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Hagel Seeking Broad Debate On Draft Issue By HELEN DEWAB Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.), a Vietnam War veteran and an influential member of the Foreign Relations Committee, wants the United States to consider reviving the draft as part of a broader effort to ensure that all Americans "bear some responsibility" and "pay some price" in defending the nation's interests. At a committee hearing Tuesday and in subsequent interviews, Hagel said he is not advocating reinstatement of the draft, although he added that he is "not so sure that isn't a bad idea." His main interest, he said, is to make sure that some kind of mandatory national service is considered so "the privileged, the rich" as well as the less affluent bear the burden of fighting wars of the future. Hagel said he does not expect to see action on such a bill this year but wanted to spark debate that will "bring some reality to our policymaking" about future military needs. With American forces stretched thinner than they have been at any time since Vietnam and with wartime needs likely to continue indefinitely, "this is a steam engine coming right down the track at us," he said. Appearing with Hagel on NBC's Today" show, Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (Del.), ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, agreed with Hagel's goal of shared sacrifice and did not rule out a draft. But "I don't think it's necessary now," Biden said. The "whole notion of a shared burden is something we should be talking about well beyond the issue of just the draft," he said. Legislation has been introduced in both chambers to revive the draft, which was ended in 1973 as the Vietnam War wound down and subsequently was replaced by an all-volunteer army. The bills are sponsored by Sen. Ernest F. Hottings (D-S.C.) and Rep. Charles B. Rangel (D-N.Y.). No action has been scheduled on either measure. Hagel, an independent-minded conservative with a penchant for provocative comments, supported the war in Iraq but has criticized many aspects of the administration's postwar operations. Rarely, however, has he taken on a more controversial subject than the draft. "My colleagues are running away from this as fast as they can," he said. But "there isn't a one of them who doesn't understand what I'm doing," he added. President Bush is right that the country is engaged in a long-term war, Hagel said, and the country is "making commitments for future years that we cannot fulfill" in fighting terrorism and trying to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction. Already 40 percent of the ground troops in Iraq come from the National Guard and reserves, and recruitment and retention will be a problem, he said. Moreover, he said, all Americans should be asked to "share the sacrifice" of protecting their country. "It's unfair to ask only a few people to bear the burden of fighting and dying," he said. Also, a mandatory national service requirement for civilian as well as military work could help meet many needs at home at the same time that it is providing personnel for the armed forces, Hagel said.

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

Warren Bass Monday, April 26, 2004 10:23 AM Chris Kojm; Dan Marcus Mike Hurley Etzioni op-ed

My favorite hobby horse! Warren

The 9/11 Panel Looks the Wrong Way AMITAI ETZIONI The Los Angeles Times Fast-forward three years. A bipartisan commission is conducting hearings in Washington to determine why we were asleep at the wheel when terrorists set off a nuclear device in one of our major cities. The attack killed 300,000. It shook the nation's confidence so profoundly that the Constitution was "temporarily" suspended; all civil liberties were waived to prevent future attacks. The new commission has established that one of the reasons we failed to prevent this tragedy was the impact of an earlier commission and an earlier set of hearings: the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, a.k.a. the 9/11 commission. The problem was that the 9/11 investigation spent too much time assigning blame and looking backward. When it came to recommending safeguards for the future, it encouraged the public, federal agencies and the White House to plan for the kinds of attacks we had faced in the past rather than foreseeing dangers to come. It unwittingly contributed to a malaise that military historians have long studied: fighting the last war rather than preparing for the next one. Could a mere congressional commission really have such a long-reaching effect? Indeed. A similar set of hearings spelled the end of the McCarthy era. Another drove Richard Nixon out of office and led to campaign finance reform. And the Church Commission, which found that the FBI improperly spied on domestic dissenters during the 1960s, strengthened the wall between the FBI and the CIA — the same wall that is now under attack for its role in our 9/11 failures. Consider the buzz emerging from the 9/11 commission now. In reaction to our intelligence miscues, it's pushing public opinion toward approving something like an American MIS, a domestic spying agency similar to Britain's. By highlighting Bush's inattention to terrorism before Sept. 11, it is no doubt abetting an administration desire to recoup politically by dispatching Osama Bin Laden before the elections. These actions might have merit, but they don't block the gravest of the foreseeable dangers posed by terrorism — nuclear weapons. In much the same way, our current anti-terrorist strategies also miss the point. Because airplanes were the previous weapon of choice, we've earmarked $5.17 billion in 2005 (out of $5.3 billion budgeted for the Transportation Security Administration) for airports. Now that trains have been attacked in Madrid, we are moving to better protect the rails. But we seem to ignore that Al Qaeda rarely attacks twice in the same way or in the same place. We're also spending billions trying to eliminate terrorists — in Afghanistan, in the Philippines and Indonesia, in Colombia and in Europe — before they can hit us. This could be effective, but it is also exceedingly difficult. Terrorists are mobile, hidden and often protected by local populations. And there seems to be an unending supply of fresh recruits for every cell we take out. As for preventing terrorists from getting their hands on nuclear weapons, it's a strategy that by comparison gets little attention and few resources. Approximately $1 billion is set aside for the purpose, just one-fifth of what we're spending to find shoe bombs, box cutters and nail clippers at airports. (Eliminating chemical and biological weapons is also important but less so, because those agents are much more difficult to weaponize and employ than nuclear material.) Yet the nuclear threat can be met. The number of nuclear devices floating around on the black market is limited. The number of sites where they are poorly protected is small and well known. The list of experts who might illicitly develop nuclear weapons is relatively short.

