T5 B55 Fbi Response 1 Of 3 Fdr- Tab 13-6- Entire Contents- Memos- Statement 161

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Message

Page 1 of 4

Joanne Accolla >m:

Susan Ginsburg

Sent:

Monday, February 16, 2004 5:49 PM

To:

Tom Eldridge; Caroline Barnes

Cc:

Joanne Accolla

Subject: RE: FBI Testimony Thank you both

—Original Message From: Tom Eldridge Sent: Friday, February 13, 2004 3:30 PM To: Joanne Accolla Cc: Susan Ginsburg Subject: FW: FBI Testimony Joanne Please put into the FBI and watchlisting files. Thanks. -- Tom

—Original Message From: Caroline Barnes Sent: Friday, February 13, 2004 2:25 PM To: Team 6; Team 5 Subject: FBI Testimony Was trolling FBI's website and saw this....

Congressional Statement Federal Bureau of Investigation

February 13, 2004 Testimony of Robert J. Garrity, Jr. Deputy Assistant Director, Records Management Division Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the House of Represenatatives Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights Los Angeles, California FBI's Role in the Process of Preventing the Entry of Terrorists into the U.S.

2/17/2004

Page 2 of4

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting Director Mueller here today to testify in this hearing, in which the Committee is examining the FBI's role in the process of preventing the entry of terrorists into the United States. Unfortunately, Director Mueller could not be here today, so I have been designated to provide testimony in his stead. My name is Robert Garrity, and I have served as an FBI Special Agent since 1976.1 currently serve as the Deputy Assistant Director of one of the FBI's newest divisions, the Records Management Division (RMD). My goal today is to inform you of two main methods in which the FBI is an integral part of the cooperative effort of federal agencies to screen for potential terrorists attempting to enter this country. The first process is the FBI National Name Check Program which screens selected groups before they receive a visa for entry into the United States. Lastly, I want to provide you with the mission and objectives of the new Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) which assists in the efforts to respond to suspected terrorists screened or stopped at our borders. FBI Name Check Process Certain visa applications require substantial interagency vetting prior to approval by the Department of State. The primary category is designated Visa Condor, relevant to certain individuals who are from designated countries and who satisfy additional criteria which may make them worthy of additional scrutiny. The FBI receives information on the applicants from the Department of State, which is entered into the FBI's National Name Check Program (NNCP). The information is searched against the FBI's Universal Indices (UNI). The searches seek all instances of the individual's name and approximate date of birth, whether a main file name or reference. By way of explanation, a main file name is that of an individual who is the subject of an FBI investigation, whereas a reference is someone whose name appears in an FBI investigation. References may be associates, witnesses, co-conspirators, or victims whose name has been indexed for later retrieval. The names are searched in a multitude of combinations, switching the order of first, last, middle names, as well as combinations with just the first and last, first and middle, and so on. It also searches different phonetic spelling variations of the names, which is especially important, considering that many names in our indices have been transliterated from a language other than English. If there is a match with a name in an FBI record, it is designated as a "Hit", meaning that the system has stopped on a possible match with the name being checked, but now a human being must review the file or indices entry to further refine the "Hit" on names. If the search comes up with a name and birth date match, it is designated an "Ident." An "Ident" is usually easier to resolve. Approximately 85% of name checks are electronically returned as having "No Record" within 72 hours. A "No Record" indicates that the FBI's Central Records System contains no identifiable information regarding this individual. By agreement with the Department of State, partially due to our concern about the time factors in approving most visa requests, a "No Record" equates to a "No Objection" to the issuance of a visa. The substantive investigative divisions in the FBI, (i.e., the Counterterrorism Division (CTD), the Counterintelligence Division (CD), the Criminal Investigative Division (CID) and the Cyber Division (CyD)) do not review visa requests where there is no record of the individual. Duplicate submissions (i.e., identically spelled names with identical dates of birth submitted within the last 120 days) are not checked, and the duplicate findings are returned to State. Because a name and birth date are not sufficient to positively correlate the file with an individual, additional review is required. A secondary manual name search usually identifies an additional 10% of the requests as having a "No Record", for a 95% overall "No Record" response rate. This is usually accomplished within a week of the request. The remaining 5% are identified as possibly being the subject of an FBI investigation. The FBI record must now be retrieved and reviewed. If the records were electronically uploaded into the FBI Automated Case Support (ACS) electronic record keeping system, it can be viewed quickly. If not, the relevant information must be retrieved from the existing paper record. Review of this information will determine whether the information is identified with the subject of the request. If not, the request is closed as a "No Record."

2/17/2004

Page 3 of4

^^ ^^

The information in the file is reviewed for possible derogatory information. Less than 1% of the requests are identified with an individual with possible derogatory information. These requests are forwarded to the appropriate FBI investigative division for further analysis. If the investigative division determines there is no objection to the visa request, the request is returned to the name check dissemination desk for forwarding to the Department of State. If there is an FBI objection to the visa request, the investigative division will prepare a written Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) and forward it to the Department of State. In reviewing these visa requests, the FBI has identified individuals attempting to enter the United States who are of serious concern to the FBI. I want to emphasize to you that the FBI is sensitive to the impact that delays in visa processing may have on business, education, tourism, this country's foreign relations, and worldwide perceptions of the United States. With these considerations in mind, the FBI is working diligently with the Department of State toward the common goal of improving the expediency and efficiency of the visa clearance process. At the same time, the consequences of the FBI's mission on homeland security require that our name check process be primarily focused on an accurate and thorough result. This means that there are instances when the FBI's review of a visa request must require as much time as needed to obtain an unequivocally correct result. Processing Times

The FBI's goal is to have all requests completed within 120 days. How long does it take to complete a visa request name check? Ninety-two percent are completed in 30 days. Between 98-99% of the requests are resolved in 120 days. Most name check requests that are over 30 days old are the result of the time required to retrieve and review field office record information. Some delay occurs at substantive analysts' desks, but this is to be expected. These analysts are assigned to the investigative divisions and are primarily assigned to the analysis of intelligence reports from around the world in order to support <*~\g investigations, or to support the flow of intelligence to policy makers. Despite these significant and voluminous responsibilities, these are the best professionals to review information in our records, and to then make an informed decision on whether a requester of a visa represents a threat to our homeland, or is interested in illegally acquiring our targeted technology. Nevertheless, as I stated earlier, the FBI resolves between 98-99% of all types of visa requests within 120 days. Decentralized Record Keeping System I alluded to the time delay for most requests in excess of 30 days being the time necessary to retrieve the file from the field office where the file is stored. This is the primary factor in any delay in the FBI responding to a visa name check. FBI files are currently stored at one of 265 locations, including FBI Headquarters, all 56 field offices, many of the larger of our 400 resident agencies, several warehouses around the Washington Metropolitan area, in records centers operated either by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) or a commercial concern, four large Information Technology Center facilities on the east and west coast, and at Legal Attache offices worldwide. Delays result from NNCP personnel identifying a file's location and then requesting the file from a field office. Time delays mount as field office staff search file rooms and then fax or ship copies of the needed file or a prepared summary to FBI Headquarters. This process - repeated for many tasks, not only dilutes the FBI's responsiveness, but also limits information sharing - a critical success factor in working counterintelligence and counterterrorism cases.

r*^

One possible solution to this problem the FBI is exploring is the establishment of a central records repository where all of our closed paper files could be located, and our active files stored electronically. Our frequently requested closed files could be scanned and uploaded into our electronic record keeping system, so that Agents and analysts worldwide would have instant electronic access to the information they require for their jobs. Terrorist Screening Center

2/17/2004

Page 4 of4 The TSC was created to ensure that government investigators, screeners, agents, and state and local law enforcement officers have ready access to the information and expertise they need in order to respond quickly when a suspected terrorist is screened or stopped. The TSC will consolidate access to terrorist watch lists from multiple agencies and provide 24/7 operational support for thousands of federal screeners and state and local law enforcement officers across the country and around the world. When fully operational, the TSC will dramatically increase our ability to ensure that federal, state, and local officials are working from the same unified, comprehensive set of anti-terrorist information. The TSC allows for the consolidation of disparate information, currently held by multiple agencies to be brought together for a single purpose of identifying and detaining potential terrorists, or prevent future terrorist attacks. The creation of the TSC marks a significant step in protecting America's communities and families by detecting, disrupting or preempting terrorist threats. Since December 1, 2003, TSC has been providing key resources for screeners and law enforcement personnel. These include: 1. a single coordination point for terrorist screening data; 2. a consolidated 24/7 call center for encounter identification assistance; 3. a coordinated law enforcement response to federal, state and local law enforcement; 4. a formal process for tracking encounters and ensuring feedback is supplied to the appropriate entities. Since December 1, 2003, the TSC has had the ability to: (1) make the names and identifying information of terrorists (known to or suspected by the U.S. Government) accessible to federal, state and local law enforcement; (2) systematically review whether a known or suspected terrorist should be included in or deleted from additional screening processes; (3) administer a process to ensure that persons, who may share a name with a known or suspected terrorist, are not unduly inconvenienced in U.S. Government screening processes; and, (4) implement a system to adjust or delete outdated or incorrect information to prevent problems arising from misidentifications. Conclusion The nature of the terrorist, foreign intelligence and criminal threats facing our nation continues to evolve and so does the FBI. We have made significant strides toward enhancing our operations, both domestically and overseas, and depend upon valuable partnerships with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In addition, the FBI recognizes the importance of accurate and timely name check processing. I want to emphasize to you, this issue has the full attention of Director Mueller. The FBI appreciates the interest of the Committee in this matter. I am prepared to answer any questions the Committee may have. Thank you. I 2004 Congressional Statement | FBI Home Page |

