T5 B55 Fbi Response 3 Of 3 Fdr- Tab 13-10- Entire Contents- Memos- Notes- White Paper Re Ftttf 167

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force Original Mission Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2 (October 29, 2001) required the Attorney General to create the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) to ensure that federal agencies coordinate programs to: (1) deny entry into the US of aliens associated with, suspected of being engaged in, or supporting terrorist activity, and (2) locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already present in the US. HSPD-2 requires that the Director of the FTTTF "maintain direct liaison" with the ENS Commissioner and consult with the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs on visa matters. HSPD-2 authorizes the assignment to the FTTTF of foreign liaison officers from cooperating countries with the concurrence of the Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence. Previously, FTTTF staff: worked with ODAG to develop the list of countries and criteria to be used for Condor visa checks, as well as to develop a supplemental questionnaire participated in the Condor visa check process until September 2002 identified [individuals who entered the U.S. with possible lost or stolen passports and referred those cases to INS, FBI and created a system to track lost and \n passport numbers • assisted INS in Phase I of Alien Absconder Initiative by developing list of almost | | high-risk individuals out of 350,000 absconders worked with INS and EOUSA to develop a list of 5,000 aliens for "Interview Project" volunteered to develop a system to perform background checks for flight school candidates under Section 113 of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act Congress provided $30 million in reprogrammed funds for FY 2002. The FTTTF recently received $62 million in appropriated funds for FY 2003, The former leadership of the FTTTF emphasized the FTTTF's ability to perform "risk assessments" based on public source and government information. Congress, JMD and OMB all were under the impression that the FTTTF was moving toward conducting "risk assessments" based on algorhythms. Current Mission Has three units: (1) Checks names for certain NSEERS registrants from ports-of-entry and informs ICE whether such registrants are complying with the terms of admission and whether the INS should monitor the individuals.

OAG015-0035

Law Enforcement Sensitive

(2)

Maintains consolidated terrorist list and compares list to immigration records and . other law enforcement data to detect potential presence in the US of individuals on list. Refers names and location information to FBI and ICE for further analysis and follow-up investigation. As of January 2, 2003, FTTTF had received a list oq Jpossible terrorists for evaluation. Ofthcsj [vere forwarded to the ICE for action. (3) Conducts background checks for persons seeking aviation training in planes over 12,500 pounds. An interim process was established in June 2002, and the final rule took effect March 17, 2003. As of January 30,2003, FTTTF had conducted over 30,000 checks. At the present time, the FTTTF has access to four public source databases. The FTTTF is able to search these databases, as well as the FTTTF's own data warehouse, with software called QJTP. QTIP allows the FTTTF to perform searches of all data without having to search each database individually. The FTTTF is not performing risk assessments at this time. On March 17, Bob Casey stated that there is no "magic" algorhythm that will tell whether an individual is a terrorist or a threat. The FTTTF, however, is performing limited checks based on factual information, such as whether an address submitted by an NSEERS registrant or flight school applicant actually exists. FTTTF is, however, seeking access to additional public source databases. Issues: FTTTF has moved away risk assessments. There is concern from JMD and OMB that our budget requests and actual funding was based on representations that the FTTTF would be doing things that they now have no intention of doing. I spoke with Steve McCraw on March 19 and he disagrees with the lack of effort in this area and plans to revert back to his previous plan. Interim assistance to OCDETF for establishing a new automated drug investigative system. FTTTF had indicated a willingness to assist under prior leadership but has since expressed reservation about that commitment. Assistance to BOP in running names of inmates. FTTTF had indicated a willingness to run the names but last week informed BOP that checks should be done by FBI. On March 7, Steve McCraw stated that both FTTTF and FBI should run names and FTTTF has since cooperated with BOP. On March 17, Bob Casey said that FTTTF is cooperating with the

OAG015-0036

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

J OMB agrees with that step. On March 18, OMB decided that it would not allow the FBI to charge a fee for fingerprint and name checks for this program. OMB noted Ed noted that the amount that FBI will have to absorb in FY 2003 is less that $1 million. FBI could potentially use a portion of the $4 million requested in the FY 2004 budget for these checks (the request was based on FTTTF performing the checks), or include the resources in the upcoming supplemental being prepared. Talking Points/Questions The Section 113 final regulation for full background checks takes effect Monday. How has implementation gone during the first week? I understand that the FTTTF is not conducting risk assessments at the current time. Why not? I am concerned that the Department, OMB and the Congress were under the impression that we were pursuing that ability, based on representations made be previous FTTTF officials. We want the FTTTF to conduct checks for foreign nationals seeking access to bio-hazardous materials. Do you have a problem with being involved in that process? I know that OCDETF was interested in modeling a new automated drug investigative system after the FTTTF's systems. Is the plan still to co-locate the FTTTF with the OCDETF startup for a short period of time? Doesn't it make sense for OCDETF to learn from what the FTTTF has done? I've been informed that the Bureau of Prisons has sought your assistance in running the names of its inmates against your databases. I understand that you arc working with BOP to get this accomplished and that BOP will also request that the FBI run the same individuals against its databases. I strongly support this effort. There is high-level interest in getting this project completed. Do you anticipate that issues may arise due to the ENS's transfer from the Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security? Have you had any discussions with officials from the former INS or from DHS? In November 2002, JMD issued a White Paper on the FTTTF. Have you implemented JMD's recommendations that call for action by you?

OAG015-0037

In December 2002 you sent to Stuart a memo outlining your concern that there were other efforts underway in other agencies that were potentially duplicative of the FTTTF's mission. You mentioned in the memo that you were taking steps to coordinate with these other agencies (CIA, OHS, and DOD). Is that effort still ongoing? I'm concerned that the FTTTF has fallen into a reactive role, rather than coming up with new initiatives proactively. Do you have any new projects you are developing?

OAG015-0038

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

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OAG015-0039

1

of si^tltgtJitt,!. (1205311 August 6, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT S. MUELLER, m DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM: SUBJECT:

Foreiarf Terrorist Tracking Task Force

The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) was established by Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2 (HSPD-2) on October 29,2001, as a premier component of the President's initiative to combat terrorism. Despite substantial fundine ani logistics challenges, the FTTTF already has achieved significant success in establishing ani coordinating programs to deny entry into the United States of aliens associated with, suspected of being engaged in, or supporting terrorist activity, In order to sustain and build upon this success, the Departaeni of Justice must continue to commit the necessary budget and personnel resources in a timely rrjanr.er. To enable the M I IF to continue its current level of operations through the end of the current fiscal year, 1 am directing the Immigration and Naturalization Service to reallocate 51C million from its budget for FY 2002 to the FTTTF as soon as possible. I would like the FBI to ccntr.butc $13 million from currently available no-year funds to support the f 11 It- FY 2003 fund ing needs (ihe Department is working with OMB to identify other non-FBI sources for additional FY 2003 requirements). Please coordinate the allocation of these funds to the FTTTF with the Ooiitrollcr of the Department of Justice. " — The FTTTF has been providing vital operational support for th: Bureau's countcrtcrrorism mission. In that regard, I commend your plan, BJS reflected in "Phase I"" of the FBI's reorganization, to formally consolidate the FTTiF within the Counterterrorism Diviri :m. Please move forward as quickly as possible to formalize this element of the reorganization. Cc.nsi stent witfi HSPD-2. the Director of the FTTTF will conlinuc to report to the Deputy Attorney i jcr .oral as \vell as the FBI Director. Finally, it is imperative that we move forward as quickly as po:isib Ic to identify a nc\ Director of the F I'l'l'f in the Wake of Steve McCraw's departure, and lha the Bureau continue to assign high-performjni} personnel to the FTTTF to servo in critical positicns. I appreciate your work toward that objective. Thank you for your attention to these matters and for your coniimt sd leadership in the war against terrorism.

OAG015-0040 9/11

Law E n f o r c e m e n t P r i v a c

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OAG015-0041

Cost of Allen Registration and Overstay Prevention for Males 15 14 High Risk Countries with Limited Entrance and Exit Hflffl IMPLEMENTATION • Immtyaticn Intctclor. OS-'2 iiuptction Awwlwm Communicalion Urwt Equttmw* E«S FaeMes Tachndxy Secondary Fie*"* Steondary Aton Subsist**;* intowievMrs Cwttrnpu Cterht A-B* Folder and Sioraq* ENFORCEMENT Pubic Education Program Dawniion Space OflKrtlon Ertorewnent QHtceo Dtponaton Oflfctrt Dock* CMito Omw Pttonvon r«ut*a cwtt fltrowii L*pal YMhnteMfl* (rcnwwM) invettiMIO* irw*Ml9i|ief» Support SUV lnMigiTOAn.ly.tl ImrrJgnbor. JudgM (nmovaMl

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OA6015-0042

ESTIMATED FIVE YEAR COSTS OF ALIEN REGISTRATION AND OVERSTAY PREVENTION ASSUMING 14 HIGH RISK COUNTRIES - MALES 15-35 .5% Enforcement on 14 High Risk Countries Males 15-35

1% Enforcement on 14 High Risk Countries Males 15-35

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Nonimmigrant Admissions Crew Admissions Total Population

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sub-total

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TOTAL COSTS OVER FIVE YEARS

S $ $ $ S _$ S

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239,722,979

Notes: Nonimmigrant Admissions Source - INS Nonimmigrant Information System. FY 2000. Crew is estimated. By law, crew is admitted tor no longer than 29 days. Approximately 38% of the subject populations remain in the U.S. after 30 days.

OAG015-0043

U.S. Department of Justice Justice Management Division Management^and Planning Staff

For Official Department of Justice Use Only

White Paper:

Management Review of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force

Draft

November 13, 2002 •&*-,

For Official Department of Justice Use Only OAG015-1001

Table of Contents Page Executive Summary

i

Background

1

Mission and Functions

1

Organizational Placement and Structure

5

Staffing

9

Information Resources

14

Administrative Management

17

Summary List of Recommendations

22

Appendix - Sample Charters

27

OAG015-1002

Executive Summary MISSION AND FUNCTIONS •

The FTTTF mission as set forth in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2 is very broad arid encompasses many functions that cut across multiple Federal agencies. A challenge for FTTTF has been to find a niche that would complement and not duplicate other efforts.

•

The FTTTF mission that still is being refined is: to become and serve as the premier information center/clearinghouse (i.e., build the data warehouse) for accessing, sorting, and mining large datasets (public source, proprietary, law enforcement, and select 1C) and then using the data warehouse in order to develop and disseminate critical information about known or potential terrorists who may already be within, or seek entry into, the United States. This information serves many purposes, including support of ongoing CT investigations, development of new leads for CT investigations (within the U.S.), development of intelligence collection targets (outside the U.S.), and the production and dissemination of lookout lists to deny entry.

•

The preponderance of Fl'lTF work thus far has been to develop information that permits FBI and INS law enforcement elements to initiate or support investigations and prevent potential terrorist acts, and the State Department and INS to identify and deny entry to known or potential terrorists.. Because collection, sorting and dissemination of massive amounts of information lies at the core of FTTTF's work, a strong and ever-improving IT capability must be present.

Key Recommendations: • • —

Develop a charter that clarifies FTTTF's mission, operations, staffing, etc. (see samples) Establish an FTTTF Policy Advisory Board to advise on and guide Fl'lll1 activities. Continue innovative IT development and implementation.

ORGANIZATIONAL PLACEMENT AND STRUCTURE •

FTTTF initially was an independent entity reporting to the Deputy Attorney General, but on August 6,2002 was placed within the FBI, specifically its Counterterrorism Division. This caused concern by some that the FTTTF would be less efficient in this context and that other important agency participants might leave, undermining FTTTF's mission accomplishment.

•

The FBI is changing rapidly, logically and positively to meet its new terrorism mission and that the FTTTF, in fact, while continuing to be a national Counterterrorism asset, fits well into the organization that has the clear Counterterrorism enforcement mandate. In addition other FBI headquarters and field elements with which FTTTF will be linked already have extensive participation of other agencies; FTTTF complements these efforts with its unique information.

-i-

OAG015-1003

•

The internal FTTTF organizational/management structure currently does not support the FTTTF mission well. The report examines several areas, e.g, administrative management, that need to be strengthened.

