T5 B64 Gao Visa Docs 1 Of 6 Fdr- 5-21-03 Gao Interview Of Fbi-doj Re Gao Findings On Visa Revocation 507

FBI Prepared by: J. McCloskey Date Prepared: 5/23/03

"2.. 5

Index: FBI 2.5 DOC Number: 888594 Job Code: 320172

Record of Interview Title

Purpose Contact Method Contact Place Contact Date Participants

Dept. of Justice/FBI Exit Conference To obtain DOJ and FBI officials' views on our findings regarding the FBI's role in the visa revocation process. In person

Dept. of Justice May 21,2003 DOJ Kris Kobach, Office of the Attorney General Laura Baxter, Office of the Deputy Attorney General Vickie Sloan, GAO Audit Liaison DOJ/FBI Mr. Robert E. Casey, Jr., Office of Intelligence, rnnntprtprrnrism/Counterintelligence Division iCounterterrorism Division

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Mr. Tom Ruocco, Special Assistant, Office of Intelligence, Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division GAO liaison (leaving soon) AO liaison (new) GAO/IAT Mr. John Brummet, Assistant Director Ms. Kate Brentzel, Analyst Ms. Judy McCloskey, Senior Analyst

For phone numbers, see attached list (included in w/p FBI 2.5 as attachment I)

Comments/Remarks: We provided the officials with a written synopsis of our FBI-related findings. The findings are listed below in italics, followed by the comments of DOJ/FBI officials in regular type. State's Notification Sent to FBI and FBI Followup • While State generally sent information cables to FBI to notify it of the revocations, FBI officials could not provide us with evidence that units in the Counterterrorism Division received these cables from the bureau's main communication center. (FBI officials said that the agency's main communication center received the notifications but could not confirm if they were then distributed internally to appropriate investigative units at the FBI.) Page 1

Record of Interview

9/11

Law E n f o r c e m e n t

Privacy

Prepared by: J. McCloskey Date Prepared: 5/23/03

Index: FBI 2.5 DOC Number: 888594 Job Code:320172

. in the country; thus, they did not attempt to clear, remove, or prosecute any of them. According to INS and State data, at least 30 of the 240 individuals whose visas were revoked may still be in ihe country. FBI officials told us that, in the past, they did not routinely attempt to locate and investigate individuals with revoked visas who may have entered the United States. They did not do so because the notification cables State sent to the FBI "were information only" did not specify "possible terrorist" as the reason for the revocation and did not request FBI action on the case. Moreover, State did not attempt to make other contact with the FBI that would indicate any urgency in the matter. Mr. Casey and|

]had a copy of a sample visa revocation cable that State sends to the FBI,

which they used to highlight problems in State's revocation notices to the bureau. They told us that the FBI did not routinely open investigations as the result of visa revocations on terrorism grounds because the cable did not clearly indicate that visas had been revoked because the visa holder was a possible terrorist. In general, the cable as currently constructed as an insufficient mechanism for requesting FBI action. For example, the cables were sent as "information only" and did not request specific follow-up action from the FBI. In addition, the cable does not use the word "terrorism" in the text. It only says the visa is revoked under INA section 212(a)(3). FBI agents wouldn't necessarily know this is the national security provision of the INA, or that 212(a)(3)(B) is the terrorism provision. Moreover, State did not attempt to make other contact with the FBI that would indicate any urgency in following up on visa revocations, for example, State never called over to ask for FBI action. Mr. Casey said that State has the obligation of notifying the FBI immediately and directly if it believes a possible terrorist has entered the country. State should include a point of contact for each case on the revocation cable. The FBI officials said that if the cable is uploaded into the FBI's ACS (automated cable system), then if that person is already under investigation by the FBI, the investigator would know that the person had his visa revoked. However, a visa revocation cable alone would not trigger the FBI to open an investigation for reasons stated above. Mr. Casey said that we should familiarize ourselves with the Attorney General's guidelines for FBI investigations so that we know what type of FBI followup is allowed and under what circumstances. (Note: These guidelines are contained in w/p FBI 1.11.)

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Record of Interview

prepared by: J. McCloskey Date Prepared: 5/23/03

Index: FBI 2.5 DOC Number: 888594

Job Code: 320172

In order for the FBI to take action in specific cases, State's revocation notice would have to include more information/evidence on why State thinks the individual might be a terrorist. The information should be sent to the Counterintelligence/Counterterrorism Division, which would then direct it to the appropriate unit within the division that would determine whether the person had already entered the country, and, if so, whether the FBI should locate, investigate, and take appropriate action in each case. Possible units for this followup could be either the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force or the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, who would funnel the information to the local Joint Terrorism Task Forces. Mr. Casey said that in our report, we should not specify which unit within the Counterintelligence/Counterterrorism Division should receive the revocation notice; instead, we should allow FBI management to make that decision.

• On March 12,2003, FBI's Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force reported to Congress that it had cleared 76 of the 105 individuals whose visas had been revoked due to FBI delays in completing Visas Condor name checks. We asked for additional information on this group of 105 individuals in February 2003. As of May 16, %)03, the Department of Justice had not released this information to us. Mr. Casey, until recently the Director of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, said that he had prepared a response to our questions but that DOJ had not cleared the response. After the exit conference, Ms. Sloan called me to say that DOJ realized the department should provide the response to us as soon as possible. I received the response via courier at 4:05 pm that day. We ' changed some of the wording in the report draft dealing with the above two findings to account for this new information. FBI Watchlist • FBI officials in mid-May 2003 had not determined whether the agency's watch list units had received any notice of visa revocations. Mr. Casey said that the FBI only has one watch list unit, rather than plural as we stated in our finding. The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force uses data from many agencies' watchlists; it has no watchlist of its own.

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Record of Interview

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

9/11 Personal Privacy

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