2/17/2004

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OF TERRORISTS SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

RESPONSIVE to REQUEST #13-6

COMMISSION COPY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Precedence:

To:

Date:

Immedia

All Field Offices

09/I4/20C1

Attn : ADIC' s SAC' s

From: Counterterrorism Division Domestic Terrorism / Counterterrorism Planning Section . : . Contact: SSA

Approved By:

Mueller Robert S Pickard Thomas J Watson Dale L Locke Thomas Bernard / Dick Ronald L Jarboe James F

_..-•-•" 9/il Law Enforcement Privacy Drafted By: [ Case ID #:• 265-NY-280350 Title:

(Pending)

TWIN TOWERS BOMBING; "Project Lookout" 00:NY

Reference: EC dated 09/14/2001, directing all field offices to interview all UBL, IRF and Sunni Extremists Full Field Investigation (FFI) and Preliminary Investigation (PI) subjects. Synopsis: Instructions to all Field Offices to locate, identify and interview possible associates of hijackers connected with captioned investigation. Details: All field offices are directed to immediately assign personnel to access the SIOC web-page on the FBI Intranet and locate a spreadsheet list of individuals who may be connectea ^o the hijackers associated with the captioned investigation. The SIOC v;eb-page contains -vjo spreadsheet lists of individuals, one list is being utilized as the Federal Aviation Administration watch-list of individuals for

Req 13-6

000000001

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy \\''••.. J To: .-.II Offices 1 '"R £ *

Z nuns d 2- ~ *~ £ — 5 2 cl

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/9/11 Law Enforcement 'Sensitive From: Counzei'te. •. crisr. division ID B ~ s i C i- -: — ~ ';— 'J '•».• — •

connections to ar.y ruture airline travei; tnis list is :,desicrriatea bv the name LEO-FAA. The second spreadsheet is s iav.: enforcement sensitive list with cre&ter information anc. •detail and is -designated bv the name "Associates'-. All assigned personnel are LO immediately Access and 'retrieve -he "Asl,pcia~es" spreadsheet of individuals and conduct all logical investigation to identify, locate and interview all individuals on the list located wizhip uheir respective field of rice '-territories. '•-., / \e spreadsheet list can b.e a SIOC Home^-paae by selecting tn'e Aviation Aler' List \or by the aHH^-agc; \^ x... j. if for some reason, the \office cannot retrieve the list of'--individuals, then \d personnel are::-.to immediately contact'! h.in SIOC Operations at \d the list will be sent by facsimile transmission. This list will be updated twice d ai1y. \e of the individuals on the "Associates" '• spreadsheet list may be closely or tanger.tially connected with the known hijackers. \l offices should conduct all logical investigation, including but not limited to, all FBI database searches, drivers license searches, state.and local law \t database sea'-rches,

any information on the further identification and whereabouts of the\s listed 'on the "Associates" spreadsheet\d d.pon the exigent circumstance

Field or''-Preliminary Investigations. Off-ices are directed '\to alert UC \r UC\f any individuals listed on the "Associates" spreadsheet are under current investigation. Once located and completely identified, topics of interview coverage should include but not be limited to issues of I ' ' I J and so

Req 13-6

000000002

Re: Immediate lead

Date: 09/14/2001

to SIOC operations at I ~1 and followed by EC. Please be advised that a Law Enforcement J-1LZTS message will be sent out simultaneously with the publication of the "Associates" spreadsheet names and therefore1, contact with sll state and local law enforcement liaisons should occur to coordinate search efforts. \D (s) : , 9/11 Law Enfor

Set Lead 1: .ALL RECEIVING OFFICES Immediately assign personnel to access the SIOC Intranet vjeb-sit.e, locate the law enforcement sensitive list of individuals..-who may be connected to the hij'a.ckers associated with .the captioned investigation and''conduct all logical investigation for the identification, location and interview' of these individuals. Once completed, a 11 results are to/'ba immediately reported to SIOC operations at/1 j ' 1'and followed by EC.

Req 13~6

000000002

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Precedence:

To •

, . Immediate

'

ri =a 4- A •

uare.

-1! Field Offices

Attn:

ADiC SAC CDC

From: Counterterrorism Division 'Domestic Terrorism / Counterterrorism Planning Section Contact: SSA

Approved By:

Pickard Thomas J Watson Dale L /9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy Parkinson Larry Locke Thomas Bernard Jarboe James F

Drafted By:

I

I

Case ID #:

265-NY-260350

(Pending)

Title:

TWIN TOWERS BOMBING; "Project Lookout" 00: NY

Reference:

265-NY-280350, serial 1584, dated 09/14/2001.

Synopsis: Guidance to all Field Offices on individuals located on the LEO+FAA spreadsheet commonly referred to as the "Watch List". Details: Questions from the field have arisen concerning what action Agents should take if they come in contact with one of the individuals on the "Watch List." All field offices were previously directed to locate the SIOC v/eb-oage containing the spreadsheet designated by the name LEO-rFAA "watch List". Previous instructions to the field were to conduct all logical investigation to identify, locate and interview all individuals on the list located within their respective field office territories. The primary goal behind the" location, identification and interview investigation is to

-- ,. Req 13-6

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9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

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Re: Irrjriediate leac

•is:

<ji _^i *:OG1

determine whether any of the individuals on the "watch _i5t" are a current or continuous threat. Please be advised that a separate list designated as the Non-LHO list, containing just uhe\names and known identifiers of the "Watch list," but not certain law 'enforcement sensitive information has been provided to the FAA and all major commercial air carriers. The following procedures have been established by F3IHQ in the event., agents locate an individual listed on the "Watch List," whether through contact from airline companies or through logical investigation. Agent personnel are directed to immediately notify Immigration\and Naturalization Service (INS) personnel when an individual o'ri the "Watch List" is located or when notified by airline persdnnel. At this\time, it appears that an unknown number of the | ] individuals-., on the "Watch List" may have an INS status problem that might lead to INS detention. INS Agents should be contacted to advise or when practicable in the interests of time, accompany 'FBI or JTTF Agents during the interview in order to resolve any questions or ambiguities. In the event INS Agents are unavailable, contact should be made with the INS's Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) through FBI Albany at telephone number I ~| Upon location of an individual on the "Watch List" agent personnel are directed to stop and detain the individual for interview./

i The next step will be to FULLY identify the, ^individual. \3

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

All Offices lead

~ er _e C 9 / 1 5 ' 20 0 -

\s should be prepared to obtain material witness warrants or other legal process for permanent custody. Agents = Hrv-,irj, contact SIOC/OPS for further instructions and coordination of all material witness warrants. Members of the FBI'3 Office of General Counsel (OGC) and Department of Justice, (DOJ) representatives are available 24 hours a day in ] or the National Security SIOC at Law Unitt a tT\ I to answer questions on the elements and requirements for material witness warrants and orher legal questions. Once the immigration status of the individual is completely determined, additional topics of interview coverage should include but not be limited to issues of:/

Req 13-6

000000006

oun~ei"~err

isr. Divisio

Re: Immediate lead

and other relevant rcoics. Please be advised that, it is the sole decision of SIOC operations personnel whether or not an individual is placed •upon or removed from the "Watch List". However, assuming an individual on the "Watch List" cannot be detained "through criminal or INS process, the decision as to_whether or not the individual is allowed to board a commercial aircraft remains solely with the private airline companies, who can refuse to provide air services.

Again, results of the location, identification and interview of the individuals should be immediately reported to SIOC operations at L ""] and followed by EC.

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

Req 13-6

000000007

-ronr. C c u n - e r - e r r

isir, Division

LEAD (s) : Set Lead 1 :

,ns,r, GIJ-J. all Kpersonnel are provided with this Please ensure guidanc e .

Req 13-6

000000008

9/11 Law Enforcement Priivacv

'•{•0!.'2n I MS i

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date:

., IMMEDIATE To:-.

Counterte'rronsrr.

From.: \l Counsel \l Sscnr-. rv \: S SA

Attn:

10/01/2001

AD Dale I. Watson DAD James T. Caruso

Law Unit

Approved By: Pickard Thomas J \n Dale L

\,

Parkinson Larry '•

Drafted By:

Locke Thomas Bernard

j_

Case ID #: 265A-NY-280350-WLC (Pending) 265A-NY-280350-LEGAL (Pending) 66F-HQ-A1255362 (Pending) Title:

PENT30MB; "PROJECT LOOKOUT" 00: NY

Synopsis: To set forth OGC' s opinion on the entry of information on United States Persons (US.PER) and Non-United Spates Persons (NONUSPER) results of investigations conducted pursuant to he Project Lookout "Watch List." Reference:

265A-NY-280350-2164

Details: Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, numerous FBI field divisions engaged in a logical investigation of the suspected terrorist subjects. In the interests of safety and security for the public and the security of future commercial air travel, the investigation expanded from the terrorist subjects themselves to other individuals who may be linked to the criminal acts that occurred on September 11, 2001. Based upon criteria outlined roject Lookout personnel, F3I personnel are compiling a list DV of individuals who might be associates of the subjects, material witnesses to the attacks or logically connected the criminal activity.