Key Recommendations: • • „

FTTTF continue to be a national counterterrorism asset but remain in FBI CTD. FTTTF Director continue to have direct communication and reporting lines to both FBI and DOJ leadership, with quick access to any DOJ or FBI level on urgent matters. FTTTF Director quickly complete his internal review and change the organization/staffing as necessary to meet the mission.

STAFFING •

Sustained, effective leadership is critical to FTTTF's future effectiveness. The Director, Deputy Director and CIO positions are the key slots, and recent departures from this leadership core have negatively impacted FTTTF's operations and staff.

•

FTTTF must maintain a high-level ENS link and staff presence, factors thus far ensured by the detailed INS manager encumbering the Deputy Director position.

•

The recent departure of the "fill-in" CIO position has disrupted FTTTF's efforts to implement its initial systems design/developmental work. Recruiting a high-level systems manager to oversee making the vision operational is a priority need.

•

Interagency participation is critical and will be ensured if agencies perceive a "valueadded" aspect to their participation. Thus far, funding uncertainty, lack of adequate space, and undefined roles have caused understaffing and led to some degree of employee frustration. Once resources are made available, FTTTF should be able to attract other participants more readily. The tie-in with FBI leverages other agency participation there.

Key Recommendations: Ensure that there is a strong recruitment and selection process for key leadership positions (Director, Deputy Director, CIO), and that leadership service gaps are avoided. Require that: (1) the FTTTF Director be a senior-level agent who is jointly selected by DOJ and FBI management and agrees to serve for a minium of two years; (2) the Deputy Director be a senior-level INS official, also with a two-year commitment, and (3) FBI and DOJ CIO confer on how best to select a permanent, senior-level CIO who has expertise in the development of large-scale state-of-the-art systems for the law enforcement and intelligence communities. Articulate general approach/criteria for interagency participation in the FTTTF charter and have the new Policy Board endorse a staffing plan that ensures key agency representation, e.g., from INS, DBA, NDIC, 1C member agencies.

-11OAG015-1004

INFORMATION RESOURCES -

Access to and manipulation of information (made possible by the large computing capacity and state-of-the-art tools) lies at the heart of what FTTTF does and is what makes the FTTTF such an important national and FBI asset. The FTTTF is in the early stages of locating the best available up-to-date investigative, intelligence, public source, and proprietary data derived from a broad range of government and non-government sources. This information already has proven very useful to initiate and support investigations.

-

FTTTF continues to expand its data collection and mining capabilities and has been especially successful in accessing and mining public source information, combining this information with key FBI/INS law enforcement information, and using link analysis tools to identify known and potential terrorists within the United States. FTTTF has been very responsive to taskings in this regard and seems to be well on its way to developing a unique capability to develop and share critical information in support of CT enforcement.

-

FTTTF's IT capabilities must always be cutting-edge/state-of-the-art. In part, to achieve a quick and efficient capability during start-up, FTTTF tied into DOD's Counter Intelligence Field Activity(CIFA)/Joint Counterintelligence Assessment Group (JCAG) for technology assistance and technical support. This relationship appears to be flourishing, but may require stronger FTTTF management and oversight.

Key Recommendations:

-

Establish a permanent FTTTF IT unit reporting to the CIO. Maintain and continue to leverage CIFA/JCAG support. Develop a long term IT acquisition plan and ensure that it is funded appropriately. Ensure coordination and fit with the FBI Enterprise Architecture. Continue innovative research and development and share lessons learned.

ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT -

Most of the administrative management functions at FTTTF are being performed as collateral duties, often by staff who were brought to FTTTF to perform other duties. For example, an intelligence research specialist is doing budget formulation, the operations chief is handling personnel, and the Chief of Staff is trying to do various other activities. As a general rule, whomever is willing and has sufficient skill may be asked to assist, even if it is not their area of expertise or interest.

Key Recommendations: -

Hire an Executive or Administrative Officer - Establish *n FTTTF Administrative Unit with appropriate expertise, specifically personnel, budget/finance, and procurement (COTR-qualified) jr_; ;jj£ Explore need for legal counsel and permit those not needed to return to home agencies ---- ' '"#.

-111-

OAG015-1005

Background In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the President decided to pursue many initiatives aimed at preventing additional terrorist attacks. One was promulgated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2 (HSPD-2) dated October 29, 2001, which states: "By November 1, 2001, the Attorney General shall create the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) with assistance from the Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence, and other officers of the government, as appropriate." The FTTTF was stood up quickly and during its first year of operations already has achieved many successes in the war on terrorism. Recently, however, questions and concerns have surfaced regarding its current and future status, as key managers have departed to assume other duties and the FTTTF has been placed organizationally within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The Office of the Attorney General asked the Management and Planning Staff (MPS), Justice Management Division (JMD), to conduct a quick, top-to-bottom management review of the FTTTF to assess its current management status and to make recommendations to further improve its role as a national asset in the war on terrorism. MPS formed an interdisciplinary team with general management, information systems, personnel, and security knowledge to conduct mis review. The team performed an extensive review of pertinent FTTTF policy and management documents, observed FTTTF work being done on-site, and interviewed approximately 60 officials from within FTTTF, the Department, the FBI, and others in the Intelligence Community, i.e., Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and National Security Agency (NSA). This report presents the team's independent findings and recommendations based on this work. The report is divided into 5 topic areas: 1) mission and functions; 2) organizational placement and structure, 3) staffing-, 4) information resources; and 5) administrative management. Recommendations are presented at the end of each section and there is a composite list attached to the end of the report.

Mission and Functions The FTTTF mission articulated in HSPD-2 is to: "ensure that, to the maximum extent permitted by law, Federal agencies coordinate programs to accomplish the following: 1) deny entry into the United States of aliens associated with, suspected of being engaged in, or supporting terrorist activity; and 2) locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already present in the United States."

-1-

.&,

OAG015-1006

In addition, HSPD-2 elements suggest a strong coordinative role for the FTTTF. For example, it requires: 1) the establishment of the FTTTF to involve the Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence and others; 2) the AG appoint a senior level official to be full time FTTTF Director, 3) the FTTTF Director report to DAG, serve as a Senior Advisor to the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, and maintain direct liaison with the INS Commissioner; and 4) the FTTTF Director consult with the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs on visa matters. This underscores the need for FTTTF to be positioned organizationally to provide effective leadership/coordination, even with regard to visa matters. (See organizational placement and interagency participation discussions later in this report) The mission, which seems simple and direct, encompasses many complex activities that cut across multiple organizations. For example, other agencies, such as the Department of State, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the U.S. Customs Service (USCS), have longstanding important responsibilities with regard to ensuring that aliens who pose threats, terrorist or otherwise, are denied entry into the United States at borders and ports of entry. The identification of persons abroad who may be terrorists or pose a terrorist threat is an ongoing intelligence responsibility of the many 1C agencies, including the CIA, the DIA, the NSA, and the FBI.. The FBI also has the law enforcement (LE) responsibility related to counterterrorism. In addition, other law enforcement agencies/entities, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) also have information useful to the war on terrorism, The FTTTF is not itself responsible for certain actions/outcomes stated in HSPD-2. Instead, it may assist others in achieving these. For example, Border Patrol and INS/Customs Inspectors located at our borders and ports deny entry and make arrests. ENS investigators across the U.S. search for and arrest illegal aliens and "absconders." The FBI performs international and domestic terrorism investigations and make arrests. The U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), INS, and Bureau of Prisons detain those arrested for terrorism or related charges. The U.S. Attorneys and INS Attorneys prosecute ten-orisnVirnmigration-related cases. The INS deports illegal aliens who might be involved in terrorist activities. FTTTF information may lead to these outcomes, but FTTTF is not responsible for them. Presumably, the FTTTF efforts must be able to address anyone who could pose a potential terrorist threat The FBI has extensive experience in and responsibility for counterterrorism enforcement functions, thus making FTTTF's placement there logical. Further complicating FTTTF's role definition is the fact that there are so many multi-agency centers (for counterterrorism, countertintelligence and counterdrugs) across government involving the same or similar law LE and 1C players. While these increase the potential to collect, disseminate and act upon valuable information, they also increase the potential for duplication of effort, stretch thin the resources available to support the various agency goals

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OAG015-1007

and objectives, and reduce the overall efficiency of the counterterrorism effort. Linking FTTTF to the evolving CT systems architecture of the FBI, which already has strong 1C participation and will include links among the FBI's intcragency headquarters/field enforcement entities (JTTFs), will reduce information redundancy and enhance information collection/sharing potential to protect the nation against terrorists. Some interviewees were concerned that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) may duplicate FTTTF's work. Discussions of the DHS structure/role thus far center on: border and transportation security; emergency preparedness and response; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures; and information analysis and infrastructure protection. FTTTF activities have centered on supporting counterterrorism enforcement activities, e.g., identifying and investigating individuals within the U.S. who have been involved in terrorist activities and/or who may pose a terrorist threat. The President has indicated that counterterrorism law enforcement will remain within the FBI. While certain current/proposed FTTTF activities (e.g., visa applicant reviews/bioterrorism-related foreign student reviews) may relate to proposed DHS activities), the preponderance relate to the counterterrorism law enforcement mission of the FBI. To the extent FTTTF can assist in projects and coordinate activities with DHS it certainly should, but generally the evolving missions of DHS and FTTTF seem to be separate, distinct and complementary. A major challenge for FTTTF within the current complex and fluid environment has been to define and pursue a clear and unique mission that would be viewed as providing value to the various agencies performing or supporting counterterrorism functions. The Department's strategy was to apply DOJ's uniquely suited staff and information resources to the FTTTF mission. Specifically, DOJ identified the FBI's mandate for counterterrorism prevention/investigations/enforcement, the INS' responsibility for denying entry of illegal aliens, and the case/intelligence information potentially available from each as the starting point for setting up FTTTF operations. The FTTTF mission that still is being refined is: to become and serve as the premier information center/clearinghouse (i.e., build the data warehouse) for accessing, sorting, and mining large datasets (public source, proprietary, law enforcement, and select 1C) and then using the data warehouse in order to develop and disseminate critical information about known or potential terrorists who may already be within, or seek entry into, the United States. This information serves many purposes, including support of ongoing CT investigations, development of new leads for CT investigations (within the U.S.), development of intelligence collection targets (outside the U.S.), and the production and dissemination of lookout lists to deny entry. Using powerful computing capacity and state-of-the-art computer software tools (e.g., to perform searches, sorts and link analyses), FTTTF is able to: 1) identify known/suspected terrorists and their links, to potential others within (and outside) the United States by running -3-

OAG015-1008

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

names of individuals and groups against available databases; and 2) prepare and regularly update/run algorithms against available databases to identify potential terrorists. Among the results of these efforts may be: special reports for DOJ leadership, leads/investigative ' information sent to FBI headquarters and field elements (N/JTTFs), lookout reports for INS ^adquarters and field units, foreign leads to be worked by the 1C, and various reports to the Department of State. Twomajor functions evident in the FTTTF briefing materials and organizational chart are: 1) detection, tracking and arrest/removal of known/potential terrorists; and 2) developing risk/threat assessments related to known/potential terrorists. i

The FTTTP is intended to receive tasks from various sources, including the Offices of the Aitpniey General and the Deputy Attorney General, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, the Joint Terrorisni Task Forces, Field Offices and others. Requests range from a basic name check to more in-depth requests for tracking and the completion of risk assessments (See Figure 1). Since becoming operational, the FTTTF has provided significant information derived from a broad range of government and non-government data sources including the identification and referral to the FBI o J Iknown and suspected terrorists who entered the United States undetected. Iff addition, it has assisted the INS in utilizing its investigative resources by \identirying,oveiCI3ndividuals from 26 countries of .interest, and others who warranted priority attention due to their criminal histories and other factors. The individuals identified were developed from a list of ™"-rl lahsconders suspected of remaining in the United States following their final order of deportation deadlines. This ongoing absconder project has resulted in nverf Ihieh risk absconders being arrested, of whichQare still in INS custody ar j have been removed from the United States. The FTTTF also has processed over 21,000 flight training candidate checks in accordance with Section 113 of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act and vetted State Department Security Advisory Opinion visa applications. A key function that should continue to be performed at the FTTTF is its innovative, ongoing research and development activities. This allows FTTTF to continue to experiment with cutting edge technology so that a state-of-the-art system can be developed and maintained which provides for large scale data storage and exploitation. The FTTTF is dealing with staggering amounts of data. The FTTTF must keep abreast of new expert tools to apply to the data warehouse in order to more effectively detect patterns and undiscovered knowledge in databases. Recommendations: 1 DOJ FBI and FTTTF leadership should work with other participating agencies to develop and adopt by signature a formal charter (see examples at Appendix A) that clearly sets forth _ -4-

