T3 B4 Hurley Reading Material 1 Of 4 Fdr- 1st Pgs Of All Reading Material In Folder (for Reference- Fair Use) 991

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To:

[email protected] Wednesday, November 19, 2003 11:12 AM Team 3

Subject:

Cohen 1999 op-ed

This seems to be the SecDef Cohen piece that Rudman mentions. Copyright 1999 The Washington Post The Washington Post July 26, 1999, Monday, Final Edition SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. A19 LENGTH: 1217 words HEADLINE: Preparing for a Grave New World BYLINE: William S. Cohen BODY: In recent months, the eyes of the world have rightly focused on the threat to American interest and values in the Balkans. At the same time, we cannot afford a national case of farsightedness that precludes us from focusing on threats closer to home, such as the potential danger of a chemical or biological attack on U.S. soil. The United States now faces something of a superpower paradox. Our supremacy in the conventional arena is prompting adversaries to seek unconventional, asymmetric means to strike our Achilles' heel. At least 25 countries, including Iraq and North Korea, now have -- or are in the process of acquiring and developing -- weapons of mass destruction. Of particular concern is the possible persistence in some foreign military arsenals of smallpox, the horrific infectious virus that decimated entire nations down the ages and against which the global population is currently defenseless. Also looming is the chance that these terror weapons will find their way into the hands of individuals and independent groups -- fanatical terrorists and religious zealots beyond our borders, brooding loners and self-proclaimed apocalyptic prophets at home. This is not hyperbole. It is reality. Indeed, past may be prologue. In 1995 the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo used sarin gas in its attack on the Tokyo subway and also planned to unleash anthrax against U.S. forces in Japan. Those behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing were also gathering the ingredients for a chemical weapon that could have killed thousands. In the past year, dozens of threats to use chemical or biological weapons in the United States have turned out to be hoaxes. Someday, one will be real. What would that day look like? A biological agent would sink into the respiratory and nervous systems of the afflicted. The speed and scope of modern air travel could carry this highly contagious virus across hemispheres in hours. Indeed, the invisible contagion would be neither geographically nor numerically limited, infecting unsuspecting thousands -- with many, in turn, communicating the virus to whomever they touch. 1

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To:

[email protected] Wednesday, Novem ber 19, 2003 11:14 AM Team 3

Subject:

More on Cohen (esp. for Bonnie)

And speaking of Cohen, here's an Outlook piece from him three days after the 1998 reprisals on Afghanistan and Sudan after the embassy bombings. The rhetoric's pretty tough. The policy? Bonnie, you tell me. Might be worth stealing a sound bite or two. Warren

Copyright 1998 The Washington Post The Washington Post

August 23, 1998, Sunday, Final Edition SECTION: OUTLOOK; Pg. C01 LENGTH: 761 words HEADLINE: ABOUT LAST WEEK . . . The Policy: We AreReady to Act Again BYLINE: William S. Cohen BODY: The U.S. strike against terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan should not be seen simply as a response to the Aug. 7 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, but as the longterm, fundamental way in which the United States intends to combat the forces of terror. Just as those advocating terror have been relentless in their efforts, so shall we be relentless in ours. We have had compelling evidence that Osama bin Laden and his associates are continuing to plan terrorist acts against American facilities and American citizens around the world. In response to that evidence, we have been enhancing security at diplomatic posts and military facilities as required. But terrorists should know that we will not simply play passive defense. America will defend itself and its interests through active measures such as the strikes last Thursday. As always, we will work with our friends around the world where we can, but we are also ready to act unilaterally when circumstances require. For example, the bin Laden network of terror and murder is intimately connected with the Khost training facility in Afghanistan against which we conducted operations. Sometimes referred to as "Terrorist University," this is the largest Sunni terrorist training facility in the world. At these facilities, terrorists from around the world receive paramilitary training that ranges from target practice to improvising explosive devices to training on tanks and other armored vehicles. In recent months, there has been an expansion of these facilities, including construction of new buildings, which indicates that an increase in training activity was planned. These facts helped shape our decision to strike at these facilities.