LL STREET JOURNAL.

OPINION

TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 2004

Global View / By George Melloan

We Already Know Why al Qkeda Succeedet

W

hen the USS Cote was attacked in the Yemeni port of Aden on Oct. 12, 2000, president BUI Clinton responded by launching . an FBI criminal investigation. One might have thought that file near-sinking of a billion-dollar American warship wasan act of war. But the Clntonites treated it like, say, a 7-Eleven stfckup in Little Rojk.. • This is particularly egregious because Osama bin Laden had declared'War on the U.S. in 1996. Murderous bombings of1 U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Bar es Salaam in August 1998 had shown that he meant it and, with his international al Qaeda terrorist organization, could carry it out As National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said in her testimony to the 9/11 Commission last week, "The terrorists were* at war Wfith us, but we were not yetffipr with tfcem,",,

ings are mainly a political exercise, Ms, Rice was quite generous in saying that America's insufficient response to terrorism over the last 20 years stretched "across, several administrations of bofli parties." She chose not to say that the most serious "insufficiencies" cfearly happened during the eight years of the Clinton presidency. It wont take an encyclopedia-sized 9/11 Commission report to ex-' plain the background of that negligences. Mr. Clinton, never a great faa of et, ther the military or the CIA, was psychologically ill-equipped to admit that the U.S. was under attack. He preferred to' think that he was dealing merely with an , outbreak of criminality. The failure to distinguish between crime and war is crucial to understanding why America ultimately became vulnerable. Over the 30 years since the U.S. de-

feat in Vietnam, Congress has tangled up the executive branch in legalities limiting its ability to fight a "war in the shadows." While Mr. Clinton was himself subject to these limitations, he never offered much objection, perhaps because his own party was mainly responsible for them. An article in the ApriMssue of Commentary is must reading for anyone seriously interested in why the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation failed to act on information they already possessed that might have allowed them to block the 9/11 hijackers. It was written foy Andrew C. McCarthy, chief prosecutor of Sheflc Omar Abdel Rahman, who masterminded the Idas truck-bomb attack on the World Trade Center. The political mindset that tied up the CIA and FBI in legal red tape began with the witch hunt conducted against the CIA in 1976 by a 'Senate committee chaired by liberal Democrat Prank Church. He was in; censed that President Richard Nixon had tried to use the agency to block an FBI investigation of the Watergate scandal. Mr. Nixon was by no means the first to try to employ a federal •agency lor political purposes, as any close inspection of the Lyndon B. Johnson record wifl show. It should.be noted that at that time the CIA, a key instrument for waging the Cold War against the Soviet Uniofj was getting a propaganda barrage fromlhe international Left as well. The upshot of this feverish political era was the 191$ congressional passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). As f|r. McCarthy writes, "Here, for the first time. Congress and courts undertetft t6 regulate the gather-

