T5 B55 Fbi Response 3 Of 3 Fdr- Tab 13-11- Entire Contents- Aviation Security Directive (see Unredacted T5 B24)

U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D. C. 20535-0001

November 18, 2003 Daniel Marcus, General Counsel National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States Suite 300 2100KStreet,N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 RE: Commission's Request for Documents Dear Mr. Marcus: In response to the Commissions Request for Documents, please find the following:

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Documents responsive to Document Request 3-If; Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #3-e -4 Packets; Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #3-h -2 Packets; Documents responsive to Document Request 13-11.

This is part of the FBI's rolling production and thus may be supplemented in The future. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 202-324-9613. Sincerely,

?ert S. Sinl assistant General Counsel

SECURITY DIRECTIVE LIST DOCUMENTS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE ORIGIN , MISSION AND RESULTS OF THE SECURITY DIRECTIVE LIST CREATED AND DISSEMINATED BY THE FBI IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.

RESPONSIVE to REQUEST #13-11 (PACKET #2)

COMMISSION COPY

•9/11 COMMISSION TASK-FORO, DOCUMENT DELETION CODES [As of August 11, 2003] "A" - SOURCE/INFORMANT INFORMATION - Information, the disclosure of which would tend to reveal the identity of an informant or source where confidentiality is expressed or implied. "B" - FBI TECHNIQUES AND/OR METHODS - Information on sensitive FBI techniques and/or methods which would impede or impair the effectiveness of that technique and/or method. "C" - NON-RELEVANT FBI CASE INFORMATION - Information neither relevant nor responsive to the Commission's requests. "D" - FBI PENDING CASE INFORMATION - Information which would impede or jeopardize a pending investigation of the FBI. "E" - STATUTORY - Information legally prohibited from release by statute. "F" - PRIVACY/SECURITY - Information, the disclosure of which would be an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy or jeopardize the safety of law enforcement personnel and/or -tiicir iaiis% :iiejnhers Material redacted under this code includes (1) social security nuniFerS; (2) date and place of birth; (3) home address and telephone numbers; (4) personnel cell phone and pager numbers

"G" - FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION - The identity of a foreign government and/or foreign service to include the names of foreign law enforcement employees/officials.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

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TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Aviation Security Directive

Subject: Threat to U.S. Airports - No Fly and Selectee Lists Number: SD 1542-01-1 OB Date: April 22, 2003 EXPIRATION: Indefinite This Security Directive (SD) supercedes and cancels SD 1542-01-10A and must be implemented not later than April 29, 2003. Revised procedures are indicated by bold text. INFORMATION: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has received information indicating that the individuals on the No Fly and Selectee Lists associated with this SD could pose a threat to civil aviation and national security. This SD provides procedures that airport operators are to follow to compare individuals whose names appear on the No Fly and Selectee Lists with direct employees and those employees to which the airport has issued Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) identification media, or is OOH Jdering issuing SIDA identification media.

REVISION SUMMARY: • •

Revises procedures for comparing names of direct employees and those employees to which the airport has issued SIDA identification media or is considering issuing SIDA identification media against the No Fly and Selectee Lists Provides guidance and direction to restrict or p> ;h:hit access to the SIDA and other sterile areas of the airport

ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIRPORT OPERATORS REGULATED UNDER 49 CFR 1542: The requirements of this SD are applicable to Category X through IV airports that are required to maintain SIDAs and sterile areas.

I. TSA will provide No Fly and Selectee Lists to the security coordinator of each airport to which this SD applies. The No Fly and Selectee Lists will be provided via password protected email or may be obtained from TSA's secure webpage. All future SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW. AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WAPIiiNRTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE VAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR I i? '•'•-•' ""NMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

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DIRECTIVE 1542-01-10B Page 2 of 3

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updates (removal or ?vU!ition of names) to thp N> - iy 3,1 i Selectee Lists will be provided in the S3r KI^^T, Air^Ji>. • * v••>: ^s niuat conduct a comparison between the names on the most recently issued No Fly and Selectee Lists and its direct employees and any other individual to whom the airport has issued, or is processing an application for SIDA, sterile area, or other identification media that is evidence of employment at the airport.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIViL PPM.1*!,!"' OR OTHER ACTION. FOR US. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

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SECURITY DIRECTIVE 1542-01-108

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n. Many nun W-.^^n .-.-^-.\\r-jk do'not follow strict patterns in name order. The names that; appear on the No Fly and Selectee Lists may be in varying order and spelling. Data such ad / issue, will be provided by TSA when available. This data must be used when making a comparison between names on the No Fly and Selectee Lists and those individuals to whom the airport has issued, or is processing an application for, SIDA, sterile area, or other identification media that is evidence of employment at the airport. HI. NO FLY LIST ACTIONS A. If during the course of the name comparison, the airport operator determines it has issued, or is processing an application for SIDA, sterile area, or other identification media that is evidence of employment at the airport, to an individual named on the No Fly List, the airport operator must immediately contact: 1, The nearest FBI Office. 2. The Transportation Security Intelligence (TSI) Watch ad

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B. If processing an application for SIDA, sterile area, or other identification media that is evidence of employment at the airport, the airport operator must not issue the media. For those individuals already issued SIDA, sterile area, or other identification media that is evidence of employment at the airport, the airport operator must suspend the media and prohibit the individual's access, whether escorted or unescorted, to the SIDA and sterile areas until the status of the individual is determined by the FBI. IV. SELECTEE LIST A A. If during the course of UIH nam.; comparison, the airport operator determines it has issued, or is processing an application for SIDA, sterile area, or other identification media that is evidence of employment at the airport to a direct employee and that employee is named on the Selectee List, the airport operator must immediately contact: 1. 2.

The nearest FBI Office. The Transportation Security Intelligence (TSI) Watch at|

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B. lu relation to identification media: 1.

