T3 B6 Public Hearings Fdr- Team 3 Ct Policy Hearing Schedule- 3 Drafts And Proposal 067

Team 3 CT Policy Hearing Schedule March 22-24, 2004 (as (f 1/2/04, 3:00 p.m) Overview Staff statements: • Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia: al Qaeda Safehavens • The Intelligence Community's response to al Qaeda • Diplomatic response to the threat • Military response to the threat • Domestic intelligence and law enforcement • National strategy and policy management Schedule of Hearings Monday. March 22. Day One: Safehavens and Foreign & Defense Policy AM: 9:00-12:00 • • •

Taliban: Ahmad Rahshid Pakistan: Robert Oakley (perhaps William Milam) Saudi Arabia: Martin Indyk or Robert Jordan

Issues: What was the relationship of UBL / AQ to these powers? Prior to 9-11, how did the leaders of these powers support or hinder UBL / AQ in mounting attacks on the United States? After 9-11, what did the leaders of these powers do to assist and support our efforts to defeat UBL / AQ? What lessons can we learn? PM: 1:00-5:00 •

Clinton Administration Foreign & Defense Policy (1:00-3:00) with Madeline Albright, Thomas Pickering, and William Cohen. Issues: How did State and Defense see the AQ threat before Jan. 2001? What diplomatic efforts were taken to counter the threat of UBL/AQ? What military efforts were taken? How did other states and organizations respond? What lessons can we learn? (Break 3:00-3:15)

•

Bush Administration Foreign & Defense Policy (3:15-5:00) with Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, and Donald Rumsfeld. Issues: How did State and Defense see the AQ threat in 2001 before 9-11? What diplomatic efforts were taken to counter the AQ threat in 2001 before 9-11? What military efforts were taken? How did other

nations and organizations respond? What is our current approach to addressing safehavens? What lessons can we learn? Tuesday. March 23. Day Two: Foreign and Domestic Intelligence AM: 9:00-12:00 •

Foreign Intelligence (9:00-12:00) with George Tenet. Issues: How well did the U.S. intelligence community track the adapting AQ threat? What did the intelligence community do to counter the AQ threat? What lessons can we learn?

PM: 1:00-5:00 •

Pre 9/11 Domestic Intelligence & Law Enforcement (1:00-3:00) with Louis Freeh. Issues: How well did the FBI track the AQ threat within the US? What steps were taken to build and improve the analytic and intelligence capabilities of the FBI, its information technology, and its ability to act proactively? What lessons can we learn? (Break 3:00-3:15)

•

Post 9/11 Domestic Intelligence & Law Enforcement (3:15-5:00) with Robert Mueller. Issues: What priority was given to counterterrorism concerns prior to the attacks of September 11? What actions did the FBI take during the summer of 2001 in response to threat reporting? What steps were taken in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to prevent a second wave of attacks within the US? Will the FBI be able to accomplish its reform goals? Has an adequate architecture been developed for intelligence, warning, and response to the continuing threat of terrorist attack in the United States? What lessons can we learn?

Wednesday. March 24. Day Three: National Al Oaeda Strategy and Policy Management AM: 9:00-12:00 •

Coordination of National Strategy (9:00-12:00) with Richard Clarke, former national coordinator for counterterrorism. Issues: How did the National Coordinator see the AQ threat? What efforts did the National Coordinator undertake to counter the AQ threat (diplomacy, capturing AQ leaders, law enforcement, financial controls, 1C actions, public diplomacy, etc?) How well did the USG perform? What lessons can we learn from U.S. counterterrorism policy of both administrations?

PM: 1:00-5:00 •

Clinton Administration CT Policy (1:00-2:45) with Samuel Berger, former national security adviser. Issues: What was the Clinton administration's strategic approach to

countering the threat posed by AQ, from 1993 to the Millennium plot? What was the Clinton administration's strategic approach to countering AQ from Jan. 2000 to Jan. 2001? What lessons can we learn? (Break 2:45-3:00) Bush Administration CT Policy (3:00-4:45) with Condoleezza Rice, national security adviser. Issues: What was the Bush administration's strategic approach to countering AQ in 2001 before 9-11? What was the Bush administration's strategic approach to countering AQ in 2001 immediately after 9-11? What lessons can we learn? Closing Statement (4:45-5:00) by Gov. Thomas Kean (Chair, 9/11 Commission)

DETAILED SCHEDULE Day One; Safehavens and Foreign & Defense Policy 9:00 - 10:30 Ahmad Rashid (Taliban) and Robert Oakley (Pakistan) Commission Lead Questioners: (2) TBD Key Questions: • Why was Afghanistan unable to reach peace among its internal factions? • Why did Afghanistan become fertile ground for Islamic radicalism? • How did the Islamic radical movement take root and flourish in Afghanistan and Pakistan? • Why were Islamic radicals drawn to UBL and AQ? • Why did the Taliban give safehaven to UBL and his movement? • How did the Taliban view U.S. approaches to handing of UBL for prosecution? • What were U.S. limitations in dealing with the Taliban? • What was the relationship of Pakistan and the Taliban? • Why was Pakistan a key player in containing the AQ threat? • What is the current assessment of Pakistan's role in defeating the AQ threat? 10:30 -10:45 Break 10:45 - 12:00 Martin Indyk and Robert Jordan (Saudi Arabia) Commission Lead Questioners: (2) TBD Key Questions for Indyk • What was the extent of the Saudi regime's support for radical causes including direct links to al-Qa'ida, if any? • What was the extent of indirect support through NGOs or by spreading Wahhabism? • Why was this support given? • How much attention was given to Saudi support for radicalism by the USG? • What other issues prevented more attention to Saudi backing of radical causes (Oil, Iraq, etc.)? • What was the Saudi capacity for CT? Key Questions for Jordan • How much attention did the USG give to Saudi support for radical causes before 9/11? How did the Saudis respond to 911? • What changes occurred after the May attacks and why wasn't 9/11 enough? • How well do the Saudis cooperate with the US today? • What was the Saudi regime's CT capacity? 12:00-1:00 Lunch Break

