T3 B6 Hearing Presentations Fdr- Power Point Print- Overview- 3-22-04 Public Hearing- Us Counter Terrorism Policy 056

Overview Public Hearing • U.S. Cour

Team 3 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Briefing Intent • Review hearing purpose & agenda • Explain the staff investigation - Clarify "big questions" - Highlight staff findings - Explain the lines of inquiry - Clarify "redlines"

• Clarify desired outcomes • Answer your questions COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Hearing Overview Purpose: Investigate the formulation and conduct of U.S. counterterrorism policy, with particular emphasis on the 5 _ _« .*?__ «_• • mrmmtfii ""* ' ****** • 1—— — •_:___ .•._ sriod from the August 7,1998 embassy bombings to September 11, 2001 —

Issue: What options did senior officials consider and what choices did they make before September 11, 2001? Importance: Understand how senior officials from the past two administrations handled the most pressing national security threat to our country

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Topics & Witnesses DIPLOMACY • Madeleine Albright • Colin Powell THE MILITARY • William Cohen • Donald Rumsfeld CLANDESTINE & COVERT ACTION

• George Tenet NATIONAL POLICY COORDINATION • Samuel Berger • Richard Clarke • Richard Armitage (WH Witness) COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Diplomacy: The Big Questions What was the State Department's diplomatic strategy for ending the Afghan safe haven for al Qaeda before 9/11? When did key foreign policy decisions arise such as Imposing sanctions on the Taliban? What factors influenced senior officials in making them? What challenges had to be overcome in leveraging influential states such as Pakistan, the UAE, Sauc Arabia, and Sudan in fighting al Qaeda terrorists? What diplomatic efforts were undertaken before 9/11? What lessons can we ascertain about the limits of diplomacy as an instrument of U.S. counterterrorism policy? COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Diplomacy: Staff Findings U.S. officials employed a range of measures to pressure the Taliban to cease harboring Bin Ladin. However, the Taliban held firm both before or after 9/11. U.S. officials pressed Pakistan to demand the Taliban hand over bin Ladin, or failing that, to cut off its support to the Taliban. However, Pakistan did not alter its ties with the Taliban until after 9/11. The United States pressed the UAE to break ties with the Taliban and enforce Security Council sanctions. However, these efforts achieved little before 9/11. Saudi Arabia worked closely with us to end the Afghan safe haven for Bin Ladin. However, before 9/11 we could not get adequate cooperation on sharing intelligence and disrupting finances of the al Qaeda organization. COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Diplomacy: Lines of Inquiry & "Red Lines" Lines of Inquiry • Strategy; How did the diplomatic strategy against al Qaeda terrorists change after the embassy bombings of August 7, 1998? • Key Decisions: What factors influenced State Department thinking on key foreign policy decjsions, such as containing the influence of the Taliban in the region? • Taliban: How did we pressure the Taliban to hand over Bin Ladin? • Pakistan: What efforts were taken to enlist Pakistan's support for pressuring the Taliban to expel bin Ladin, or cutting its ties? Saudi Arabia; How well did Saudi Arabia cooperate with us in jring th "' . . . . .off support. for - al . Qaeda? - . _ pressuring the ~ Taliban or cutting mlts of Diplomacy: At what point was it clear that diplomacy H alone would not end the Afghan safe haven for Bin Ladin? • Hindsight; What forms of diplomatic pressure the United States did not use before 9/11 that, in hindsight, should have?

Red Lines . •

Criticism of allies Private sensitive discussions of friendly foreign officials COMMISSION SENSITIVE

The Military: The Big Questions What were the Pentagon's military strategies and plans for defending the nation against the al Qaeda threat before 9/11? When did key decisions arise? What factors influenced senior officials regarding the use of U.S. military force against the al Qaeda threat in Afghanistan? What military operations were conducted (or set aside) to defend the nation against the growing threat of al Qaeda before 9/11? What lessons can we ascertain about the U.S. military as an instrument of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

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The Military: Staff Findings From August 1998 until after 9/11, the U.S. mijitary did not conduct operations against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The Pentagon prepared options to use force in Afghanistan, however operational and policy considerations led to reliance on the "default option of cruise missile strikes. Military officials were reluctant to conduct Special Operations in Afghanistan due to its difficult operational conditions. Senior officials set aside cruise missile strikes against bin Ladin on three occasions due to lack of suitable intelligence, unacceptable collateral damage, and other unwelcome consequences for U.S. interests in the region. The consensus of U.S. officials is that a large-scale military invasion of Afghanistan did not have the support of either the Congress or the American people before 9/11. After the attack on the USSCole, neither administration ordered a military response against al Qaeda. COMMISSION SENSITIVE

The Military: Lines of Inquiry & "Red Lines

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Lines of Inquiry • Strategy: What was the Pentagon's military strategy to defeat the al Qaeda terrorist threat before 9/11? • Kev Decisions: What factors influenced senior officials on using force, including criticism of the cruise missile attacks of August 20,1998? Why was there no response following the USS Cole? • Military Planning: What was the state of military planning to conduct military operations in Afghanistan before 9/11 to support the administration's policy to destroy al Qaeda? • Actionable Intelligence: Why was this an recurring problem? What actions did the military take to get the intelligence needed for conducting a stand-off attack against bin Ladin? • Reluctance: Why was the Pentagon reluctant to use Special Forces to destroy al Qaeda in Afghanistan? • Support to Diplomacy: What efforts did the military take to strengthen the credibility of the threat against the Taliban?