Req 13-6

000000002

Tc: Re:

Counrerterro; rr. • ^ o.T.: 265A-KY-2S035v-KI

3ur.se _

This investigation by the FBI is premised upon the important duty to protect the public. At the same time, our dutv must be performed with care to protect individual rights and to insure that investigations are confined to matters cf lecirimaie law enforcement in-eresr.

It is ~he opinion of the Office of The General Counsel that, based upo n the P5 T' s lecjiLima^0 law enforcement ourocse O"^ investigating a crs cf terrorism and preventing future acts of terrorism, this collection of information upon both United States Persons and non United States Persons, meets the standards for collection, use , retention and dissemination of information pursuant zo nhe Attorney General Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering, Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations and the Privacy Act of 1974, specifically, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(7), which governs the collection of information that may impact on an- individual's First Amendment riahts. As such, retention of this information within the FBI system of records and the indexing of all names and other identifying information into the Automated Case Support System (ACS) is appropriate.

Req 13-6

000000010

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,

LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: ALL RECEIVING OFFICr Read and clear,

000000011 Req 13-6

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: To:

All Field Offices All Legats

From:

Date:

ROUTINE

Attn: ADIC's Attn : SAC ' s Attn : CDC ' s Attn: LE GAT's

Counterterronsm TTOS/nm./RFU/RM 5328 Contact: UC [_

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Pickard Thomas J /9/ 1 1 W a t s o n Dale L / D ' A m u r o Pasquale J / |_

Law

E n f o r c e m e n t Privacy

J

Case ID #: 265A-NY-280350-WLC (Pending) 265A-NY-280350 (Pending) Title:

PENTTBOM "PROJECT LOOKOUT" 00: NY

Synopsis: Information and guidance to all offices regarding the elimination of the Project Lookout Watch List on 10/23/01. T3«-r~-~~,-,r,-

26:A-MY-2S0350 Serial 1684 265A-NY-280350 Serial 2164

Enclosure(s): Fact Sheets.

Referral to Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA), 20

Details: The FBI initiated captioned investigation immediately following the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001. Through logical investigation and in the interest of safety and security for the public and commercial air travel, the investigation expanded from the known susoect terrorist to other individuals who may possess kncwledae of the criminal act of 09/11/2001. Based uoon criteria established following the attac personnel began no compile the Project Lookout Watch list. T s watch List was made up of individuals thought to be associates of t subjects, material witnesses to the attacks or in some other way

000000012 Rsq 13-6

-oRe:

^.11 Field Of 3 es From: ~oun: 265A-NY-230350-KLC, 1C,':3/2001

connected to the events of 09/11/2001. Inclusion or. z^e _ist^ necessarily mean that an individual was a knowing ^ano./^- w _ _ _ . Da^-;c-ipant. in criminal activity, but rather it iaen^i-ies ^ ^ someone*who may possess information of value to the investigation, -o date this p-oject has met with a high degree or success in io>nti4ing~and interviewing individuals potentially connected to tne PENTTBOM investigation and resolving their status as a threat to U.S. interests. Over th* last three weeks Project Lookout has reviewed ev-rv nam~ on the Watch List. This diligent review has resulted in the elimination of the Project Lookout Watch List. A determination has been made in every case to open an investigation o.-the individual, Place them into the State Department ^lass/I3iS/Visa Viper program, recommend they be included on an FAA Security Directive and/or recommend no'further investigation. r0r each of those individuals who have been recommended for further investigation, SIOC has drafted, uploaded and discriminated an EC to the appropriate field office. For those Individuals placed into the State Department class/IBIS/Visa Viper program, SIOC has drafted and disseminated a teletype to the St.te Department. During the review Project Lookout determined that a number of Watch Listed individuals could pose a risk to commercial air trav-1 A fact sheet was created for each of these individuals and provided to the FAA for review. All other Watch Listed individuals were reviewed with a recommendation of no further investigative action. For the information of the field, attached are copies _: the FAA fact sheets provided to tne FAA. _ These individuals may be added to an FAA Security Directive. The field is requested when ask-d by airline or airport security to respond and interview these individuals to evaluate their risk to commercial air travel. The ^ fi-ld should consult with the UBL/RFU unit in the event that one or th-so individuals is identical to the individual provide to the F.nA rhrouoh these fact sheets. It will be left to the discretion of the individual airline as to travel of these individuals. -^--^ c t-iv» the date of this communication Project Lookout Wat-h~List. Notification of this termination will _;;; ^r^;^-'^ through LEO, NLET3 and the Virtual Private Network °.::^ ' -The D£ily investigative Accomplishment Report is still rs X u i ro -J a-i-i .should be faxed to SIOC by COB each day. The "lelo. sh-u^d"continue to fax this report to SIOC Fex^nusbs-H 1

w,i: rp^n= rr-h-

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

000000013

.--11 r i e l d Off 2S ?ro~: Cour.terrerrorisr 265A-NY-280350-WLC, 10/23/2001

The Corrjnur.ications Katc'n supsrviso^ on zhe 3oir; t.o llcrr. s h i f ~ w h a v e supervisory responsibility for "he Daily Investigative Accorp.clishment Report..

000000014

Re:

265.V-NY-28035CI-KLC, ID.'23 '2001

LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: ALL RECEIVING OFFICES Inform all personnel connected uo the Projecr Lookoul Watch List that it will be terminated bv the COB 10/23/01.

Req 13-6

0000000X5

FEDERAL B U R E A U OF INVESTIGATION Precedence:

To:

Ir.teiiHte

.-.11 Tieli Iffires

Date:

Attn:

ADICs SA.Cs

From: Counterterrorism Division .i Domestic Terrorism / Ccuntertferrorism Planning Section Contact: SSA |_

Approved By:

Mueller Robert S Watson Dale L McChesney Kathleen L Parkinson Larry Caruso James T Bowman M E Jarboe James F Davis Tocid

i .---" '..--"" / 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

Drafted By : Case ID #:

Title:

6 6F-HQ-AI2 5 53 62 (Pending) 66F-HQ-C1321794 (Pending)

SAFE STREETS VIOLENT CRIME INITIATIVE VIOLENT GANG AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS FILE (VGTOF)

Reference: £6r -HQ-A1255352, serial 12, ca^ec 11/20/JLVJ. , ^:- _rc.Ti cne Office of the General Counsel (OGC). Synopsis:

_nstruotions _o ^^~

Details:

_, ,

Req 13-6

000000016

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

Based upon the need for increased safetv for the Clvmpic Games and the necessity fo.r increased information sharing with our law enforcement partners, senior FBI management personnel concluded that due to the substantial risk imposed upon the 2002 Winter Olympic Games that each field division'-.would search their files to compile a list cf subjects from the Counterterrorism program who could pose a threat to the Olympic Games. Therefore, all field offices are directed to immediately .compile a list of =11 Counterterrorism Program subjects from open Dom5st_ic_Terrorism and International Terrorism .cases (Preliminary Inquiries 'and Full Investigations'*. ?.il assigned personnel are to immediately access end.retrieve th.e name?, dates of birth, social security numbers and.other relevant unclassified identifying information, such as.descriptive data (height:, weight, eye color, hair color., etc.) , miscellaneous numbers (passport numbers, etc.), operator license numbers, and vehicle . information, o_f ALL investigative classifications .'for Domestic and I International Terrorism,, including cases concerning \ ' "_ ~l I ' \d then task vour NCIC operators to load all names and identifying, information into the NCIC VGTOF file by C.Q3 February 1, 2002. . Additional, information concerning details for entry into the VGTOF, can be found in the NCJC_Operating Manila JL, VGTOF Chapter. Not all states have the capability to enter records into the VGTOF. The field divisions in the following states, due to a lac?, cf crogramming fcr this function in those respective states, must submit their record entry requests with a cover EC and a comoleted FD-930 for each individual er.trv, assigning the appropriate Terrorist Organization Classification {outlined on ^ace 3 of this .document; with all relevant data, to the CJIS Division, Programs "|. effected states are: -

%-

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-

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy Req 13-6

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9/11

Law Enforcement Sensitive

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All field offices who have the capability to enter r.f ormation into- the NCIC VGTOF file must use the follov.-ing Terror raanizs-ic-r. Classifications and corresponding codes prior to ntering individual subject information. For Domestic Terrcrisrrv_ ubjects, the Terrorist Organioetion Classif icat io-ns are:

The following inform-tion v;ill be procjrarrjned v;ithin the NCIC VGTOF =s directions to state and local law enforcement officers: "WARNING - APPROACH WITH CAUTION. HOWEVER, MAKE NO EFFORT TO ARREST INDIVIDUAL UNLESS THERE IS EVIDENCE OF A VIOLATION OF FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL STATUTE(S). ONCE AN INDIVIDUAL IS IDENTIFIED WITHIN THIS SYSTEM, CONDUCT ALL LOGICAL INVESTIGATION UTILIZING TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED IN YOUR JURISDICTION. DO HOT ALERT THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE FBI'S INTEREST AND CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE AT T-'T ~ n S I E T Oc -^ORTUHIT^'. " :v a.

Req 13-6

000000018

Vll Law Enforcement Sensitive

tr.at ir.;crr.stitn tc tr.e--.,rc-__ov:ir.r entities: Zivisic"' 2 The Office o'5-. jricir. .'CC for th:.