OAG015-1009

n fl if 111 u y u B 11 if 1111 if i B B B H «i H i H 11 a FTTTF TASKINGS Offices of the Attorney General /Deputy Attorney General

Other Federal Participating Agencies

FTTTF Clearinghouse (for name checks, tracking requests, and risk assessments)

Counterterronsm Division

Joint Terrorism Task Forces

National Joint Terrorism Task ;<« Force

National Joint Strategic Assessments and Warning Section

Figure 1 OAG015-1010

the FTTTF mission, functions, and broad operating parameters. Such a document would help emphasize the priority of FTTTF's work and clarify the coordinative role that it is expected to play with other agencies, especially those engaged in intelligence collection activities. The charter could also address: the FTTTF's policy coordination role, if any, relative to HSPD-2; the duration of service required of the FTTTF Director and inter agency detailees; and the reporting relationships/responsibilities of the FTTTF Director. 2. Given the interagency nature of FTTTF's role and its status as a national counterterrorism asset, the charter should include the creation of an FTTTF Policy Advisory Board, chaired by the Deputy Attorney General, with participation of the FBI Director, Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence, the Assistant Director for Counterterrorism, the FTTTF Director, and any other interagency participation designated by the Deputy Attorney General and the FBI Director. Its role would be to oversee the continuing process of bringing FTTTF to full operational status. The Board could advise on all remaining start-up activities, determine future requests/allocation of funds, advise on selection of the Director and Deputy Director, give guidance on establishment of major ongoing functions/key taskings, and address interagency issues. 3. Because information management (e.g., collection, sorting, and dissemination) lies at the core of the FTTTF mission and functions, FTTTF should continue with its innovative, ongoing research and development activities to ensure that systems and tools remain cutting edge in support of the FTTTF's unique counterterrrorism enforcement mission.

Organizational Placement and Structure Recent Placement and Attorney General Policy Direction From inception to August 6, 2002, FTTTF operated as an independent entity reporting to the Deputy Attorney General (DAG) . On August 6, 2002, the Attorney General issued a memorandum to the FBI Director supporting consolidation of the FTTTF within the FBI Counterterrorism Division (CTD), and asking that this occur "as quickly as possible." It also stipulated: "Consistent with HSPD-2, the Director of the FTTTF will continue to support the Deputy Attorney General as well as the FBI Director." Several FTTTF participants have expressed skepticism and concern about whether the FTTTF can retain its vitality/effectiveness/responsiveness/clout ("nimbleness" was a word often used) if organizationally placed within the FBI. Generally, these considered the FBI too stovepiped/hierarchical in its management and too bureaucratic/lumbering in its administrative management support. They fear that access to top DOJ managers will be reduced and that external perceptions of a diminished role will cause non-Justice agency participants to pull out.

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OAG015-1011

They also are concerned that this might lead to organizational or physical separation from CIFA/JCAG, which they view as detrimental to the growing IT/IRM foundation upon which FTTTF's mission is based. Others considered placement within the FBI a potential benefit, since it could afford more consistent and stable management oversight, economies of scale through administrative management infrastructure support (e.g. .budget, personnel, etc.), access to broader information/analytical resources at FBI headquarters and the field (NJTTF, JTTFs, 1C), a clearer and more stable source of staff/funds, and perhaps a clearer command structure for taskings. •

Some employees did not care so much about organizational placement so long as the mission was clear and being met effectively and efficiently; however, most indicated that it was time to move beyond the somewhat chaotic management approach that had characterized FTTTF for the past year during its "start up" phase. Most of these seemed to want top management stabilized (since there has been much leadership turnover recently), their own roles and responsibilities clarified, and for FTTTF to retain certain operational freedom/independence (e.g., to retain CIFA/JCAG relationship for IT/IRM support).

Merger into FBI - Actions Thus Far The FBI clearly is the lead agency and has the mandate by law and Presidential Directive to perform the counterterrorism enforcement mission. The FBI has acted upon the Attorney General's direction and the FTTTF now is placed organizationally within the FBI's Counterterrorism Division (CTD). The review team found that the FBI is reorganizing its entire headquarters CTD and field infrastructure to better perform the counterterrorism mission. Also, the FBI's Information Resources Division (IRD) is being completely revamped by the FBI Chief Information Officer to better support counterterrorism and to assure interoperability and connectivity among FBI and 1C systems within a new enterprise architecture. At the same time, forward-thinking FBI agents/managers are being placed in key counterterrorism positions at CTD, FTTTF, and the Office of the CIO. The review team considers these changes a positive sign for the future of the FTTTF within the FBI context They signal anew direction and strong commitment to ensuring that to the extent possible, terrorist acts are prevented in the future and that if they occur, investigations are properly supported and can proceed expeditiously and successfully. DOJ and FBI leaders interviewed regarding FTTTF were clear that they continue to consider the FTTTF an important, national-level, interagency asset that must be responsive to Department leadership and to the FBI Director. They recognize its unique independent role/mandate, as articulated by the President, but they also consider it a key element ("the fourth

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OAG015-1012

leg of the table") within the context of the FBI information management architecture focused on counterterrorism. A recent iteration of the CTD organization chart shows FTTTF as a stand-alone, operational support entity to be tied to other CT system nodes within FBI, e.g., the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) and the field-based Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). These links are critical to the national interest and to carrying out the investigative mandate contained within the second part of the HSPD-2 mission statement They also will provide FTTTF an opportunity to leverage the LE and 1C resources already present in the FBI structure, without duplicating their efforts. Several Department-level interviewees pointed out that it does not make sense for AG/DAG staff to act as line managers, especially over an entity intended to directly support operational activity. AG/DAG staff typically do not do this. However, to ensure responsiveness to Department leadership needs and better coordinate and communicate regarding FTTTF taskings and activities, they were supportive of regular FTTTF meetings with, and status reports provide to, the Office of the DAG (ODAG). The review team is aware of comments by senior congressional Appropriations staff that there are mixed views regarding whether FTTTF can be effective within the FBI. However, the FTTTF counterterrorism enforcement support mission, successful activities thus far, and plans being pursued to tie FTTTF to FBI operational and systems elements, all suggest that FTTTF belongs in the FBI and will add significant value to our nation's counterterrorism prevention and enforcement efforts. Recommendations: 4. Although FTTTF will continue to be a national asset with interagency participation and use, it should remain organizationally placed within the FBI's Counterrorism Division (CTD) where it can be linked functionally and operationally to the FBI headquarters National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) and the field-based Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). This will: (1) ensure clear command, control and coordination over counterterrorism enforcement assets; (2) guarantee FTTTF system interoperability and interconnectivity to the FBI's national systems architecture being developed to support counterterrorism; and (3) avoid duplication of effort in counterterrorism enforcement support activities. 5. Pursuant to the August 6th memorandum, a dual communication/reporting arrangement will need to be worked out to ensure that the FTTTF Director: (1) keeps both the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and the Assistant Director, CTD, apprised of FTTTF activities; and (2) receives and controls taskings from the ODAG and FBI. Specifically, the FTTTF Director and FBI Assistant Director for CTD together should meet with, and report regularly to, die .7-

f

OAG015-1013

ODAG, where a single point of contact (e.g., the DAG Chief of Staff) should serve as the DOJ executive-level information/tasking conduit The specific expectations and responsibilities involved in this arrangement should be articulated in a memorandum from the DAG to the FBI Director. 6. The FTTTF Director should have direct access to any level of the FBI (including the Director), as well as to the Deputy Attorney General, when circumstances (e.g., information is uncovered pertaining to a major, immediate threat) demand quick communication/response to protect the national interest or the lives of U.S. citizens, or in response to urgent taskings assigned by the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General. Internal Management Structure The FTTTF organizational structure has evolved along with the mission/functions and it has not yet stabilized. This is typical of "start-up"organizations. FTTTF provided the team an "Interim FTTTF Organizational Chart"showing an August iteration of the evolving structure and staffing (see next page). The chart, which is now under review by the new Director, does not seem to accurately describe current operations nor does it appear to support the mission well. For example, the "Chief of Staff/Deputy Director for Policy and Law" is shown as the official to whom all FTTTF staff report. The bifurcated functions of this position are divergent, and the wide variation and quantity of duties being performed are simply too broad for one individual. The chart shows Chief of Staff, Special Assistant, Executive Assistant, and Administrative Officer staff. Based upon our interviews, the delineation of these responsibilities and the rationale for their separation is unclear. In addition, the role and functions of the agency liaisons and their integration into the actual work supporting the mission is not evident from how FTTTF is operating nor from the chart. Administrative management functions, such as budget/finance, personnel, and security, usually are overseen by an Executive Officer or Administrative Officer and comprise a single organizational unit. The FTTTF chart shows these as separate, independent entities. Finally, the great importance of the IT/IRM function and its heavy reliance on JCAG suggests that perhaps a CIO with IT/JCAG personnel reporting or connected to it, would be warranted. Recommendation: 7. The new FTTTF Director needs to complete his ongoing management assessment and establish an organizational structure that supports the FTTTF mission and functions and clarifies employee roles, responsibilities and reporting relationships. He should work with other agency representatives to agree upon a structure that both effectively and efficiently -J-ST-:

^ - V

., ? ^ 0 ..;

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OAG015-1014

IJIIJIiillllllllflllHIIIIIIIIIIII. 111 Interim FTTTF Organizational Chart

OAG015-1015

3 11 La J E n f o r c e m e n t Privacy

accomplishes the mission and meets their needs and expectations. The structure should be flexible enough to cover the range of functions to be performed now and in the foreseeable future, and changed as appropriate to meet new needs or requirements. The review team defers to the FTTTF Director and managers to determine what structure best supports the mission; however, five organizational/functional/staffing issues need to be addressed soon: (1) role, duration, representation (e.g., continued ENS) and responsibilities of the Deputy Director, (2) role and placement of the Chief of Staff; (3) the need for an administrative unit headed by an executive or administrative officer; (4) the need for a full-time CIO/IT unit to oversee/coordinate systems development; and (5) role and potential greater integradon of the liaison staff into the core FTTTF work. Physical Location •

Initially, FTTTF was physically located within INS space and was to be principally supported by INS. Subsequently, the first FTTTF Director determined that the INS systems development and support infrastructure was not adequate to respond quickly to the urgent FTTTF needs in the wake of 9/11. He also was familiar with the FBI systems capabilities at that time and considered them inadequate to meet the mission. So, he decided to partner with the Department of Defense's CIFA/JCAG for this support, which by all accounts, has been a great success. CIFA/JCAG wanted access to information likely to be resident at FTTTF, and in return, was willing to invest its own resources in FTTTF hardware/software, provide procurement/systems expertise, and share/provide office space. Virtually all interviewees have indicated that the relationship to CIFA/JCAG is critical and must continue if FTTTF is to be successful. FTTTF already has begun on the buildout of space uj jnear to CEFA/JCAG, although construction is currently delayed pending new resources. Based on team interviews, JCAG IT support is an essential part of FTTTF's operation.

Recommendation: 8. Although FTTTF is organizationally placed within the FBI, its collocation with CIFA/JCAG should continue and it should move into the new space ln| Joncc funding is available and construction is completed.