Martha Crenshaw is the Colin and Nancy Campbell Professor of Global Issues and [)emocra.ic Bought in the Department ol Government. Wesleyan University.

Hie United States and Coercive Diplomacy edited by Robert J. Ait and Patrick M. Cronin

Coercive Diplomacy and the Response to Terrorism MARTHA CHENS HAW

I

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE PRESS Washington, D.C.

KHKOIiISM ||\ I'|«>\KI) TO UK A IKKFICI ill TKST lor coercive

diplomacy. ILS. counlcrlerrorism policy cannot routinely meet the basic requirements ol the strategy. When coercive; diplomacy is applied, the conditions that would make it successful are rarely met. \\hile the United States has sometimes been effective in changing the policies of slates (hat instigate or assist terrorism, it has not found an appropriate mix of threat and reward that could constrain (he behavior of nonstate adversaries. This chapter focuses on (he U.S. response to terrorism from 1993 to (he "war on terrorism" launched in 2001. ft first outlines the general contour? of the threat as it developed alter (he Cold War. 'flu's overview is followed by analysis of (he general concept of coercive diplomacy in relation to terrorist strategies. The propositions thus generated are then tested against the instances of post-Cold' War counlerterrorism policy that most closely lit (lie definition of the concept of coercive diplomacy. 'Iliesc cases, when military force was used or (hrealened. provide the best basis for evaluating (he success or failure of (lie; slrategy. They include the retaliatory strike against Iraq in 1993, threats against Iran following (he bombing of U.S. military facilities in Saudi Arabia in 1996, cruise missile attacks against Sudan and Afghanistan in !99Ji. and efforts to compel (ho Taliban to yield Osama

United States General Accounting Office

f^ AO

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

COMBATING TERRORISM April 6, 2000

Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director National Security Preparedness Issues National Security and International Affairs Division

GAP

Accountability * Integrity * Reliability

GAO/TNSIAD 00-145

December 20, 2002 10:23 a.m. EST PAGE ONE December 20, 2002 Friend or Foe: The Story Of a Traitor to al Qaeda Divided Allegiances in Yemen Undo The Betrayer, Who Himself Is Betrayed By ANDREW HIGGINS and ALAN CULLISON Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL SANAA, Yemen — Fed up after two decades of Islamist plotting, the veteran Egyptian militant decided to jilt the jihad. In early 1998, he walked into the heavily guarded offices of Yemen's intelligence agency, the Political Security Organization, with a startling proposal: He could help unravel Osama bin Laden's network. He disclosed the hiding places in Yemen of foreign terrorists, including one who would shortly become Mr. bin Laden's chief lieutenant. He described the extremists' weaponry, security and violent plans for the future. He revealed the locations of al Qaeda encampments in and around Marib, a desert region scattered with ruins of the biblical kingdom of Sheba. But instead of cracking down on the militants, members of Yemen's security service tipped them off. Mr. bin Laden's acolytes grabbed their turncoat, grilled him about his treachery and made plans to send him to Afghanistan to be killed. What should have been a triumph in a shadowy struggle against terrorism became an intelligence coup for the terrorists. Safe in Yemen, they went on to launch a string of attacks there, from the bombing of the USS Cole to an assault on a French oil tanker, the Limburg, this fall. On Nov. 3, more than four years after the warning about camps in Marib, the desert region was targeted for a lethal assault - not by the Yemenis but by the Central Intelligence Agency. Monitoring satellite-telephone chit-chat, the CIA tracked two Toyotas carrying suspected al Qaeda members across the desert. An unmanned U.S. spy plane then fired a Hellfire missile that incinerated six people, including Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a Yemeni suspected of helping organize the Cole attack. The missile strike blew a hole in a diplomatic facade, as well. After Sept. 11, President Bush gave the world a simple choice: "Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists." Yemen — Mr. bin Laden's ancestral homeland - and other hotbeds of Islamist sentiment such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia declared themselves "with us." Their leaders pledged unequivocal support for the struggle against al Qaeda. But within these nations' bureaucracies, not to mention their citizenries, the lines of loyalty are fuzzy. The U.S.-Yemen relationship is unusually delicate today, after the U.S. asked Spain's