W

—J

a balance Between reducing the possible threat to the Olympic Games and the comprehensive investigative interests cf the Counterterrorism Program. Therefore, all recipients are reminded that Lf there is a particular subject of 3 Domestic or International Terrorism investigation whose identity is so sens-it ive that the possibility of that subject's identity becoming known could compromise current or future FBI investigative operations, then that subject can be placed on the "silent hit" notification program discussed at the SAC Conference. Such capability for this type of entry into NCIC is currently unavailable for field offices. Therefore, all subject information, to include primarily first and last name, date of birth, and numeric identifiers capable of being retrieved in 1-3CIC (i.e. drivers license or DMV numbers, passport numbers and social security numbers) for all silent hit requests, should be forwarded to CJIS, Programs Development Section for entry. However, utilizing the "silent hit" capability of the VGTOF system will forego the intelligence a state or local lav; enforcement officer can gather during the course of a field interview. Finally, please be advised that a Law Enforcement NLETS message will be sent out simultaneously with the transmission cf this EC notifying ail state and local lav; enforcement agencies that the VGTO" system will be utilized throughout the 20C2 Olympic Games for the identification and tracking cf current terrorism subjects. Thur-., each field office liaison should coordinate with their state and local lav: enforcement partners to ensure consistent application of the svstem.

Req 13-6

000000019

LEAD (s): Set Lead 1:

Immediately assign names and all identifying information of ALL investigative '•• classifications for domestic and international terrorism, including cases concerning any diplomats from state sponsors of terrorism and then task vour I^CIC ooerators to load all names and identifvinc information into the ^CIC VGTOF system by COB February 1, 2002.

Req 13"6

000000020

(Rev OS-2S-2000i

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: DEADLINE 03/20 '2002 DEADLINE 04/15/2002 To:

All Field Offices

Date: 03-'l 9/2002 Attn: SACs

All Divisions

ADs

All Legats

LEGATs

Counterterrorism

TAWU

From: Counterterrorism Contact: AD Pasquale .T. D'Amuro Approved By:

UCL

/9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

Mueller III Robert S /Watson Dale L

Drafted Bv: Case ID #: 66F-HQ-A1296544-P (Pending) Title:

CREATION OF TERRORISM WATCH LIST OO:HQ BUDED: 03/20/2002 BUDED: 04/15/2002

Synopsis: The FBI is establishing a permanent Terrorism Watch List (TWL). The purpose of this electronic communication (EC) is to outline the development protocol and the approach that will be followed to establish the TWL. Details: As you are aware, following the terrorist attacks of September 11. 2001. FBI Headquarters compiled what became known as the "Project Lookout Watch List." The project was successful in identifying a number of individuals potential!}' connected to the PENTTBOM investigation. Due to the success of this effort and in recognition of the need to maintain a centralized repository of names of investigative interest related to terrorism investigations. Director Mueller authorized the establishment of a permanent Terrorism Watch List (TWL). As the Director noted, this TWL is not intended to replace the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the Interpol "RED" notice. Federal Aviation Administration (FAAj Security Directives, the State Department Class/IBIS/Visa Viper program, the Custom Department's TECS, the Immigration and Naturalization Sen-ice NAILS.. FBI BOLO Alerts, or any other watch and warning system. It is intended to supplement these existing tools and to be the CTD's single, integrated listing of individuals of investigative interest. Composition of the TWL

Req

13-6

000000021

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

To: Re:

All Field Off', es Frora: 199-HQ-NEV', 0 3 / 1 9 / 2 0 0 2

Counterterroris

The TWL will consist of a compendium of names based on information identified through FBI and Joint Terrorism Task Force investigations. U .S. Intelligence Community reporting, and Department of Defense intelligence gathering, as well as information provided by foreign intelligence/ security sen-ices. Although potential candidates for inclusion on the TWL will come from multiple sources, the FBI will decide which names are ultimately placed on the TWL. The FBI also will decide into which systems TWL names will be entered (e.g.. some names may be forwarded to the Violent Gang Terrorist Organizations File [YGTOF] maintained by~N CIC. while other names may be forwarded to other databases, to include the Visa Viper System operated by the Department of State, the FAA Watch List, or other systems). The TWL will be designed to assist both the intelligence and the law enforcement communities in their investigations of terrorist groups/individuals. TWL staff will coordinate with the Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division to ensure the utilization of appropriate NCIC files \, VGTOF). This capability will provide all state and local law enforcement agencies ready access to this information, 'information in the TWL will also be shared with U.S. Government agencies that operate comparable tracking systems. The TWL will be divided into three distinct categories. The first category will include the names of individuals for whom formal criminal charges or indictments have been handed down (e.g.. the 22. individuals on the Most Wanted Terrorist list). The second category will include the names of individuals under Full Investigations by the FBI. (Preliminary Investigations may be recommended by a Field Office or selected by FBIHQ for inclusion into the TWL.) The third category of the TWL will include the names of individuals of interest to the FBI but who may' not be the subjects of an active FBI investigation The list will be based upon criteria established by CTD. Individuals on the TWL will be listed with identifying information, much like a "wanted" poster.

Administration of the TWL The TWL will be managed by the Counterterrorism Threat Assessment & Warning Unit CCTAWU), CTD, in conjunction wittTCJlS. As part of the reprogramming of FBIHQ. however, the Counterterrorism Division will immediately identify one (1) Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) and six (6) Intelligence Operations Specialists (IOS) to staff the TWL. These positions will be filled and personnel in place by 04/15/2002. The CTAWU staff will maintain TWL international and domestic terrorism files covering various classifications, such as 199.265.174. 266. and 279. These case files will contain a sub-file for each of the individuals listed in the TWL. These sub-files will be worked much the same way that field office investigative case files are handled. This applies to persons who are not readily identifiable with a field division. As a result, preliminary investigative steps will be undertaken by FBIHQ. For example, records checks will be performed, leads will be set. and intelligence and biographical information will be accumulated and maintained in these sub-files, until such information is developed to allow afield office designation. When sufficient information has been developed, an EC will be generated to the field directing that a case be opened and assigned. In situations where a field division already has an investigation opened, the FBIHQ sub-file will minor the field case file and will only be maintained at FBIHQ for reference. The initial TWL will include the 22 individuals named to the Most Wanted Terrorists list I'Cateeory One. as discussed above), other individuals being sought in connection with the PENTTBOM

Req 13-6

000000022

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

To: 'Ail Fiel.c Of'J es Frorr.: Re : 19 5 -HO - NSW-,-...0 3 /19 / 2 0 C 2

Counterterror

investigation, and all hullEield investigation.subjects. From this starting point, the TWL staff will expand the list, as appropriate, base'ckon contribution's- from the sources identified above. A protocol will be established and mechanisms will'-be put in place to ensure full utilization of this asset. The CTD and T\VL staff, in coordination with relevant FBIHQ divisions, will develop the protocol and establish the mechanisms necessary for utilizing the TWL. The field W M bs advised by EC when this protocol has been developed. However, in the interim, beainninc on the date of this EC. field offices are advised to direct all inquiries and candidates for inclusion on the TWL to Unit Ch'Vefl \l ^ "I FRTHO ft r.nm 5432. In addition to the name, field offices will be asked to provide as many of the following identifiers as possible for each submission: date of birth (essential), known aliases, alien registration number, social security number, terrorist group affiliation, race, height, weight, and hair color.

000000023

To: Re:

All Field Or c:es r'romi 199-HQ-NSW, 0 3 / 1 9 / 2 0 0 2

Coun~erterroris

LEAD(s): Set Lead 1:

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES Beninninc 03/20/2002. receiving offices should direct all inquiries and Preliminary Inquiry candidates for inclusion on the TWL to Unit Chiefl I. CTAWU..aiV "7. FBIHQ. Room 5432. In addition to the name, field offices should provide as ..many of the following identifiers as possible for each submission: date of birth (essential), known aliases, alien/registration number, social security number, terrorist group affiliation, race, height, weight, and hair cplor. Set Lead 2:

CQUNTERTERR PRISM AT TAWU 9/11

Law E n f o r c e m e n t Privacy

By 04/15/2002, one (]) Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) and six (6) Intelligence Pperations Specialists will be reassigned to manage and implement the Terrorism Watch List in accordance with the «eneral framework outlined in the "Details" section of this EC.

1 - Mr. 1 -Mr. 1 -Ms. 1 - Mr.

Req

13-6

000000024

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Date:

Precedence:

To:

All Field Offices

Attn:

ADICs SACs ADs Ms. Mr. Mr. Mr.'

All Divisions National Security CJIS

Mr.