If the employee has applied for SIDA, sterile area, or other identification media that is evidence of employment at the airport, the airport operator must not issue the media until the FBI clears the employee. An airport operator may issue other than SIDA identification media if that employee will be subject to screening in accordance with the SD 1542-02-03 series prior to entrance into any sterile area of the airport.

2.

Do not permit the employee access to the SIDA if the employee has already been issued a SIDA identification media unless that employee is accompanied SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEEO TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 4» CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20SSO. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR US. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETF.RMINm • ;,nER 5 U.S.C. ?52.

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»scc 1 fho has been issued a SIDA media, or the employee is cleared by

AIRPORT OPERATOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT: The Airport Operator must immediately provide written confirmation to the Federal Security Director (FSD) indicating receipt of this SD.

AIRPORT dissemination: The FSD will disseminate this SD to the Airport Security Coordinator (ASC) and any law enforcement element having 49 CFR 1542 responsibilities at that airport. No other dissemination may be made without prior approval of the FSD. Airport Law Enforcement Agency Network (ALEAN) affected members who currently have a memorandum of agreement with the TSA will also receive this SD from the TSA. No other dissemination may be made without prior approval of the Administrator. Unauthorized dissemination of this document or information contained herein is prohibited by 49 CFR 1520. APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: With respect to the provisions of this SD, an airport operator may submit in writing to the FSD, proposed alternative measures and the basis for submitting the alternative measures, for approval by the Assistant Administrator for Aviation Operations. FOR THA ACTION ONI Y: The TSA shall issue this 80 immediately to 49 CFR 1542 airports Categc: y X thrcuah IV and to the corporate security element of all affected U.S. aircraft operators.

/s/ J. M. Loy, ADM Administrator

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR US. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Aviation Security Directive Subject: Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators - Selectee List Number:

SD 1544-01-21C

Date: April 22, 2003

EXPIRATION: Indefinite This Security Directive (SD) supercedes and cancels SD 1544-01-21B and must be implemented not later than April 29, 2003. Revised procedures are indicated by bold text. INFORMATION: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has received information indicating that individuals on the Selectee List associated with this SD may warrant additional scrutiny prior to boarding to ensure they do not pose a threat to civil aviation and national security. This SD provides procedures that aircraft operators are to follow to verity the identity of individuals who.=e names appear on the Selectee List. The procedures outlined herein appiy to passengers carried by the aircraft operator and the frircnft op^ntoc'.*? dii«iet employees. REVISION SUMMARY: • Revises procedures for verifying the identity of individuals whose names appear on the Selectee List • Revises procedures to restrict or prohibit access to restricted areas of an airport by aircraft operator employees whose names appear on the Selectee List ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIRCRAFT OPERATORS REGULATED UNDER TITLE 49. CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR). PART 1544: If you are an aircraft operator covered by 49 CFR 1544, you must implement all the measures set forth in this SD. I. TSA will provide a Selectee List to the security director or designee of each aircraft operator required to implement this SD. The Selectee List will be provided via password protected email or may be obtained from TSA's secure webpage. All future updates (removal or addition of names) to the Selectee List will be provided in the same manner. Aircraft operators must conduct a comparison between the names on the most recently issued Selectee List and SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 2Q590, UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

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Security Directive 1544-01 -21 C

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those passengers checking in for flights. ArtditiuiuiJiv. j
n. Many non-Western cultures do not follow strict patterns in name order. The names that appear on the Selectee List may be in varying order and spelling. Data such asj | I | will be provided by ISA when available. This data must be used during the flight check-in process to assist in the determination of an individual's status as outlined in Section III of this SD. HI. PASSENGERS Should an individual whose name appears on the Selectee List present himself or herself to the aircraft operator for transport, the aircraft operator must complete the following procedures prior to allowing the passenger and bags on board the aircraft: A. Compare all available passenger data| | to determine if there is a match.

(to information on the Selectee List

B. If the passenger matches both name and one piece of identifying data or there is an exact name match and no additional identifying data is provided to you on the Selectee List, the aircraft operator must: 1. Designate the person as a uelcctcft i'cs financed .srrotming procedures. 2. Clear all checked baggage belonging to Hu> jw? senger, if any, in accordance with the measures in AOSSP Section VIII. E. 3. Ensure the passenger and all their accessible property are subjected to secondary screening either at the security screening check point or at the gate in accordance with SD 1544-01-10 series. 4. Immediately contact the following: a. The nearoy
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Security Directive 1544-01-21C Page 3 of 4

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« ne'r *- j; verification check of the information .j:•..,.•;•;<;.-;-J o^ aiu oei^ctee List. A record must be maintained at each station of all flights operated with passengers who are designated as selectees in accordance with this SD, listing the name of each passenger and the names of the two aircraft operator representatives who completed the verification. These records must be maintained at the station for a minimum of seven (7) days if in the United States or 180 days if outside the United States.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION WARNING; THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER $ U-S.C. SS2.

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Security Directive 1S44-01-21C

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D. The procedures in Section Ill.C. do not apply to a passenger designated as a selectee based on the application of the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) or manual prescreening criteria. IV.

AIRCRAFT OPERATOR EMPLOYEES

A. Aircraft operators must conduct a comparison against the most current Selectee List for ail direct aircraft operator employees. If during the course of the name comparison the aircraft operator determines that an employee has been issued, or is processing an application for a SIDA, sterile area, or other identification media that is evidence of employment with the aircraft operator, and that employee is named on the Selectee List, the aircraft operator must immediately contact: 1. The nearest FBI Field Office if within the United States, or the United States legal attache at the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate, if outside the United States: 2. The Transportation Security Intelligence (TSI) Watch at| 3. The appropriate law enforcement officials at the airport, advising them of the situation. B. Upon completion of the steps in I V.A., aircraft operators must take the following action in relation to ID media; '..