1:00-3:00 Madeline Albright (former Secretary of State), Thomas Pickering (former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs), and William Cohen (former Secretary of Defense) Commission Lead Questioners: (2) TBD Key Questions for State Witnesses: • Why did the United States ignore Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union? • How did the administration view the rise of the Taliban? • How did the administration assess Pakistan's role in Afghan politics and what did the administration do to shape Pakistan's involvement with the Taliban? • What was the evolving diplomatic strategy for dealing with the Taliban, particularly with turning UBL over for prosecution? Were the assumptions of the strategy realistic? • How did State view the Taliban and UBL as a threat to U.S. national security? • What diplomatic efforts were taken to counter the threat of UBL/AQ? What were the limits of our diplomatic efforts? • Could diplomacy ever have split the Taliban from UBL? Did we spend time pursuing futile options? • Did U.S. diplomacy toward Pakistan appropriately address the UBL issue? How was the terrorist issue viewed among other competing security issues with Pakistan? • Did U.S. diplomacy toward Saudi Arabia appropriately address the UBL issue? • How did State's leaders feel about the use of force after the August 1998 embassy bombings and the 2000 attack on the Cole? • Were U.N. sanctions useful tools for changing Taliban behavior? • Was the office of the S/CT powerful enough within the State Department? • Are our embassies and consulates safe enough? • Did U.S. diplomacy toward Sudan appropriately address the terrorism issue? • Were we too cautious about reaching out to the Northern Alliance? Key Questions for the Defense Witness: • How did the U.S. military view the terrorist threat to Americans? • Did the military focus too much on force protection and too little on carrying the fight to AQ? • Did DOD and JCS produce the military options they were asked to? • Were the August 1998 strikes effective? • Did DOD/JCS think follow-on strikes were in order? • Did DOD offer enough options for attempts to target UBL after 1998, including submarines? • Did DOD/JCS want to strike AQ targets after the Cole attack? • Was the U.S. military's CT budget spent effectively? • Did DOD and CIA cooperate effectively on UBL? • Did DOD work effectively with the NSC?

•

What role did DOD play in protecting American soil? Did DOD plan and prepare adequately for terrorist attacks in America? Was NORAD ready for the full range of threats?

3:00-3:15

Break

3:15 - 5:00 Colin Powell (Secretary of State), Richard Armitage (Deputy Secretary of State) and Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense). Commission Lead Questioners: (2) TBD Key Questions for State Witnesses: • How was terrorism viewed by State prior to 9/11 ? • What diplomatic efforts were taken to counter the threat of UBL/AQ? What were the limits of these efforts? • Could diplomacy ever have split the Taliban from UBL? Was it reasonable to believe we could convince the Taliban to turn over UBL before 9/11? Why not? • Did U.S. diplomacy toward Pakistan appropriately address the UBL issue? How was the terrorist issue viewed among other competing security issues with Pakistan? • Did U.S. diplomacy toward Saudi Arabia appropriately address the UBL issue? • How did State's leaders feel about the use of force to respond to the Cole? • Was the office of the S/CT powerful enough within the State Department? • Are our embassies and consulates safe enough? • Were we too cautious about reaching out to the Northern Alliance? • How did U.S. diplomacy change from 9/11 to 9/20? • Is U.S. CT policy too focused on state sponsors rather than transnational threats? • What is our current approach to addressing safehavens? Key Questions for the Defense Witness: • How did the U.S. military view the terrorist threat to Americans? • Did DOD focus too much on force protection and too little on carrying the fight to AQ? • Did DOD and JCS have options and plans for Afghan operations? • Did we rely too much on CA and too little on overt force in the pre-9/11 Bush period? • Did DOD offer enough support for efforts to target UBL, including Predator? • Did DOD and CIA coordinate well over UBL in general and Predator in particular? • Did DOD/JCS want to strike AQ targets after the Cole attack? • Was the U.S. military's CT budget spent effectively? • Did DOD work effectively with the NSC? • What role did DOD play in protecting American soil? • Did DOD plan and prepare adequately for terrorist attacks in America? • Was NORAD ready for the full range of threats? • What planning had been done for homeland defense?

Day Two: Foreign and Domestic Intelligence 9:00 -12:00

George Tenet (Director of Central Intelligence)

Commission Lead Questioners: (2) TBD Key Questions for the DQ: • How well did the intel community understand AQ? Did we take the threat seriously enough? • Was your 1998 "declaration of war" backed up, over time, with action and resources? • What were the limits on U.S. intelligence collection on AQ? • Did we do enough to understand/block AQ's WMD capabilities? • What was done (unilaterally and otherwise) to disrupt AQ cells, its network and infrastructure? • Did the 1C have the legal authorities it needed to do the job? • What should have been learned from the 1998 bombings, the Millennium plot, and the USS Cole? Did we respond adequately to the threat over time? • What was the QA role in debates over Predator? • How did the intel community perform during the 2001 " summer of threat" ? • Why didn't we know about the 9-11 plot? What did we know about the use of airplanes as weapons? What warnings did policymakers get?

1:00 - 3:00

Louis Freeh (former Director of the FBI)

Commission Lead Questioners: (2) TBD Key Questions for the Director • How well did the FBI track the AQ threat within the US? • How capable was the FBI to respond to the threat of terrorism? • What steps were taken to build and improve the analytic and intelligence capabilities of the FBI? • What steps were taken to improve its information technology and its ability to find and share information? • What steps were taken to increase the FBI's ability to act proactively? • What prevented these reforms from being implemented successfully? 3:00- 3:15

Break

3:15 - 5:00

Robert Mueller (Director of the FBI)

Commission Lead Questioners: (2) TBD Key Questions for the Director: • What priority was given to counterterrorism concerns prior to September 11, 2001? • How well were the FBI field offices engaged in the counterterrorism effort? • What actions did the FBI take during the summer of 2001 in response to threat reporting? • What is the significance of the Phoenix EC, Hamzi-Mihdhar, and Moussaoui matters? • What steps were taken in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to prevent a second wave of attacks? • Will the FBI be able to accomplish its reform goals? Has sufficient progress been made? • Is the FBI on the right track with its reform efforts? • Has an adequate architecture been developed within the federal government as a whole for intelligence, warning, and response in light of the continuing threat of terrorist attack in the United States?