Counterterrorism

From: Counterterrorism Division Domestic Terrorism / Counterterrorism Planning Section Contact: SSA I | J9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy Approved By:

Drafted By: Case ID #:

Title:

Mueller Robert S Wstson Dale L McChesney Kathleen' L Caruso James T D'Amuro Pasquale / Parkinson Larry / Kirkpatrick Michael D Bowman M E / Jarboe James F / Davis Todd

|_ 66F-HQ-A1255362 (Pending) 66F-HQ-C1321794 (Pending)

PLACEMENT OF TERRORIST INFORMATION IN THE NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER (NCIC)

Reference: 6S?-HQ-A12553o2, serial 12, 66F-HQ-A1255362, serial 13, 66F-HQ-A1255362, serial 68 and 66F-HQ-A1296544-?, 37. se Synopsis: Notification zo all iield Oificss of upcoming changes and pro~ocol procedures for Counterterrorism Program

Req 13-6

000000025

:m: Cour.terzei : e: 06 /' 1G./ 2 0 C 2

subjects c-laced into Details: As all recipients are aw=re, based upon, an analysis of the systerr.s use and functionality during the 2002 Winter Olympic Games, the minimal potential for compromise to active investigations, feedback from field offices, and in light of the Director's initiative for designing and maintaining the FBI'S new Terrorism Watch List, a meeting was held on March 20, 2002, among senior FBI managers. During this meeting the decision was made to provide guidance to the field and provide protocols to clarify which subject names and identifying information from the Counterterrorism Program must be kept in NCIC. I.

PROTOCOLS FOR USING AND MAINTAINING INFORMATION IN NCIC

NCIC includes a file for listing members of violent criminal gangs as well as members of terrorist organizations. Currently these are grouped together in NCIC under the heading "Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File" (VGTOF). As explained in this communication, the Bureau is adding more NCIC sub-groups for other categories of persons who may not meet the criteria for existing NCIC files, and it may be appropriate in the future to change the heading "VGTOF" to a more generally encompassing heading. Until such time as the term "VGTOF" might be changed, the NCIC entries addressed by this communication (except for silent hits) will be entered into the NCIC file described herein via the VGTOF entry screen - ~J its newly created sub-groups. The following protocols are to be used for determining which subjects are to be entered into the system and when the Silent Hit system should be utilized:

1) As of the date of this communication only FULL Investigation subjects will be required to be olaced into the NCIC system. 2) The decision as to which, if any, Preliminary Inquiry (Pi's) subjects are placed into the NCIC system is .._-_,_-j.~-= — ^^>

^_ '*"'• **' *~ i •.

Ljt-1

c* ^"j O £, v*v ^C "^ •'""^ O>" i £. ^1 *"*

S ~*'"""' TI ^ ^ I"i

'^» r ^ ^ ^~

"•T"

~" r*\

International or Domestic Terrorism program at F3IHQ. If the C.r.C cr Section Chief deems a carticular individual who is the

Req 13-6

000000026

All Field On', as

rrorr.: Date:

Counterte. ^risir. Jivisior. 06<'"_C/2CC2

~^c be appropriate for entry into the system., then that SAC or Section Chief can order that subject's name and identifying information be loaded and maintained: in the NCIC svstem. 3; The protocol for selecting a subject (Full or ?I) as 5. candidate for a Silent Hit, are as follows: A) International Terrorism Invesrigations - SACs should consider the following criteria when selecting an IT subject of a FULL investigation ro be placed into the Silent Hit system within NCIC. i) Subject of investigation is target of classified collection techniques or FULL investigation was opened based upon single source reporting. ii) Subject of FBI FULL investigation was opened due to classified information received from other U.S., or foreign law enforcement or intelligence agencies. iii) Subject does not posa a safety or violence threat to local lav; enforcement. &} Domestic Terrorism Investigations - SACs should consider the following criteria when selecting a DT subject of a FULL investigation to be placed into the Silent Hit system within NCIC. i) Subject of FULL investigation was opened based upon single source reporting. ii) Subject of FBI FULL investigation was opened due to classified information received from other U.S., or foreign law enforcement or intelligence aaencies.

Req 13-6

000000027

To: All Field Offi' Re: 65F-HQ-AL255362

Count-rter 06/10/20C2

cism Division

\y or violence ict aoes not pose a

threat to local law enforcement . iv) Subject is an employee, member of or affiliated with' a. military, federal, state, local or other law enforcement agency, first respcnder agency or any group that could have access to NCIC terminals. II.

THE FBI TERRORISM WATCH LIST AND NCIC SIL5NT HITS

As described in the communication creating the FBI's new Terrorism Watch List (see 66F-HQ-A1296544-P, serial 37), the Counterterrorism Threat Assessment & Warning Unit (CTAWU) at F3IHQ, will establish a permanent Terrorism Watch List. In light of the Terrorism Watch List (TWL) project which will be managed on a 24 hour per day, seven day per week schedule by the CTAWU at FBIHQ, the decision was made that CJIS will not re-program its software concerning NCIC "Silent Hits." At this time, reporting of a "Silent Hit" is made only to FBIHQ SIOC, however, in light of the proposed capabilities of the Terrorism Watch List Group and after discussions with CJIS personnel, it was decided that CJIS will program its system to report all "Silent Hits" to the TWL personnel at FBIHQ who will be responsible for notifying a field office when a subject of a Silent Hit is identified. Once the TWL project personnel ^nd 24/7 operations are established and in place within the CTAWU at FBIHQ, all offices will be notified so that all ADICs and SACs can make their NCIC operators and Counterterrorism Program personnel aware of the Silent Hit notification being sent to the CTAWU and to establish a method for responding to the Silent Hit notifications communicated to the field office. III.

CREATION OF SUB-GROUP CATEGORIES WITHIN NCIC

Consistent with the communication creating the new TWL there will be four (4) sub-groups created within the NCIC

Req 13-6

000000028

3/11

Law Enforcement Sensitive

To: All Field O f f i i j Re: 66F-HQ-A1255362

From: . Date:

Counterteri

,ism Division

heading). The f o u r sub-groups will be comprised of: Category 1: Individuals who are the subject of f c r m a l criminal charges or indictments (this includes individuals 1 named to the Most Wanted Terrorist L i s ~ ) ; Category 2: Individuals of Special Counterterrorism interest to the FBI, but do not yet have formal charges pending. This category will be limited to uniquely situated individuals such as, the three (3) remaining individuals listed on the F B I ' s Most Wanted Terrorist List;| Jand those individuals identified during "Operation Enduring Freedom" that pose a threat to the United States. Category 3: All subjects of FBI Domestic and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Terrorism FULL Investigations and subjects of Preliminary Inquiries as deemed appropriate by the SAC or Section Chief; and Category 4: Individuals of active Investigative interest. For example, the individuals who the FBI wanted to interview who were identified as part of the Penttbcm Watch List. Based upon the creation of the NCIC sub-group .~ = -t-a.-pries described above, there will also be a corresponding w a r n i n g statement programmed within the system for each subgroup category that will provide federal, state and local law enforcement o f f i c e r s with directions of what to do when an individual within the system is identified.

1 Please be advised that out of the 22 individuals named to the FBI's Most Wanted T e r r o r i s t List, 19 of these individuals are listed in the Wanted Persons f i l e wi-hin NCIC due to the fact that arrest warrants axist for those *ndivi; J .uals, However, the 19 known terrorists will additionally be listed in sub-group Category 1 within the VGTOF f i l e of NCIC. The remaining three (3) •* ndiviciusls will be listed in sub-group Category 2, within the VGTOF file of NCIC.

Req 13-6

000000029

To: All Field Offx s Re: 66F-HQ-A1255362

From: Date:

Counterter. 06/10/2002

;ism Division

Field offices entering information into NCIC should differentiate between the Wanted Persons File within NCIC and the sub-group Category 1 within the VGTOF file... Field offices are directed to enter ALL subjects of terrorist investigations2 who ,have arrest warrants issued into BOTH the Wanted Persons File within NCIC and the sub-group Category 1 within the_ VGTOF file. All field office subjects, of nonterrorism criminal charges, who have arrest warrants ^issued should only be placed into the Wanted Persons File within NCIC, NOT Category_1 sub-group of the VGTOF file. Category 1: Individuals who are the subject of formal criminal charges or indictments. ALL field offices and the CTAWU will have the ability to enter subject identifying information into this category. The following information will be programmed within the NCIC system as directions to federal, state and local law enforcement officers: "WARNING - APPROACH WITH CAUTION - ARMED AND DANGEROUS. PLEASE ARREST AND DETAIN INDIVIDUAL. ONCE THE INDIVIDUAL IS SECURELY DETAINED, IMMEDIATELY CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE." Category 2: Individuals of Counterterrorism interest to the FBIt but do not have formal charges pending-. Only the CTAWU fto.il 'navi !_i'.e ability to enter subject identifying information into this category. The following information will be programmed within the NCIC system as directions to federal, state and local law enforcement officers:

2 Subjects of Terrorist investigations include all domestic and international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction classifications, including (98, 183C, 199, 253A, 256B, 265, 266, 279, 291), but also all other traditional criminal classifications with a terrorism nexus, including but not limited to explosives or weapons violations, or any of the covered offenses enumerated under Title 18 of the United States Code Section 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i)(ii) and (iii).

