T5 B64 Gao Visa Docs 2 Of 6 Fdr- 5-7-03 Gao Dos Exit Conference Re Findings- Visa Revocation

Prepared by: J. McCloskey Date Prepared: 5/23/03

Index: State-*-f2 DOC Number: 888582 Job Code:320172

Record of Interview Title Purpose

Contact Method Contact Place Contact Date Participants

State Department Exit Conference To provide the preliminary findings for our review of the visa revocation process. During this discussion State Department officials provided additional information on policies and procedures for the revocation process. In person State Department, Office of Visa Services May 7, 2003 State/Bureau of Consular Affairs Ms. Catherine Barry, Managing Director, Office of Visa Services Mr. Steve Fischel, Director, Office of Legislation, Regulations and Advisory Assistance Mr. Richard Beer, Chief, Coordination Division, Office of Legislation, Regulations, and Advisory Assistance GAO Mr. Jess Ford, Director, IAT Ms. Kate Brentzel, Analyst, IAT Ms. Mary Moutsos, Attorney, IAT Ms. Judy McCloskey, Senior Analyst, IAT

Comments/Remarks:

• According to Ms. Barry and Mr. Fischel, the U.S. government has no overall written policy on how agencies should use visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool. However, Ms. Barry and Mr. Fischel told us they envision the revocation process as taking place before the visa holder -—| enters the country. This would allow State and other agencies more time to investigate and determine whether a suspected terrorist is in fact ineligible for a visa on terrorism grounds before allowing the visa holder to enter. As these officials explained, since the September 11 attacks, State's consular affairs bureau has been receiving a large volume of information on suspected terrorists from the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, overseas posts, and other units within State, particularly Diplomatic Security. The department reviews this information to determine if a suspected terrorist has a U.S. visa. If the identifying information is incomplete, as is often the case, State may have difficulty in determining whether a visa holder with the same or a similar name as a suspected terrorist is in fact the

I suspected terrorist. It may also lack sufficient proof of a specific act that would render the i Page 1

Record of Interview

Prepared by: J. McCloskey Date Prepared: 5/23/03

Index: State 1.12 DOC Number: 888582 Job Code: 320172

suspected terrorist ineligible for a visa, as required by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). In these cases, State would revoke the person's visa under the Secretary of State's discretionary authority, requiring the person to reapply for a visa if he or she still intended to

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visit the United States. State would then use the visa issuance process to obtain additional biographic and other data on the visa applicant and make a determination on the person's eligibility.

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• Mr. Fischel and Ms. Barry further explained that under the INA, the Secretary of State has discretionary authority to revoke any visa that a consular officer has issued, including cases in' which he believes that the visa holder may be ineligible for a visa under the INA's terrorism

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provision. They said that all 240 isa revocations in our review were revoked under the Secretary of State's discretionary authority. All department revocations are prudential revocations, i.e., they are done under the Secretary of State's authority. Thus, the wording in the revocation cables that they are "prudential revocations" means only that they are done

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under that authority. Ms. Barry said that there are no written procedures to guide the interagency process for revoking visas on terrorism or other grounds. These officials explained that prior to September 11, 2001, State revoked only a small number of visas for terrorism-related reasons. This relatively small number resulted in State and INS operating in an informal manner when cooperating on denying admission to revoked visa holders at ports of entry. State officials said that they and the Department of Justice (DOJ) had agreed to informal notification procedures between the two agencies and crafted language for the visa revocation certificates several years ago; however, they did not develop formal written procedures. Ms. Barry said that State does not have any statistics on the number of pre-September 11 visas that were revoked on terrorism grounds; the Visa Office does not these figures in its annual report. Accordng to Mr. Fischel, State and DOJ lawyers carefully crafted the language of the visa revocation certificates so that the revocations for people in the United States would only take effect when they left the country. This language ensures that there will be no judicial review of the Secretary of State's revocation decisions. Mr. Fischel said that revoking a visa while a

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Record of Interview

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Prepared by: J. McCloskey Date Prepared: 5/23/03

Index: State 1.12 DOC Number: 888582 Job Code: 320172

person is here would be irrelevant, since the revocation would not provide any additional weapons for the U.S. government while the visa holders are still in the country. • According to Ms. Barry and Mr. Fischel, the policies and procedures contained in the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) apply only to situations when a consular officer revokes a visa and explain under what conditions a consular officer may do so. The FAM instructs consular officers to obtain a security advisory opinion from the department before determining that a visa holder is ineligible for a visa on terrorism grounds. In practice this means that department /)

officials at headquarters acting under the authority of the Secretary of State—not the consular v

officers at overseas posts—revoke visas based on terrorism concerns. Because the FAM is written for consular officers overseas, it does not include the standard operating procedures that the Department uses in revoking visas. Mr. Beer and Ms. Barry said that the department follows specific, but unwritten, operating procedures when revoking visas . They said that once the Deputy Assistant Secretary signs a revocation certificate, the department is supposed to take the following actions, as soon after the visa is revoked as possible: (1) notify the INS Lookout Unit via a faxed copy of the revocation certificate so that the unit can enter the individual into its watch list, IBIS. State considers the faxed revocation certificate to be the primary notification method for the INS Lookout Unit. State officials told us that they try to send notification to the Lookout Unit the same day the revocation certificate is signed. If a revocation is time sensitive, State will call the Lookout Unit as well. (2) notify consular officers at all overseas post that the individual is a suspected terrorist by entering a lookout on the person into State's watch list, CLASS. This would alert the consular officers that they need to ask for a security advisory opinion before issuing a new visa to the person whose visa had been revoked. (3) notify the issuing post via cable so that the post can attempt to contact the individual to physically cancel his visa. Information-only copies of these cables are also sent to INS's and FBI's main communication centers. State relies on INS and FBI internal distribution

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mechanisms to ensure that these cables are routed to appropriate units within the agencies.-' State considers the cable was an additional backup method. Ms. Barry said that the cables

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Record of Interview

Prepared by: J. McCloskey Date Prepared: 5/23/03

Index: State 1.12 DOC Number: 888582 Job Code:320172

are the only method State uses to inform the FBI of the revocation. State does not coordinate its visa revocations with the FBI. • Ms. Barry and Mr. Beer said they did not have fax transmission receipts to confirm that sent revocation certificates for each of the 240 cases we reviewed, although they,- said this •I ! would become a standard operating procedure for the Visa Office in the future/they also said the State Visa Office did not keep a central log of visas it revoked based on terrorism concerns, nor did it monitor whether notifications were sent to other agencies. All three officials attributed the breakdowns in the interagency and interagency notification process to personnel changes in the INS Lookout Unit and FBI's reorganization and expansion of its counterterrorism efforts. Mr. Beer was not aware that the VRVK code was not being entered into CLASS. He said he would check into it.

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Record of Interview