Day Three; National al Oaeda Strategy and Policy Management 9:00 - 12:00

Richard A. Clarke (former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism)

Commission Lead Questioners: (2) TBD Key Questions: • How did the NSC see the AQ threat? • Did other policymakers grasp the gravity of the UBL threat? • What efforts did the National Coordinator undertake to counter die AQ threat (diplomacy, disruptions, law enforcement, financial controls, 1C actions, public diplomacy, preparedness, etc?) • How well did the USG perform? Did the interagency process work? • Was there a strategy? What were its goals? Could it have worked? • How well did the U.S. intelligence community perform? Did it work effectively with policymakers? • How well did U.S. law enforcement perform? Did it work effectively with policymakers? • How well did DOD perform? Did the military work effectively with policymakers? • Did the USG anticipate attacks on U.S. soil? Did the USG anticipate mass-casualty attacks? • What went wrong? • Did we get it? • What still needs to be fixed? • Over the long term, how do we destroy AQ and dry up its pools of support? • What short-term and medium-term steps should we be taking? • Do we have die right 1C for fighting AQ? • Do we have the right military for fighting AQ? • Do we have the right FBI for fighting AQ? • Is DHS making America safer? • How did the Clinton and Bush administrations see the AQ threat? • What sort of attacks should we be preparing for? • Was it possible to move more aggressively against AQ before the shock of 9/11 ? • Is Iraq helping or hurting the war on terrorism? • Are we winning the war on terrorism? 12:00 - 1:00 Lunch Break

1:00 - 2:45

Samuel Berger (former National Security Adviser)

Commission Lead Questioners: (2) TBD Key Questions: • What was the Clinton administration's strategy for countering the threat posed by AQ? • How dangerous did the president think UBL was? How was that assessment communicated— to the public and to other policymakers? • Did the USG have enough resources for CT? • Did the USG devote enough high- level attention to CT? • Was the U.S. response to the 1998 embassy bombings effective? • Was the U.S. response to the 1999 Millennium plot effective? Did the Ressam episode trigger enough attention to terrorist attacks on U.S. soil? • Why didn't the Clinton administration respond militarily to the Cole attack'1 • Did domestic politics— including the president's political troubles, the Florida recount, and the transition— affect U.S. responses to UBL? • Did foreign problems— including the Balkans and Iraq— affect U.S. responses to UBL? • Did the NSC think UBL had WMD capabilities? What steps were taken in this regardeither to get more clarity or to interdict mass-destruction arms? • Did the NSC give the QA the authority for effective steps to disrupt the UBL network5 • Did the NSC task the Pentagon for a more vigorous response? • Was the NSC preparing for major terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland? • Did you offer warnings about AQ to the incoming Bush team? How did they respond? • Was the U.S. national security structure designed to grapple with the AQ threat? • Was Saudi Arabia sufficiently cooperative with our efforts against AQ? • Was Pakistan sufficiently cooperative with our efforts against AQ? • Did the USG make enough use of the Predator? • Was the American public ready for more sweeping measures on terrorism? • Is Iraq helping or hurting the war on terrorism? • Are we winning the war on terrorism? 2:45 - 3:00

Break

3:00 - 4:45

Condoleezza Rice (National Security Adviser)

Commission Lead Questioners: (2) TBD Key Questions: • What advice did you receive from the outgoing administration about UBL? • What was the pre-9/11 Bush administration's strategy for countering the threat posed by AQ? Why did the administration start developing an NSPD on the issue? • How dangerous did the president think UBL was? How was that assessment communicated— to the public and to other policymakers?

10

• • • • • •

How high a priority was UBL for the pre-9/11 Bush administration? Did the USG have enough resources for CT? Did TNT think so? Did the USG devote enough high-level attention to CT? Who did you think attacked the Cole? When did you get a definitive intel judgment? Why didn't the Bush administration respond militarily to the Cole attack? Did domestic politics— including the Florida recount and the transition— affect U.S. responses to UBL? • Did the USG expect a massive terrorist attack in the summer of 2001? How did it respond? Were the ICs warnings useful? • Were homeland defenses adequate to meet the warning levels of the summer of 2001? • Was the USG expecting terrorist attacks on U.S. soil? • Did the NSC think UBL had WMD capabilities before 9/11? What pre-9/11 steps were taken in this regard— either to get more clarity or to interdict mass-destruction arms? • Did the NSC give the QA the authority for effective steps to disrupt the UBL network? • Did the NSC task the Pentagon for a more vigorous response? • Was the NSC preparing for major terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland? • Was the U.S. national security structure designed to grapple with the AQ threat? • Was Saudi Arabia sufficiently cooperative with our efforts against AQ? • Was Pakistan sufficiently cooperative with our efforts against AQ? • Did the USG make enough use of the Predator? Did the interagency process move efficiently? • Should the USG have given more assistance to the Northern Alliance pre-9/11? • Was the American public ready for more sweeping measures on terrorism before 9/11? • Is Iraq helping or hurting the war on terrorism? • Are we winning the war on terrorism?

4:45 - 5:00

Gov. Thomas Kean (Chair, 9/11 Commission) Closing Statement

5:00 - 5:30

Press availability

11

Team 3 Draft CT Policy Hearing Schedule March 22-24,2004 (as cf 1/2/04,11:00 a.m)

Overview Staff statements:

• • • • • •

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia: al Qaeda Safehavens The Intelligence Community's response to al Qaeda Diplomatic response to the threat Military response to the threat Domestic intelligence and law enforcement National strategy and policy management

Monday. March 22. Day One: Safehavens. Foreign Policy, and Force AM: •

Afghanistan and Pakistan: Robert Oakley and Ahmad Rashid (Perhaps William Milam)

•

Saudi Arabia: Martin Indyk and Robert Jordan

•

Clinton Administration Foreign Policy. Thomas Pickering and Michael Sheehan: How did the State Department see the AQ threat before Jan. 2001? What diplomatic efforts were taken to counter the threat of TJBL/AQ? How did other states and organizations respond?

•

Bush Administration Foreign Policy: Colin Powell and Richard Armitage: How did the U.S. State Department see the AQ threat in 2001 before 9-11? What diplomatic efforts were taken to counter the AQ threat in 2001 before 9-11? How did other nations and organizations respond?