If lh« employee has applied to the local airport operator for SIDA identification media, the aircraft operator must advise the airport operator not to issue the media until the FBI clears the employee. An aircraft operator may issue sterile area or other identification media that Is evidence of employment with the aircraft operator if that employee will be subject to screening in accordance with the SD 154401-10 series prior to entrance into any sterile area of the airport and equivalent restricted areas at airports outside of the United States, or

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2. If the employee has already been issued a SIDA identification media, the aircraft operator must not permit the employee access to the SIDA or other airport sterile areas unless that employee is accompanied by an escort who has been issued and is displaying a valid S^OA media or is cleared by the FBI. AIRCRAFT OPERATOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT: The aircraft operator shall provide immediate written confirmation to its assigned PSI indicating that it has received this SD. AIRCRAFT OPERATOR dissemination required: The aircraft operator shall immediately pass •the information and directives set forth in this SD to all stations affected, and provide written confirmation to its assigned PSI, indicating that all stations affected have acknowledged SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 4» CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 4» CFR 1S20, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION, FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE PETERMINEO UNDER 5 U.S.C. SSZ

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Security Directive 1544-01-21C Page 5 of 4

• •eipt of the information and directives set forth in this SD.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1S20. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVFPNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

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The aircraft operator shall disseminate uJ -(.io,;nation to senior management personnel, GSC's, and supervisory security personnel at locations within the United States and its territories. Aircraft operator security personnel at each location should coordinate the distribution of information in this SD with local airport management and law enforcement personnel on a strict need-to-know basis. All recipients must limit dissemination within their respective organizations to personnel with an operational need-to-know. All aircraft operator personnel implementing this SD must be briefed by the aircraft operator on its content and the restrictions governing dissemination. APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: With respect to the provisions of this SD, the aircraft operator may submit in writing to its Principal Security Inspector (PSI) proposed alternative measures and the basis for submitting the alternative measures, for approval by the Assistant Administrator for Aviation Operations. The aircraft operator shall immediately notify its PSI whenever any procedure in this SD cannot be carried out by the aircraft operator or its agents, or is not being carried out by a government authority charged with performing security procedures. FOR TSA ACTION ONLY: The TSA shall issue this SD immediately to the corporate
Is/ J. M. Loy, ADM

Administrator

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1S20. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DERNED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20S90. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENAL IY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT Or HOMCUVK) SECURITY TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Aviation Security Directive Subject: Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators - No Fly List Number:

SD 1544-01-20B

Date: April 22, 2003

EXPIRATION: Indefinite This Security Directive (SD) supercedes and cancels SD 1544-01-20A and must be implemented not later than April 29, 2003. Revised procedures are indicated by bold text INFORMATION: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has received information indicating that individuals on the No Fly List associated with this SD could pose a threat to civil aviation and national security. There have been many instances where the name of a passenger is identical or similar to an individual on the No Fly List. This SD provides revised guidance and direction concerning use of the No Fly List and procedures aircraft operators are to follow to resolve name conflicts. Affirming the incorrect iderrtity of the Individual can cause unnecessary embarrassment and inability to board a flight Additionally, this SD revises procedures currently in piaec which prohibit aircraft operator employees whose names appear on the No Fly List, accost to restricted areas of airports. REVISION SUMMARY: • Revises procedures for verifying the identity of individuals whose names appear on or are similar to names on the No Fly List • Provides guidance and direction for the use of the No Fly List and procedures aircraft operators are to follow to quickly resolve conflicts • Revises procedures to restrict or prohibit access to restricted areas of an airport by aircraft operator employees whose names appear on the No Fly List ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIRCRAFT OPERATORS REGULATED UNDER TITLE 49. CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR). PART 1544: If you are an aircraft operator covered by 49 CFR 1544, you must implement all the measures set forth in this SD. I. TSA will provide a No Fly List to the security director or designee of each aircraft operator required to implement this SD. The No Fly List will be provided via password protected email or may be obtained from TSA's secure webpage. All SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RFLEAS* MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNI.,.;: j u.J.C. 552.

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nb_r?o j updates ^removal or addition of names) to the No Fly List will be provided in the same manner. Aircraft operators must conduct a comparison between the

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHING. \C 2059^ UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBUti AVV.,1 ABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

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names on the most recently issued No Hy Lisi and tlioue passengers checking in for flights. Additionally, aircraft operators must also conduct a comparison between names on each updated No Fly List and all direct aircraft operator employees and those individuals to which the aircraft operator has issued SIDA identification media, or is processing an application for SIDA identification media. II. Many non-Western cultures do not follow strict patterns in name order. The names that appear on the No Fly List may be in varying order and spelling. Data such as / I will be provided by TSA when available. This data must be used during the flight check-in process to assist in the determination of an individual's status as outlined in Section III of this SD. III. PASSENGERS A.

Check Prior to Arrival: When passenger reservation data is available in advance of the arrival of a passenger for check-in, the aircraft operator must conduct a comparison of its flight reservation system to the most current No Fly List. During this process, if an aircraft operator matches a name and at least one additional piece of identifying data on its flight reservation system with the No Fly List, excluding a match of identifying data that appears in the Remarks Section of the No Fly List, the aircraft operator must immediately contact the following: 1. The nearest FBI Field Office, if the departing flight is within the ' hji'-r-j States, or the United States legal attache at the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate, if the departing flight is outside the United States, 2. The Transportation Security Intelligence (TSI) Watch at/

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3. The local Federal Security Director, if the departing flight is within the United States, who will alert other aircraft operators at that airport of the situation. B.