Req 13-6

000000030

To: All Field Offi,.-s Re: 66F-HQ-A1255362

From: Date:

Counterter. _ irism Division 06/10/2002

"WARNING - APPROACH WITH CAUTION. PLEASE DETAIN THIS INDIVIDUAL FOR QUESTIONING. THIS INDIVIDUAL IS OF INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST TO THE FBI. ONCE THE INDIVIDUAL IS SECURELY DETAINED CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE IMMEDIATELY." Category 3: All siib-jects of FBI Domestic and International Terrorism FULL Investigations and subjects of Preliminary Inquiries as deemed appropriate by the SAC or Section Chief. ALL field offices and the CTAWU will have the ability to enter subject identifying information into this category. The following information will be programmed within the NCIC system as directions to federal, state and local law enforcement officers: "WARNING - APPROACH WITH CAUTION. HOWEVER, MAKE NO EFFORT TO ARREST INDIVIDUAL UNLESS THERE IS EVIDENCE OF A VIOLATION OF FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL STATUTE(S). ONCE AN INDIVIDUAL IS IDENTIFIED WITHIN THIS SYSTEM, CONDUCT ALL LOGICAL INVESTIGATION UTILIZING TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED IN YOUR JURISDICTION. DO NOT ALERT THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE FBI'S INTEREST AND CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY." Category 4: Individuals of Active Investigative interest. Only the CTAWU will have the ability to enter subject identifying information into this category. The following information will "be programmed within the NCIC system as directions to federal, state and local law enforcement officers: "WARNING - APPROACH WITH CAUTION. HOWEVER, MAKE NO EFFORT TO ARREST INDIVIDUAL UNLESS THERE IS EVIDENCE OF A VIOLATION OF FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL STATUTE(S>. ONCE AN INDIVIDUAL IS IDENTIFIED WITHIN THIS SYSTEM, CONDUCT ALL LOGICAL INVESTIGATION UTILIZING TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED IN YOUR JURISDICTION. DO NOT ALERT THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE FBI'S INTEREST AND CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY."

Req 13-6

000000031

Re: 66F-HQ-A1255362

TV.

Date:

RE-DESIGNATION OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATION CLASSIFICATIONS Tn an effort to reduce the risk of another law redefine

he Terrorist Org.ni

s e .ub>=«. the Terrorst Organization Classif ic.tion is: International Extremist (INTRNTL XTHSTS'IFBI) . All field offices that have the capability to enter

information to CJIS. All field offices are reminded to continue to initiate and use the two tiered Reporting and Audit system referenced on page three (3) of the communication located at 66F^HQ-A1255362, serial 68. Additionally, all receiving offices are instructed to continue using a 66 classification "administrative file) for their divisions and use that file number as the default file number for entry of all -tterterrorism Program records (Domestic or International) into the NCIC system.

Req 13-6

000000032

To: All Field OffV-es Re: 66F-HQ-A1255362

From: Date:

Countertei .jrism Division 06/10/2002

LEAD (s): Set Lead 1: ALL RECEIVING OFFICES v 1) Please ensure that all names and all identifying information of ALL investigative classifications for domestic and international terrorism, including cases•concerning any diplomats from state sponsors of terrorism are maintained in the NCIC system for All FULL INVESTIGATIONS ONLY. All offices are requested to review all current entries of subject information that each office has in the NCIC system, and to cancel or modify any current entries that do not meet the new criteria outlined above, and for offices in non-programmed NCIC states to submit any cancellations or modifications to CJIS. 2) Review ALL individuals who are subjects of domestic and international terrorism Preliminary Investigations (PI) to determine which subjects are relevant enough to the FBI's mission of Counterterrorism and Prevention, to maintain in the NCIC system. 3) Review and modify all "Silent Hit" submissions to make certain they are consistent with the new criteria outlined above. Set Lead 2...: CJIS

1) Please modify the NCIC program software, so that "Silent Hit" notifications will be sent to the Counterterrorism Threat Assessment & Warning Unit (CTAWU) at FBIHQ, room 5432. 2) Please modify the system software so that "Silent Hits" are given a unique code designation, so that Counterterrorism "Silent Hits" can be distinguished from Undercover Operation "Silent Hits."

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive Req 13-6

000000032

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

To: Ail Field Offii. 3 Re: 66F-HQ-A1255362

From: Date:

Counterteri 06/10/2002

ism Division

3) Please modify the system software to re-define the Terrorist Organization Classifications, for all Domestic Terrorism subjects, the Terrorist Organization Classification is: Domestic Extremist (DMST XTMST*DFBI), for all International Terrorism subjects, the Terrorist Organization Classification is: International Extremist (INTRNTL XTMSTS*IFBI). 4) Please modify the system software to create four (4) sub-group codes within the NCIC file system. The four sub-group codes will correspond to: Category 1: Individuals who are the subject of formal criminal charges or indictments. (This includes individuals named to the Most Wanted Terrorist List); Category 2: Individuals of Counterterrorism interest to the FBI, but do not have formal charges pending. For example, the three (3) remaining individuals listed on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorist List; -—•/ those individuals identified during "Operation Enduring Freedom" that pose a threat to the United States and others sought in connection with the PENTTBOM investigation; Category 3: All subjects of FBI Domestic and International Terrorism FULL Investigations and subjects of Preliminary Inquiries as deemed appropriate by the SAC or Section Chief; and Category 4: Individuals of Active Investigative interest. For example, the type of individuals who the FBI wanted to interview who were identified as part of the Penttbom Watch List. 5) In connection with the creation of the sub-group categories, please program the appropriate Warning Statement that corresponds to the appropriate sub-group category as defined in detail in Section III, of this communication.

10

Req 13-6

000000034

To: All Field Offi Re: 66F-HQ-A1255362

Set Lead 3: (Adm.l

From: Date:

Counterter. rism Division 06/10/2002

y/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

CJIS

Please address, in consultation with the Office of the General Counsel (OGC), the feasability and desirability of replacing the heading "Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File" (VGTOF) with a more appropriately descriptive term.

11

Req 13-6

000000035

(Rev. OS-28-2000)

{

:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE To:

Date: 07/11/2002

All Field Offices

Attn: ADIC SACs DTY1T SSAs

From: CJ1S Programs Development Section/Criminal Information Coordination Unit/Module C3 Contact: i 9/11 Law E n f o r c e m e n t Privacy Approved By:

Drafted By: Case ID #: 66F-HQ-C1250689 Title:

CJIS DIVISION VIOLENT GANG AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATION FILE

Synopsis: Instructions to all field offices to utilize new terrorist organization group/subgroup codes and to modify all NCIC VGTOF terrorist records to new codes. Reference: 66F-HQ-A1255362 Serial 104 Enclosure(s): Modification chart/worksheet Details: As all recipients are aware, the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) has been utilized since January /uuz in an effort to prevent potential terrorist attacks. The referenced electronic communication provides direction for the entry of Counterterrorism Program subjects into the NCIC VGTOF. The entry of the Counterterrorism Program subjects into the VGTOF increases information sharing among law enforcement throughout the United States and Canada. In an effort to facilitate the field offices in modification of_ existing VGTOF records, to comply with the revised criteria as detailed in the above referenced electronic communication (EC), the CJIS Division has developed new VGTOF terrorist group and subgroup codes. The new VGTOF group codes which are co be used in new cases, as well as, in the modification of records already entered into NCIC are listed below: GROTJP



., ,

Req 13-6

000000036

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

•..To: ''••Re:

All Field. Ofi ,.es From: CJIS 66F-HQ-C125Q6.89, 07/11/2002

Domestic Extremist NCIC Code: International Extremist NCIC Code: In addition to the new group codes, four new categories of subgroup codes have been created for both domestic (DFBI) and international (IFBI) terrorism cases. The new subgroup codes are listed below with associated description of each and caveat which will appear.at the top of the VGTOF record. It is important to ensure the proper codes are used so the appropriate warning is appended to the record. The warning caveat directs federal, state, and local law enforcement on proper procedures upon an encounter with 'the subject listed in VGTOF. SUBGROUPS Category 1 Individuals \who are the subject of formal criminal charges or indictments\(this includes individuals1 named to the Most Wanted Terrorist List),. ALL field offices and FBIHQ's Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit (CTAWU) have the ability to enter subjects into VGTOF using this category. The new VGTOF subgroup codes which are to be used are listed below: Domestic NCIC Code: International NCIC Code: Caveat: WARNING - APPROACH WITH CAUTION - ARMED AND DANGEROUS. PLEASE ARREST AND DETAIN I N D I V I D U A L . ONCE THE INDIVIDUAL IS SECURELY DETAINED, IMMEDIATELY CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD O F F I C E .

Please be advised that out of the 22 individuals named to the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorist List, 19 are listed in the NCIC Wanted Person File. However, the 19 known terrorists will additionally be listed in sub-group Category 1, within the VGTOF file of NCIC. The remaining three (3) individuals will be listed in sub-group Category 3, within the VGTOF file of NCIC.

Req

13-6

000000037

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

To.: All Field Offi Re:\, 01/11/2002

3

From:

CJIS

Category 2 Individuals of Counterrorism interest to the FBI, but do riot . yet ha've formal charges pending. This category will be limited to uniquely situated individuals such as: the three remaining individuals listed on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorist List; |\ and those individuals identified during "Operation Enduring Freedom" that pose a threat to the United States. '-Only the FBIHQ.' s CTAWU have the ability to enter subjects into VGTOF using this category. The new VGTOF subgroup codes which are to be used,, are listed below: Domestic NCIC Code: International-.., NCIC Code: Caveat: WARNING - APPROACH WITH CAUTION. PLEASE DETAIN THIS INDIVIDUAL FOR QUESTIONING. THIS INDIVIDUAL IS OF INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST TO THE FBI. ONCE THE INDIVIDUAL IS SECURELY DETAINED CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE IMMEDIATELY.\y 3

All subiects of FBI Domestic and International Terrorism FULL Investigations and subjects of_Preliminary Inquiries as deemed appropriate by the SAC or Section Chief. All field offices and the FBIHQ's CTAWU has the ability to enter subjects into VGTOF using this category. The new VGTOF subgroup '••^des which are to be used a.re listed below: Domestic NCIC Code: International NCIC Code: Caveat: WARNING - APPROACH WITH CAUTION. HOWEVER, MAKE NO EFFORT TO ARREST INDIVIDUAL UNLESS THERE IS EVIDENCE OF A VIOLATION OF FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL STATUE (S). ONCE AN INDIVIDUAL IS IDENTIFIED WITHIN THIS SYSTEM, CONDUCT ALL LOGICAL INVESTIGATION UTILIZING TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED IN YOUR JURISDICTION. DO NOT ALERT THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE FBI'S INTEREST AND CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

Req

13-6

000000038

.