Red Lines • •

Specific capabilities and deployments of military forces Current intelligence and jnlJJiii^gHfft^tions against al Qaeda

Clandestine & Covert Action: The Big Questions How did the CIA implement U.S. counterterrorism policy through the conduct of clandestine and covert action programs against Bin Ladin in Afghanistan before 9/11? What clandestine and covert action strategies and plans to attack Bin Ladin and his lieutenants did the CIA develop before 9/11? Were they implemented, and if so to what effect? Did the CIA have the authorities to effectively attack Bin Ladin and al Qaeda? Did the CIA have the capabilities to effectively attack Bin Ladin and al Qaeda? What lessons can we draw about the DCI's role as a policy advisor and the effectiveness of covert action as an instrument of U.S. counterterrorism

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Clandestine & Covert Action: Staff Findings The CIA attacked al Qaeda globally and focused on pursuing Bin Ladin specifically as early as 1996. The CIA did more than any other agency to bring the fight to al Qaeda before 9/11. Although the CIA developed successive covert action programs against Bin Ladin in Afghanistan using various proxy groups, these efforts were not fruitful. Problems hindering effective covert action included unreliable proxies, risks to innocents, and confusion about the authorities to take extreme action. An inability to provide 'actionable intelligence' hindered policymakers' efforts to use the U.S. military effectively in Afghanistan. The recon Predator offered a new capability to help solve the actionable intelligence problem. However, after initial flight in the fall of 2000, the recon Predator did not fly in Afghanistan until after 9/11. The armed Predator was not technically ready for operations in Afghanistan until a few weeks after 9/11. Covert action had operational limitations and was not a "silver bullet". It could not defeat al Qaeda alone. COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Clandestine & Covert Action: Lines of Inquiry & "Red Lines" Lines of Inquiry • Strategy; How did CIA's covert action strategy for attacking Bin Ladin and al Qaeda in Afghanistan evolve before 9/11? • Authorities: Did CIA have the authorities it needed & wanted in order to go after Bin Ladin and al Qaeda in Afghanistan? • Capabilities: What were the practical limitations of relying on proxies in Afghanistan, and how were these conveyed higher? • Missed Opportunities: Were there missed opportunities to get Bin Ladin? When and why? • The Predator: Why did CIA officials resist resuming recon Predator flights before 9/11?

Red Lines • • • •

Open discussion of capture vs. kill authorities Operational details of covert action programs Problems in current bilateral relations Revealing sources and methods COMMISSION SENSITIVE

National Policy Coordination: The Big Questions •

How did senior officials view the gravity of the threat posed by al Qaeda to the United States before 9/11?

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What strategies were implemented by senior officials for combating the threat of al Qaeda terrorism? How were the instruments of power focused to achieve policy aims?

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What were the key policy decisions before 9/11? What factors influenced senior officials in making them?

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What interagency planning and coordinating mechanisms were relied upon By senior officials to guide agency efforts?

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How well postured and resourced were key departments and agencies in order to combat the al Qaeda threat?

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What lessons can we ascertain for the future?

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National Policy Coordination: Staff Findings The national coordinator for counterterrorism understood the gravity of the al Qaeda threat to the U.S. and spurred several initiatives to combat terrorism in the government. Plan Delenda, prepared by the national coordinator, was a national strategy to eliminate the Bin Ladin threat. Although never formally adopted, it guided the national coordinator's efforts to destroy al Qaeda before 9/11. The Clinton administration relied on a "Small Group" of cabinet principals to formulate national policy. The Millennium celebration marked a dramatic increase in threat warnings in December 1999 and exceptional national policy coordination and information-sharing. Neither administration responded to the Cole attack. The Bush administration relied on the Deputies Committee to formulate national policy on counterterrorism. Bush administration principals first met on September 4, 2001 to approve a three-year strategy to destroy al Qaeda. Counterterrorism funding grew in the years before 9/11 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

National Policy Coordination: Lines of Inquiry & "Red Lines" Lines of Inquiry • Threat Assessment: When did senior officials grasp the gravity of the al Qaeda threat to the United States? • Strategy: How did Plan Delenda shape national counterterrorism strategy of both administrations? • Key Decisions: What were the factors that influenced senior officials in making key decisions on fighting al Qaeda including covert action, the use of military force, the Predator, etc? • National Coordinator: What factors were important to creating an effective role for combating terrorism? • Interaaency Mechanisms: How was did each administration organize interagency coordinating mechanisms to integrated agency efforts. • Agency Capabilities: What are the limitations in the capabilities of USG agencies in fighting terrorism? Red Lines • Private advice to the President • Specific discussions of covert action COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Desired Outcomes The American public is better informed about how senior officials of both administrations dealt with this emerging threat to our national security Commissioners are able to: • Understand how U.S. counterterrorism policy was formed and implemented before September 11 • Formulate recommendations for U.S. counterterrorism policy and strategy to make America safer and more secure COMMISSION SENSITIVE