Clearance at Check-In (Within the United States); Upon arrival of a passenger for check-in at an airport in the United States, the aircraft operator must conduct a comparison botv/een the names on the most recently issued No Fly List and their flight reservation -system. During this process, if an aircraft operator matches a name and, if provided, at least one additional piece of identifying data on its flight reservation system with a name on the No Fly List, excluding a match of identifying data that appears in the Remarks Section (if the passenger matches data in the Remarks Section, see HI. B. 4.), the aircraft operator must deny transportation to that individual, their accessible property, checked baggage, and any other individual(s) accompanying the passenger and their baggage unless cleared by the following process: 1. Contact the appropriate local law enforcement officials and ensure the responding Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) compares all available data SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1620. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. WASHINGTON, DC 205»0. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR 11/3. «UVfctlNME.NT,AGENCIES, PUBUC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER * U AC. SSZ.

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to determine if the individual is a match.

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SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1S20, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. WASHINGTON. DC 20S90. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL P6N«L
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2. If the LEO determines there is no matching data from the No Fly List other than the individual's name, the aircraft operator may accept the individual as a passenger for transport. 3. If the LEO determines that an individual matches the name and at least one additional piece of identifying data (requirement to match additional data does not apply where only a name is listed) from the No Fly List, the aircraft operator must immediately contact the following: a. The nearest FBI Field Office. b. The Transportation Security Intelligence Watch at|

I

c. The local Federal Security Director who will alert other aircraft operators at that airport of the situation. 4^ Match of identifying data that appears in the Remarks Section of the No Fly List. TSA may provide identifying data in the Remarks Section of the No Fly List for an individual who bears a name that is the same as, or similar to, a name on the No Fly List, but who is permitted to fly. This identifying data will be used to confirm that the individual is not the person identified as a threat on the No Fly List. a. TSA will accept, from individuals only, written requests for relief from the No Fly List clearance procedures of III. B. 1., 2., and 3. b. If TSA establishes that an individual requesting relief is not on the No Fly List, TSA will include in tho R?mar!-;r- Sectioo of the No Fly List the identifying data tSuiu distinguishes the cicii.od passenger from the individual who \* prohibited from flying. c. An aircraft operator must implement a system approved by its Principal Security Inspector (P3I) that: (1) Utilizes the data provided in the Remarks Section of the No Fly List to clear an individual for flights at check-in without the procedures, listed in 111. B. 1., 2., and 3. (2) Provides a procedure to verify that an authorized aircraft operator representative responsible for verification of the No Fly List applies these clearance procedures. (3) Maintains at each station a record of every flight that operated with an individual who was cleared to fly with these clearance procedures, including listing the name of each individual and the names of two representatives of the aircraft operator who completed the verification. These records must be maintained at the station for a minimum of seven (7) days. C.

Clearance at Check-In (Outside of the United States); Upon arrival of a passenger for check-in at an airport outside of the United States, the aircraft operator must conduct a comparison between the names on the most recently issued No Fly List and their flight reservation system. When an SENSITIVE SECURfTY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 48 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN «» CFR 1S20, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. WASHINGTON, OC 20SSO. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMWF_L> UNO K "i i I.S.C. 552.

REQ 13-11

000000018

Closed by S t a t u t e

^

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-> Security Directive 1544-01-20B \e 6 of 1 - j

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•'

individual rrmtcirjs information on the No Fly List, excluding a match of identifying data that appears in the Remarks Section (if the passenger mat<;hos
|

3. Additionally, the appropriate law enforcement officials at the airport should be notified. 4. Match of identifying data that appears in the Remarks Section of the No Fly List. TSA may provide identifying data in the Remarks Section of the No Fly List for an individual who bears a name that is the same as, or similar to, a name on the No Fly List, but who is permitted to fly. This identifying data must be used to confirm that the individual is not the person identified as a threat on the No Fly List. a. TSA will accept, from Individuals only, written requests for relief from the No Fly List clearance procedures of this SD. b. If TSA establishes that an individual requesting relief is not on the No Fly List, TSA will include in the Remarks Section of the No Fly Listfhe identify!n»:,' d;iia Uiat distinguishes the cleared passenger frouj tao individual who is prohibited from flying. <... An aircraft operator must implement a system approved by its Principal Security Inspector (PSI) that:

IV.

(1)

Utilizes the data provided in the Remarks Section of the No Fly List to clear an individual for flights at check-in, alleviating the requirement to process the passenger through the procedures of III.C.1., 2., and 3.

(2)

Provides a procedure to verify that an authorized aircraft operator representative responsible for verification of the No Fly List applies these clearance procedures.

(3)

Maintains at each station a record of every flight that operated with an individual who was cleared to fly with these clearance procedures, including listing the name of each individual and the names of two representatives of the aircraft operator who completed the verification. These records must be maintained at the station for a minimum of one hundred and eighty (180) days.

AIRCRAFT OPERATOR EMPLOYEES SENSfTIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1SJO. EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBUC AV*M ABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER S U.S.C. 5C2. ^

REQ 13-11

000000019

I * r~l

Security Directive 1544-01-20B Page 7 of 1

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>...* \.

Aircraft operators must,condnct a comparison be

updated No Fly List and its direci airci-n I «r;i vor s^ipioyees and those individuals to which the aircraft operator has issued, or is processing an application for SI DA, sterile area, or other identification media that is evidence of employment with the aircraft operator.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

REQ 13-11

000000020

Security DlrecUve 1544-01-20B Page 8 of 1

9/11 Closed by Statute

B.

|f during the course of the name comparison an aircraft operator determines it has issued, or is processing an application for a SIDA, sterile area, or other identification media that is evidence of employment with the aircraft operator, fpr an individual named on the No Fly List, the aircraft operator must immediately contact the following: 1. The nearest FBI Field Office, if within the United States, or the United States legal attache at the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate, if outside the United States. 2. The Transportation Security Intelligence Watch aq

I

3. The local Federal Security Director who will alert other aircraft operators at that airport of the situation. C.

If processing an application for a SIOA, sterile area, or other ID media that is evidence of employment with the aircraft operator, the aircraft operator must not issue the media. For those individuals already issued SIDA. sterile area, or other identification media that is evidence of employment with the aircraft operator, the aircraft operator must suspend the media and prohibit the individual's access, whether escorted or unescorted, to the SIDA and sterile areas until the status of the individual is determined by the FBI.