... _

_

_

.

_

^

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

To: All Field Off" ,es From: CJIS Re:'--.. 66F-HQ-C1250689, 07/11/2002

Category 4

Individuals of Active Investigative interest. For example, the individuals the FBI wanted to interview who were identified as part pf the Penttbom Watch List could be entered into VGTOF using this., category. Only'the FBIHQ's CTAWU has the ability to enter subjects into VGTOF using this category. The new VGTOF subgroup codes which are to be used are listed below: Domestic NCIC Code: International NCIC Code: Caveat: WARNING - APPROACH WITH CAUTION. HOWEVER, MAKE NO EFFORT TO ARREST INDIVIDUAL UNLESS THERE IS EVIDENCE OF A VIOLATION OF FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL STATUTE(S). ONCE AN INDIVIDUAL IS IDENTIFIED WITHIN THIS SYSTEM, CONDUCT ALL LOGICAL INVESTIGATION UTILIZING TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED IN YOUR JURISDICTION. DO NOT ALERT THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE FBI'S INTEREST AND CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. All new VGTOF terrorist entries and existing VGTOF records should use the aforementioned codes. Per the referenced EC, all field offices have been directed to use the new codes when making VGTOF record entries. In addition, all field offices are directed to modify existing VGTOF records to reflect the new group and subgroup codes. record.

Below is an example of an existing VGTOF terrorist Please note this is a test record.

WARNING - APPROACH WITH CAUTION. HOWEVER, MAKE NO EFFORT TO ARREST INDIVIDUAL UNLESS THERE IS EVIDENCE OF A VIOLATION OF FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL STATUTE (S). ONCE AN INDIVIDUAL IS IDENTIFIED WITHIN THIS SYSTEM, CONDUCT ALL LOGICAL INVESTIGATION UTILIZING TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED IN YOUR JURISDICTION. DO NOT ALERT THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE FBI'S INTEREST AND CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. MKE/TERRORIST ORGANIZATION MEMBER - CAUTION ORI/DCBIWAT2 NAM/L TEST TEST TEST TEST SEX/F RAC/W

i"

GNG/ANRKST*DFBI .SGP/NONE KNOWN ECR/DF DOP/20070118 OCA/123456 TEST TEST MIS/TEST TEST T/EST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST MIS/TEST TES^T TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST MIS/TEST TEST/TEST TEST TEST TEST .TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

Req 13-6

000000039

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive 9/11 Law Enforcement Privacv

To: All Field Off! :.s From: CJIS Re:'••-.. 66F-HQ-C1250689, 07/11/2002

•.MIS/TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST ''OKI IS NCIC INVEST & OPER ASSIST UNIT/CJIS 000 000-0000 IMN/I255004094 IMT/I iMN/1490004110 IMT/M IMN/I265005412 IMT/I NIC/T250007891 DTE/20020118 1021 EST If the field office utilizes formatted screens for NCIC VGT'OF entries, it is suggested the NCIC operator always use the NIC \number (a unique NCIC number assigned to the record by the computer), along with other fields, to identify the record being modified. If a field office does not have formatted screens the following string format wilt.need to be used to modify all \g VGTOF records: 'MMG.DCFBIWAT2.NIC/T25Q007891.NAMl, ~~\T TEST TEST •TEST.OCA/123456 TEST TEST.GNG/DMST XTMST*DFBI.SGP/CATEGORY 1 \o note the above record is identified by NIC, Name 0f subject (NAM), and Originating Agency Case Number (OCA), while the Group (GNG) and Subgroup (SGP) fields are being modified to the new codes. Additionally, the modification of the VGTOF record will change the caveat which is appended to the top of the iecord. After modification, the record would appear as follows: \G - APPROACH WITH CAUTION - ARMED AND DANGEROUS. PLEASE ARREST'''AND DETAIN INDIVIDUAL. ONCE THE INDIVIDUAL IS SECURELY DETAINED, IMMEDIATELY CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE. MKE/TERRORIST ORGANIZATION MEMBER - CAUTION QRI/DC3IWAT2 NAM/L j TEST TEST TEST TEST SEX/F RAC/W DOB/I | GNG/DMST XTMST*DFBI SGP/CATEGORY 1 ECR/DF DOP/20070118 OCA/123456 TEST TESTMIS/TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST MIS/TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST MIS/TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST MIS/TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST • ORI IS NCIC INVEST & OPER ASSIST UNIT/CJIS 000 000-0000 IMN/I255004094 IMT/I IMN/1490004110 IMT/M IMN/I265005412 IMT/I NIC/T250007891 DTE/20020118 1021 EST FBI staff should refer to the NCIC Operating Manual for additional information on modification of records. In addition, for NCIC audit and review purposes, all supporting documentation

Req 13-6

000000040

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

To: Re:

All Field Offi ,s From: CJIS 66F-HQ-C1250689, 07/11/2002

should be placed in a 66 classification file with original documentation related to the entry of the record which is being modified. For those field offices located in states that are not programmed to make VGTOF entries in NCIC f Offices) , CJIS Division will continue to make the entries/updates until advised otherwise. A chart/spreadsheet should be created by each above-mentioned field office specifying the new group and subgroup codes for the modification(s). The chart should identify the record(s) to be modified by the NIC, NAN, OCA, new GNG, and new SGP data (see attached). All records utilizing the same group and subgroup codes should be listed together in the chart and sent to the CJIS Division attached to an EC. All documentation should be sent to: CJIS Division, Programs Development Section, Attention: Unit Chief (" ^ Once the CJIS Division has completed the,.NCIC transactions, the original NCIC printouts will be mailed--'back to the field office for placement in the 66 classification file for review and audit purposes. All new VGTOF entries should continue to be forwarded to I j via cover EC with a completed FD-930 for each individual entry. Any questions regarding the modification of records by the CJIS Division, should be forwarded to/ \1 Law Enforcement Pri\y

Req 13-6

000000041

9/11 Law Enforcement 'Sensitive

To: Re:

All Field Of: ces From: CJIS 66F-HQ-C1250689, 07/11/2002

LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: ALL RECEIVING OFFICES 1) Use the newly created terrorist codes for entry of all new NCIC VGTOF records. 2) All existing VGTOF records should be modified to reflect the new codes. 3) The CJIS Division will continue to update existing VGTOF records fog your VGTOF records, you are requested to create a chart listing each VGTOF record, specifying the appropriate new group and subgroup codes along with the record's NIC, NAM, and OCA. Forward this chart with a cover EC to: CJIS Division, Programs Development Section, Attention: Unit Chief\ 4) All new VGTOF ,.entries should continue to be forwarded via cover EC with a completed FD-930 for each individual entry to the CJIS Division, Programs Development Section, Attention: Unit Chief/ £ Set Lead 2: (Adm)

COUNTERTERRORISM AT WASHINGTON. DC .Attention: Chief; Domestic Terrorism/ Counterterrorism Planning Section For information only. Please read and clear.

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

Req 13-5

000000042

(Rs\.OS-:S-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: To:

Date:

PRIORITY Attn:

All Field Offices

All Legats Cour.tertsrrorism From:

> £ / o r, ,^ -*1

ADICs SACs IT Program Manager DT Program Manager Section C h "* efs

Counterterrorism SAWS/TWWuVRoom 11303 Contact: SSA

Approved By:

Law Enforcement Privacy Drafted By: Case ID #: 66F-HQ-C1392852 Title:

(Pending)

TERRORISM WATCH LIST TIPOFF MATTERS

Synopsis: This communication describes the Department of State's terrorist TIPOFF system and establishes procedures for FBI field office entries into TIPOFF. Details: The Department of State (DOS) Bureau of Intelligence and Research maintains a classified database, referred to as TIPOFF, which contains information regarding known or suspected terrorists who are not U.S._citizens. TIPOFF was designed to detect these individuals as they apply for visas overseas cr as they attempt to pass through U.S., Canadian or Australian border entry points. DOS has established a "reasonable suspicion" threshold for a qualifying TIPOFF entry. Specifically, there has to be reasonable suspicion the individual is a terrorist or is associated with terrorism. The TIPOFF database maintains classified electronic copies of supporting documents regarding individual TIPOFF entries. In addition to the above, DOS shares qualifying TIPOFF data with U.S. embassies via the Consular Lookout and Support System. (CLASS) ana with ether U.S. border agencies via the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS). Only those TIPCFF entries which contain names and identifying data to facilitate positive identifications are shared through CLASS and I3IS. The information

Req 13-6

000000043

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

.

.