U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland

wrong. The idea underlying all of our scenarios was that martial law would be a gradual escalation." (Which was certainly not what Kuklinski had been describing.) According to the press accounts in the immediate aftermath of the crackdown, virtually all other U.S. officials willing to comment on the issue said that the Reagan administration had been poised to confront a Soviet invasion, but had not developed plans on how to deal with martial law.8

l.'hat Was Hissing? From what is now known of the information available to the CIA at the time, it is clear that the failure was not in the intelligence "gathering," but rather in the use—or nonuse—of the information that had been "gathered." This is illustrated in the following chronological summary of information that had been obtained by CIA analysts during the two months preceding Kuklinski's escape from Poland, and was thus available in the aggregate over a month before martial law was imposed. Because most of what Kuklinski reported, as well as evidence that may have been obtained from other sensitive human or technical sources, has not to date been declassified, the information in this chronology represents the minimum that was known at that time. • 4 September: In a speech aired in the Polish media, Kania for the first time personally declared the regime's willingness to impose a "state of emergency" (universally understood to mean some form of martial law) "to preserve the socialist system in Poland." This statement was given the day before the scheduled opening of Solidarity's first national congress. Earlier that same day the Soviets announced major exercises of their army and naval forces around the borders of Poland. • 5-10 September: Solidarity held the first session of its national congress, and took steps that even some sympathetic Western observers described as going too far. The union challenged party dominance in management of the economy and in political control of the parliament, and—most dramatically—publicly urged workers of the other Soviet bloc countries (including the USSR) to follow Solidarity's example in forming independent unions. 8. For the "senior State Department official," see "U.S. Calls for Release of Walesa," WP, 19 December 1981, Ai. The comments from the former member of the interagency working group is in Rosenberg, Haunted Land, 206.

Caught Off Guard

217

• 9 September: At the same time Solidarity was putting forward this program, the Chief of the Polish General Staff informed a small group of military officers who were preparing the martial law plans that the regime was moving toward implementing the plans. According to a source with direct access to this group, the Chief of Staff said the proclamations that would be distributed to the public when martial law was declared were being printed in the Soviet Union. He assured the officers that Moscow would provide military assistance if it were needed. • 13 September: The Polish National Defense Committee, the body of military and political authorities responsible for major decisions on strategic military affairs, held a special meeting to address the implementation of martial law. Jaruzelski, in his dual capacities of head of the government (prime minister) and head of the military (minister of defense), serves as both chairman and vice chairman of this committee. The committee also includes the minister of the interior (a military officer appointed by Jaruzelski) and other high level military and civilian officials. A CIA source was told by one of the officers who attended the meeting that nearly all participants favored carrying out martial law. Although the party first secretary is not a regular member of this committee, Kania attended the meeting, the first time he has done so. He reportedly was surprised by the tenor of the meeting. He did not question that a military crackdown would ultimately be required, according to what the source was told. He did argue, however, for first pursuing additional political means to constrain Solidarity's growing challenge, and said that after these were demonstrated to be unsuccessful, forceful repression could then be adopted. After the meeting, working groups were formed to refine the martial law implementation measures. The basic plan is for martial law to begin at midnight on a night before a day when industrial plants will be closed (either Saturday or a Friday before a work-free Saturday). Roughly six hundred union officials and prominent dissidents are to be arrested in Warsaw alone; the arrests are to be carried out by the internal security forces while army units are deployed to seal off major cities. • 15 September: The party Politburo met to discuss the martial law plan submitted by the military authorities. According to various accounts, including some reported in the press, the meeting continued until

