simply because we say ‘La ilaha illallahu, Mammmdur-Rasoolullah’ because of our belief in Allah and Prophet Muhammed (peace be upon him) … if that is the only reason, it is the commandment of the Holy Quran that we should declare Jihad against them and kill every LTTEr. We shall now intend to slaughter every LTTEr including Mr. Prabhakaran. In a personal note, I will be the happiest if I can die in battle at the time of slitting the neck of this bloody Prabhakaran. (Ameerdeen, 2006: 17)

Then again, Tamils share different perceptions on the worsening Tamil– Muslim relations in the region. Tamils believe that problems started between Muslims and Tamils, because various Muslims started being recruited into the armed forces, intelligence and home guards to be used against the Tamil militants. In the 1980s the Sri Lanka government created armed Muslim paramilitary groups which it utilized to fuel communal violence and open a third

412

Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

front in the bloody war. The Tamil Tigers responded violently to the Muslim willingness to cooperate with the State (Nayagam, 2006). Further, study on the Eastern situation maintains that Muslims in the East are accused of confiscating Tamils’ land and are ‘perceived as taking advantage of Tamil misfortune’. It further notes, ‘Muslim purchasing of paddy land from Tamil absentee landlords, buying up Tamil owned shops, the creeping spread of Muslim villages into Tamil villages is part of the contemporary reality of the Eastern Province’ (Raheem and Haniffa, 2005: 4). Ethnic and religious rhetoric generally helps to mobilize economically and politically disadvantaged groups. However, such political rhetoric aimed at destabilizing ethnic harmony in divided societies could seriously undermine the security and stability of the region. In the Eastern region of Sri Lanka, it seems both the Tamil and Muslim leaderships exploited the vulnerability and emotions of the masses to gain the upper hand in politics. In sum, the employment of ethnic and religious emotions, particularly since 1985, had radically exacerbated ethnic dissonance, and thus led to a serious security crisis. Special Issues: Question of Land and Permanent Merger of the North and East Tensions between the groups in divided societies can occur as a result of growth of the population and increased competition for land and jobs (Brubaker, 1996). Land-attached communities often develop confrontations when both communities expand their farming or grazing into the same land. This often leads to sharp competition over land, which is likely to take on an ethnic coloration. This theoretical understanding can be applied to examine the situation of the Muslims of the Eastern province who claim that their lands were being forcefully confiscated by the Tamil Tigers. A peculiar phenomenon in the East is that Muslim and Tamil villages closely intersperse with each other. The large share of Muslim lands squeeze in the Tamil villages. To meet the population growth, they need farm land and/or urban jobs, and these jobs and resources are in short supply. Unemployment and despair become a serious challenge both for Muslims and Tamils. Economic competition causes tension between the two communities, mainly because of the fears of expansion. Communities fixed unwritten rules and regulations strictly discouraged members of one ethnic group from selling the land to the other ethnic community. Muslims in the Eastern Province often complain about being harassed by Tamils when they pass through the adjacent Tamil villages, waylaying of vehicles, robbing of paddy and cattle belonging to the Muslims. By the 1980s, the Muslims and Tamils had developed different economic interests. While the Eastern Muslims paid interest to buying the lands and property and setting up businesses, the Tamils had concentrated on pursuing education and trying to secure government jobs and professions. With the

Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka

413

ethnic civil war sharpened between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, Tamils in the Eastern began to sell the lands to the Muslims. This contributed enough to generate an economic gap between the Tamils and the Muslims and the violent tensions in the region. Economically poor Tamils with the help of Tamil militants confiscated the lands located in the adjacent Tamil villages but belonging to the Muslims when the ethnic tensions disturbed the order and stability. After the 1983 ethnic violence, North and East Tamils, according to Mohideen (2002), ‘have started to forcibly occupy the lands belonging to the Muslims in areas close to the Tamil villages’ and ‘there are about 490 locations in the North-East where the Tamils are forcibly occupying about 100,000 acres of agricultural lands belonging to 30,000 Muslim Families’. In fact, the question of land largely decides the fate of the ethnic harmony and stability between these conflicting groups. To mitigate the Tamil and Muslim tensions, a high level meeting took place between the SLMC delegation led by its leader Rauf Hakeem and the LTTE delegation led by Mr V. Pirapakaran on 13 April 2002. The three-and-a-half hours of discussion centered on several problems faced by Muslims in the North and East including that of the land dispute. The delegations finally reached what they called the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MoU), between the leader of the LTTE, and the leader of the SLMC. The MoU maintained that cultivation by Muslims in untended Muslim lands in the region would be enabled and the practice of collecting funds from Muslims in the East would cease. Moreover, the Tamil Tigers also made a similar offer at the second round of peace talks in Thailand with the Sri Lanka Government from 31 October to 3 November 2000 that they were seriously considering returning the lands and the properties to the Muslim owners at the end of the harvest. According to Mohideen (2002), had the Tamil Tigers fulfilled their commitments concerning the Eastern Muslim land question, ‘it would have benefited more than 22,000 families – 103,000 men, women and children and will establish the basis for conflict resolution and help peaceful co-existence between the Tamils and Muslims’. Another issue concerning the stability of the region is the permanent merger of the North-East province. Tamils consider the recently de-linked North and East provinces as the traditional homeland of the Tamils (Wilson, 2000), and they would reject any solution beyond the permanent fixture of the provinces (Vigneswaran, 2007). Eastern Muslims, however, express reservation about the permanent merger of the provinces. According to some opinions, Muslims opposed the permanent merger for valid reasons: Muslims have reasonable fear over the permanent annex of the regions (Siddeek, 2002). A permanent merger would marginalize the Muslims and lose the unique identity of the Muslims.