ing of national intelligence, particularly by electronic eavesdropping against agents of hostile foreign powers." To conduct wiretaps, a powerful tool for counterintelligence agents* the executive branch was required to ao to a special FISA court and establish "probable cause" that the target was a foreign agent. "Previously it would have been laughable to suggest that foreign enemy operatives had a righttoconduct their perfidies in privacy," writes Mr. McCarthy. "The Fourth Amendment prohibits only 'unreasonable' searches, and there is nothing unreasonable about searching or recording people who threaten national security. (The federal courts have often recognized that the Constitution is not a suicide pet.) Now, such operatives became the beneficiaries of precisety sich, protection." FISAw: ; accompanied by mass firings by JUnmy Carter's CIA director, Stansfiel Turner, which further shattered agei :y morale. And congressional DemoqSate, hwrijig seized control of nation " from its constitutional owner lit, piled on more restriction amendj, bills attempted ments to approp to prevent Presi ijfrom sup;,aCastroporting the "con Soviet attempt to rmcaragua. When cold Reagan White House usec smethods to try to cir authored by Mas t Edward Boland, the scandal erupted. Oliver North and others would have been in deeper trouble if anyone could have figured out what the Boland amendments actually proscribed.

long other things, restricted of information between the the CIA and e FBI. It may have been a failure of reports of «!' factor in Qaeda ivities in the U.S. and abroad in time to prevent the being using airliners as bombs, terrorists in Minnesota and Arizona FBI had s suspicious activity but their ';' reports ren't acted upon. The tent that the CIA must hay^e no role domestic investigations stems posse comitatus principle that from bars theju.S. military from domestic pblice work. But Mr. McCarthy points out that if me U.S. were invaded, the U.S. army would fight on U.S. soil. So why is it an infringement on posse comitatus tx> allow the CIA to battle foreign agents and terrorists on U.S. soil? ! resident Bush's creation of th$ Homeland Security Department i and the passage of the Patriot Act by Cogress have removed some of thfe underbrush that caused the 9/11 failure. The Oat the somewhat expanded po#ers *f federal anti-terrorist agencies are $ threat to civil rights. Ther0 are still congressmen who want to micromana^e aatfraial security policy. U.S. Vfcters will ves have to decide whom they fesfr most, Osama bin Laden or their own ent.

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The New York Times on the Web

April 1

Weighing Stronger Control Over Intelligence Agencies As director of central intelligence, George J. Tenet runs the C.I.A. and coordinates the work of 15 intelligence departments and agencies. The

INDEPENDENT AGENCY

MILITARY AGENCIES

• Defense Intelligence Agency provides military intelligence to the armed forces and to policymakers.

m National Security Agency intercepts, decodes and translates foreign communications.

Each armed service has its own intelligence element:

• National GeospatialIntelligence Agency analyzes aerial and satellite photographs and prepares maps.

• Army Intelligence • Navy Intelligence • Air Force Intelligence • Marine Corps Intelligence

C.i.A

Bush administration is considering centralizing the leadership of nalio intelligence as a response to criticism from the Sept. 11 commission.

• National Reconnaissance Office builds and operates spy satellites.

• Central Intelligence Agency collects and analyzes foreign intelligence and conducts clandestine activities. Counter-terrorist Center reports directly to the director of central intelligence. Terrorist Threat Integration Center is a joint venture of the C.I.A., F.B.I., Homeland Security and other agencies to analyze and share intelligence on terrorism.

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http://www.nytimes.eom/imagepages/2004/04/l 6/politics/20040416_INTE_GRAPH.html

PJiBTS OF OTHER OIPARTMi«T§ • F.B.I. The National Security Division conducts domestic counterintelligence and counterterrorism activities and investigates international criminal cases. • Homeland Security Dept. The Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection determines domestic vulnerabilities to terrorist attack. • Coast Guard Intelligence is part of Homeland Security.

• State Dept. The Bure Intelligence and Resear provides analysis on ton policy matters. • Energy Dept The Ofl of Intelligence is concer with nuclear weapons, nuclear energy and ene related areas. • Treasury Dept. The C of Intelligence Support studies intelligence rela to financial matters.