The First Home-Front Battle in the War on Terror ~ Ivo H. Daalder

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The First Home-Front Battle in the War on Terror The New York Times, October 16, 2003 Ivo H. Daalder, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies One of the many nightmares that followed the Sept. 11 attacks was the thought that more terrorists might be hiding in the United States, ready to strike at a moment's notice. The possibilities were endless—and frightening. Millions pass through America's open doors every day, many disappearing without much of a trace. After the attacks the F.B.I, discovered that no fewer than 70,000 Saudi men, their ages ranging from 18 to 35, had entered the United States between December 2000 and August 2001. None were likely to pose a threat, but how could you really know? To reduce the chance of another attack, thousands of foreigners were detained on minor immigration violations. Many were kept incommunicado until they were deported. The president ordered the Pentagon to set up military tribunals as a swift means to bring terrorists to justice. The F.B.I.'s mission changed from catching those who had committed crimes to preventing those who might attack from doing so. Congress passed the USA Patriot Act, giving the federal government sweeping new powers, not least by breaking down the wall between intelligence information gathered overseas and law enforcement here at home. Armed with these new powers, the federal authorities scoured the land in search of terrorist sleeper cells. The first seeming success came a year after the twin towers were brought down, when the Justice Department announced that it had "identified, investigated and disrupted a Qaeda-trained terrorist cell on American soil." Six Americans of Yemeni descent were arrested in Lackawanna, N.Y., a small town just south of Buffalo. They were charged with training with a terrorist organization. President Bush hailed the arrest months later as proof that America was winning the war on terror. "We have broken Al Qaeda cells in Hamburg, Milan, Madrid, London, Paris, as well as Buffalo, N.Y.," he told the nation last January in his State of the Union address. The story of the Lackawanna Six, as the young men became known, is the subject of tonight's edition of "Frontline" on PBS. Based on joint reporting with The New York Times (which on Sunday published a 10,000word article on the case by Matthew Purdy and Lowell Bergman), "Frontline" takes us into the complexities of the fight against terror at home. Through interviews with top government officials, the F.B.I, agents who worked on the case and with one of the men charged, the report recounts how the Muslim Americans fell prey to a Qaeda recruiter in Lackawanna, set off for training in terrorist camps in Afghanistan, met with Osama bin Laden when he hailed martyrdom missions, and then returned home in the summer of 2001, apparently to resume their normal lives. The matter-of-fact exposition of how Al Qaeda recruits and trains is sobering. But the "Frontline" report is more than a chilling tale. It is above all a careful account of the quandary that confronts the United States as it seeks to prevent another 9/11: how to thwart an attack without curtailing the freedoms all Americans now take for granted. The Lackawanna six are Americans. They were born here and went to local schools, and some were married with children. In the months just after the F.B.I, received an anonymous letter in May 2001, saying that the men had gone to Afghanistan to train at Qaeda camps, the bureau failed to substantiate the charges. When asked, the men said they had gone to Pakistan for religious training and denied any connection with Al Qaeda. Their story did not change after the Sept. 11 attacks, and without more evidence, there was nothing the F.B.I, could do. "Inside the borders of the United States, there is the rule of law," Peter Ahearn, the special agent in charge of the

http://www.brookings.edu/printme.wbs?page=/pagedefs/5192f82424e3ff3d3d77309aOal4... 10/21/2003

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Mike Hurley From:

Warren Bass

Sent:

Wednesday, December 17, 2003 1:12 PM

To:

Team 3

Subject: FW: I'm sure you've seen this, but just in case you haven't...

FYI. —Original Message— From: Mike Jacobson Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2003 1:03 PM To: Warren Bass Cc: Scott Allan Subject: I'm sure you've seen this, but just in case you haven't...

November 11, 1998 Taliban Cautions U.S. Regarding bin Ladin Indictment The Afghan Taliban militia has issued a statement to the effect that the United States could endanger its citizens by attempting to prosecute Osama bin Laden. The U.S. Supreme Court has indicted bin Ladin and his top military commander, Mohammed Atef on 224 counts of conspiracy to commit murder on the background of the August bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The Indictment covers over a decade of terrorist activity Also named in the indictment were four of bin Ladin's operatives--Wadih El Hage, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Mohamed Sadik Odeh and Mohamed Rasheed Daoud Al-'Owhali. In addition to the embassy bombings, the indictment accuses bin Ladin of a long list of terrorist activities. Among these are: • The October 1993 attack in Mogadishu, Somalia, that killed 18 U.S. soldiers, • Cooperation and joint activities with terrorist groups such as AI-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group), Hizballah, and the Egyptian al-Jihad. • Assistance to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in weapons development. • Cooperation with representatives of the government of Iran in planning operations against the United States. • Planning and/or executing a wide range of terrorist attacks against American citizens and the citizens of other nations, • Attempting to obtain the components of chemical and nuclear weapons.