Staffing The most critical leadership positions within the FTTTF are the Director, Deputy Director, and CIO. Recently, the first Director departed and a new one was hired, the Deputy Director from

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9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive OAG015-1016

INS is rumored to be leaving, and the CIO returned to her home FBI office in Tucson, AZ,. Stable, sustained leadership is imperative for ensuring FTTTF effectiveness over the long term. Directorshio Relative to the Director position, HSPD-2 says: "The Attorney General shall appoint a senior official as the full-time Director of the Task Force. The Director shall report to the Deputy Attorney General, serve as a Senior Advisor to the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, and maintain direct liaison with the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) on issues related to immigration and the foreign terrorist presence in the United States. The Director shall also consult with the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs on issues related to visa matters." The August 6 memorandum from the Attorney General to FBI Director Mueller states: ".. .it is imperative that we move forward as quickly as possible to identify a new Director of the FTTTF in the wake of Steve McCraw's departure, and that the Bureau continue to assign high performing personnel to me FTTTF to serve in critical positions." DOJ, FBI, and FTTTF interagency staff said that FTTTF Director McCraw had the right leadership qualities-e.g., vision, energy, drive and outreach-^o get FTTTF started quickly. He brought a good mix of people and skills together and established a partnership with the Defense Department's Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA)/ Joint Counterintelligence Assessment Group (JCAG) to provide systems development and procurement support. In addition, he was very responsive to leadership requests for information/projects. He also was not hesitant to deal with DOJ, FBI, or other agency leaders at any level to meet the HSPD-2 mandate. Since his departure, there has been a leadership vacuum at FTTTF. Mr. Bob Casey, recently the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the FBI's Miami Field Office, was selected as Mr. McCraw's successor to the FTTTF Director position. In addition to understanding the FTTTF mission vision and its unique FBI/interagency role, Mr. Casey brings strong management and administration skills which now need to be applied to help stabilize and prepare FTTTF for long-term operations. As an FBI agent manager, he also is said to have strong ties/direct access to senior FBI and other agency officials with whom he must work as FTTTF Director. The review team interviewed/interacted with both FTTTF Directors extensively-over 3 hours with each-and we feel confident that the new FTTTF Director is a good selection and will have a positive, stabilizing impact on FTTTF management and operations. At this stage, he is only beginning to assess the current organizational and management environment, meeting with key DOJ, FBI and interagency players, and working to understand in detail the important mission and ongoing activities of the FTTTF: -10-

OAG015-1017

Recommendations: 9. The FTTTF charter should specify that its Director be an SES-level career FBI agent, jointly selected by FBI and DOJ management 10. The FTTTF Director should be required to serve a minimum of two years, with potential to extend this period of service, with the advice of the proposed FTTTF Policy Advisory Board. 11. Given the nature and importance of the FTTTF Director position, the FBI should ensure careful succession planning that includes some overlap in service to avoid any leadership gaps such as occurred recently. This will give new Directors a chance to learn and become familiar with the FTTTF work and to be introduced to key DOJ, FBI and interagency officials who interact with, and participate in, FTTTF. Deputy Director The current Deputy Director is assigned from the Immigration and Naturalization Service's Intelligence Office. He has been part of the FTTTF since its inception and has been instrumental in providing leadership and guidance through the transition period between Directors. He has been especially important to building the information base for the data warehouse which continues to evolve at FTTTF. As a senior INS representative, he also ensures FTTTF access to INS information needed to identify known/potential terrorists, engages appropriate INS enforcement officials when appropriate, and communicates through INS channels information aimed at denying entry as articulated in the mission. Thus, it is very important for the FTTTF to maintain a strong INS leadership and significant staff presence. Recommendation: 12. The FTTTF charter should specify that the Deputy Director be a senior-level (GS-15 or above) INS official who commits to a minimum two-year tenure (possibly extended with Board approval) and who has direct access to the INS Commissioner and field units when circumstances/information dictate immediate action by the INS. Similar to the Director position, appropriate succession planning and overlap of tenure should occur. (Note: if the intelligence/enforcement elements of INS are integrated into DHS, the team recommends that DOJ/FBI work with DHS to continue having an FTTTF Deputy be assigned from there.) Chief Information Officer The person designated FTTTF CIO recently departed to return home after an extended rotational assignment with FTTTF. Although trained as a lawyer and assigned to the FBI •f.t. '- r

-- - _ --

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OAG015-1018

Office of the General Counsel, she also had experience planning and working with information systems. She was instrumental in getting FTTTF systems under way, working closely with CIFA/JCAG staff who had extensive information systems procurement and development expertise, hi addition, she was relied upon to address complex legal issues related to systems design and use of information. •

Because everything that FTTTF does revolves around access to and manipulation of large amounts of information (e.g., dataset development/access, data mining, link analysis, data warehousing, reporting, dissemination), a highly-skilled CIO is needed to oversee the continuing evolution of FTTTF systems. The CIO must grasp the myriad needs that must be met, set the continuing vision and plans for the internal FTTTF architecture, and ensure that the FTTTF system fits well with the overall FBI enterprise architecture. The CIO will have to work closely with the FTTTF Director/Deputy, FBI IT staff, and interagency staff to ensure that FTTTF systems perform well in support of the FTTTF mission. Unlike the Director and Deputy Director positions, the CIO needs to be a long-term senior level FTTTF position to ensure continuous oversight and continuity of system development efforts. This person also needs to have extensive experience developing and working with TT contracts and contractors, and with defense elements such as CIFA/JCAG, to obtain quickly and efficiently IT products and services needed to support FTTTF. CIO/IT staff also should be hired to assist the CIO in planning systems and serve as Contracting Officer Technical Representatives (COTRs) for contract activities within the FTTTF.

Recommendation: 13. The FBI and DOJ should confer on how best to hire a highly skilled, long-term senior level CIO to oversee all information systems planning and development activities. This person should have experience in developing major, large-scale, state-of-the-art systems for the LE and Intel Communities. They should also understand how to overcome the challenges of obtaining, controlling and sharing sensitive LE and intelligence information, and have specialized experience in connecting disparate systems/data so that analysts can perform needed functions at their desktops. Intcragencv/Intereovernmental Participation HSPD-2 also specifies that "The Task Force shall be staffed by expert personnel from the Department of State, the INS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Secret Service, the Customs Service, the Intelligence Community, military support components and other Federal agencies as appropriate to accomplish the Task Force's mission.

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OAG015-1019

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

Finally, HSPD-2 says: "With the concurrence of the Attorney General and the Director of Central' Intelligence, foreign liaison officers from cooperating countries shall be invited to serve as liaisons to the Task Force, where appropriate, to expedite investigation and data sharing." Implicit in the mission are myriad potential activities involving many organizations, but the clear major players are: the Attorney General as the chief law enforcement official responsible for enforcement policy in the United States; the FBI as the Jead agency responsible for counterterronsm enforcement; and the INS as the kcy.enforcer at U.S. entry points and within our interior of laws related to immigrant entry and exit. At a minimum, FBI and INS need to continue to be the LE partners within the FTTTF to meet the mission. Other agencies also need to be represented for FTTTF to achieve its majtirnum potential. Recently, FBI, INS, Civil Division, Criminal Division, Coast Guard, State, Customs, ATF, Transportation Security Agency, Social Security Administration, NSA, DIA and thej____J 1 ""frave been represented, but some of these are now rotating out with no clear plans for their replacement Absent is the CIA, which is playing a direct role at FBI headquarters and in the FBI's field-based JTTFs. The CIA needs to join the FTTTF for it to be fully effective. Prdblems potentially impeding participation are shortage of staff due to other commitments, lack of understanding by external agencies of the FTTTF mission/services/capabilities relative to other centers, desire to wait for DHS role to be clarified to avoid duplication. The review team believes that the FTTTF's national role in the organizational/functional context of the FBI is beginning to solidify and that DOJ and FTTTF leadership must keep pressing forward with current plans. A principle articulated by several interviewees that continues to apply is that if the information and product is valuable to the war on terrorism and, if participants can obtain information that furthers their own missions, then others will want to participate, no matter where FTTTF is placed organizationally. The review team agrees and already has observed this as other LE and 1C members already participate at FBI HQ, JTTFs, DEA HQ, EPIC, NDIC, CDX, etc. While having the FTTTF Director and Deputy Director remain FBI and INS positions respectively, staffing of other FTTTF management positions as defined in the new organization could be open to other agency officials as appropriate, perhaps as an additional incentive for their participation. Currently, there are several positions identified as performing domestic, international, and intel community liaison functions. However, management positions/functions throughout FTTTF need to be clarified at this point to ensure a rational staffing/skills approach is followed to meet the mission.

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OAG015-1020

Recommendation: 14. The FTTTF charter should articulate the general approach/broad criteria for interagency participation at FTTTF. At a minimum, FTTTF, FBI and Department leaders should ensure that the federal law enforcement, the Intelligence Community and the Department of State continue to participate in order to meet the HSPD-2 mandates. The FTTTF Director and Deputy also should develop and present to the Policy Board an interagency staffing plan (including agencies that should be represented, the number and types of staff needed, and the proposed duration of their details) to meet the FTTTF mission over the long-term. Appropriate memoranda of understanding or interagency agreements should be developed to effect appropriate participation. 15. The FTTTF should better articulate the skills sets needed from the candidate agency to best complement its overall effort To support this, FTTTF should upgrade/update its current powerpoint briefing to present the FTTTF capabilities and potential participants. It should accurately and clearly describe FTTTF's mission, role in the national context, structure, accomplishments, capablities, future plans. This material should, be flexible enough to be easily updated and adapted for use in multiple settings and for various audiences, including policy makers, new employees, and potential participants. Such a tool would be very helpful in getting the word out to others about FTTTF and achieving broader understanding of and support for its activities. 16. The FTTTF Director should visit and meet regularly with executives from DOJ and nonDO J participating agencies to ensure their satisfaction with their continuing role and product out of FTTTF. The Director must participate in and perhaps develop other interagency fora to foster communication and information sharing. Interagency relationships need to be nurtured to ensure continued buy-in and participation of agencies that are key contributors.

Information Resources With regard to information sharing, HSPD-2 says: "The Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure, to the maximum extent permitted by law, that the Task Force has access to all available information necessary to perform its mission, and they shall request information from State and local governments, where appropriate. It also says: "Other Federal entities, such as the Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons Coordination Center and the Foreign Leads Development Activity, shall provide the Task Force with any relevant information they possess concerning aliens suspected of engaging in or supporting terrorist activity. ]*£'& -14-

OAG015-1021

Access to, and manipulation of, information lies at the heart of what FTTTF does. The large computing capacity and state-of-the-art tools and technology, along with access to the data most critical to the war on terrorism, are what make the FTTTF such an important national and FBI asset. In order to carry out its vital mission and fill gaps in existing government efforts relating to the prevention of terrorist activities, the FTTTF is locating the best available up-to-date investigative, intelligence, public source, and proprietary data derived from a broad range of government and non-government sources. The FTTTF has established a technical partnership with the Department of Defense, CIFA/JCAG to assist the FTTTF in achieving its mission. CIFA/JCAG has a complementary mission to the FTTTF (i.e., the identification of foreign terrorists and their supporters is mission critical to CIFA in relation to critical infrastructure protection). CIFA/JCAG has technical expertise in developing systems to facilitate analytic support processes and performing data analysis. dFA/JCAG/DOD is designing, developing, and implementing a data warehouse and a suite of automated analytical tools and threat assessment techniques needed to support the Fi IMF's mission. The data warehouse will provide the capability to integrate law enforcement, intelligence, public, and private source data into a common repository for the analyst to query. A summary of the current contents of the data warehouse is provided in Figure 2. The data warehouse permits analytical modeling based on mathematical algorithms that query large data sets using unique criteria developed by the FTTTF. In addition to the data warehouse, the FTTTF is responsible for the development of the Flight Training Candidates Check Program (FTCCP) system which automates the application process and risk assessment process for foreign individuals who desire to take flight training for the first time and foreign nationals who are licensed pilots seeking recurrent training as required by Federal Aviation Administration regulations. The FTTTF must continue to leverage the knowledge and technical expertise of CIFA/JCAG/DOD in order to ensure the successful completion of these IT efforts. The build-out plan for the FTTTF assumes that there will be three systems delivered to each desk: *• * >

JWICS, which will provide access to the data warehouse as well as any other JWICS system for which an individual should have access NTPRNET, which will continue to provide access to internet e-mail as well as news and public source connectivity REACHBACK, which will provide access to an individual's home agency system (e.g., FBI, INS, Department of State, U.S. Customs Service) so that each

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OAG015-1022

1111111 i i fl 11111 i i B 11 R u D 1 1 1 1 1 D 1 1 1 CURRENT FTTTF DATA WAREHOUSE CONTENTS

FIGURE!