PM

Clinton Administration defense response to al Qaeda, William Cohen and General Hugh Shelton: How did the U.S. military see the threat posed by terrorism before Jan 2001? What did the military do to counter the UBL/AQ threat? Bush Administration defense response to al Qaeda: Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers: How did the U.S. military see the threat posed by terrorism in 2001 before 9-11? What did the military do to counter that threat before 9-11? Tuesday. March 23. Day Two: Foreign and Domestic Intelligence AM: 1

•

Foreign Intelligence response to al Qaeda across the Qinton and Bush Administrations: George Tenet: How well did the U.S. intelligence community track the adapting AQ threat? What did the intelligence community do to counter the AQ threat?

PM

Clinton Administration domestic intelligence and law enforcement response to al Qaeda: /Janet Reno andj Louis Freeh: How well did the FBI track the AQ threat within the US? What steps were taken to build and improve the analytic and intelligence capabilities of the FBI, its information technology, and its ability to actpmactively?

t

,

Bush Administration domestic intelligence and law enforcement response to al Qaeda: /John Ashcroft andj Robert Mueller. What priority was given to counterterrorism concerns prior to the attacks of September 11? What actions did the FBI take during the summer of 2001 in response to threat reporting? "What steps were taken in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to prevent a second wave of attacks within the US? Will the FBI be able to accomplish its reform goals? Has an adequate architecture been developed for intelligence, warning, and response to the continuing threat of tenvrist attack in the United States?

Wednesday. March 24. Day Three: National Al Oaeda Strategy and Policy Management AM:

•

Richard Clarke, former national coordinator for counterterrorism: How did the National Coordinator see the AQ threat? What efforts did the National Coordinator undertake to counter the AQ threat (diplomacy, capturing AQ leaders, law enforcement, financial controls, 1C actions, public diplomacy, etc?) How well did the USG perform? What lessons can we learn from U.S. counterterrorism policy from both the Clinton and Bush administrations?

PM:

•

Samuel Berger, former national security adviser What was the Clinton administration's strategic approach to countering the threat posed by AQ, from 1993 to the Millennium plot? What was the Clinton administration's strategic approach to countering AQ from Jan. 2000 to Jan. 2001? What lessons can we learn?

•

Condoleezza Rice, national security adviser What was the Bush administration's strategic approach to countering AQ in 2001 before 9-11? What was the Bush administration's strategic approach to countering AQ in 2001 immediately after 9-11? What lessons can we learn?

{ Formatted: Font: Bold, Italic

Detailed Schedule Day One; Safehavens. Foreign Policy, and Force 9:00 - 10:00 Robert Oakley and Ahmad Rashid 10:00 - 10:15 Break 10:15 - 11:15 Martin Indyk and Robert Jordan 11:15 - 12:15 Thomas Pickering, former undersecretary of state for policy Michael Sheehan, former coordinator for counterterrorism Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • Was terrorism a high enough priority for the State Department during your tenure? • What diplomatic efforts were taken to counter the threat of UBL/AQ? • Could diplomacy ever have split the Taliban off from UBL? Did we spend time pursuing futile options? • Did U.S. diplomacy toward Pakistan appropriately address the UBL issue? • Did U.S. diplomacy toward Saudi Arabia appropriately address the UBL issue? • How did State's leaders feel about die use of force after the August 1998 embassy bombings and the 2000 attack on the Cole? • Were UJST. sanctions useful tools for changing Taliban behavior? • Was the office of the S/CT powerful enough within the State Department? • Are our embassies and consulates safe enough? • Did U.S. diplomacy toward Sudan appropriately address the terrorism issue? Were we too cautious about reaching out to the Northern Alliance? 12:15 - 1:15 Gen. Colin Powell, secretary of state Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of state Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • Was terrorism a high enough priority for the State Department during your tenure? • What diplomatic efforts were taken to counter the threat of UBL/AQ? • Could diplomacy ever have split the Taliban off from UBL? Did we spend time pursuing futile options and unnecessary policy reviews? • Did US. diplomacy toward Pakistan appropriately address the UBL issue? • Did US. diplomacy toward Saudi Arabia appropriately address the UBL issue? • How did State's leaders feel about the use of force to respond to the Cole?

• • • • • •

Was the office of the S/CT powerful enough within the State Department? Are our embassies and consulates safe enough? Did U.S. diplomacy toward Sudan appropriately address the terrorism issue? Were we too cautious about reaching out to the Northern Alliance? How did U.S. diplomacy change from 9/11 to 9/20? Is U.S. CT policy too focused on state sponsors rather than transnational threats?

1:15 - 2:00 Break 2:00 -3:30 William Cohen, former secretary of defense Gen. Hugh Shelton (ret), former chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • Did the U.S. military think terrorism was its problem? • Did the military focus too much on force protection and too little on carrying the fight to AQ? • Did DOD and JCS produce the military options they were asked to? • Were the August 1998 strikes effective? • Did DOD/JCS think follow-on strikes were in order? • Did DOD offer enough options for attempts to target UBL after 1998, including submarines? • Did DOD/JCS want to strike AQ targets after the Cole attack5 • Was the US. military's CT budget spent effectively? • Did DOD and dA cooperate effectively on UBL? • Did DOD work effectively with the NSC? • What role did DOD play in protecting American soil? Did DOD plan and prepare adequately for terrorist attacks in America? Was NORAD ready for the full range of threats? 3:30 - 3:45 Break 3:45 - 5:15 Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense Gen. Richard Myers, chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • Did the U.S. military think terrorism was its problem? • Did DOD focus too much on force protection and too little on carrying the fight to AQ? • Did DOD and JCS have options and plans for Afghan operations? • Did we rely too much on CA and too little on overt force in the pre-9/11 Bush period? • Did DOD offer enough support for efforts to target UBL, including Predator? • Did DOD and QA coordinate well over UBL in general and Predator in particular? • Did DOD/JCS want to strike AQ targets after the Cole attack?

Was the U.S. military's CT budget spent effectively? Did DOD work effectively with the NSC? What role did DOD play in protecting American soil? Did DOD plan and prepare adequately for terrorist attacks in America? Was NORAD ready for the full range of threats? What planning had been done for homeland defense?