AIRCRAFT OPERATOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT: Upon receipt of this SD, the aircraft operator •.;i! )il iKovido immediate written confirmation to its assigned PS!, indicating that they iwra received this SD. AIRCRAFT OPERATOR dissemination required: The aircraft operator shall immediately pass the information and directives set forth in this SD to all stations affected, and provide written confirmation to its assigned PSI, indicating that all stations affected have acknowledged receipt of the information and directives set forth in this SD. The aircraft operators shall disseminate this information to senior management personnel, GSC's, and supervisory security personnel at locations within the United States and its territories. Aircraft operator security personnel at each location should coordinate the information in this SD with local a*i port management and law enforcement personnel on a strict need-to-know basis. All recipients must limit dissemination within their respective organizations to personnel with an operational need-to-know. All aircraft operator personnel implementing this SD must be briefed by the aircraft operator on its content and the restrictions governing dissemination. APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: With respect to the provisions of this SD, as stated in 49 CFR 1544, aircraft operators may submit in writing to their PSI, proposed alternative measures and the basis for submitting the requests, for approval by the Assistant Administrator for Aviation Operations. The aircraft operator shall immediately notify its PSI whenever the aircraft operator or its agents cannot carry out any procedure in this SD, or is not being carried out by a government authority charged with performing security procedures. SENSmVE SECURITY INFORMATION WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 41 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW. AS DEFINED IN 4t CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, OC S0590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PFH",LTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 8 U.S.C. SSI

REQ 13-11

000000021

Watch0/o20L.ist%20SD-1544-01 -20B%2Qi3ted%204-22-03[1].doc' Security Directive 1544-01-20B Page 9 of 1

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20S90. UNAUTHORIZED ZKLi-ASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.

REQ

13-11

000000022

Watch%20List%20SD-1544-01-20B%^lated%204-22-03[1].doc • - •

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Security Directive 1544-01-20B Page 10 of 1

FOR ISA ACTION ONLY: The TSA shall issue this SD immediately to the corporate security element of all affected U.S. aircraft operators and to local airport management and associated law enforcement officials.

FOR STATE DEPARTMENT: Retransmittal to appropriate foreign posts is authorized. Post must refer to STATE 162917, 201826Z Sep 01, Subject: FAA Security Directives and Information Circulars: Definitions and Handling, for specific guidance and dissemination.

fsl J. M. Loy, ADM

Administrator

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. WASHINGTON, DC 20S90. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC A'/ '.il ABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER S U.S.C. 552.

REQ 13-11

000000023

9/11

Law Enforcement

Privacy '-

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

}

/,

t

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence:

Date:

PRIORITY

06/09/2003

All Field Offices

Attn:

ADIC/SAC ASAG Counterterrorism JTTF Supervisors Airport Liaison Agents FBIHQ, Manuals Desk

All Legats Counterterrorism

Attn:

Section Chief, ITOS I Section Chief, ITOS II Section Chief, DTOS Unit Chiefs

To:

From:

Counterterrorism Special Events Management Unit/ Civil Aviation Security Program Contact: SSAJi

Approved By:

Drafted By: Case ID #: 3UOti-HQ-< :iLA-i203 -K 66F-HQ-C1384970 Title:

(Pending)

TSA NO FLY AND TSA SELECTEE LIST; PROCEDURES TO ADD OR REMOVE NAMES

Reference: 265A-NY-280350-WLC Serial 98 265A-NY-280350-WLC Serial 89 265A-NY-280350 Serial 1586 66F-HQ-C13928S2 Serial 8 Enclosure: The following three TSA dated April 22, 2003, are enclosed: (1) SD-1544-01-21C, "Threat to U.S. List" ; (2) SD-1542-01-10B, "Threat to U.S. Lists"; and, (3) SD-1544-01-20B, "Threat to U.S. List. "

REQ 13-11

Avj.,\tion Security Directives, Aixorai7t Operators-Selectee Airports-No Fly and Selectee Aircraft Operators-No Fly

000000024

To: All Field O f e s From: Counterterroriv Re: 300B-HQ-C1184^03-K, 06/09/2003

-A

Synopsis: To advise of procedures established to provide consistent application of names submitted by the FBI to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) No Fly and Selectee Lists. Details: Background: On October 15, 2001, the FAA issued Security Directives (SD's) after receiving lists of individuals associated with Al-Qaeda from both the CIA and the FBI. The SD's contained a list of persons who were believed to pose a threat to civil aviation security. This process was refined to a coordinated policy and protocol between the FBI, CIA, and FAA (now the TSA) to identify persons who may pose a threat to civil aviation security. Since late 2001, there have been refinements -to the protocol in which persons are either placed on or removed from either'list. The TSA maintains the two lists and names are submitted mostly by the CIA and the FBI, but also from the Department of Homeland Security/Bureau of Immigration and Customs .Enforcement, TSA, and on occasion, other agencies. The TSA No Fly List and TSA Selectee List are not to be confused with other watch lists, such as: a. b. o. d. e. f.