The Taliban, in an official statement read over the its official radio, warned that the U.S. Supreme Court's indictment could set off a violent popular response: "all that the Americans will gain is a storm of hatred against them—in this region, and in the whole Muslim world. It will cost them hundreds of millions of dollars and hundreds of years to find any friends here." Five million dollar reward may find no takers U.S. officials have offered a $5 million reward for information leading to capture of either Osama bin Ladin or Mohammed Atef. Some have questioned the effectiveness of offering a monetary reward for someone who is regarded as a hero by just about anyone likely to have any concrete knowledge of his doings. In any case, extricating bin Laden from his fortress in the remote Afghan mountains would be no easy task. The terrain, the close-knit structure of his organization, and the esteem in which he is held by his compatriots, all make a covert mission to capture him extremely risky and unlikely to

12/18/2003

Op-Ed Contributor: Saddam Is Ours. Does Al Qaeda Care?

y t i m e s COm

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srowtweo

December 17,2003 OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

Saddam Is Ours. Does Al Qaeda Care? By BRUCE HOFFMAN

W

ASHINGTON — While President Bush was careful to remind Americans that even with Saddam Hussein behind bars, "we still face terrorists," the White House and Pentagon have characterized the arrest as a major victory in the war on terrorism. But is Iraq really the central battleground in that struggle, or is it diverting our attention while Al Qaeda and its confederates plan for new strikes elsewhere? There's strong evidence that Osama bin Laden is using Iraq the way a magician uses smoke and mirrors. News reports that Al Qaeda plans to redirect half the $3 million a month it now spends on operations in Afghanistan toward the insurgency in Iraq lent credence to the view that it is turning Iraq into center stage for the fight against the "Great Satan." That might actually be good news: Iraq could become what American military commanders have described as a terrorist "flytrap." But there's a better chance that Osama bin Laden is the one setting a trap. He and his fellow jihadists didn't drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan by taking the fight to an organized enemy on a battlefield of its choosing. In fact, the idea that Al Qaeda wanted to make Iraq the central battlefield of jihad was first suggested by Al Qaeda itself. Last February, before the coalition invasion of Iraq, the group's information department produced a series of articles titled "In the Shadow of the Lances" that gave practical advice to Iraqis and foreign jihadists on how guerrilla warfare could be used against the American and British troops. The calls to arms by Al Qaeda only intensified after the fall of Baghdad, when its intermittent Web site, Al Neda, similarly extolled the virtues of guerrilla warfare. In urging Iraqis to fight on, the site invoked prominent lessons of history — including America's defeat in Vietnam and the Soviet Army's in Afghanistan. But as useful as Iraq undoubtedly has been as a rallying cry for jihad, it has been a conspicuously less prominent rallying point, at least in terms of men and money. The Coalition Provisional Authority may be right that thousands of foreign fighters have converged on Iraq, but few who have been captured have demonstrable ties to Al Qaeda. Nor is there evidence of any direct command-and-control relationship between the Qaeda central leadership and the insurgents. If there are Qaeda warriors in Iraq, they are likely cannon fodder rather than battle-hardened mujahedeen. In the end, Qaeda's real interest in Iraq has been to exploit the occupation as a propaganda and recruitment tool for the global jihadist cause. While America has been tied down in Iraq, the international terrorist network has been busy elsewhere. The various attacks undertaken by Qaeda and its affiliates since the occupation began have taken place

http://www.nytimes.conV2003/12/17/opinion/17BRUC.html?pagewanted-print&position=

12/18/2003

/ashingtonpost.com: Chemical, Nuclear Arms Still 'Major Threat,1 Cheney Says

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washingtonpost.com

T*OVl«f ISiHG

Chemical, Nuclear Arms Still 'Major Threat,' Cheney Says Vice President Decries 'Cheap Shot1 Journalism By Mike Allen Washington Post Staff Writer Wednesday, December 17, 2003; Page A15