Day Two; Foreign and Domestic Intelligence 9:00-12:00

George Tenet, director of central intelligence

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • How well did the intel community understand AQ? Did we take the threat seriously enough? • Was your 1998 "declaration of war" backed up, over time, with action and resources? • What were the limits on U.S. intelligence collection on AQ? • Did we do enough to understand/block AQ's WMD capabilities? • What was done (unilaterally and otherwise) to disrupt AQ cells, its network and infrastructure? • Did the 1C have the legal authorities it needed to do the job? • What should have been learned from the 1998 bombings, the Millennium plot, and the USS Cole? Did we respond adequately to the threat over time? • What was the QA role in debates over Predator? • How did the intel community perform during the 2001 "summer of threat"? • Why didn't we know about the 9-11 plot? What did we know about the use of airplanes as weapons? What warnings did policymakers get? 12:00-1:00 Break 1:00 - 3:00 Janet Reno and./Louis Freeh Key Questions: • • • • • •

Howadl <M the FBI trade tlxAO threat wthin the US? Howcapab/e inns dxFBl to respond to the tliveat of terrorism? What steps isere taken to hold and, impme the analytic and intettigerxE capaHHties aftix FBI? Wloat steps IIEK taken to imprme its irfonmticn technology and its ability to find and s/jare irfarmztian? What steps wre taken to increase the FBI's ability to act pmactiidy? What presented these reform fmm being implemented successfully?

3:00 - 3:15 Break

3:15-5:15 John Ashcroft and/ Robert Mueller Key Questions: • • • • • • • •

What priority ims gzim to axmtertemrismconazrris prior to September 11. 2001? How -tedl -acre the FBI field qffiaes ermged in the countertermrism effort? 'What actions M the FBI take during the summer of 2001 in response to tfweat reporting? What is the significance of the Phoenix EC, Hamii-Mihdbar, ardMaussatw matters? What steps aere taken in the imrediate afierrmth cf9/l 1 to prevent a second iiaie (/attacks? W$ the FBI be able to accomplish its reformgoals? Has sufficient process hen made? Is the FBI on the rvjjvt track mth its rejbrmeffarts? Has an adequate anhttectim been developed wthin the federal government as a iihdefar inteUi^e . and response in £gfa cfthe continuing thrwt (/terrorist attack in the United States? Formatted: Font: Not Bold, Italic [ Formatted; Indent: Left: 0"

Day Three: National al Oaeda Strategy and Policy Management 9:00 - 12:00

Richard A. Clarice, former national coordinator for counterterrorism

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • • •

• • • • • • • • • • • •

How did the NSC see the AQ threat? Did other policymakers grasp the gravity of the UBL threat? What efforts did the National Coordinator undertake to counter the AQ threat (diplomacy, disruptions, law enforcement, financial controls, 1C actions, public diplomacy, preparedness, etc?) How well did the USG perform? Did the interagency process work? Was there a strategy? What were its goals? Could it have worked? How well did the U.S. intelligence community perform? Did it work effectively with policymakers? How well did U.S. law enforcement perform? Did it work effectively with policymakers? How well did DOD perform? Did the military work effectively with policymakers? Did the USG anticipate attacks on U.S. soil? Did the USG anticipate mass-casualty attacks? What went wrong? Did we get it5 What still needs to be fixed? Over the long term, how do we destroy AQ and dry up its pools of support? What short-term and medium-term steps should we be taking? Do we have the right 1C for fighting AQ?

• • • • • • • •

Do we have the right military for fighting AQ? Do we have the right FBI for fighting AQ? Is DHS making America safer? How did the Qinton and Bush administrations see the AQ threat? What sort of attacks should we be preparing for? Was it possible to move more aggressively against AQ before the shock of 9/11? Is Iraq helping or hurting the war on terrorism? Are we winning the war on terrorism?

12:00 - 1:00 Break 1:00 - 3:00 Samuel Berger, former national security adviser Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • What was the Clinton administration's strategy for countering the threat posed by AQ? • How dangerous did the president think UBL was? How was that assessment communicated— to the public and to other policymakers? • Did the USG have enough resources for CT? • Did the USG devote enough high-level attention to CT? • Was the U.S. response to the 1998 embassy bombings effective? • Was the U.S. response to the 1999 Millennium plot effective? Did the Ressam episode trigger enough attention to terrorist attacks on U.S. soil? • Why didn't the Clinton administration respond militarily to the Cole attack' • Did domestic politics— including the president's political troubles, the Florida recount, and the transition— affect U.S. responses to UBL? • Did foreign problems— including the Balkans and Iraq— affect U.S. responses to UBL? • Did the NSC think UBL had WMD capabilities? What steps were taken in this regardeither to get more clarity or to interdict mass-destruction arms? • Did the NSC give the QA the authority for effective steps to disrupt the UBL network' • Did the NSC task the Pentagon for a more vigorous response? • Was the NSC preparing for major terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland? • Did you offer warnings about AQ to the incoming Bush team? How did they respond? • Was the U.S. national security structure designed to grapple with the AQ threat? • Was Saudi Arabia sufficiently cooperative with our efforts against AQ? • Was Pakistan sufficiently cooperative with our efforts against AQ? • Did the USG make enough use of the Predator? • Was the American public ready for more sweeping measures on terrorism? • Is Iraq helping or hurting the war on terrorism? • Are we winning the war on terrorism? 3:00 - 3:15 Break 3:15 - 5:15 Condoleezza Rice, national security adviser