Definitions of each list The perspns o<.. the TSA No Flv List are to be prevented from using U.S. commercial Aviation, since they have been deemed by the TSA to be a threat to civil aviation security, based upon information received from various sources. These individuals may not use commercial aviation as long as their name appears on the TSA No Fly List. When a person on this list arrives at an airport and attempts to fly, the airline is required to alert local law enforcement. Local law enforcement authorities will be the primaryresponse to determine if the person at the airport matches the person on the list. If there is a positive match, then the local law

REQ 13-11

000000025

js-TV To: Re:

/~v

All Field Of; ):es From: Counterterrori. j 300B-HQ-C1184203-K, 06/09/2003

enforcement authorities will contact the local FBI Field Office's Airport Liaison Agent or Joint Terrorism'Task Force. The FBI shall then respond to the airport to conduct further investigation, including identity checks, consensual interview, and notification to FBIHQ. Such responses should be documented at the field division level. A detention is generally warranted for individuals with an outstanding arrest warrant, or if investigation reveals the person is on an operational terrorist mission. The persons on the TSA Selectee List are not known to be a threat to aviation, but an agency has said, they may have a possible connection to terrorism or a terrorist organization. Passengers determined to match the name on this list are subject to enhanced pre-boarding security screening measures, and ultimately, are permitted to travel on commercial aviation. The .airlines are also required to notify both local and airport law enforcement and the' local FBI office. However, as long as individuals are subject to enhanced screening, additional law enforcement review is not required. The backbone to the regulatory process for the civil aviation industry is Security Directives, issued by the TSA (formerly Federal Aviation Administration) . Over the past twenty months, the TSA has issued updated SB's that outline actions for airport operators and airliner; in regard to names appearxug on either the TSA No Fly List or TSA 3ei<>c'i:ee Li3t. ' In essence, the SD' d advise airport operators to (1) check applicants for airport ID card (e.g., SIDA badge) applicants names against the TSA No Fly List and TSA Selectee List, and (2) outline procedures for airlines to check passengers names and employees for name matches from either list. Responses to positive name identification may require FBI involvement for further identification and interview after screening by local or airport law enforcement in questionable cases of identity.

To control all names placed on and removed from both the TS-\o Fly file (300B-HQ-C1184203-K), has been established for accountability purposes in the Counterterrorism Division. This file number shall be appropriately referenced in all documentation. Procedures to add or remove a person for both lists: The Counterterrorism Division has developed the following procedures to add a person to either the TSA No Fly List or TSA /\. Selectee List. TSA has concurred with the following procedures:

REQ 13-11

000000026

To:

f ,-? All Field Of5 )es

Re:

300B-HQ-C1184^03-K, 06/09/2003

From: Counterterrory,

1. .

A substantive terrorism case, such as a 265 and 199 or a 266, must be open on the subject. (Neither a Headquarters nor Field Office's control file may be used for this purpose.)

2.

Submissions to either the TSA No-Fly List or the TSA Selectee List must be done via an EC that is uploaded with unrestricted text. The person's name and identifying information must also be indexed in UNI. Submissions to add or remove a person via an e-mail message or telephone call will be denied.

3.

The EC must include all of the following: a.

The substantive file number(s) and the control file number (300B-HQ-C1184203-K) ;

b.

Addressed to the following three ' units Counterterrorism Division at Headquarters:

in

t-h<=»

(1)

the appropriate FBIHQ operational unit;

(2)

Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit, Room 11303; and

(3)

Special Events Management Unit/Civil Aviation Security Program, Room 11795.

c. . The Synous.L-; section of the EC should state:- "Kequ«su i ' < > .-i.dd for remove] [Name] [DOB], a U.. S. citizen [or USPER o;.non-TfSPER] , to [or from] the TSA No Fly List [or TSA Selectee List]-" Example: Request to add John Q. Citizen, DOB 03/15/1971, a U.S. citizen, to the TSA No Fly List. d.

The Details section of the EC must specify: (1) which of the ' two lists (TSA No-Fly or TSA Selectee) the person should be added or removed, (2) whether the person is an USPER (citizen) , USPER (non-citizen, such as a Permanent Resident Alien or lawful non-immigrant visa status), or a non-USPER, and (3) complete identifying infor.mat-.ion.

e.

For all persons -- including npn-citizen USPERs and nonUSPERs - - t h e E C must include a \ a person to either list without information.

f.

these

three pieces of

For USPERs, and non-USPERs when the information is attainable, the identifying information shall include all

9/11 Closed by Statute

REQ 13-11

000000027

9/11 Closed by Statute >

V— -

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To: All Field Off }es From: Counterterrori', Re: • 3003-HQ-C1184203-K, OS/09/2003 •

... other known identifiers, such as.-f

g.

The Details section of the EC must describe: (1) the person's known or suspected connections to terrorism or a terrorist organization, and (2) the reasons to believe the person poses a threat to civil aviation security.

h.

The Details section of the EC must include a point-ofcontact who is thoroughly familiar with the case, such as the case agent, co-case agent, and/or supervisor. The POC should be available at all hours (24/7) in case questions arise about the person placed on the list. Include directdial work numbers, pager number, and cellular number for" each POC.

i.

The Leads section of the EC must include leads to the Counterterrorism Division: unit's

Unit

Chief

at least four

(1)

the operational approve;

to

review

and

(2)

the operational unit's SSA;

(i)

Terrorism Watch and Warning Unit and; .' • _

(4)

Special Events Management Unit/Civil Aviation Security Unit ("Read and clear") .

("Road and clear"),.

Approval of request 4.

Note that only a Unit Chief or higher in the Counterterrorism. Division at HQ may approve the inclusion (or deletion) of a person, onto either list. No one In any field office or Legal Attache has approval authority. a.

Approval to add to the TSA Mo Flv List: If the Unit Chief (or higher) approves the request to add a person, then he/she will add the following statement: "The FBI considers this person to be a threat to civil aviation security."

b.

Approval to delete from the TSA No Flv List: If the Unit Chief (or higher) approves the request to delete a person, then he/she will ad'd the following statement: "The FBI no longer believes this person is a threat to civil aviation security."