414

Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

Since Muslims of the East became victims of Tamil violence in the region, they constantly develop fears over the Tamils who violently mobilize against the State. The majority of the Eastern Muslims think that Muslims would further lose their lands and political mobility, and Muslims would be placed at the receiving end of the Tamil domination if the merger is done. This confirms that the Tamil radical nationalist violence against the Muslims had persuaded many Muslims in the region to oppose the permanent merger of North and East provinces. The Sinhalese oppose the merger because they think it would lead to the separation in the region (Rodrigo, 2006). Eastern Muslims believe that Muslims for their part have similar concerns of living in a ‘unitary’ North and East under the Tamil–Hindu chauvinism, given their own history of harassment and oppression at the hands of the Tamil Tigers. Thus, they demand permanent demerger of the province for their better future. In any divided societies, minorities tend to establish certain fears with a logic or otherwise to challenge the real or perceived domination of the majority. Such fears can be managed or minimized if there were some institutional safeguards in the form of power-sharing. Muslims’ Perceptions of the ISGA and P-TOMS Agreement: Will They Accommodate Muslim Interests? The Muslim perceptions of the Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) and the Post-Tsunami Operation & Management Structure (P-TOMS) represent the Eastern Muslims’ concerns and frustration. In October 2003, the LTTE submitted its proposal for political power-sharing in the form of ISGA (Philipson and Thangarajah, 2005). The Eastern Muslims consider that the ISGA would not deliver any justice to them and, in fact, would lead to institutionalize the Tamil domination over the Muslims in the region. Therefore, Muslim opinions reflect that the implications of the ISGA rather than easing the concerns of the Muslims, it would further aggregate the Muslim fears. Muslims of the region also think that the ISGA fails to address the Muslim concerns on the representation and authority. Further, the ISGA does not offer institutional guarantee for the Muslims in the Tamil-dominated North and East polity. As a matter of fact, in the Muslim psyche, the past history of Tamil discrimination of Muslims is still fresh. Muslims believe that the Tamil forces did noting to allay the Muslim fears. Political communities often refuse to submit their sovereignties when they feel that their interests would be marginalized in a new political environment. The responses from the Eastern Muslims to the ISGA confirm this understanding. The Sri Lanka government sealed the P-TOMS with the Tamil Tigers in June 2005 to distribute international aid equally to the North and East, implicitly accepting administration of aid by the Tamil Tigers.

Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka

415

Muslims thought that the P-TOMS was unfair because it did not give any weight to the concerns of the affected Muslims. The study on the tsunami and its impact on the Eastern Muslims estimated that ‘approximately half of the close to 30,000 people killed in the tsunami is Muslim. Kalmunai and Sainthamarudhu stand out as some of the most severely affected areas in the country’ (Raheem and Haniffa, 2005: 4). In other words, the Muslim community in the East suffered a staggering 65% of the total damage caused there. The Muslims believed that implications of the P-TOMS would strengthen the Tamil domination over the Muslims because the regional committees, the key part of the pact, grants the lion’s share (five members) to the Tamils, while allocating three seats to the Muslims, the most affected group by the killer tsunami, thus Muslims would be placed in a precarious position in this mechanism. Muslims’ concerns were further provoked when the pact formally declared Killinochichi, as a headquarters of the regional committee. Tamil Tigers consider Killinochichi as their de-facto political capital of Tamil Eelam, and it became a symbolic home of political and military decision making of the Tamil Tigers. Many local and foreign dignitaries including Norwegian peace brokers often visit Killinochichi for consultation with the Tamil Tigers. Thus, Muslims consider a regional committee located in Killinochichi controlled by the Tamil Tigers would not address the problems of the Muslim victims of the tsunami. According to Moulavi M. Musawwir of Trincomalee, ‘Muslims will be at a disadvantageous position of not getting their due share as their opinion will not carry any weight against the powerful LTTE once P-TOMS would be in their hands’ (telephone interview, 13 May 2006). Muslim opinions also rejected government efforts to seal a pact with the Tamil Tigers. Muslims, according to Moulavi M. Musawwir, think that the Government should not do any political business in relation to the tsunami with the Tamil Tigers. If there is any agreement for tsunami purpose by the Government, ‘it should have been done with the Muslims’, Moulavi concluded. However, some Muslim respondents of the survey rejected such opinions, and said the pact offers equal representation to the Muslims in the high level committee which is more or less an equally powerful role in the decision making. Institutions such as P-TOMS could have cemented mistrust among the subcultures at the level of the masses if the politicians and leaders keep the trust in the institutions. But Muslim politicians shared reservations and thus, opposed the P-TOMS: Rauff Hakeem, leader of the SLMC said that the lack of Muslim input into the P-TOMS would seriously affect its credibility. He had accused those at formulation level of cold-shouldering them and expressed concern that the Muslim community in the East had a feeling that it was being ‘besieged’ by the Tamil Tigers. If the logic is that of tsunami relief, according to Muslims, then surely the Muslims should have more, not less representation than the Tamils (Hakeem, 2005).

416

Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

By and large, the masses follow the rhetoric and actions of the political leaders. When political leaders justify the decisions or when they appeal to the masses with symbolic ethnic or religious slogans, it is highly likely that the masses will follow the appeals of politicians. Such a tendency is particularly common among the ethnically and religiously deeply oriented people. This is the general pattern in Sri Lanka, including among the Muslims: the section of the Muslim youth violently opposed the P-TOMS in the region, particularly in Kattankudy, the area increasingly becoming a hotbed for Islamic extremism (Lankamuslims, 2005). The unprecedented uprising across the region underscored the widespread Muslim rejection of the raw deal dished out to the Muslim community in the processes of the joint pact with the Tamil Tigers. Hence, when the Supreme Court issued an interim injunction (on 15 July 2005) restraining the key operational clauses of the agreement made for the P-TOMS, Eastern Muslims found they had reasons to breathe a sigh of relief.1 Muslim Political Autonomy: Will It Survive? Political scientists such as Horowitz (1998) suggest that political power-sharing can strengthen marginalized trust by offering opportunities to govern their affairs. The key question is that could an arrangement of devolution of powers acceptable to the Muslims of the Eastern province be arrived at in the present political context? Muslims in the region think that the establishment of a political unit for the Eastern Muslims could be arrived at in the present political context. Though Muslims sharply differ about the form of devolution model, they think such a politico-administrative unit is possible in the Eastern corner. There are many options, which are being put forward. One is an exclusive power-sharing arrangement, which can take care of the Muslim majority areas of the region with the legislature and the executive political arena proportionate to their demographic presence in that area, in other words, a kind of Muslim unit that would ensure administration and security of the Muslims in the region. Second, there is the need for some means of equitable sharing of resources between the Muslims and the other communities with regard to issues like economic development, land, financial resources, credit and educational opportunities. This is one type of approach, which is essentially an arrangement for the Muslims to participate meaningfully in a devolved administration (Imtiyaz, 2004). Degrees of autonomy can be discussed, but Muslims think they should be given an opportunity to have a greater say in how they are governed in the areas where they live. Then, another question that arises is how would the resources currently shared between the Tamils and Muslims of the Eastern province, for instance water, roads and other public infrastructure including government administration, be affected by the proposed scheme of devolution in the form of a Muslim unit?

Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka

417

Though Muslim spokespersons succeeded in articulating the rationale for the separate power-sharing, it seems many of them are not very knowledgeable about the practical difficulties of such a power-sharing mechanism in the region. The Eastern province, homeland of both Tamils and Muslims, is demographically adjacent with Tamil and Muslim villages. The analogy of ‘pittu and coconut’ the traditional Tamil delicacy explains how adjacent the Tamil and Muslim villages are and how deeply linked their economic and social relations and affairs are in Eastern Sri Lanka. The purpose of the establishment of a power-sharing unit is to give opportunities to the local people to decide how they should be governed in the areas where they live. Such opportunities need market, adequate resources, and effective control for delivery. As Lijphart (1977) notes, socio-political conditions are crucial for successful consociationalism. It is true that Muslims in the region are economically rather well off. However, what is also true is that they do not have an exclusive market to decide their own destiny. Farmers from Sammanthurai or Sainthamaruthu from the Amparai district or Eravur or Kattankudy from Batticaloa willingly or unwillingly need to cooperate with the Tamils in the region for their prosperity. It is, thus, practically impossible for the Eastern Muslims to freeze the economic cooperation with their Tamil counterparts. It is very likely that Tamils would hold back their economic dealings with the Muslims if the Tamil unit controlled by the Tamil nationalists chooses hostility against the interests of the Muslim unit. Practically, greater Tamil areas containing the North and East can survive without the active support of Muslims of the East. The Tamil Tigers already proved such a politico-economic infrastructure is possible in the chunk of North and East. And, in future a greater Tamil power-sharing unit composing Tamil pockets in the East could further strengthen the mobility of the Tamil market. However, Muslims in the region would likely confront greater challenges if the Tamil unit declines to build a healthy economic cooperation with the Muslims who become part of the Muslim unit. Such a scenario would be disastrous both for the Muslims and the Muslim unit. Thus, it remains unclear how the future Muslim powersharing unit would create a market for the Muslims in the region on its own to meet the pressing challenges of the greater Tamil unit. Besides the controversy of the market, uncertainties are prevailing in the areas of water, roads and other public infrastructure including government administration. As a matter of fact, regional institutions such as Muslim schools, local libraries and administrative bodies that come under the control of the Muslim unit may function well because they do not necessarily require exclusive Tamil cooperation. However, a crisis is likely when the Muslim unit begins businesses with public resources, particularly public water and roads as well as government infrastructure.

418

Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

In July 2006, the Tamil Tigers cut off the water supply to over 30,000 acres of paddy lands in Sinhalese-dominated Seruwila, a key village of Trincomalee, threatening the livelihoods of a large farmer community. The situation has assumed grave proportions since the local population are largely dependent on this supply for drinking (Mallawarachi, 2006). A Muslim unit may face such a fate since the areas of the Muslim unit do not possess independent natural resources under the control of Muslims of the region. Instability concerning sharing resources, however, can be minimized if there is a political cooperation possible both at the elite and masses level among the Tamil and Muslim community. According to Lijphart (1977), power-sharing is prosperous when the cooperation dominates both at the masses and elites level, particularly the latter level. However, it is not very clear that implementation of power-sharing divisions in the Eastern province would promote ethnic cooperation or ethnic disaster in the impulsive Eastern region. If cooperation dominates, difficulties related to public infrastructure and resources can be fixed in an amicable manner. Muslim Political Representation: Are Muslims Satisfied with Them? What history proves is that the Muslim political leaders of the South regularly maintained cooperation with the Sinhalese political parties, which formed the successive governments since independence to win and consolidate their interests and to prevent the fate of the Tamil community being subjected from the Sinhala polity (Phadnis, 1979; Ismail, 1997). However, the Muslim politicians from the North and East until the early 1980s contested under the Federal Party ticket (FP), a party dominated by the Tamil nationalists, and won elections to Parliament (Phadnis, 1979). The studies argue that pressures of the ethnic conflict in the mid-1980s compelled the section of the young Eastern Muslim politicians to rally behind Mr Ashraf, a young Muslim lawyer from the Eastern Province (Ali, 1977; de Silva, 1986). Mr Ashraf formed the SLMC in the early 1980s, which was formally registered as a political party in 1986. The SLMC largely employed the Islamic religious and ethnic symbols for the electoral purposes and used mosques as its base. They participated for the first time in the December 1988 Provincial Council elections. The Muslim Congress highlighted the Tamil violence as well as atrocities perpetrated by the Indian forces on Muslim women and the desecration of their places of worship. The emotional appeal of the SLMC attracted the Muslims of the region and the party won a reasonable portion of the North-East Muslim votes (de Silva, 1998). The SLMC obtained 168,038 votes of the North-East Muslims, and thus, secured 29 seats (Dissanayake, 1994; Statistical Abstract, 2002). The SLMC, thanks to the proportional representation system that gave more incentive to the smaller

Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka

419

parties to win the seats from various districts, effectively dominated Sri Lanka politics until its leader Mr Ashraff died in the most tragic circumstances when the helicopter that he was traveling in crashed into a hillside somewhere close to Kegalle in 2000 (BBC, 2000). Essentially, the death of Mr Ahraff undermined the unity of the SLMC. Several factions emerged within the party ranks. Many believed that Muslim political representations have lost the common program to win the security and rights: they failed to win legitimate shares both in the process of ceasefire of 2002 and P-TOMS of 2005 as well as at the peace talks. Their inability to articulate coercive policies to win Muslim interests largely frustrated the Eastern Muslims who had put their trust in the delivery of moderate democratic Muslim leadership. Muslim opinions in the East held that the disunity and factionalism among the Muslim politicians undermined the Muslim interests both at the peace talks and beyond. Such frustrations could de-legitimize political alternatives and weaken the trust of the Eastern Muslims in the Muslim political establishment if the Muslim political representation continuously dissatisfies the Muslim masses. Also, it may lead frustrated Muslims to seek violent means as their only choice in conditions that are beyond their control when their moderate political representation was weakened. Such a scenario had ensued in relation to the Tamil struggle in Sri Lanka against the State and its institutions. Radicalization of Eastern Muslims: Will It Lead to Violent Mobilization? Academically speaking, social, political and/or economic grievances motivate communities to rebel violently against the dominant actors (Gurr, 1993). This understanding can be applied to read the trend of radicalization of the Eastern Muslims. It is true, ‘there is discontent among Muslims, particularly among the young in some areas’ (Luthra, 2004) and it could radicalize the section of the Eastern Muslims (Imtiyaz, 2005). However, the key questions are what form does radicalization take? Who is financing it? And is it likely to lead to violent resistance by the Muslims of the Eastern province against the Tamil Tigers? Radicalization among the Eastern Muslims is still confined to the basic level and a remarkable amount of the Muslims of the region are active in embracing the radical Islamic ideology to eradicate all ethnic identities and make the religious identity paramount. Unemployment, frustration and Tamil violence as well as the inability of the Muslim political representations to fix the problems of the Muslims of the East motivated some Muslims to adopt violence. Such groups are active though ‘they are small and not a major security threat’ (International Crisis Group, 2007: 3) and ‘had been warning Muslims not to indulge in un-Islamic activities like consuming alcohol, gambling, visiting

420

Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

prostitutes and misbehaving with women … Women, even tiny tots in nursery schools, now cover themselves from head to foot’ (Hindutantimes, 2005). These elements, however, according to our respondents, do not run effective financial networks to support their activities. They support their activities with the limited local help and their salaries. Also, these elements are trying to collect financial support from the local business circle and threatening those if they refuse to contribute to them. The report circulated in the Lanka Muslim e-Forum reflects their need: Several Muslim youths were arrested by a special CID team in a mosque premises (Sirajiyya Nagar mosque) on July 24, 2006 when they forced a Muslim well wisher (who is in Mutur to do some charity works) for a ransom of 10 lakhs. It is learned that the well wisher has come to Mutur to build some toilets for the Tsunami victims and was approached by these youths for money. In his first visit, he has given some money to them. Later he was threatened to be killed if he is not giving 10 lakhs. (Lankamuslims, 2006)

A solid financial network is the backbone of any successful political movement for vigorous mobilization. Muslim youths seem to be aware of the fact. Thus, it is likely that interested external forces can manipulate the fears and financial needs of Eastern Muslims. The former Indian intelligence officer Col. Hariharan, a top-ranking intelligence officer with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s argued that Pakistan can manipulate Eastern Muslims’ fears for its own agenda against the interests of India (Hindutantimes, 2005). Further, B. Raman, a former Additional Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat revealed that some Pakistani diplomats in Colombo had sent some Sri Lankan Muslims to the radical Binori madarsa in Karachi for religious education with scholarships arranged by the Tablighi Jamat, an ISI outfit (Hindutantimes, 2005). In fact, Muslims of Sri Lanka tend to look East for all form of support from the Arab states and from Iran and thus believe that Arabs and Persians would extend financial and military support to energize the Muslim cause. This theory does not draw enough attention, primarily due to the post-9/11 international political climate. It is highly unlikely that international forces, particularly India and the USA would tolerate any free flow of financial and moral support to the violent Muslim mobilization under any pretext. In point of fact, there is no substantial evidence to prove the existence of such a financial or political collaboration between the Eastern Muslims and the external forces. However, the key question in relation to the Muslim radicalization is that if there is the tendency of radicalization among the Muslims of East, then, is it likely to lead to violent resistance against the Tamil Tigers? Given the fact that Muslim polity often cooperates with the Sinhalese leaderships, relationships both at the elite and masses level between the Muslims and

Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka

421

the Sinhalese often anger the Tamils. Also, the State or the Sinhalese majority has not made a serious threat to the Muslims’ identity and security as the Tamil leadership committed against the Muslims since well before independence. The political motivations and actions of Tamil leaders from P. Ramanathan (1888), who argued that the Muslims were Tamils in ethnic calculations but Mohammedans in religious identify, to the Tamil Tiger leader V. Pirapakaran, whose organization violently targeted the Muslims in the North and East from the mid-1980s, significantly contributed to the early growth of the Muslim radicalization against the Tamil minority. However, there are no established reports to substantiate the claim about the existence of the organized Muslim arm element in the region. On the other hand, even if jihadi groups exist in the East as the Tamil Tigers claimed (Balasingam, 2006), they seem to be not well-organized. But it is very likely that continuous Tamil discrimination and oppression packed with the brutal violence against the Muslims can encourage the Muslims to make choices beyond the democratic channel, in order to confront the violent threats of the Tamil Tigers. The logic of mobilization is easy to understand: when the mainstream polity denies fairness to a particular group or by taking a position of upholding exclusive status to a particular group, there is likelihood that the section of the society would lose the trust in the system. Such a situation more likely could legitimize violent alternatives if the political forces exhaust correct actions. Conclusion: Can Muslim Trust Be Restored? There are numerous reasons why the nation-building process in Sri Lanka can trigger tensions between groups. Domination of the majority group over the minorities to win a larger share in the economic competition can lead to the mobilization by the marginalized, because such competition creates special problems. This study attempted to identify some special problems of the Eastern Muslims. Regardless of their size in the demographic map, Eastern Muslims became the key actor in the conflict. It is beyond the scope of this study to judge all of their past political maneuvers and approaches. The key point is that Muslims of the East have legitimate grievances, in other words, some well-established special problems, which deserve both local and global attention. In Sri Lanka, the process of modernization produced violence and chaos rather than trust and stability. Sinhalese leaders formulated some antiTamil policies to attract the sympathy of the Sinhalese. The result was violent Tamil mobilization. On the other hand, Tamil polity controlled by the violent Tamil movements denied justice to the Muslims. Thousands of Muslims were expelled forcefully from Jaffna in October 1990; 300 Eastern

422

Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

Muslims were killed at prayer time inside their mosque in 1991 and Muslim wealth confiscated in the Jaffna, Baticolaoa and Amparai districts of the NorthEastern Province. But a conflict resolution process supported by the global community does not give due space to the Muslim representation. Muslim elites and intellectuals might have constructed Muslim identity, but such constructions could have made less impact if the Muslims had been treated humanely by the Tamil polity. Therefore, un-making or re-constructing the Muslim identity may not help build peace between the Tamils and Muslims as long as Muslims patch the differences and problems with the Tamils. On the other hand, the Muslim democratic representations need to play ‘genuine and responsible’ political roles in the national affairs concerning Tamil and Muslim relations. In this regard, Muslim political forces should seek policies both to calm the fears of Eastern Muslims concerning the Tamils and to develop cooperation with the Tamils at the elite level to seek a political solution. Also, Muslim politicians need to understand the consequences of employing symbolic religious slogans to win the votes of the Muslims who value religious identity over other traits. It is very likely too much dependency on religion to just win elections could transform the society into the stage where commitments to non-violence can be discouraged. It may be hard for political parties to freeze some easy access to power, because they formulate policies, in Downs’s (1957: 28) language, ‘to win elections’. But bad choices of Muslim politicians more likely would trigger instability and chaos in the East among the Muslims and Tamils at the masses level. Also, as suggested by the ICG (2007), a democratic Muslim political establishment needs to monitor the activities and behaviors of the Muslim armed groups in the East. The Eastern Muslims already have spilled enough blood. So, the special problems of the Eastern Muslims require political solutions as the Tamil grievances deserve. Maybe help from the international community to pressure the actors in the peace process could raise the trust of the embattled Muslims. The global community needs to ‘make a greater commitment in any peace process, including a separate delegation at peace negotiations’ (ICG, 2007: 5). Then again, it is the responsibility of the Sri Lanka government to search for a solution beyond the current unitary political system. Such a solution can be found based on consociationalism, which proportionally allocates political power among the communities – whether religious or ethnic – according to the percentage of their population. Note 1. JVP and JHU, the parties that opposed the P-TOMS right from the very beginning and went to court on 15 July 2005 to deny the tsunami aid-sharing deal between the Government and the LTTE signed in June 2005. Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court Blocks P-TOMS Deal. http://www. dailymirror.lk/2005/07/16/front/2.asp (accessed 20 July 2006).

Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka

423

References Ali, A. (1977) ‘The Muslim Factor in Sri Lankan Ethnic Crisis’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 17(2): 253–67. Ali, A. (1986) ‘Politics of Survival: Past Strategies and Present Predicament of the Muslim Community in Sri Lanka’, Journal of Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 7(1): 147–70. Ali, A. (1997) ‘The Muslim Factor in Sri Lankan Ethnic Crisis’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 17(2): 253–67. Ameerdeen, V. (2006) ‘A Separate Muslim Administrative Unit: A Revolution or Disaster?’, paper presented at the South Asian Anthropologists’ Group (SAAG), Goldsmiths College, University of London, London, 4 July. Balasingham, A. (2004) War and Peace: Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of Liberation Tigers. London: Fairmax Publishing. Balasingham, A. (2006) Ceasefire Agreement Is Foundation of Peace and Must Be Implemented – Balasingham, 22 February. http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid= 13&artid=17260 (accessed 24 February 2006). BBC (2000) Key Minister Killed in Sri Lanka Crash. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ south_asia/927370.stm (accessed 20 June 2004). Brubaker, R. (1996) Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. De Silva, K.M. (1986) Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka, 1880–1985. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. De Silva, K.M. (1998) Reaping the Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka. New Delhi: Penguin Books. De Votta, N. (2004) Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Dissanayake, T.D.S.A. (1994) The Politics of Sri Lanka. Colombo: Swastiki. Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. Gurr, T.R. (1993) Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Hakeem, R. (2005) ‘Joint Mechanism Unfair by Eastern Muslims’, Daily Mirror, 29 April. Hasbullah, S.H. (2000) ‘Ethnic Conflict and Prospects for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction: The Eastern Province’, in K.M. de Silva and G.H. Peiris (eds) Pursuit of Peace in Sri Lanka, Past Failures and Future Prospects, pp. 155–75. Kandy: ICES. Hindutantimes (2005) Are Lankan Muslims Taking to Radical Islamic Groups? http:// www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_985140,00050002.htm (accessed 10 January 2006). Hoole, R. (2001) Massacres of Muslims and What It Means for the Tamils. http://www. uthr.org/Rajan/muslims.htm (accessed 20 May 2007).

424

Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

Horowitz, D.L. (1998) ‘Structure and Strategies in Ethnic Conflict’, paper presented at the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, DC, 20–1 April. Imtiyaz, A.R.M. (2004) ‘Conflict and Constitutional Solution in Sri Lanka’, Indian Journal of Asian Affairs 17(2): 23–42. Imtiyaz, A.R.M. (2005) ‘Violent Muslim Mobilization in Sri Lanka’, Polity 2(5&6): 14–18. International Crisis Group (ICG) (2007) Sri Lanka’s Muslims: Caught in the Crossfire. Asia Report 134, 29 May. Ismail, Q. (1997) ‘Unmooring Identity: The Antinomies of Elite Muslim SelfRepresentation in Modern Sri Lanka’, in Q. Ismail and P. Jeganathan (eds) Unmaking the Nation: The Politics of Identity and History in Modern Sri Lanka, pp. 55–105. Colombo: SSA. Lankamuslims (2005) Thousands Force Hartals – Vibrations of Muslim Mass Uprising Shake Eastern Province. http://www.lankamuslims.com/index.php?option=com_cont ent&task=view&id=662&Itemid=1 (accessed 15 June 2005). Lankamuslims (2006) Mutur Updates. [email protected] (25 July 2006 20:28:09 +0600). Lijphart, A. (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Luthra, D. (2004) Sri Lanka’s Muslims Warn of Backlash. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ south_asia/4076561.stm (accessed 22 May 2007). Mallawarachi, B. (2006) Sri Lankan Military, Rebels Battle over Water, at Least 46 Killed. http://www.tamilnewsweb.com/31-07-06-Fight.htm (accessed 24 May 2007). Mohideen, M.I.M. (2002) The Need for Power Sharing Arrangement for the Muslims in the North-East Sri Lanka. Colombo: Private Publication. Nayagam, J. (2006) The Tamil–Muslim Question – Again. http://www.sangam.org/taraki/ articles/2006/01-05_Tamil_Muslim_Question_Again.php (accessed 15 June 2006). Nuhuman, M.A. (2002) Understanding Sri Lankan Muslim Identity. Colombo: ICES. Phadnis, U. (1979) ‘Political Profile of the Minority of Sri Lanka’, International Studies 18(1): 27–48. Philipson, L. and Y. Thangarajah (2005) ‘The Politics of the North-East: 2000–2005’, Asia Foundation 4. http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/SL_Politics_of_NE.pdf (accessed 5 May 2007). Raheem, M. and F. Haniffa (2005) ‘Post Tsunami Reconstruction and the Eastern Muslim Question’, paper presented at the Seminar on ‘The Eastern Muslim Question’, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 31 March. Ramanathan, P. (1888) ‘The Ethnology of the Moors of Ceylon’, Journal of Royal Asiatic Society [Ceylon branch], X(36): 234 –62. Rodrigo, N. (2006) Understanding the South’, Lanka Academic 7(2). http://www. theacademic.org/feature/152543364081482/index.shtml (accessed 2 January 2006).

Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka

425

Siddeek, M.Y.M. (2002) ‘Will the Muslims Be Sidelined?’, Daily News, 12 April. http:// origin.dailynews.lk/2002/04/12/fea04.html (accessed 15 May 2007). Statistical Abstract-2002. (2002) Sri Lanka: Department of Census and Statistics, Ministry of Interior. Stone, J. (1995) ‘Race, Ethnicity, and Weberian Legacy’, American Behavioral Scientists 38(3): 391–407. Taras, R. and R. Ganguly (2002) Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension. New York: Priscilla McGeehon. Vigneswaran, K. (2007) N-E Merger Answer to Ethnic Problem: AITUF. http://www. nation.lk/2007/04/29/inter2.htm (accessed 29 April 2007). Wilson, A.J. (2000) Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Appendix: Questionnaire on the Special Problems of the Eastern Muslims in Sri Lanka Today’s date: City where survey completed: Confidentiality requested? 1. Biographical Personal Name: Gender: [M/F] Age: Education (if any): Full-time job or occupation: 2. Ethnic relations with Tamils On a scale of 0–7, how strongly do you identify with the Tamils (0 meaning no identification and 7 meaning extremely strong identification)? Circle the best answer. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 On a scale of 0–7, how strongly do you identify with the Sinhalese (0 meaning no identification and 7 meaning extremely strong identification)? Circle the best answer. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 On a scale of 0–7, how strongly do you identify with other members of your ethnic/ religious (0 meaning no identification and 7 meaning extremely strong identification)? Circle the best answer. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

426

Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

On a scale of 0–7, how strongly do you believe that Tamils should be blamed for the sufferings of the Eastern Muslims? (0 meaning no identification and 7 meaning extremely strong identification)? Circle the best answer. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 On a scale of 0–7, how strongly do you believe that the Tamil radical forces such as EPRLF–Varadar, TELO, EPDP and Karuna Group should be blamed for the political and social difficulties Muslims have been facing? (0 meaning no identification and 7 meaning extremely strong identification)? Circle the best answer. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 On a scale of 0–7, how strongly do you believe that the LTTE should be blamed for the marginalization of the Eastern Muslims? (0 meaning no identification and 7 meaning extremely strong identification)? Circle the best answer. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Main issues Do you support the permanent merger of the NorthEast merger? [Yes/No] What are the specific advantages and disadvantages accruing to the Muslims community of the Eastern province from the merger? What are your perceptions as to the implications of ISGA and P-TOMS? If the merger of the Northern and Eastern is made permanent, could an arrangement of devolution of powers acceptable to the Muslims of the Eastern province be arrived at in the present political context? [Yes/No] Do you think that the Sri Lanka government should offer a unit of devolution to the Eastern Muslims? [Yes/No] Why do you think Muslims should have a unit of political devolution? Do you not think that the LTTE led political administration would fulfill the needs of the Eastern Muslims? [Yes/No]. Please explain: In your opinion, what would be a likely outcome if the Sri Lanka government controlled by the Sinhalese rejects the Muslim devolution unit – the key demand of eastern Muslims? Do you think that Muslims’ decision to form a Muslim ethnic nationalist party in the form of Sri Lanka Muslims Congress (SLMC) is the right choice? [Yes/No] Are you a supporter of the SLMC? [Yes/No] Has there ever been fighting or tension between the Tamils and Muslims in the past? [Yes/No]

Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka

427

Do your religious beliefs justify the use of force and/or violence under certain circumstances? Please explain: Some sources speak of Eastern Muslim violence against the Tamils in the mid-1980s and 1990s? Are you aware of any such violence against the Eastern Tamils? [Yes/No] Do you think that Sinhala-Buddhist extremists forces such as the JVP and the JHU are intentionally making use of Muslim fears over the Tamils for their own electoral benefits? [Yes/No]. Any comments: Is there a trend towards the radicalization of the Muslims of the Eastern province? [Yes/No] The media claim that there are certain Muslim violent units existing in the corner of Eastern. Any comment? Thank you for your time and willingness to offer your perceptions on the special problems of the Muslims of the Eastern province. A.R.M. Imtiyaz, PhD Department of Political Science Temple University, USA

A.R.M. Imtiyaz is currently a visiting scholar at the Department of Political Sciences, the College of Liberal Arts, Temple University, USA. His primary research interest is in the study of ethnic conflict, both in Sri Lanka and in other countries. His articles have been published in several journals and presented at the international conferences on ethnicity. He served as a lecturer in Political Science at the South Eastern University of Sri Lanka from 1995–2002. Address: Department of Political Science, Gladfelter Hall, Room No. 414, Temple University, 1115 West Berks St, Philadelphia, PA 19122–6089, USA. ([email protected])