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • What advice did you receive from the outgoing administration about UBL? • What was the pre-9/11 Bush administration's strategy for countering the threat posed by AQ? Why did die administration start developing an NSPD on the issue? • How dangerous did the president think UBL was? How was that assessment communicated— to the public and to other policymakers? • How high a priority was UBL for the pre-9/11 Bush administration? • Did the USG have enough resources for CT? Did TNT think so? • Did the USG devote enough high-level attention to CT? • Who did you think attacked the Cole? When did you get a definitive intel judgment? • Why didn't the Bush administration respond militarily to the Cole attack5 • Did domestic politics— including the Florida recount and the transition— affect U.S. responses to UBL? • Did the USG expect a massive terrorist attack in the summer of 2001? How did it respond? Were the ICs warnings useful? • Were homeland defenses adequate to meet die warning levels of the summer of 2001? • Was the USG expecting terrorist attacks on U.S. soil' • Did the NSC think UBL had WMD capabilities before 9/11? What pre-9/11 steps were taken in this regard— either to get more clarity or to interdict mass-destruction arms? • Did the NSC give the QA the authority for effective steps to disrupt the UBL network' • Did the NSC task the Pentagon for a more vigorous response? • Was die NSC preparing for major terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland? • Was the U.S. national security structure designed to grapple with the AQ threat? • Was Saudi Arabia sufficiently cooperative with our efforts against AQ? • Was Pakistan sufficiently cooperative with our efforts against AQ? • Did the USG make enough use of the Predator? Did die interagency process move efficiently? • Should the USG have given more assistance to the Northern Alliance pre-9/11? • Was the American public ready for more sweeping measures on terrorism before 9/11? • Is Iraq helping or hurting the war on terrorism? • Are we winning the war on terrorism? 5:15 - 5:30 Gov. Thomas Kean, chair, 9/11 Commission Closing Statement 5:30-6:15

Press availability

Team 3 Draft CT Policy Hearing Schedule (as of 12/29/2003 6:39 PM)

Staff statements: • • • •

How did bin Laden and AQ rise to threaten the US? (perhaps by Team 1) Clinton CT policy Bush CT policy, pre-9/11 Bush CT policy, 9/11-9/20

Day One: The Gathering Storm • AM (Tenet): How well did the U.S. intelligence community track the adapting AQ threat? What did the intelligence community do to counter the AQ threat? • PM (Clarke— and perhaps Cressey?): How did the National Coordinator see the AQ threat? What efforts did the National Coordinator undertake to counter the AQ threat (diplomacy, capturing AQ leaders, law enforcement, financial controls, 1C actions, public diplomacy, etc?) How well did the USG perform? Day Two: Diplomacy. Force, and Strategy • AM (A thrift— and perhaps Pickering?): How did the State Department see the AQ threat before Jan. 2001? What diplomatic efforts were taken to counter the threat of UBL/AQ? How did other states and organizations respond? • PM (1) (Cohen, Sheltan): How did the U.S. military see the threat posed by terrorism before Jan 2001? What did the military do to counter the UBL/AQ threat? • PM (2) (Bergr— and perhaps Steinberg?): What was the Clinton administration's strategic approach to countering the threat posed by AQ, from 1993 to the Millennium plot? Day Three: Diplomacy. Force, and Strategy • AM (Bergr conduced): What was the Clinton administration's strategic approach to countering AQ from Jan. 2000 to Jan. 2001? What lessons can we learn? • PM (1) (Poiedl): How did the U.S. State Department see the AQ threat in 2001 before 9-11? What diplomatic efforts were taken to counter the AQ threat in 2001 before 911? How did other nations and organizations respond? • PM (2) (Rumjeld, Myers): How did the US. military see the threat posed by terrorism in 2001 before 9-11? What did the military do to counter that threat before 9-11? Day Four: Strategy and the War on al-Qa'ida • AM (Rice— and perhaps Hadleyf): What was the Bush administration's strategic approach to countering AQ in 2001 before 9-11? • PM (1) (Rice continued): What was the Bush administration's strategic approach to countering AQ in 2001 immediately after 9-11? What lessons can we learn? • PM (2) (Clarke): What lessons can we leam from U.S. counterterrorism policy from both the Clinton and Bush administrations?

Day One: The Gathering Storm 9:00-12:30

George Tenet, director of central intelligence

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • How well did the intel community understand AQ? Did we take the threat seriously enough? • Was your 1998 "declaration of war" backed up, over time, with action and resources? • What were the limits on U.S. intelligence collection on AQ? • Did we do enough to understand/block AQ's WMD capabilities? • What was done (unilaterally and otherwise) to disrupt AQ cells, its network and infrastructure? • Did the 1C have the legal authorities it needed to do the job? • What should have been learned from the 1998 bombings, the Millennium plot, and the USS Cole? Did we respond adequately to the threat over time? • What was the QA role in debates over Predator? • How did the intel community perform during the 2001 "summer of threat"? • Why didn't we know about the 9-11 plot? What did we know about the use of airplanes as weapons? What warnings did policymakers get? 12:30-2:00 Break 2:00- 5:30 Richard A. Clarke, former national coordinator for counterterrorism Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • • •

• • • • • •

How did the NSC see the AQ threat? Did other policymakers grasp the gravity of the UBL threat? What efforts did the National Coordinator undertake to counter the AQ threat (diplomacy, disruptions, law enforcement, financial controls, 1C actions, public diplomacy, preparedness, etc?) How well did the USG perform? Did the interagency process work5 Was there a strategy? What were its goals? Could it have worked? How well did the U.S. intelligence community perform? Did it work effectively with policymakers? How well did U.S. kw enforcement perform? Did it work effectively with policymakers? How well did DOD perform? Did the military work effectively with policymakers? Did the USG anticipate attacks on US. soil? Did the USG anticipate mass-casualty attacks?

Day Two: Diplomacy. Force, and Strategy 9:00-11:00

Madeleine Albright, former secretary of state Thomas Pickering, former undersecretary of state for policy

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • Was terrorism a high enough priority for the State Department during your tenure? • What diplomatic efforts were taken to counter the threat of UBL/AQ? • Could diplomacy ever have split the Taliban off from UBL? Did we spend time pursuing futile options? • Did U.S. diplomacy toward Pakistan appropriately address the UBL issue? • Did U.S. diplomacy toward Saudi Arabia appropriately address the UBL issue? • How did State's leaders feel about the use of force after the August 1998 embassy bombings and the 2000 attack on the Cole? • Were UN. sanctions useful tools for changing Taliban behavior? • Was the office of the S/CT powerful enough within the State Department? • Are our embassies and consulates safe enough? • Did U.S. diplomacy toward Sudan appropriately address the terrorism issue? • Were we too cautious about reaching out to the Northern Alliance?