Vice President Cheney warned this week that "the major threat" facing the nation is the possibility that terrorists could detonate a biological or nuclear weapon in a U.S. city. Cheney told commentator Armstrong Williams that the war on terrorism is "going to go on for a long time" and that U.S. soil remains vulnerable to al Qaeda, the network behind the Sept. 11,2001, attacks. The vice president said one of his biggest worries is "the possibility of that group of terrorists acquiring deadlier weapons to use against us ~ a biological weapon of some kind, or even a nuclear weapon."

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"To contemplate the possibility of them unleashing that kind of capability ~ of that kind of weapon, if you will, in the midst of one of our cities -- that's a scary proposition," he said. "It's one of the most important problems we face today, because I think that is the major threat." Cheney also criticized what he considers a proliferation of "cheap shot journalism" about the administration. "People don't check the facts," he said.

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Cheney's language about threats was similar to previous admonitions. He made the remarks in response to a question about what scares him as vice president. He said part of his job is "contemplating sort of worst-case scenarios for attacks on the United States." Cheney said in the 35-minute interview, taped Monday and made available to The Washington Post yesterday, that he believes "we're winning now" in the war on terrorism. "We've seen, just recently, of course, the wrap-up of Saddam Hussein, one of the worst offenders in the 20th century," Cheney said. "We've wrapped up a large part of the al Qaeda organization, but there are still a lot of folks out there." He cited an estimate that training camps in Afghanistan in the late 1990s produced at least 20,000 terrorists. Cheney has often been the subject of critical news coverage, including his prewar allegations about the arsenal of unconventional weapons that Hussein might possess, his refusal to release records of his energy policy task force, and his connection to the Halliburton Co., which has been paid $5 billion on government contracts for rebuilding Iraq and has been accused by a Pentagon audit of overbilling the Army by $61 million for gasoline. Cheney called the free press "a vital part of society," but added: "On occasion, it drives me nuts." When Williams asked what drives him nuts, Cheney said, "When I see stories that are fundamentally

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A6345-2003Decl6?language=printer

12/18/2003

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Subject:

Warren Bass Tuesday, December 09, 2003 3:58 PM Team 3; Team 1; Team 1A 1998 fatwa

Thought you might be interested in this--a brief Bernard Lewis analysis of UBL's Feb. 1998 declaration, published in "Foreign Affairs." (If it's badly written, blame me; I was the editor on the piece.) Warren

Copyright 1998 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc, Foreign Affairs November, 1998 / December, 1998 HEADLINE: License to Kill; Usama bin Ladin's Declaration of Jihad BYLINE: Bernard Lewis; BERNARD LEWIS is Cleveland E. Dodge Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University. His books include The Arabs in History, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, and, most recently, The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years. BODY: On February 23, 1998, Al-Quds al-Arabi, an Arabic newspaper published in London, printed the full text of a "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders." According to the paper, the statement was faxed to them under the signatures of Usama bin Ladin, the Saudi financier blamed by the United States for masterminding the August bombings of its embassies in East Africa, and the leaders of militant Islamist groups in Egypt, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The statement -- a magnificent piece of eloquent, at times even poetic Arabic prose -- reveals a version of history that most Westerners will find unfamiliar. Bin Ladin's grievances are not quite what many would expect. The declaration begins with an exordium quoting the more militant passages in the Quran and the saying of the Prophet Muhammad, then continues: Since God laid down the Arabian peninsula, created its desert, and surrounded it with its seas, no calamity has ever befallen it like these Crusader hosts that have spread in it like locusts, crowing its soil, eating its fruits, and destroying its verdure; and this at a time when the nations contend against the Muslims like diners jostling around a bowl of food. The statement goes on to talk of the need to understand the situation and act to rectify it. The facts, it says, are known to everyone and fall under three main headings: First -the holiest humiliating a spearhead

For more than seven years the United States is occupying the lands of Islam in of its territories, Arabia, plundering its riches, overwhelming its rulers, its people, threatening its neighbors, and using its bases in the peninsula as to fight against the neighboring Islamic peoples.