OAG015-1023

1

individual can remain in contact with their home agency without having to travel to another office. The development of the data warehouse and the FTCCP system is highly technical work which is being completed by the CEFA/JCAG IT contractors. These IT contractors require oversight and direction from the FTTTF personnel with expertise in the areas of knowledge management, visualization tools, system security, telecommunications, and relational databases. Currently, the FTTTF does not have a permanent IT staff with the requisite knowledge to effectively inspect and monitor FT contractor performance to assure technical proficiency and compliance. Permanent IT staff who are certified as contracting officers' technical representatives (COTRs) must be hired by the FTTTF to better manage its IT development efforts. The continued success of the FTTTF depends on its ability to collocate the critical data available from law enforcement, intelligence, public, and proprietary sources. The FTTTF has acquired data sets from a variety of sources. However, much more data must be acquired, especially intelligence data from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. The FTTTF needs to strategize its data needs and develop apian for the acquisition of the necessary data. The FTTTF has achieved major accomplishments despite minimal funding and mostly borrowed facilities and technology. The FTTTF has provided leads to the FBI about persons who are identified as terrorists and appear to have entered the United States undetected. It has assisted with identifying the whereabouts of several hundred convicted felons, foreign nationals who have evaded deportation orders. Also, it has assisted the FBI with the review of thousands of visa requests referred by the Department of State and appears to have identified persons who are the subject of terrorism investigations and persons who are known terrorists. While organizations traditionally seek funding for new projects based upon predictions of performance, the FTTTF has heeded the call of urgency and has produced results by available means. The FTTTF has proven its capabilities and needs to be fully funded to ensure continued success. The lack of funding especially in the area of IT is a major impediment towards the FTTTF achieving full operational capability. In FY 2002, the FTTTF received $20 million, of which $17 million is for IT and collection and dissemination requirements. The Department currently has a $62 million budget amendment/reprogramming pending for FY 2003, of which $59 million is for IT and collection/dissemination requirements. In addition, a $10 million reprogramming is pending which includes $9 million for IT. The FTTTF strategy is to provide investigative support to the JTTFs. The FTTTF will need to communicate with the JTTFs through the FBI's Enterprise Architecture. Because of this, the FTTTF must ensure that its major IT development efforts are coordinated with the Enterprise Architecture Group in the Office of the FBI's Chief Information Officer to ensure the "free flow" of data between the FTTTF and the JTTFs.

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OAG015-1024

The FTTTF's data warehouse is the next evolutionary step in information technology and knowledge management. The FTTTF has experimented with a variety of data mining techniques to manipulate data including batch match, fuzzy match, multi-variable search, entity extraction, links, exploitation, and visualization. Other DOJ components that have similar requirements to manipulate and mine large amounts of data could benefit from the techniques used by the FTTTF. The FTTTF needs to share their techniques with other DOJ components. Recommendations: 17. Because of its close working relationship with CIFA/JCAG, the FTTTF should continue to leverage the technical expertise of CIFA/JCAG for its current system development efforts and future technology efforts wherever relevant in order to achieve economies of scale. 18. The FTTTF should establish an IT unit reporting to the proposed CIO (see Recommendation 7), and hire into this unit permanent IT staff with technical expertise in the areas of knowledge management, visualization tools, system security, telecommunications, and relational databases. The permanent IT staff should be certified as COTRs. 19. The FTTTF should develop a long term plan for the acquisition of law enforcement, intelligence, public source, and proprietary data for the data warehouse. Due to limited resources, the FTTTF should also prioritize its data warehouse requirements. 20. The Department must ensure that adequate IT funding is provided to the FTTTF to complete its system development efforts in a timely and cost-effective manner. 21. The major IT development efforts at the FTTTF that will be institutionalized should be coordinated with the FBI's Enterprise Architecture Group to ensure compliance with the overall FBI's Enterprise Architecture and FT standards as well as the Department's IT standards. 22. The FTTTF needs to share then' lessons learned and data mining techniques with other DOJ components.

Administrative Management •

Most of the administrative management functions at FTTTF are being performed as collateral duties, often by staff who were brought to FTTTF to perform other duties. For example, an intelligence research specialist is doing budget formulation, the operations chief is handling personnel and the Chief of Staff is trying to do various other activities. As a general rule,

OAG015-1025

whomever is willing and has sufficient skill may be asked to assist, even if it is not their area of expertise or interest. Recommendation: 23. FTTTF should have (or the FBI assign) an experienced Executive Officer or Administrative Officer to oversee and coordinate activities of a small administrative unit (see Recommendation 7) that would perform functions critical to sustaining FTTTF operations. Specifically, the unit should have three staff with expertise in personnel, budget/finance, and procurement The head of this unit also would establish relationships and ensure liaison with the FBI on other administrative matters to maximize potential economies using the existing FBI infrastructure. General Personnel Management •

FTTTF employees are detailees and most, reportedly, were hand picked by the first FTTTF Director. Currently, there are about 45 FTTTF staff, about half of whom are FBI employees. It is understandable that while operating as a "start-up" organization totally reliant on detailees, FTTTF has not yet established a clear personnel/staffing strategy or any infrastructure to actively provide human resources planning and development Staff brought on board to provide one skill or service often have ended up working in a variety of areas and performing multiple jobs to meet the mission. For example, Intelligence Research Specialists are performing budget and personnel functions in addition to doing their regular analytical work. While all acknowledged die value of being part of this important effort initially, sustained long work hours and performance of tasks outside of their areas of expertise or interest now are leading some to job burnout and frustration.

•

Many key staff are leaving FTTTF as their details expire, e.g., the CIO who had overseen/coordinated IT activities returned to her home office. Since its inception, there has been no sense of permanence or structure to the basic processes of recruiting and retaining the best personnel available.

•

There is some confusion among staff regarding information flow and assignments. Certain staff, recruited by the previous Director for a certain purpose, were not fully utilized for those tasks. It appears there is no real "chain of command" for making assignments, with the result that a few "star performers" receive the bulk of the work.

•

The FTTTF needs to stabilize its management of human resources. The review team found that there appears to be no system in place yet that: (1) identifies the specific positions/skills sets needed (e.g., optimum mix of agents, analysts, admin, othejrs); (2) clarifies employee work -18-

* -"i -..,..

OAG015-1026

responsibilities and performance requirements/expectations (e.g., no position descriptions or performance planning/review process; (3) establishes and articulates recruitment, hiring or succession plans and strategy; (4) establishes detailee commitment time frames and ensures backfilling of detailee positions; (5) sets criteria for employee award/recognition. •

The FTTTF has operated without the benefit of human resources personnel on site or clear HR support from DOJ or FBI. The new FTTTF Director has indicated his desire to review and better define staff roles and reponsibilities to ensure that staff are treated fairly and used efficiently and effectively to support the mission.

Recommendations: 24. The FTTTF should have (or the FBI assign) a full-time human resources specialist to support the FTTTF. This person would help the new Director ensure that current FTTTF staff are assigned appropriate duties and that new staffdetailees have appropriate background/skills to address the mission requirements and are placed appropriately within the organization. 25. The human resources specialist should work closely with FTTTF managers to develop position descriptions and performance standards and plans. He/she would also implement an overall hiring plan/strategy for FTTTF that covers both permanent and rotational detailee positions, and career ladders/succession planning. FBI and FTTTF managers should adopt any available incentives to attract the highest quality recruitment candidates, for both its permanent and detailee positions. Budeet/Financial Management For FY 2002, FTTTF was provided a total of $20 million for startup costs and initial operations. •

Because of the timing of the directive establishing the FTTTF and the planning activities necessary for its activation, operational resources for the FTTTF were not included in the President's FY 2003 budget request. For FY 2003, the Department is seeking a budget amendment and reprogramming that would add $62 million in no-year money ($13 million via reprogramming of FBI resources). There is also a $10 million reprogramming pending on the Hill which is intended to complete the build-out of space, security and IT requirements.

Recommendation: 26. The FTTTF should have (or the FBI assign) a person to work full-time at the FTTTF on budget/financial matters, considering*the anticipated growth level of such activity. This

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OAG015-1027

person would be responsible for FTTTF budget formulation and execution, as well as ongoing financial planning and management related to FTTTF activities. This person also would be directly involved in setting up any reimbursable agreements that might be necessary with participating agencies for information or other services. Procurement Management •

FTTTF relies heavily on its relationship with CIFA/JCAG to handle the administrative requirements of its procurement activity. There has been some concern raised that the placement of FTTTF in the FBI will undercut FTTTF's ability to procure services in an expedited manner to complete urgent taskings. FBI managers have expressed sensitivity to these concerns and appear willing to set up whatever mechanisms (e.g., designating a procurement specialist to handle FTTTF requirements) are most appropriate to ensure responsiveness.

Recommendation: 27. FTTTF should have (or FBI assign) a procurement specialist familiar with requirements of major systems acquisitions (e.g., systems often encountered in IT/IC work) and put in place suitable mechanisms to meet FTTTF's unique procurement requirements. The FBI should ensure that FTTTF has available to it the necessary flexibility to meet these types of requirements. Legal Counsel •

There are 4-5 lawyers assigned to the FTTTF. The Interim FTTTF Organizational Chart shows a Chief Counsel and 3 attorneys reporting to him. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the CIO was an attorney and so is the Chief of Staff/Deputy Director Policy and Law. This seems like an excessive number of attorneys to provide legal counsel, and in fact, interviews suggested that, like other staff, these also were performing FTTTF developmental/start up/management duties unrelated to their skills.

•

At the same time, the team found that there are significant legal issues that need to be addressed related to the loosened information sharing rules under the USA PATRIOT Act and the Attorney General's Guidelines on Information Sharing, as well as to address Privacy Act and other requirements. Continuing legal advice is likely to be needed, but the number of attorney staff on board seems excessive.

•

With the potential for many of the management/administrative functions now performed by the Chief of Staff/Deputy Director Policy and Law to be performed in the future by an Executive/Administrative Officer and the Administrative Management Unit, it may be desirable -20-

OAG015-1028

for the incumbent of this position to become the FTTTF legal counsel. The FTTTF legal counsel should coordinate their efforts through the FBI's General Counsel. Recommendation: 28. The FBI General Counsel should ensure that FTTTF receives its required level of continuing legal counsel services, and assist in making a determination of which such services should be provided on site.

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OAG015-1029

Summary List of Recommendations Mission and Functions 1. DOJ, FBI and F1TT*' leadership should work with other participating agencies to develop and adopt by signature a formal charter (see examples at Appendix A) that dearly sets forth the FTTTF mission, functions, and broad operating parameters. Such a document would help emphasize the priority of FTTTF's work and clarify the coordinative role that it is expected to play with other agencies, especially those engaged in intelligence collection activities. The charter could also address: the FTTTF's policy coordination role, if any, relative to HSPD-2; the duration of service required of the FTTTF Director and interagency detailees; and the reporting relationships/responsibilities of the FTTTF Director. 2. Given the interagency nature of FTTTF's role and its status as a national counterterrorism asset, the charter should include the creation of an FTTTF Policy Advisory Board, chaired by the Deputy Attorney General, with participation of the FBI Director, Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence, the Assistant Director for Counterterrorism, the FTTTF Director, and any other interagency participation designated by the Deputy Attorney General and the FBI Director. Its role would be to oversee the continuing process of bringing FTTTF to full operational status. The Board could advise on all remaining start-up activities, determine future requests/allocation of funds, advise on selection of the Director and Deputy Director, give guidance on establishment of major ongoing functions/key taskings, and address interagency issues. 3. Because information management (e.g., collection, sorting, and dissemination) lies at the core of the FTTTF mission and functions, FTTTF should continue with its innovative, ongoing research and development activities to ensure that systems and tools remain cutting edge in support of the FTTTF's unique counterterrrorism enforcement mission.

Organizational Placement and Structure 4. Although FTTTF will continue to be a national asset with interagency participation and use, it should remain organizationally placed within the FBI's Connterrorism Division (CTD) where it can be linked functionally and operationally to the FBI headquarters National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) and the field-based Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). This will: (1) ensure clear command, control and coordination over counterterrorism enforcement assets; (2) guarantee FTTTF system interoperability and inter-connectivity to the FBI's national systems architecture being developed to support counterterrorism; and (3) avoid duplication of effort in connterterrorism enforcement support activities.