REQ 13-11

000000028

,,9/ll Law Enforcement Privacy To: Re:

1 "«s * /\ J All Field Offf From: Counterterrori»""N 300B-HQ-C1184-.3-K, 06/09/2003, V.-/

c.

Approval to add_ to the TSA Selectee, List:: If the Unit Chief (or higher) / approves t;he request to add a person, then he/she will add the following statement: "The FBI believes this person may have 'a possible link to terrorism and may be a threat to civil aviation security."

d.

Approval to delete from the.TSA Selectee List: If the Unit Chief (or highei") approves the request to delete a person, then he/she will add the following statement: "The FBI no longer believes this person to \e a threat to civil aviation security."

If the Unit Chief or higher in the operational unit in the Counterterrorism Division approves the addition to or removal from either list, then it is the responsibility of the operational unit .to coordinate with the TSA's detailees on theFBI's National J0int Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) for inclusion or deletion. / \ . . ...The TSA's detailees to the NJTTF are currently j J and / ~~7They will forward the approved request to TSA from for placement (or removal) on the appropriate list. Mandatory review of USPERs 6.

TI an USPER is added to either list, then th-:s -•jubmittor of the USPKR is required to review whct-.-hor the. person should remain on the list. This mandatory review will occur when the case is" closed and every 120 days after the- date- of the EC that requested submission of that person to the list. Note that an USPER can remain on the list even if the Field Office has closed their investigative or intelligence case, as long as there is justification to do so. The justification would have to be" articulated in an EC uploaded to the substantive and control files, and it must include articulable facts that the person continues to pose a threat to civil aviation security. Even if" . the Field Office ha.-; closed the case, it is still required to conduct a review and document the results every 120 days. The results of the review -- that is, the reasons to maintain the person on the list or the reasons to remove the person from the list -- will be documented in an EC that is uploaded with unrestricted text. The EC will be sent, as above, to the same units in the Counterterrorism Division with the same leads, described above. If the Field Office, Legat, or operational unit in theCounterterrorism Division concludes prior to the closure of the

*

J~

To: Re:

All Field Of* fes From: Counterterrori's^ ; 300B-HQ-C1184203-K, 06/09/2003 9/11 Lav; Enforcement Privacy case, or prior to the mandatory"120 day review, that the person no longer poses a threat to civil aviation security, then an EC should be submitted immediately to request deletion from the list. """•-..

Distribution of the lists The most current TSA No Fly List and TSA Selectee. List are e-mailed to all Airport Liaison Agents, Legats, and Joint. Terrorism Task Force members as soon as they are received from the TSA by the Counterrorism Division, Special Events Management Unit/Civil Aviation Security Program. Dissemination of these lists may occur as much., ai twice daily. The points-of-contact in that unit are SSA

I The lists are also posted on the FBI's Intranet, SIOC Operations, TSA/FBI Support Page, which is located at: / I FBI response to an airport If an FBI response is warranted, then full database checks and • I other .appropriate investigation should be conducted and documented. < The Terrorist .Watch and Warning Unit is available 24/7 at I I • I I as a resource to check ACS and NCIC.on possible matches. ; I If FBI searches are negative,, but; i.t •.: dcturuiirind the person is ; ; a match, then - Lhe t'.! i.-l.o agent should contact.,- the TSA's 24-hour. I i command center at I I for background information'.. TSA's. ; ; command center maintains documentation on all persons on both lists I I provided to them by the FBI and all o'th^r, agencies who contribute to/ ; the lists. For. these instances, it is .recommended that responses to ; I positive name matches on the lists bex maintained in the appropriate - / I airport liaison or. civil aviation security file in the field ; ! division. / ,.• . /1 ;; :. I! ;/ II I! ll ;•

/

For Itegat response purposes, Individuals appearing on the TSA No Fly. list may not utilize, U.S. commercial aviation. Interview and identification of the individual will rest within the appropriate local law enforcement jurisdiction, at the request of the FBI. If the individual uses a,foreign-flag air carrier to attempt to enter the U.S. and cannot.be prevented from traveling, the FBI • office at the arriving city, must be contacted for appropriate action as soon as possible. For reference, it is the responsibility of the TSA to include names appearing on the TSA No Fly List to also be entered in TIPOFF and TECS. In instances in which individuals are prevented from flying and wish to voice their objection, the TSA, Office of the Ombudsman has

9/11 Law Enforcement. Sensitive

REQ 13-11

'

000000030

To: Re:

V i # All Field Ofl. Jes From: Counterterrorik,. 300B-HQ-C11S4203-K, 06/09/2003

been organized to handle such matters. They can be contacted, in writing, at: Office of the Ombudsman, Transportation Security Administration, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202.

REQ 13-11

000000031

To: Re:

All Field O f j a s From: Counterterrori^ 300B-HQ-C1184V03-K, 06/09/2003

TSA Security Directive 1544-01-20A [Note that this SD was replaced on April 22, 2003 by TSA SD-1544-012OB, but is included here for background]: US Department of Transportation Transportation Security Administration Civil Aviation Security Security Directive Information of Concern to Aviation Security Personnel: Current Security Procedures Should be Reviewed Subject: Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators — No Fly List Number: SD 1544-01 -20 A Date: April 5, 2002 EXPIRATION: Indefinite This Security Directive (SD) 1544-01-20A supercedes and cancels the SD 108-01-20 and must be implemented immediately upon receipt by corporate offices. INFORMATION: The TSA has received information indicating the individuals on the list associated with this Security Directive are dangerous and could pose a threat to civil aviation. REVISION SUMMARY'—Updates I'Cguldtoiycitario"-, -Provides an additional option for clearing passengers listed on the No Fly Sm. ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIR CARRIERS REGULATED UNDER TITLE 49. CODE OF FEDERAL RlL(J(Jt ATiONS CCFR"). PART 1544: if you are an aircraft operator covered by 49 CFR Part 1544, you must implement all the measures set forth in this SD. I. TSA will provide a No Fly List to you. All future updates to the list will be forwarded by the TSA to your corporate security office under separate cover. It is anticipated that .names may be added or removed from this list. When you receive mt updated No Fly List, you must immediately conduct a comparison of passengers boarding all flights, as well as screeners and direct air carrier employees. , II. Many non-Western cultures do not follow strict patterns in name IK dor. The names that appear on the No Fly List may be in varying order and spelling. Data such as Date of Birth, Citizenship, Passport Number, etc, will be provided when available. III. PASSENGERS A. Should you find in your flight reservation system an individual whose name appears on the No Fly List, you must immediately notify: The nearest field office of the FBI, and at overseas locations the nearest United States Embassy. B. Should an individual whose name appears on the No Fly List present himself or herself for transport, you must deny transportation for that individual, their accessible property, checked baggage and any person(s) accompanying that individual and their baggage until cleared by one of the following processes:

REQ 13-11

000000032

To: Re:

All Field Off }es From: Counterterrori i 300B-HQ-C1184z03-K,\._06/09/2003 "'_

LEAD(s): Set Lead 1:

(Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES Disseminate as appropriate.-

12

REQ 13-11

000000035

SECURITY DIRECTIVE LIST DOCUMENTS SUFFICIENT TO ESTBALISH THE ORIGIN , MISSION AND RESULTS OF THE SECURITY DIRECTIVE LIST CREATED AND DISSEMINATED BY THE FBI IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.

RESPONSIVE to REQUEST #13-11

COMMISSION COPY

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy*

(Rev, 08-28-2000)

' .

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: To:

ROUTINE

All Field Offices

Date: Attn:

11/04/2001

ADIC's SA.C's CDC 1 s LEGAT's

All Legats From:

Counter-terrorism \M 5328 Contact:

Approved By: Drafted By: Case ID #: 265A-NY-280350-WLC (Pending) 265A-NY-280350 (Pending) Title:

PENTTBOM Major Case # 182 OO:NY

Synopsis: Information and guidance to aii offices regarding FAA Security Directive(SD), SD 108-01-15B and SD 108-01-17. Reference: 265A-NY-280350-WLC Serial 89 265A-NY-280350 Serial 15786 Details: The FAA issued two SDs, SD 108-01-15E on October 15, .2001 and SD 108-01-17 on October 26, 2001, after receiving lists of individuals associated with AL-Qaida/PSNTTBOM from both the CIA and FBI. SD 108-01-15B contained a list of names provide by the CIA and SD 108-01-17 contained a list of names provided by the FBI as noted in the above referenced communications. The SDs stated that the individuals listed in the attachment may pose a threat to civil aviation, should be denied transportation and the carrier should immediately contact the FBI. The attachment to SD 108-01-15B contained Name List 4 updated on October 27,2001. The attachment to SD 108-01-17 contained Name List 3. The FBI and CIA both believed that by providing names and having them listed on a SD, it would give the FBI and CIA a useful tool for tracking and/or locating AlQaida/PENTTBOM associates. It however quickly became apparent

REQ 13-11

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To: Re:

All Field Off .es From: Counterterrori; 265A-NY-280350-WLC, 11/04/2001

that without close coordination, this was not an effective and efficient way to utilize the SD asset. It was determined that the FBI, CIA and FAA must first establish a policy for provided names and also establish a protocol when an associate is identified. In addition the field and HQ must have inplace the established infrastructure to adequately administer such a program. The FBI has reviewed Name List 3 and determined that there is no conclusive evidence that any of the listed individuals pose a present threat to Civil Aviation. The FBI has requested that the FAA recall SD 108-01-17 at this time. The CIA has not at this time requested that SD 10801-15B be recalled. Therefore the field when asked by airline or airport security must respond and interview individuals who match the names of those individuals on SD 108-01-15B Name List 4. The field will fully identify the individual and determine through an interview if identical to the individual on Name List 4. The CIA has not provided to the FBI the criteria use for selecting these individuals however all are believed to be known members of terrorist organizations. If identical to a name contained in SD 108-01-15B Name List 4 the field is requested to check indices and notify the substantive .FBIHQ unit. If no substantive- unit can be determined contact the writer until a protocol is established. FBIHQ is aware of the difficulty the field has had in positively identifying these individuals and responding to calls by airline and airport security due to the lack of identifiers. FBIHQ is also aware of the lack of information regarding why the CIA has asked the FAA to place these individuals in a SD. These issues are presently being addressed by FBIHQ. The FBI, CIA and FAA both believe that the SD is an effective tool. That when used correctly the SD could provide the community with a wealth of information from tracking a target's travel to locating a target. However a protocol must be established and mechanisms must be in-place to fully utilize this asset. FBIHQ in coordination with the CIA and FAA is presently engaged in discussions that will develop the protocol and establish the mechanisms necessary for utilizing this asset. The field will be advised by EC when this has been accomplish. FBIHQ will establish a POC to coordinate future request from the field for placing names on FAA SDs.

REQ 13-11

000000002

To: Re:

All Field Ofi _es From: Counterterrori. 265A-NY-280350-WLC, 11/04/2001

LEAD(s) : Set Lead 1: ALL RECEIVING OFFICES Read and Clear.

REQ 13-11

000000003

U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D. C. 20535-0001

November 5, 2003 Daniel Marcus, General Counsel National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States Suite 300 2100KStreet,N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 RE: Commission's Request for Documents Dear Mr. Marcus: In response to the Commission's Request for Documents, please find the following: Documents responsive to Document Request 13-9a; Documents responsive to Document Request 13-9b; Documents responsive to Document Request 13-9c;

This is part of the FBI's rolling production and thus may be supplemented in the future. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 202-324-9613.

Robert S. Sinton Assistant General Counsel