Though some in the past have disputed the true nature of this occupation, the people of Arabia in their entirety have now recognized it. There is no better proof of this than the continuing American aggression against the Iraqi people, launched from Arabia despite its rulers, who all oppose the use of their

1

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Commentary Terrorism — A Policy Behind the Times By Bruce Hoffman

Office of External Communications (703)413-1100x5117 (310) 451-6913 David Egner

This opinion article appeared in the Los Angeles Times on November 12, 2000.

Director Warren Robak Deputy Director

WASHINGTON -- When Bill Clinton leaves office in January, he can claim credit for having done more than any other president to ensure that the United States is prepared to counter the threat of terrorism. Overall spending on preparedness and response measures nearly doubled, and terrorism was elevated to the top of the list of security threats confronting the United States. Yet, despite all this progress, last month's attack on the USS Cole tragically demonstrates that U.S. capabilities to defend itself against terrorism, and to preempt or respond to attacks, remain inchoate and unfocused. Constructing an effective counterterrorism policy is not a question of more attention, bigger budgets and increased staff. Rather, it requires greater focus, a better appreciation of the problem and understanding of the threat, and, in turn, the development of a clear, cohesive strategy.

Tania Coderre Amanda Gaylor Paige Parham

Congressional Inquiries Washington External Affairs Office Shirley Ruhe, Director (703)413-1100x5632 wea @ ra n d , o rg

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This is not simply an intellectual exercise. It is the very foundation of any effective counterterrorism policy. The failure to develop such a policy has undermined counterterrorism efforts of the U.S. and other democratic nations before, producing frustratingly ephemeral, if not sometimes negative effects. In some cases, it actually increased the threat of terrorism.

Homeland Security and Terrorism International Affairs and .Regions Labor Population and Demographics Public Safety and Criminal Justice Science and Technology Welfare and Poverty

For example, as satisfying or cathartic as retaliating against terrorism may be, it can have the opposite effect: provoking an escalation rather than curtailing terrorist attacks. The 1986 U.S. airstrike on Libya is

http://www.rand.Org/commentary/l 11200LAT.html

12/16/2003

9-11 COMMISSION DAILY PRESS CLIPS for December 18, 2003

***HEADLINES*** 1 . 9/11 Chair: Attack Was Preventable (CBS News) 2. Kean: 9/1 1 report to detail who and what failed U.S. (Star-Ledger) 3. Kean: We could have halted 9/1 1 (NY Post) 4. Could have foiled 9/1 1 , Kean says (NY Daily News) 5. 9/1 1 Commission Set to Blame Bush, Clinton Gets a Pass (NewsMax) 6. Kerrey says 9/1 1 panel's aim is 'trust' (The Villager) 7. Dubious Link Between Atta and Saddam (Newsweek) 8. Hussein Enters Post-9/1 1 Web of U.S. Prisons (NYT) 9. Yemeni Official Indicted (Newsday) 10. U.S.: AI-Qaeda has resources to run Saudi Arabia bombings (AP) 1 1 . Final Member of Lackawanna Six Sentenced to 9 1/2 Years in Prison (AP) 12. Bush Should Have Found Bin Laden, Clark Says (WP) 13. Australian at Guantanamo in 'Legal and Moral Black Hole,1 Lawyer Says (WP) 14. Spies: More Than Two Years After 9/1 1 , the Dots Remain Farther Apart Than Ever (CQ) 15. Is state license system vulnerable to terrorism? (AP) 16. When Bombers Are Women (WP) ***FULL TEXT*** 1. 9/11 Chair: Attack Was Preventable CBS News For the first time, the chairman of the independent commission investigating the Sept. 1 1 attacks is saying publicly that 9/1 1 could have and should have been prevented, reports CBS News Correspondent Randall Pinkston. "This is a very, very important part of history and we've got to tell it right," said Thomas Kean. "As you read the report, you're going to have a pretty clear idea what wasn't done and what should have been done," he said. "This was not something that had to happen." Appointed by the Bush administration, Kean, a former Republican governor of New Jersey, is now pointing fingers inside the administration and laying blame. "There are people that, if I was doing the job, would certainly not be in the position they were in at that time because they failed. They simply failed," Kean said. To find out who failed and why, the commission has navigated a political landmine, threatening a subpoena to gain access to the president's top-secret daily briefs. Those documents may shed light on one of the most controversial assertions of the Bush administration - that there was never any thought given to the idea that terrorists might fly an airplane into a building. "I don't think anybody could have predicted that they would try to use an airplane as a missile, a PRESS CLIPS FOR DECEMBER 18, 2003

