T5 B55 Fbi Response 1 Of 3 Fdr- Tab 13-5- Entire Contents- Memo 160

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WATCHLISTING OF TERRORISTS BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

RESPONSIVE to REQUEST #13-5

COMMISSION COPY

9/11

Lav; E n f o r c e m e n t Privacy

(Rov.QS-:8-.iOOO)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: To:

Date:

PRIORITY Attn:

All Field Offices

12/24/2002

ADICs \s IT Program Manager DT Program Manager

All Legats Ccur.terterrorism From:

Section Chiefs

Counterterrorism SAWS/TWWU/Room 11303 Contact:

Approved By: Drafted By: Case ID #: 66F-HQ-C1392852 Title:

[Pending)

TERRORISM WATCH LIST TIPOFF MATTERS

Synopsis: This communication describes the Department of State's terrorist TIPOFF system and establishes procedures for FBI field office entries into TIPOFF. Details: The Department of State (DOS) Bureau of Intelligence and Research maintains a classified database, referred to as TIPOFF, which contains information regarding known or suspected terrorists who are not U.S. citizens. TIPOFF was designed to detect these individuals as they apply for visas overseas or as they attempt to ss through U.S., Canadian or Australian border entry points. DOS has established a "reasonable" suspicion" threshold for a qualifying TIPOFF entry. Specifically, there has to be reasonable suspicion the individual is a terrorist or is associated with terrorism. The TIPOFF database maintains classified electronic copies of supporting documents regarding individual TIPOFF entries. In addition to the above, DOS shares qualifying TIPOFF data with U.S. embassies via the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) and with other U.S. border agencies via the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) . Only those TIPOFF entries which contain names and identifying data to facilitate positive Identifications are shared through CLASS and IBIS. The information

Req 13-5

000000001

1 Law Enforcement. •Sensitive

.To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism Re-,, 66'F-HQ-C1392852, 12/24/2002

shared \with CLASS and IBIS is provided at the unclassified level and does not, includexany of the classified supporting documentation. 'Currently,-DOS and CJIS are developing procedures and protocols which will 'enable qualifying TIPOFF data to be entered directly into NCIC's Violent Gang and Terrorist Organizations File (VGTOF),. TO date, over \s have been made into TIPOFF, approximatelyr _~Jof which contain identifying data which would enable positive identifications. .In an effort to establish uniform procedures for FBI entries into TIPOFF and to develop a tracking mechanism for requests submitted to DOS, the Terrorism Watch and Warning Unit, Strategic .Assessment and Warning Section, Counterterrorism Division, will administer all field office requests for submission into TIPOFF. Field offices desiring to make an entry into TIPOFF should prepare and forward a "priority" or "immediate" communication, depending on the urgency, to the attention of the Terrorism Watch and Warning Unit, Terrorism Watch List and the appropriate Counterterrorism'..Division substantive unit. The communication should be uploaded and ihdexed into ACS and contain as much of the following information as available: a. b. c. d. e. f.

g-

h. i.

k. 1. Field offices are reminded the criteria for TIPOFF entries are (1) "reasonable suspicion" the individual is associated with terrorism, and (2) the individual is a non-U.S. citizen/non-green card holder. The communication should specifically state these facts. Moreover, if unclassified photographs of the individual(s) are available, field offices should include the photographs, in electronic format, as enclosures to their communications.

Req 13-5

000000002

To: Re:

All Field Offi-^s Fron: Counterterrorisn, 66F-HQ-C1392852, 12/24/2002

Legats should continue to coordinate with their DOS points of contact and utilize the VisaViper program to make entries into TIPOFF. However, for tracking purposes and quality assurance, Legats should forward a brief communication to the Terrorism Watch and Warning Unit which summarizes any new submissions to TIPOFF. Questions regarding this matter can be directed to SSA"

Req 13-5

000000003

To: Re:

All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism 66F-HQ-C1392852, 12/24/2002

LEAD(s) : Set Lead 1: ALL RECEIVING OFFICES International and Domestic Terrorism program managers will disseminate this communication to appropriate personnel and ensure compliance for entries into the Department of State's TIPOFF database.

R6q 13"5

000000004

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