-22-

OAG015-1030

5. Pursuant to the August 6th memorandum, a dual communication/reporting arrangement will need to be worked out to ensure that the FTTTF Director: (1) keeps both the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and the Assistant Director, CTD, apprised of FTTTF activities; and (2) receives and controls taskings from the ODAG and FBI. Specifically, the FTTTF Director and FBI Assistant Director for CTD together should meet with, and report regularly to, the ODAG, where a single point of contact (e.g., the DAG Chief of Staff) should serve as the DOJ executive-level information/tasking conduit The specific expectations and responsibilities involved in this arrangement should be articulated in a memorandum from the DAG to the FBI Director. 6. The FTTTF Director should have direct access to any level of the FBI (including the Director), as well as to the Deputy Attorney General, when circumstances (e.g., information is uncovered pertaining to a major, immediate threat) demand quick communication/response to protect the national interest or the lives of U.S. citizens, or in response to urgent taskings assigned by the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General. 7. The new FTTTF Director needs to complete his ongoing management assessment and establish an organizational structure that supports the FTTTF mission and functions and clarifies employee roles, responsibilities and reporting relationships. He should work with other agency representatives to agree upon a structure that both effectively and efficiently accomplishes the mission and meets their needs and expectations. The structure should be flexible enough to cover the range of functions to be performed now and in the foreseeable future, and changed as appropriate to meet new needs or requirements. The review team defers to the FTTTF Director and managers to determine what structure best supports the mission; however, five organizational/functional/staffing issues need to be addressed soon: (1) role, duration, representation (e.g., continued INS) and responsibilities of the Deputy Director, (2) role and placement of the Chief of Staff; (3) the need for an administrative unit headed by an executive or administrative officer; (4) the need for a full-time CIO/IT unit to oversee/coordinate systems development; and (5) role and potential greater integration of the liaison staff into the core FTTTF work. 8. Although FTTTF is organizationally placed within the FBI, its collocation with CIFA/JCAG should continue and it should move into the new space in Crystal City once funding is available and construction is completed.

Staffing 9. The FTTTF charter should specify that its Director be an SES-level career FBI agent, jointly selected by FBI and DOJ management 10. The FTTTF Director should be required to serve a minimum of two years, with potential -23-

OAG015-1031

to extend this period of service with the advice of the proposed FTTTF Policy Advisory Board. 11. Given the nature and importance of the FTTTF Director position, the FBI should ensure careful succession planning that includes some overlap in service to avoid any leadership gaps such as occurred recently. This will give new Directors a chance to learn and become familiar with the FTTTF work and to be introduced to key DOJ, FBI and interagency officials who interact with, and participate in, FTTTF. 12. The FTTTF charter should specify that the Deputy Director be a senior-level (GS-15 or above) INS official who commits to a minimum two-year tenure (possibly extended with Board approval) and who has direct access to the INS Commissioner and field units when circumstances/information dictate immediate action by the INS. Similar to the Director position, appropriate succession planning and overlap of tenure should occur. (Note: if the intelligence/enforcement elements of INS are integrated into DHS, the team recommends that DOJ/FBI work with DHS to continue having an FTTTF Deputy be assigned from there.) 13. The FBI and DOJ should confer on how best to hire a highly skilled, long-term senior level CIO to oversee all information systems planning and development activities. This person should have experience in developing major, large-scale, state-of-the-art systems for the LE and Intel Communities. They should also understand how to overcome the challenges of obtaining, controlling and sharing sensitive LE and intelligence information, and have specialized experience in connecting disparate systems/data so that analysts can perform needed functions at their desktops. 14. The FTTTF charter should articulate the general approach/broad criteria for interagency participation at FTTTF. At a minimum, FTTTF, FBI and Department leaders should ensure that the federal law enforcement, the Intelligence Community and the Department of State continue to participate in order to meet the HSPD-2 mandates. The FTTTF Director and Deputy also should develop and present to the Policy Board an interagency staffing plan (including agencies that should be represented, the number and types of staff needed, and the proposed duration of their details) to meet the FTTTF mission over the long-term. Appropriate memoranda of understanding or interagency agreements should be developed to effect appropriate participation. 15. The FTTTF should better articulate the skills sets needed from the candidate agency to best complement its overall effort. To support this, FTTTF should upgrade/update its current powerpoint briefing to present the FTTTF capabilities and potential participants. It should accurately and clearly describe FTTTF's mission, role in the national context, structure, accomplishments, capablities, future plans. This material should be flexible enough to be easily updated and adapted for-use in multiple settings and for various audiences, including -24-

OAG015-1032

1 policy makers, new employees, and potential participants. Such a tool would be very helpful in getting the word out to others about F i l l * and achieving broader understanding of and support for its activities. 16. The FTTTF Director should visit and meet regularly with executives from DOJ and nonDO J participating agencies to ensure their satisfaction with their continuing role and product out of FTTTF. The Director must participate in and perhaps develop other interagency fora to foster communication and information sharing. Interagency relationships need to be nurtured to ensure continued buy-in and participation of agencies that are key contributors. Information Resources 17. Because of its close working relationship with CIFA/JCAG, the FTTTF should continue to leverage the technical expertise of CIFA/JCAG for its current system development efforts and future technology efforts wherever relevant in order to achieve economies of scale. 18. The FTTTF should establish an IT unit reporting to the proposed CIO (see Recommendation 7), and hire into this unit permanent IT staff with technical expertise in the areas of knowledge management, visualization tools, system security, telecommunications, and relational databases. The permanent IT staff should be certified as COTRs. 19. The FTTTF should develop a long term plan for the acquisition of law enforcement, intelligence, public source, and proprietary data for the data warehouse. Due to limited resources, the FTTTF should also prioritize its data warehouse requirements. 20. The Department must ensure that adequate IT funding is provided to the FTTTF to complete its system development efforts in a timely and cost-effective manner. 21. The major IT development efforts at the FTTTF that will be institutionalized should be coordinated with the FBI's Enterprise Architecture Group to ensure compliance with the overall FBI's Enterprise Architecture and IT standards as well as the Department's IT standards. 22. The FTTTF needs to share their lessons learned and data mining techniques with other DOJ components. Administrative Management 23. FTTTF should have (or the FBI assign) an experienced Executive Officer or Administrative Officer to oversee and coordinate activities of a small administrative unit (see Recommendation 7) that would perform functions critical to sustaining FTTTF operations. -25-

(*£-•! f- t f *: f 1

OAG015-1033

Specifically, the unit should have three staff with expertise in personnel, budget/finance, and procurement The head of this unit also would establish relationships and ensure liaison with the FBI on other administrative matters to maximize potential economies using the existing FBI infrastructure. 24. The FTTTF should have (or the FBI assign) a full-time human resources specialist to support the FTTTF. This person would help the new Director ensure that current FTTTF staff are assigned appropriate duties and that new staff/detailees have appropriate background/skills to address the mission requirements and are placed appropriately within the organization. 25. The human resources specialist should work closely with FTTTF managers to develop position descriptions and performance standards and plans. He/she would also implement an overall hiring plan/strategy for FTTTF that covers both permanent and rotational detailee positions, and career ladders/succession planning. FBI and FTTTF managers should adopt any available incentives to attract the highest quality recruitment candidates, for both its permanent and detailee positions. 26. The FTTTF should have (or the FBI assign) a person to work full-time at the FTTTF on budget/financial matters, considering the anticipated growth level of such activity. This person would be responsible for FTTTF budget formulation and execution, as well as ongoing financial planning and management related to FTTTF activities. This person also would be directly involved in setting up any reimbursable agreements that might be necessary with participating agencies for information or other services. 27. FTTTF should have (or FBI assign) a procurement specialist familiar with requirements of major systems acquisitions (e.g., systems often encountered in IT/IC work) and put in place suitable mechanisms to meet FTTTF's unique procurement requirements. The FBI should ensure that FTTTF has available to it the necessary flexibility to meet these types of requirements. 28. The FBI General Counsel should ensure that FTTTF receives its required level of continuing legal counsel services, and assist in making a determination of which such services should be provided on site.

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OAG015-1034

APPENDIX - SAMPLE CHARTERS

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OAG015-1035

of

tijelitarneg t. 18. (120530

Order No. 2059-96

NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER CHARTER

I. Mission Statement. Consistent with section 9078 of Pub. L. No. 102-396, this order formally establishes within the Department" of Justice the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). NDIC's mission shall be to coordinate and consolidate strategic organizational drug intelligence from national security and law enforcement agencies, in order to produce requested assessments and analyses regarding the structure, membership, finances, communication, transportation, logistics, and other activities of drug trafficking organizations. n. Organization. NDIC shall be organized as follows: A. . Director. NDIC shall be headed by a Director, who shall be selected by, and report directly to, the Deputy Attorney General and shall be a member of the Senior Executive Service. The Director's responsibilities are described in paragraph ffl below. B. -Executive Advisory Board (EAB). The EAB, which shall meet no less frequently than twice each year, shall further refine NDIC's mission and ensure the appropriate execution of that mission, including matters related to the security and privacy aspects of information held and disseminated by NDIC. Membership in the EAB shall include the heads, or their senior representatives, of law enforcement and intelligence

OAG015-1036

agencies that actively participate in NDIC's activities. Representatives of federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies not participating in NDIC, and representatives of other appropriate federal entities, may also be invited to attend EAB meetings. C. Intelligence Priorities Board (IPS). The IPB, which shall meet at least quarterly, shall assist the Director in the prioritization of NDIC's activities, provide agency dissemination approval, and serve as a forum to resolve problems that may arise during the data gathering and analysis activities of NDIC. The IPB shall adhere to the procedures for initiating and accomplishing IPB projects, as approved by the EPB on August 15, 1995. D. Senior Management. Senior management positions within NDIC shall be •established in grades consistent with the responsibilities associated with such positions and shall be filled by NDIC or detailed personnel, as appropriate. Assignment of detailees tov senior management positions shall take account of all relevant factors, which may include such matters as individual experience in law enforcement and intelligence analysis, seniority, and appropriate representation of agencies participating in NDIC. E. NDIC Employees. NDIC shall consist of personnel directly assigned to NDIC, personnel detailed from the federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies participating in NDIC's efforts, and personnel detailed from the Department of Defense or other federal agencies for purposes of technical or other support HI. Responsibilities of the Director. The Director of NDIC shall be responsible for the following: A. The Director shall report to the Deputy Attorney General, at least on a monthly basis, concerning NDIC's activities.

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OAG015-1037

B. The Director shall report to the EAB regarding the significant activities and accomplishments of NDIC, and the current and projected assignments and projects of NDIC. C. Consistent with the provisions of paragraph LLC above, in consultation with the EAB, and subject to the approval of the Deputy Attorney General, the Director shall establish the organizational structure of the IPB. D. Consistent with the provisions of paragraphs n.D and n.E above, in consultation with the EAB, and subject to the approval of the Deputy Attorney General, the Director shall establish the organizational structure of NDIC. IV. Agreements with Non-Department 6f Justice Agencies. In conjunction With the heads, or their senior representatives, of all non-Department of Justice federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies that maintain intelligence on drug trafficking, NDIC shall determine the assistance that such agencies can provide NDIC in maximizing the accomplishment of its mission. Such assistance may include, but not be limited to, making available to NDIC, on appropriate terms and conditions, data, data systems, personnel, and other support. Based on such determinations, NDIC and these other agencies shall determine whether it is appropriate to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding, or other appropriate documentation, to facilitate the fullest appropriate participation of such agencies in the work of NDIC. V. Document Exploitation OX)CE?O. NDIC shall maintain the personnel and technical resources to provide timely support to federal drug law enforcement authorities to conduct DOCEX of materials seized in domestic law enforcement actions. NDIC shall also

OAG015-1038

seek to maximize compatibility of its DOCEX products with appropriate database and exploitation programs of other federal entities. VI. National Drug Intelligence Library (NDID. NDIC shall maintain the -personnel and technical resources to manage the NDIL, an electronic collection of drug intelligence documents not classified beyond the "Law Enforcement Sensitive" level from participating agencies and from open sources that are readily accessible to the public. NDIC shall disseminate a catalogue of information in the NDIL to federal law enforcement and intelligence authorities. VII. Protection of Sensitive Information... The Director, EAB, IPB, and ail NDIC management and employees shall meet established requirements for the appropriate handling, protection, and dissemination of sensitive information, including, but not limited to, information subject to classification for reasons of national security, information subject to protection for reasons of law enforcement sensitivity, and information subject to protection for reasons of personal privacy. NDIC shall not disseminate information provided by participating agencies to any other agency, and participating agencies shall not disseminate information provided by NDIC, without respective approval from the agency originating the information.

Date

nn

Janet Reno Attorney General

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OAG015-1039

EPIC C H A R T E R (REVISED)

U.S.