11:30-1:30

William Cohen, former secretary of defense Gen. Hugh Shelton (ret), former chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • Did the US. military think terrorism was its problem? • Did the military focus too much on force protection and too little on carrying the fight to AQ? • Did DOD and JCS produce the military options they were asked to? • Were the August 1998 strikes effective? • Did DOD/JCS think follow-on strikes were in order? • Did DOD offer enough options for attempts to target UBL after 1998, including submarines? • Did DOD/JCS want to strike AQ targets after the Cole attack? • Was the US. military's CT budget spent effectively? • Did DOD and QA cooperate effectively on UBL? • Did DOD work effectively with the NSC? • What role did DOD play in protecting American soil? Did DOD plan and prepare adequately for terrorist attacks in America? Was NORAD ready for the full range of threats?

1:30-3:00

Break

3:00-5:30 Samuel Berger, former national security adviser Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • What was the Clinton administration's strategy for countering the threat posed by AQ? • How dangerous did the president think UBL was? How was that assessment communicated— to the public and to other policymakers? • Did the USG have enough resources for CT? • Did the USG devote enough high-level attention to CT? • "Was the U.S. response to the 1998 embassy bombings effective? • Was the U.S. response to the 1999 Millennium plot effective? Did the Ressam episode trigger enough attention to terrorist attacks on U.S. soil? • Why didn't the Clinton administration respond militarily to the Cole attack? • Did domestic politics— including the president's political troubles, the Florida recount, and the transition— affect U.S. responses to UBL? • Did foreign problems— including the Balkans and Iraq— affect U.S. responses to UBL? • Did the NSC think UBL had WMD capabilities? What steps were taken in this regardeither to get more clarity or to interdict mass-destruction arms? • Did the NSC give the QA the authority for effective steps to disrupt the UBL network5 • Did the NSC task the Pentagon for a more vigorous response? • Was the NSC preparing for major terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland? • Did you offer warnings about AQ to the incoming Bush team? How did they respond? • Was the U.S. national security structure designed to grapple with the AQ threat? • Was Saudi Arabia sufficiently cooperative with our efforts against AQ? • Was Pakistan sufficiently cooperative with our efforts against AQ? • Did the USG make enough use of the Predator? • Was the American public ready for more sweeping measures on terrorism? • Is Iraq helping or hurting the war on terrorism? • Are we winning the war on terrorism?

Day Three: Diplomacy. Force, and Strategy 9:00-11:00 Samuel Berger, former national security adviser (continued) Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD 11:30-1:30

Gen. Colin Powell, secretary of state

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • Was terrorism a high enough priority for the State Department during your tenure? • What diplomatic efforts were taken to counter the threat of UBL/AQ? • Could diplomacy ever have split the Taliban off from UBL? Did we spend time pursuing futile options and unnecessary policy reviews? • Did U.S. diplomacy toward Pakistan appropriately address the UBL issue? • Did U.S. diplomacy toward Saudi Arabia appropriately address the UBL issue? • How did State's leaders feel about the use of force to respond to the Cole? • Was the office of the S/CT powerful enough within the State Department? • Are our embassies and consulates safe enough? • Did U.S. diplomacy toward Sudan appropriately address the terrorism issue? • Were we too cautious about reaching out to the Northern Alliance? • How did US. diplomacy change from 9/11 to 9/20? • Is US. CT policy too focused on state sponsors rather than transnational threats? 1:30-3:00 3:00-5:30

Break Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense Gen. Richard Myers, chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • Did the U.S. military think terrorism was its problem? • Did DOD focus too much on force protection and too little on carrying the fight to AQ? • Did DOD and JCS have options and plans for Afghan operations? • Did we rely too much on CA and too little on overt force in the pre-9/11 Bush period? • Did DOD offer enough support for efforts to target UBL, including Predator? • Did DOD and QA coordinate well over UBL in general and Predator in particular? • Did DOD/JCS want to strike AQ targets after the Cole attack5 • Was the U.S. military's CT budget spent effectively? • Did DOD work effectively with the NSC? • What role did DOD pky in protecting American soil5 Did DOD plan and prepare adequately for terrorist attacks in America? Was NORAD ready for the full range of threats? What planning had been done for homeland defense?

Day Four: Strategy and the War on al-Oa'ida 9:00-1:00 Condoleezza Rice, national security adviser Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • What advice did you receive from the outgoing administration about UBL? • "What was the pre-9/11 Bush administration's strategy for countering the threat posed by AQ? Why did the administration start developing an NSPD on the issue? • How dangerous did the president think UBL was? How was that assessment communicated— to the public and to other policymakers? • How high a priority was UBL for the pre-9/11 Bush administration? • Did the USG have enough resources for CT? Did TNT think so? • Did the USG devote enough high-level attention to CT? • Who did you think attacked the Cole? When did you get a definitive intel judgment? • Why didn't the Bush administration respond militarily to the Cole attack5 • Did domestic politics— including the Florida recount and the transition— affect U.S. responses to UBL? • Did the USG expect a massive terrorist attack in the summer of 2001? How did it respond? Were die ICs warnings useful? • Were homeland defenses adequate to meet the warning levels of the summer of 2001? • Was the USG expecting terrorist attacks on U.S. soil? • Did the NSC think UBL had WMD capabilities before 9/11? What pre-9/11 steps were taken in this regard— either to get more clarity or to interdict mass-destruction arms? • Did the NSC give the QA the authority for effective steps to disrupt the UBL network5 • Did the NSC task the Pentagon for a more vigorous response? • Was the NSC preparing for major terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland? • Was the US. national security structure designed to grapple with the AQ threat? • Was Saudi Arabia sufficiently cooperative with our efforts against AQ? • Was Pakistan sufficiently cooperative with our efforts against AQ? • Did the USG make enough use of die Predator? Did die interagency process move efficiently? • Should die USG have given more assistance to the Northern Alliance pre-9/11? • Was the American public ready for more sweeping measures on terrorism before 9/11? • Is Iraq helping or hurting the war on terrorism? • Are we winning the war on terrorism?

1-00-2:30

Break

2:30-5:00 Richard A. Clarke, former national coordinator for counterterrorism Lead Commissioner Questioners: TBD Key Questions: • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

What went wrong? Did we get it? What still needs to be fixed? Over the long term, how do we destroy AQ and dry up its pools of support? What short-term and medium-term steps should we be taking? Do we have the right 1C for fighting AQ? Do we have the right military for fighting AQ? Do we have the right FBI for fighting AQ? Is DHS making America safer? How did the Clinton and Bush administrations see the AQ threat? What sort of attacks should we be preparing for? Was it possible to move more aggressively against AQ before the shock of 9/11? Is Iraq helping or hurting the war on terrorism? Are we winning the war on terrorism?