. > r , .Q= --•• TST, < = s-ovided at the unclassified level and ' " c l a s s i f i e supporting documentation. --r C.^ r ' T 3 --= -=> o develooina orocedures ».a ^ fee e n t eand red

ntain identifying ^ o o s i . v e identifications.

-1"°l I

which would

''• r i e ld o f f i c e s desiring t o make a n entry into JIPOFF should '•-. I f ^ ,-,,=, r,i a " n r ^ o r - i t v " or "immediate" communication, g"^£ ^ e u r g e n c ^ - ? o the a t t e n t i o n of the T e r r o r i s m Match and g un,t,. Terrorise «atcn L.st Jjd the •PP»P|^ nicatlon s h o u l d n r i nd^ed 0 L?o b Srand e contain

a.

m och

of the foUowin,

i n f o r m a t i o n a,s available: a. b. c. d. £3

f. h.

k. 1.

off^ces are reminded the criteria for TIPOFF entries • suso'-ior" the individual is associated with a r e a , „, _ n a .^, -he individual is a non-U.S. citizen/non-green f^' °" -hp'oomnurication should specifically state tnese L2o-cv-; If unclassified photographs of the individual (s) /n'-b'o :^=M offices should include the pnotograpns, in rlcfo'^ras enclosures to their comraunicaricns.

Raq 13-6

000000044

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

—..1 2. * ^ s j_ c O ^ • • s s ~~ IT o T ' 5 6 F - H Q - C1 3 S 2 8 5 2 , 1212 4 / 2

Legats should continue to coordinate with rheir DOS points of contact and utilize the VisaViper program ro make entries into T1POFF. However, for tracking purposes and quality assurance, Legats should forward a brief coirjnunication to the Terrorism Watch and Warning Unit which summarizes any new submissions to TIPOFF. Questions regarding this matter can be directed to SSA

\q 1

Re:

rrorTii v_ount5 66F-HQ-C1392S52, 1 2 / 2 4 / 2 0 0

LEAD(s) : Set Lead 1:

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES International and Domestic Terrorism program managers wil! disseminate this communication to appropriate personnel and ensure compliance for entries into the Department of State's TIPOFF database.

Req 13-6

000000046

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: To:

ROUTINE

All Field O f f i c e s

"

Date: Attn:

05/09/2003

ADIC SACs

JTTF POCs FBIHQ, Manuals Desk Counterterrorisra From:

TWWU/NTCS/Room 11303 SSA.I

I

CJIS Programs Development Section/Global Initiatives Unit/Module C-3 . / 1

Contact: Approved By:

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy Drafted By: Case ID #: 66F-HQ-C1250689-VGTOFTERR 66F-HQ-C1384970 Title:

CJIS DIVISION VIOLENT GANG AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATION FILE; VGTOF CASE ASSISTANCE-TERRORISTS; SUPPORT TO THE FIELD FOR COUNTERTERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS

Synopsis: To provide support to rhe field for counterterrorism investigations by clarifying instructions for submitting requests to CJIS for entry, modification, and cancellation of and Silent Hit terrorist records. Reference: 66F-HQ-A1255362 Serial 104 66F-HQ-C1392852 Serial 8 66F-HQ-C1250689 Serial 38 Details: As the field is aware, the increased emphasis on counterterrorism post 9-11 has resulted in changes and enhancements to systems which support the counterterrorism mission. One of these systems or resources is the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF). To support the field in its use of VGTOF, the CJIS Division enters, modifies, and cancels VGTOF and Silent Hit records in NCIC for field divisions upon request. Specifically, CJIS enters VGTOF records as an interim

Req 13-6

000000047

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive To: Re:

All Field Off. as From: CJIS 66F-HQ-C1250689-VGTOFTERR, 05/09/2003

measure for those field divisions which are located in states not yet programmed to make entries. CJIS enters Silent Hit records for all field divisions. This communication is not intended to supercede referenced Electronic Communications (ECs.) , but to clarify the information required from the field divisions for CJIS to process these requests effectively and expeditiously. Requests for VGTOF and Silent Hit entries should be provided\via EC to CJIS, Programs Development Section, Global Initiatives Unit, with an FD-930 attached. The FD-930 must be complete a'tid legible. The information listed below is required for entry: \ information" is provided,

please ensure the information is valid and complete.

GANG/GROUP Domestic Extremist NCIC Code: International Extremist NCIC Code: It is important to ensure the proper codes are used so the appropriate warning is appended to the record. The warning caveat directs federal, state, and local law enforcement on proper procedures upon an encounter with the subject listed in VGTOF.

Req 13-6

000000048

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

To: ''Re:

All Field Offl-^s From: CJIS 66F-HQ-C1250689-VGTOFTERR, 05/09/2003

SUBGROUP Category 1 Individuals who are the subject of formal criminal charges or indictments (this includes individuals named to the Most Wanted Terrorist List). Field offices and FBIHQ's Counterterrorism Division, National Threat Center Section, Terrorism Watch and Warning Unit (CTD/NTCS/TWWU) have the ability to enter .subjects into VGTOF using this category. The VGTOF subgroup c.odes are: Domestic NCIC Code: International, NCIC Code: Caveat: WARNING - APPROACH WITH CAUTION - ARMED AND DANGEROUS. PLEASE ARREST AND''DETAIN INDIVIDUAL. ONCE THE INDIVIDUAL IS SECURELY DETAINED, IMMEDIATELY CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE. Category 2 Individuals, of. Counterterrorism interest to the FBI, but do not vet have formal charges pending. Only the FBIHQ's CTD/NTCS/TWWU has the ability to enter subjects into VGTOF using this category. The VGTOF subgroup codes are: Domestic NCIC Code: International NCIC Code: Caveat: WARNING - APPROACH WITH CAUTION. PLEASE .DETAIN THIS INDIVIDUAL FOR QUESTIONING. THIS INDIVIDUAL IS OF INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST TO THE FBI. ONCE THE INDIVIDUAL IS SECURELY DETAINED, CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE IMMEDIATELY. Category 3 All subjects of FBI Domestic and International Terrorism FULL Investigations and subjects of Preliminary Inquiries as deemed appropriate by the SAC or Section Chief. Field offices and the FBIHQ's CTD/NTCS/TWWU have the ability to enter subjects into VGTOF using this category. The VGTOF subgroup codes are:

Req 13-6

000000049

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

. To: \Re:

Air-Eield Off^.as From: CJIS 66F-HQ-G1250689-VGTOFTERR, 05/09/2003

Dome'stic NCIC Code: International NCIC Code: Caveat: \G - APPROACH WITH CAUTION.

HOWEVER, MAKE NO

EFFORT TO ARREST INDIVIDUAL UNLESS THERE IS EVIDENCE OF A VIOLATION OF FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL STATUTE(S). ONCE AN INDIVIDUAL IS IDENTIFIED WITHIN THIS SYSTEM, CONDUCT ALL LOGICAL INVESTIGATION UTILIZING TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED IN YOUR JURISDICTION. DO NOT ALERT THE INDIVIDUAL TO THEX.FBI ' S INTEREST AND CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE AT, THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. Category 4 Individuals of Active. Investigative interest. Only the FBIHQ's CTD/NTCS/TWWU has the ability to enter subjects into VGTOF using this category.. The VGTOF subgroup codes are listed below: Domestic NCIC Code: International NCIC Code: Caveat: WARNING - APPROACH WITH CAUTION. HOWEVER, MAKE NO EFFORT TO ARREST INDIVIDUAL UNLESS THERE IS EVIDENCE OF A VIOLATION OF FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL STATUTE(S). ONCE AN INDIVIDUAL IS IDENTIFIED WITHIN THIS SYSTEM, CONDUCT ALL LOGICAL INVESTIGATION UTILIZING TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED IN V^TJR JURISDICTION. DO NOT ALERT THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE FBI'S INTEREST AND CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. ENTRY CRITERIA CODES

Req 13-6

000000050

9/11 Law Enforcement

To: Re:

Sensitive

All Field OffWes rO, From: CJIS 66F-HQ-C1250689-VGTOFTERR, 05/09/2003

Requests for VGTOF and Silent Hit modifications and cancellations should be provided via EC to CJIS, attention Global Initiatives Unit. An FD-930 is not necessary. Please include subject's 1 | Please ensure all Silent Hit requests are identified by indicating "SILENT HIT" in the EC and on the FD-930. All requests not identified as a Silent Hit will be entered in regular VGTOF. Your contacts at CJIS for VGTOF and Silent Hit requests

are: CJIS Division appreciates your attention to this coiratmriication. We understand that compliance with this request may require additional time and effort on behalf of your staff. Your cooperation, however, will alleviate any delay in entering, modifying, and cancelling your VGTOF and Silent Hit records, thus enabling CJIS to provide valuable support to your counterterrorism investigations.

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

Req 13-6

000000051

To: Re:

All Field OffiV^J From: CJIS 66F-HQ-C1250689-VGTOFTERR, 05/09/2003

LEAD(s) : Set Lead 1:

(Action)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES Attention:

ADIC, SACs, JTTF POCs

Please disseminate to personnel responsible for submitting VGTOF and Silent Hit entries, modifications, and cancellations to CJIS and ensure that requests are submitted according to instructions thus allowing CJIS to process requests effectively and expeditiously.

Req 13~6

000000052

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