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Commentary

Office of External Communications

Terrorism — A Policy Behind the Times By Bruce Hoffman

(703)413-1100x5117 (310) 451-6913 oec@ra_ncLgrg

David Egner This opinion article appeared in the Los Angeles Times on November 12, 2000.

Director

Warren Robak Deputy Director

WASHINGTON -- When Bill Clinton leaves office in January, he can claim credit for having done more than any other president to ensure that the United States is prepared to counter the threat of terrorism. Overall spending on preparedness and response measures nearly doubled, and terrorism was elevated to the top of the list of security threats confronting the United States. Yet, despite all this progress, last month's attack on the USS Cole tragically demonstrates that U.S. capabilities to defend itself against terrorism, and to preempt or respond to attacks, remain inchoate and unfocused. Constructing an effective counterterrorism policy is not a question of more attention, bigger budgets and increased staff. Rather, it requires greater focus, a better appreciation of the problem and understanding of the threat, and, in turn, the development of a clear, cohesive strategy.

Tania Coderre Amanda Gaylor Paige Parham Congressional Inquiries

This is not simply an intellectual exercise. It is the very foundation of any effective counterterrorism policy. The failure to develop such a policy has undermined counterterrorism efforts of the U.S. and other democratic nations before, producing frustratingly ephemeral, if not sometimes negative effects. In some cases, it actually increased the threat of terrorism.

Homeland Security and Terrorism

Washington External Affairs Office Shirley Ruhe, Director (703) 413-1100 X5632 [email protected]

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For example, as satisfying or cathartic as retaliating against terrorism may be, it can have the opposite effect: provoking an escalation rather than curtailing terrorist attacks. The 1986 U.S. airstrike on Libya is

http://www.rand.org/commentary/! 11200LAT.html

12/16/2003

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A WORKING GROUP PROJECT

.HPSCI-SSCI Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I: Statement of Eleanor Hill: September ... Page 1 of 26

Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff September 18,2002 Foreword Chairman Graham, Chairman Goss, before I proceed with my statement, I want to make clear to you and the members of these two Committees that the information I am going to present has been cleared for public release. As you know, much of the information the Joint Inquiry Staff has been examining is highly classified. Over the last two months, we have been working with the Intelligence Community in a long and arduous process to declassify information we believe is important to the public's understanding of why the Intelligence Community did not know of the September 11 attacks in advance. By late last night, we were able to resolve all but two issues. The Director of Central Intelligence has declined to declassify two issues of particular importance to this Inquiry: • Any references to the Intelligence Community providing information to the President or White House; and • The identity of and information on a key al-Qa'ida leader involved in the September 11 attacks. According to the DCI, the President's knowledge of intelligence information relevant to this Inquiry remains classified even when the substance of that intelligence information has been declassified. With respect to the key al-Qa'ida leader involved in the September 11 attacks, the DCI declined to declassify his identity despite an enormous volume of media reporting on this individual. The Joint Inquiry Staff disagrees with the DCI's position on both issues. We believe the American public has a compelling interest in this information and that public disclosure would not harm national security. However, we do not have independent authority to declassify intelligence information short of a lengthy procedure in the U.S.Congress. We therefore prepared this statement without detailed descriptions of our work in these two areas. Introduction Chairman Graham, Chairman Goss, members of this Joint Conunittee, good morning. I appreciate the opporftunity to appear here today to advise the Committees, and the American public, on the progress to date of the Joint inquiry Staffs review of the activities

http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/091802hill.html

12/31/2003