5:00-5:15 Gov. Thomas Kean, chair, 9/11 Commission Closing Statement 5:15-6:00 Press availability

'Mail:: INBOX: Team 3 Hearing Proposal

Page 1 of 1

30.92MB / 476.84MB (6.48%) Date: From: To: Cc: Subject: Par*(s):

To:

Fri, 18 Jul 2003 19:27:00 -0400 "" <[email protected]>^ "" #,"" <[email protected]>4f "" 4P1 Team 3 Hearing Proposal iH 2 Hearings proposal 1 .doc application/msword 22.87 KB ^| Philip Chris

Dan Steve From:

Mike Hurley and Team 3

Attached please find Team 3's Hearing proposal, per Philip's request made during the July 16 team leaders' meeting.

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?Horde=6e3f79a9f02ffce501efa47a9...

7/18/03

UNCLASSIFIED—COMMISSION SENSITIVE

FROM: TO: CC: RE:

Michael Hurley Philip Zelikow, Chris Kojm, Dan Marcus, Steve Dunne Alexis Albion, Scott Allan, Warren Bass, Dan Byman, Bonnie Jenkins Team 3 hearings

The Commission has always held that we need to look back to look forward. Our proposed design for hearings attempts to do both. Following Philip's guidance that ambition is good, we've come up with a dream list. (Philip, we took you literally when you asked for "our druthers.") While we feel strongly about all the topics suggested below, we recognize that this draft will only be a starting point for your deliberations with the Commissioners. First, the look back. We suggest beginning with a day on the Clinton administration's CT policy and a similar day on the Bush administration. We'd hope to focus on high-level policymakers—mostly Principals—on the old-fashioned theory about where bucks ought to stop. Due to the unusual prominence of these witnesses, we imagine that most of them would sit as lone witnesses, rather than on the now more familiar panel format. Later, on a third and fourth day of hearings—either immediately after these two days or at a later point in our inquiry—we'd hope to look forward and address the all-important question of whether we have our CT policy right today. We'd suggest a mixed approach here, incorporating both senior policymakers, former officials, key foreign players, and a select few top experts with unique knowledge of the challenges we face. Of course, since Team 3 deals with grand strategy, our witnesses here may touch on a series of questions of interest to other teams. We're also keenly aware of the question of timing. We'd propose going later in the batting order—perhaps in February or March—in order to ensure that the Commissioners can question these highly important witnesses with as much of our investigative work behind them as possible. Moreover, the final panel—about where we stand in the fight against al-Qa'ida today—also lends itself well to a wrap-up to the Commission's sequence of public hearings. A four-day hearing bloc also clearly poses logistical problems (and may require Team 3 to ask for some help from our colleagues on other teams lest our investigatory work bog down too much), but we'd argue that the Commission should end its hearings with a bang, not a whimper. Some of our proposed witnesses pose strategic questions for the Commission; for instance, we've included National Security Adviser Rice, although we understand that the administration may invoke separation-of-powers concerns to keep her away. Nonetheless, we feel that she would be a surpassingly important witness and hope that the very prominence of the forum—and the fear of the loss of the chance to recount events from

UNCLASSIFIED—COMMISSION SENSITIVE

their own perspective—may tempt the White House to take a more flexible view of their traditional concerns here. We've included Richard Clarke on both of the look-back days since he played such a critical role in both administrations, including on 9/11 itself. For space considerations, we've moved DCI Tenet to the third day, where we hope he'd talk both about the CIA's pre-9/11 performance and its role today. We're also mindful of President Karzai's recent disgruntlement with his treatment before Congress and would hope to provide him with a respectful forum that addresses his earlier concerns. Finally, we expect that the question of Saudi testimony to be a touchy one—but feel strongly that a frank discussion of U.S.-Saudi relations is essential here. We hope this gets the ball rolling and look forward to talking more with you about the hearings.

UNCLASSIFIED—COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Proposed Schedule Part I: Looking Back

Day One—Counterterrorism Policy during the Clinton Administration

9-11 a.m. Richard Clarke, NSC coordinator for counterterrorism 11 a.m.-l p.m. Samuel Berger, former assistant to the president for national security affairs

2-4 p.m. William S. Cohen, former secretary of defense Gen. Hugh Shelton, former chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff 4-6 p.m. Madeleine Albright, former secretary of state

Day Two—Counterterrorism Policy during the Bush Administration

9-11 a.m. Richard Clarke, NSC coordinator for counterterrorism 11 a.m.-l p.m. Condoleezza Rice, assistant to the president for national security affairs

2-4 p.m. Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense Gen. Richard Myers, chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff 4-6 p.m. Gen. Colin Powell, secretary of state

UNCLASSIFIED—COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Part II: Looking Forward Day Three—Counterterrorism Policy after 9/11

9-11 a.m. George Tenet, director of central intelligence 11 a.m.-l p.m. Panel: Are We Winning the War on Terrorism? Gen. John Abizaid, CINCentcom Daniel Benjamin, CSIS Cofer Black, State Department counterterrorism coordinator Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times Paul Pillar, DIA

2-4 p.m. Panel: Challenges Unmet Bruce Hoffman (changes in terrorism today) Sam Nunn (nuclear terrorism) Stephen Push (aftermath of 9/11) Warren Rudman (homeland security) Michael Scheuer (al-Qa'ida today) Day Four—U.S. Foreign Relations after 9/11

9-11 a.m. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, ambassador, Saudi Arabia 11 a.m.-12 p.m. Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri, foreign minister, Pakistan

12-1 p.m. Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of state 2 p.m.-4 p.m. Hamid Karzai, president, Afghan Interim Administration Ali Jalali, minister of the interior, Afghan Interim Administration 4 p.m.-6 p.m. Panel: Draining the Swamp Fouad Ajami, The Johns Hopkins University F. Gregory Gause HI, University of Vermont (on Saudi Arabia) Fawaz Gerges, Sarah Lawrence College Andrew Kohut, Pew Research Center (on anti-Americanism) Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense

UNCLASSIFIED—COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Fareed Zakaria, editor, Newsweek International (on Arab politics)