D E P A R T M E N T OF J U S T I C E

DRUG E N F O R C E M E N T A D M I N I S T R A T I O N EL PASO INTELLIGENCE CENTER EL PASO, TEXAS

PARTICIPATING

AGENCIES:

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms U.S. U.S.

Coast Guard

Customs Service

Drug Enforcement Administration Federal Aviation Administration Federal Bureau of Investigation Immigration & Naturalization

Service

Internal Revenue Service U.S. U.S.

EPIC CHARTER

Marshals

Service

Secret Service

NOVEMBER;198J

OAG015-1040

H I S T O R I C A L BACKGROUND

M a r c h 4, 1974, in response to a request from the O f f i c e of anagement and Budget ( O M B ) , the D e p a r t m e n t of Justice b m i t t e d to OMB a paper e n t i t l e d , "A Secure Border: An A n a l y s i s of Issues A f f e c t i n g the U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of J u s t i c e . " Biis paper d e t a i l e d c u r r e n t narcotics and b o r d e r e n f o r c e n e n t strategy and p r o g r a m s , made recommendations for improved operational posture, and proposed changes in Tegislation to augment the recommendations. Recommendation Jg of this paper suggested the establishment and direction of a Southwest Border Intelligence Service Center by the _ Enforcement Administration (DEA) to be s t a f f e d by representatives of I m m i g r a t i o n & N a t u r a l i z a t i o n Service BNS), DEA and Customs ( U S C S ) . As a r e s u l t of subsequent consultation, the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) was eated. A representative of DEA was selected as Director of E P I C and a representative of INS Border Patrol was lected as Deputy D i r e c t o r . nee the creation of EPIC, it has developed into a fully functioning, coordinated intelligence facility supported by Aie respective data bases of the participating agencies. Drug Enforcement Administration, Immigration & Naturalization Hervice, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs, Bureau of Alcohol, obacco & Firearms, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. rshals Service, Internal Revenue Service, Federal Bureau

f Investigation, and U.S. Secret Service have become articipating member agencies of the Center. The National Intelligence Officer for Narcotics also participates on the PIC Advisory Board. Consistent with national policy'of Incouraging the participation of all possible law enforcenent ssets in combating the international and domestic traffic In narcotics, participating and associate memberships with PIC have been made available to Federal, state and local nforceaent organizations under guidelines established by he EPIC Advisory Board.

4

..e historical orientation of the Intelligence Center was ocused on the Mexican border with the primary priority gainst traffickers of Hexican heroin and illegal aliens, he utilization by traffickers of medium and long range ircraft as well as seagoing vessels has extended the focus f EPIC beyond the Hexican border area and has made it orld-wide in scope. In addition DEA, mandated to support tate and local enforcement elements with narcotics ntelligence, and with the concurrence of the EPIC Advisory card, established EPIC as a means to improve intelligence fupport to the state and local elements. By 1985 all 50 tates, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam had ntered into agreements with EPIC.

i

PIC CHARTER

(2)

NOVEMBER 1987

OAG015-1041

MISSION OF EPIC — The p r i m a r y mission of E P I C is to p r o v i d e a c o m p l e t e and a c c u r a t e intelligence p i c t u r e of drug m o v e m e n t by land, sea, and air t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d . Major e m p h a s i s is focused on t r a f f i c k i n g organizations whose narcotics and illegal aliens are d e s t i n e d for the United States. Direct tactical intelligence support is p r o v i d e d to p a r t i c i p a t i n g agencies. The EPIC mission is accomplished by the accumulation of raw intelligence, analysis of data and the provision of tactical and operational intelligence to agencies having direct or related statutory law enforcement responsibilities. In the process of the analysis of raw data from participating and associated agencies, trafficking organizations Mill be identified, intelligence gaps will be filled, and analytical reports w i l l be prepared and disseminated. A. T A C T I C A L SUPPORT - The support by EPIC to operational elements of participating and associated agencies is through "real-time" response to queries of field agents of the respective agencies supported by EPIC using the data bases available to it (DEA M-204, TECS, etc.). EPIC also provides special purpose tactical intelligence support such as name, vehicle, vessel, and aircraft lookouts for narcotics interdiction purposes. EPIC is an intelligence support activity with a sophisticated communications capability to accommodate its basic mission requirements. A users guide describing EPIC support and procedures for support has been prepared and will be periodically updated. B. OPERATIONAL/STRATEGIC SUPPORT - EPIC possesses the capability to perform operational and strategic intelligence analysis using EPIC Watch activity and EPIC data bases. The EPIC Advisory Board will periodically review EPIC analysis activity, priorities, and products disseminated, etc., to ensure maximum responsiveness of EPIC support. Requirements for EPIC products may be identified by EPIC management and member agencies. C. PARTICIPATING AGENCY SUPPORT - It shall be the policy of EPIC to provide continuing narcotics intelligence and related support to participating agencies to which EPIC can make a contribution--such as support to interdiction and

alien smuggling prevention.-. A '"participating agency" la defined as a Federal a gene/ directly supporting the national effort in the coordinated narcotics intelligence process within the El Paso Intelligence Center by furnishing intelligence and related resources to the Center. EPIC can also make a unique contribution to special projects. If the

EPIC CHARTER

(3)

•«

NOVEMBER 1987!

OAG015-1042

m Jl|

EPIC support is significant (magnitude, resources, policy, e t c . ) , the Special Agent in C h a r g e of E P I C or the r e q u e s t i n g agency will refer the request to the EPIC Advisory Board for coordination and approval. D. A S S O C I A T E D AGENCY S U P P O R T - It s h a l l be the p o l i c y of E P I C to p r o v i d e t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l narcotics intelligence to s u p p o r t f o r e i g n , s t a t e , and local p o l i c e agencies in t h e i r e f f o r t s against t r a f f i c k e r s at all levels. An "associated agency" is defined as a F e d e r a l , s t a t e or local criminal j u s t i c e agency d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y involved in narcotics or criminal investigation and enforcement, not h a v i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the C e n t e r , a s s i s t i n g the narcotic intelligence mission through the i n t e r c h a n g e of intelligence, c o n s u l t a t i o n , and c o o r d i n a t e d o p e r a t i o n a l support. Support to associated agencies w i l l be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h guidelines established by the EPIC Advisory Board. A D V I S O R Y BOARD

The EPIC A d v i s o r y Board is established to p r o v i d e direction to EPIC and to coordinate participating agency requirements. The Board will establish goals, priorities, and requirements and will develop and implement national policy for mutually e f f e c t i v e operation of the Center. The Chairman of the Board shall be DCA's Deputy Assistant Administrator for Intelligence. Each participating member agency shall have one Board member appointed by the head of that agency, and authorized to make policy and management decisions on behalf of that agency. At the invitation of the Chairman, Board meeting attendance will be broadened on an ad hoc basis to ensure full coordination of Federal activity in narcotics intelligence. Interagency agreements between p a r t i c i p a t i n g agencies that affect EPIC will be I reviewed and coordinated by the Advisory Board. Additional 'responsibilities of the Board shall be to provide guidelines I for the u t i l i z a t i o n of various data bases consistent with ' the provisions of the Privacy Act. The Board shall also I ensure that member agencies' participation in the Center is supported in their respective budget and planning activities*'

it dr

' T o effect periodic evaluation of ongoing EPIC activities, I the Board will meet at least semi-annually. Furthermore, an annual EPIC .report will be prepared and forwarded to the iheads of all participating agencies for appropriate review. |Any revisions to the EPIC Charter are to be reviewed by the Advisory Board and passed on to participating agencies for I r a t i f i c a t i o n . w i t h an Advisory Board .recommendation.

EPIC CHARTER

NOVEMBER

1987

iii OAG015-1043

EPIC MANAGEMENT The El Paso Intelligence Center is managed by a Special Agent in Charge (SAC) assigned from DEA and appointed by the Administrator of OCA. The Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) position will be filled on a rotating basis by U.S. Customs, U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service, and U.S Coast Guard, The ASAC position will be filled for an original three-year term with an additional option year upon agreement by the SAC and the respective parent agency. Extensions beyond four years must be approved by a majority vote of the EPIC Advisory Board. Should the ASAC position be vacated for any reason prior to the end of the original terms, it shall be filled by the next agency in rotation. The Chief, Watch Operations; the Chief, Analysis; and the Chief, Program Development are designated as EPIC management positions and will be filled by participating EPIC agencies. As vacancies occur in these positions they will be filled by interested agencies subject to approval by the Advisory Board which will determine an equitable management presence commensurate with existing EPIC resource commitments. These positions shall be filled on a three-year rotation basis with an additional option year upon agreement between the SAC and the respective parent agency. Any extensions beyond four years must be approved by the EPIC Advisory Board. All personnel assigned to the EPIC Watch A c t i v i t y will be under the supervision of the Chief, Operations, regardless of their agency affiliation. When not directly working the Watch, officers may be assigned to special projects by their respective agency program coordinators.

All personnel assigned to the EPIC Intelligence Analysis activity will be under the supervision of the Chief, Analysis, regardless of agency affiliation. The Chief will supervise and review preparation and finalization of analytical products. EPIC supervisory personnel, regardless of parent organization, will exercise complete technical and functional supervision over all personnel including the authority to release raw intelligence information and intelligence products. Performance appraisals will be prepared by the first-line EPIC supervisor in coordination with the appropriate agency program coordinator.

EPIC CHARTER

(5)

NOVEMBER

1967

lid OAG015-1044

PROGRAM C O O R D I N A T O R S Program Coordinators are Senior Representatives assigned by the heads of participating agenc.ies. They will assure that their respective agencies are properly represented within EPIC and that their mission objectives are being fully supported by EPIC and are consistent with EPIC's mission. They will be responsible for maintaining direct liaison with both their headquarters and operational field elements. Supervisory responsibility over their parent agency employees is limited to personnel administrative areas (discipline, grievance, etc.). They will consult with the SAC, A S A C , and Chiefs as appropriate on policy, plans, and program areas. Program Coordinators are not considered part of the functional management of EPIC. All products prepared by Program Coordinators and developed utilizing the EPIC data bases will be reviewed and approved by EPIC Management prior to dissemination. All correspondence relating to the management of EPIC will be forwarded through EPIC management for review and comment.

EPIC CHARTER

(&)

' ; NOVEMBER 1987

OAG015-1045

..'Jj! J.l!$

ephen E. Higgins (Date) mmissioner reau of Alcohol, Tobacco and

William S. S e s s i o n s ( D a t e }

Director

-.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Firearms

ml A. Yost, Jr. miral ited States Coast Guard

(Date)

Alan C. N e l s o n ( D a t e ) Commissioner I m m i g r a t i o n and N a t u r a l i z a t i o n Service

«=*

mreandant

liam v o n R a a b ( D a t e ) mnissioner nited States Customs Service

Lawrence B. Gibbs

Stanley E. Morris (Date) Director United States Marshals Service

n C.L a w n ( D a t e ) •inistrator ug Enforcement Administration

John R . S i m p s o n : ( D a t e ) Director United States Secret Service

Allan HcArtor (Date) ministretor Federal Aviatfon Administration

1C CHARTER

(Date)

Commissioner Internal Revenue Service

(7)

NOVEMBER 1987

OAG015-1046

General Counleidnig Intelligence Plan (GC1P)

February 2000

Section A: National Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination Introduction The central theme confronted in the White House Task Force (WHTF) Review was the need for clear, consistent intercommunity and interagency coordination of the counterdrug intelligence effort. A concern most often echoed was, "No one is in charge." The Review established that it was neither possible nor appropriate for any one person or component to be "in charge" in a monolithic coordinating body. The law enforcement and intelligence communities each have very distinct and legitimate legal and operational authorities that must be preserved in the joint management of counterdrug investigative and intelligence activities. What is possible and appropriate, however, is the establishment of a strengthened intercomponent coordinating mechanism that fosters and facilitates both greater information sharing and operational coordination between the law enforcement and intelligence counterdrug communities. This mechanism recognizes and optimizes the capabilities, equities, and authorities of all Federal departments engaged in this effort, and also strengthens the important counterdrug partnership among the Federal, state, and local law enforcement communities. The coordinating structure defined below forms the core of a three-tiered coordination mechanism designed to specifically meet the above objectives. The centerpiece of this collaborative coordinating structure is the new Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group (CDICG), with its supporting staff, the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX). The CDICG will draw its policy guidance from the President's Council on Counter-Narcotics and from the five goals and supporting objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy and derives its ability to resolve issues through the authorities and prerogatives of its respective members from the law enforcement and intelligence communities. x

National Counterdrug Intelligence Coordination *>

•

I. PURPOSE. The coordinating structure for carrying out the functions and for implementing the recommendations contained in this General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) is set forth below. This structure is intended to maximize timely information sharing, intelligence exchange, and operational coordination—fully within statutory limitations—among the poljcymaking, military, law enforcement, and Intelligence Community components that collectively make up our national counterdrug intelligence architecture. The new architecture will build on the important progress that has been made over the past decade, and provide a framework that promotes even further

19 OAG015-1047

General Counlerdrug Intelligence Plan (GC1P)

February 2000

counterdrug intelligence coordination and information flow, at the Federal, state, and local levels, in the 21st Century. II. THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COUNTER-NARCOTICS. The Council, originally established by Executive Order, was given statutory authorization under section 709 of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 (21 U.S.C. 1708). With the Director of ONDCP serving as Executive Director, this cabinet-level Council advises and assists the President in providing direction and oversight for the National Drug Control Strategy, and in ensuring coordination among departments and agencies of the Federal Government concerning implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy. Consistent with those responsibilities, the Council shall serve as the preeminent body for providing oversight on all issues relating to drug intelligence policy. There is established within the Council an eight-member body (the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of ONDCP, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of State, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) known as the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Committee, whose purpose is to provide a focal point for all counterdrug intelligence policy issues within the PCCN. Other PCCN members may attend meetings of this Executive Committee as appropriate to the issues under consideration. Through existing counternarcotics fora noted in Section III, below, and subordinate bodies prescribed in Sections IV and V, below, the Council will monitor implementation of the GCIP, and, more particularly, it will oversee the development and dissemination of law enforcement and intelligence requirements to meet the goals and objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy. III. COUNTERDRUG INTERAGENCY POLICY AND PROGRAM COORDINATION. The interdepartmental bodies listed below meet to identify and coordinate counterdrug issues. Each focuses on a distinct area of the counterdrug arena, described below, and may provide input into the CDICG or CDX, as appropriate. While the Counter-Narcotics Interagency Working Group deals exclusively with policy guidance issues, the remaining entities deal primarily with operational and programmatic issues. A. The Counter-Narcotics Interagency Working Group (CN-IWG), chaired by ONDCP, is the principal interagency, senior working-level forum for coordinating policy guidance related to counterdrug issues. As described below, it is also a principal forum for identifying counterdrug intelligence-related requirements and taskings that may cross jurisdictional lines or involve multiple components within the Federal law enforcement community and the Intelligence Community. B. The Southern Frontiers Committee is chaired by the Attorney General and provides operational focus and direction to law enforcement organizations

20

OAG015-1048

General Countadnig Intelligence Plan (GCIP)

February 2000

regarding operations along the Southwest Border and the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. C. The Interdiction Committee (TIC), which is currently chaired by the Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service, provides advice to the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) in support of his role of overseeing the adequacy and optimum use of Federal interdiction assets. Additionally, the TIC provides a forum for coordination and optimization of border interdiction and promotes seamless and effective integration of interdiction efforts in support of the National Drug Control Strategy. D. The J-3/USIC Quarterly Counterdrug Conference, which is co-chaired by the Department of Defense Joint Staff Director for Operations and the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, promotes coordination between military counterdrug support efforts and the needs of interdiction organizations. E. The Committee on Narcotics Intelligence Issues (CNII) is chaired by the Director, DCI Crime and Narcotics Center, and promotes counterdrug coordination within the Intelligence Community. Whenever these or other Federal counterdrug-related interagency committees and working groups identify counterdrug intelligence-related issues, requirements, or taskings that are cross-jurisdictional,' such matters may be referred to the CDICG, described in Section IV, below, for attention and necessary action. Matters that cannot be resolved by the CDICG will be referred to the Council.

FV. COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING GROUP. A. ESTABLISHMENT. There is established under the Council an interagency group known as the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group, or CDICG. B. MEMBERSHIP. 1. COMPOSITION. The CDICG shall be composed of 13 members, of whom: a. 1 will be designated by the DCI; b. 1 will be designated by the Attorney General; c. 1 will be desighated by the Secretary of the Treasury; d. 1 will be designated by the Secretary of Transportation; e. 1 will be designated by the Director of ONDCP; f. 1 will be designated by the Secretary of Defense; g. 1 will be designated by the Secretary of State; s/Vs

used here and elsewhere in the GCIP, the term "cross-jurisdictional" refers (o counterdrug intelligence issues that affect or involve both the law enforcement community and the Intelligence Community, or, within the law enforcement community, that affect or involve more than one department, or that affect both the U.S. Government and state and/or local officials.

21

•I*

i!

OAG015-1049

General Countcrdmg Intelligence Plan (GCIP)

February 2000

h. 1 will be designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; i. 1 will be designated by the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration; j. 1 will be designated by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; k. 1 will be designated by the Commissioner of the United States Customs Service; 1. 1 will be designated by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service; and, m. 1 will be designated by the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. 2. LEADERSHIP. The CDICG shall be led by co-chairs from the Intelligence Community and from the Federal law enforcement community. The Intelligence Community co-chair will be the member designated by the DCI. The law enforcement co-chair will be designated from among other members of the CDICG by mutual agreement of the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Transportation. Co-chair designations will be made in consultation with the Director of ONDCP. 3. OTHER ATTENDEES. With the concurrence of the co-chairs, individual members may invite other officials, representing the major counterdrug intelligence centers and components of the participating departments and agencies, to attend meetings or participate in CDICG deliberations as appropriate to the issues under consideration. In particular, the Deputy Director for State and Local Affairs/ONDCP may attend meetings of the CDICG to discuss counterdrug intelligence issues that concern state and local officials. With the concurrence of the co-chairs, said Deputy Director may invite no more than two state and/or local law enforcement representatives to attend appropriate CDICG deliberations. C. FUNCTIONS. The CDICG, in support of the Council or its individual members, will, among other things: 1. Ensure coordination among departments and agencies of the Federal Government responsible for conducting intelligence programs that support the National Drug Control Strategy; 2. Receive policy guidance and taskings from the Council; additional issues for CDICG consideration may be received from other fora as described in Section III or may be raised by individual members of the CDICG. The CDICG will refer to the Council those issues that it cannot resolve;

22

OAG015-1050

'i 'Mr* i'tri-M" 'iff -frf"^i

General Counterdnig Intelligence Plan (GC1P)

February 2000

3. Receive and recommend to appropriate CDICG members domestic and foreign drug intelligence taskings and requirements in support of national counterdrug policymakers; 4. Provide a forum to resolve or refer for adjudication those crossjurisdictional counterdrug intelligence issues that cannot be resolved at a lower level; 5. Study and advocate enhancements to promote the effectiveness and efficiency of both foreign and domestic counterdrug programs and activities, including the adequacy of intelligence services; 6. Commission national and regional drug threat assessments and studies as requested by senior policymakers; 7. Promote improvements to counterdrug intelligence centers and activities to strengthen mission focus, reduce functional overlap, and promote joint analytic products; 8. Assume the functions heretofore performed by the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) Executive Advisory Board, the ND1C Intelligence Priorities Board; and the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) Advisory Board; 9. Use the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX) (described in Section V, below) to carry out the functions of the CDICG under this section, and other taskings, as appropriate; and, 10. Submit a semiannual written report concerning drug intelligence issues and recommendations to the Council. D. AUTHORITY. The CDICG derives its ability to resolve issues through the authorities and prerogatives of its respective members.

V.

COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT. A. ESTABLISHMENT. In order to improve the overall effectiveness of counterdrug intelligence, there is established a full-time interagency staff known as the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat, or CDX, which shall operate directly under the CDICG. B. CDX DIRECTOR AND CDX DEPUTY DIRECTOR. 1. CDX DIRECTOR. There shall be a CDX Director, who will be ^«^. „. responsible for carrying out the functions of the CDX. The CDX Director' . shall be designated by mutual agreement among the

23 OAG015-1051

General Counlcrdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP)

February 2000

Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Director of ONDCP, for a renewable term of two years. The CDX Director will fill an SES position. 2. CDX DEPUTY DIRECTOR. There shall be a CDX Deputy Director, who will assist the CDX Director in carrying out the functions of the CDX. The CDX Deputy Director shall be designated by the DCI, in consultation with the Director of ONDCP, for a renewable term of two years. The CDX Deputy Director will fill an SES or SIS position. 4

C. CDX STAFF. The CDX staff shall be initially composed of approximately 30 personnel—selected by the CDX Director from departmental nominees—on twoto three-year details, and such additional detailees as needed to fill an executive officer, legal advisor, and other administrative support positions. Within one year, and annually thereafter, the CDICG will review CDX staffing to decide if the CDX needs a mix of detailees and permanent appropriated staff positions. The CDX staff shall be organized to address: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Foreign drug information and intelligence; Domestic drug information and intelligence; Information systems and technology; and, Analyst career professionalization, education, and training.

D. FUNCTIONS. The CDX shall primarily provide staff support to the CDICG, and shall act for the CDICG, as appropriate, in monitoring the implementation of the GCIP; coordinating the implementation of multiagency, cross-jurisdictional counterdrug intelligence taskings and requirements levied by or through the CDICG; and promoting resolution of cross-jurisdictional counterdrug intelligence-related issues. In so doing, the CDX shall, among other things: 1. Promote stronger information flow, information sharing, and fusion relationships among Federal, state, and local agencies, between U.S. law enforcement agencies and the Intelligence Community, and with foreign nations or international organizations; 2. Promote development of technology standards and interoperable information systems, and monitor implementation of and report on information technology and communications plans; 3. Promote improved drug intelligence career professionalization, education, and training throughout the intelligence and law enforcement communities; 4. Receive cross-jurisdictional counterdrug intelligence issues from multiple sources, review and analyze the issues, and prepare appropriate staff studies with recommendations for resolution;

24

OAG015-1052

General Countcrdrog Intelligence Plan (GCIP)

February 2000

5. Promote improved mechanisms for counterdrug intelligence exchange with foreign nations and international organizations; 6. Attempt to resolve issues and disputes at the lowest practical organizational level; and, 7. Draft reports and recommendations, as appropriate, including a semiannual, written report addressing issues raised and recommendations made over the past six months, to the CDICG for review and submission to the Council. Recommendations by the CDX shall take care to protect and preserve the safeguards between U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community, shall be advisory and non-binding, and may be formally and informally disputed by the applicable departments or agencies. E. ADMINISTRATION. 1. EVALUATIONS. The co-chairs of the CDICG shall evaluate the annual performance of the CDX Director and CDX Deputy Director. Other CDX personnel shall be evaluated within the CDX. Evaluations shall be provided to the detailing agencies. 2. COOPERATION FROM OTHER AGENCIES. The CDX will receive from each department and agency of the Executive Branch: a. Access to the information it requires to fulfill its mission, with applicable safeguards for protection of sources and methods;' b. Cooperation in carrying- out the functions of the CDX; and, c. Such assistance, information, and advice as the CDX may request, to the extent permitted by law. 3. SUPPORT AND PLACEMENT. CDX will be administratively supported by the Department of Justice, housed in Justice-owned or -leased nonheadquarters space in the Washington metropolitan area, and funded by ONDCP, as prescribed below. ONDCP will, through the Office of Management and-Budget (OMB) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), assist parent agencies in obtaining and maintaining temporary SES and SIS billets-for QDX. F. FUNDING. The CDX shall be funded as a line item through the ONDCP budget per fund availability. These funds shall be used to reimburse the Justice Department for expenses associated with CDICG and CDX operating, travel, administrative, supply, security, and support services, and those agencies that provide administrative support detailees or services. Additionally, if any funds

'Disputes regarding CDX access to information should be referred 1o the head of the department or agency concerned for resolution.

25

OAG015-1053

General Counterdfug Intelligence Plan (CCIP)

February 2000

remain after reimbursing the Justice Department, these funds will be used to reimburse departments and agencies from which other detailees are assigned. G. NOTE. The functions and responsibilities of the CDX will not derogate or supersede the statutory roles, responsibilities, or authorities of participating Executive Departments and Agencies.

26

OAG015-1054