Copyright 2004 The New York T

4/16/2004

——nhe Intelligence Mess: How It Happened, What to Do About It

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Commentary April 2004

The Intelligence Mess: How It Happened, What to Do About It Andrew C. McCarthy Intelligence-gathering is something of a square peg in the round hole of contemporary political morality. It is about unearthing that which is willfully concealed, an enterprise that necessarily calls for invading privacy and inducing betrayal—discomfiting acts in an age that exalts the individual and his liberties above community and country. It is about assuming and preparing for the worst in an era that sees "bad" as an outmoded adjective for "different," another dash of enlivening spice in a rich social stew. Intelligence is gimlet eyes in a world of rose-colored glasses. Now, however, that foreign pathologies long denied have visited their excesses upon us, many among the benignly tolerant have turned overnight into the equivalent of ambulance-chasers. In particular, they have confidently laid at the door of America's intelligence apparatus the success of America's enemies on September 11,2001. Even as investigators in the CIA and FBI were unable to "connect the dots," it is said, nineteen al-Qaeda hijackers cavorted for months in this country before carrying out the atrocities of that day. Nor was this catastrophe—"by definition, the worst intelligence failure in our country's history," in the words of the Reagan-era intelligence expert Herbert Meyer—a singular phenomenon. Less than a year earlier, a billion-dollar battle ship, the U.S.S. Cole, had been bombed and nearly sunk, causing the deaths of seventeen servicemen, because we unwittingly berthed it in the al-Qaeda-infested port of Aden, Yemen. This, after our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were turned to rubble in August 1998 by the very same al Qaeda, which had already attacked numerous times previously, and which no less often had expressly declared war on the United States. Nor is that all. Thanks to our failed intelligence services (the indictment continues), the Bush administration grossly overestimated the stockpiles and production capacity of chemical, bacteriological, radiological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. In the meantime, in North Korea, construction of nuclear weapons seems to have ensued for years right under our noses. And Pyongyang's mischief marked only a single strand in a web of proliferation woven by our ally Pakistan, a web that may have spread into as many as seven nations, including Iran, where the mullahs now harbor the remnants of al Qaeda's leadership. How did this wide wreckage in our intelligence capacities come about? One incisive answer has been given by Mark Riebling in his gripping history, Wedge: How the Secret War between the FBI and CIA Has Endangered National Security (1994, re-issued in 2002 with a new epilogue). Riebling's thesis is that the problem is longstanding, that it has a single "root cause," and that this root cause is institutional. In his telling, a full half-century's worth of national disasters—from Pearl Harbor through the Bay of Pigs, the Kennedy assassination, Watergate, Iran-Contra, and 9/11—can be traced directly to intelligence failures, and those failures were proximately caused by turf-battling between our two great rival agencies. This has now become conventional wisdom, accepted on all sides. And one can see the apparent sense in it. A ramified system of multiple agencies having similar missions and chasing the same

http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article_print.asp?aid=l 1704013_1

4/15/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Len Hawley

Sent:

Monday, April 05, 2004 7:24 AM

To:

Warren Bass

Cc:

Mike Hurley

Subject: RE: Condi Rice is no Tom Clancy Just in case you forgot this interesting email.... Len Original Message From: Warren Bass Sent: Monday, December 22, 2003 4:36 PM To: Team 3 Subject: Condi Rice is no Tom Clancy

Our Homeland Securitizers Should Read More By James Pinkerton Fellow Newsday May 21,2002 So now we know that inklings and incidents pointing to a September 11-type terrorist attack have been sprinkled throughout the last decade, like black cats crossing a darkened street. Indeed, the emerging story in the who-knew-what-when blame-game erupting in Washington last week is this: just about everyone involved in counter-terrorism had some piece of the puzzle. Reacting to questions about the ill-fitting clues littering the pre-9-11 gameboard, Rep. Jim Gibbons (R-Nevada), a member of the House Intelligence Committee, spluttered to the Fox News Channel, "This kind of information could be gleaned from a Tom Clancy novel!" Yes, that's true. On page 985 of Debt of Honor, published in 1994, a crazed Japanese pilot crashes a civilian 747 jetliner into the Capitol, as the president is addressing a joint session of Congress. Here's Clancy describing the scene: "Nearly three hundred tons of aircraft and fuel struck the east face of the building at a speed of three hundred knots." The building's walls were "smashed to gravel," but even before the roof could cave in, one hundred tons of jet fuel sparked off, "and an immense fireball engulfed everything inside and outside the building." Is that threat-scenario vivid enough? Indeed, insofar as Clancy is one of the best-selling authors in the country with a particularly large following among military types, it's a depressing commentary on military intelligence that Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, could say, a month later, to the American Forces Radio and Television Service, "You hate to admit it, but we hadn't thought about this."

4/5/2004

.—-*1—Washingtonpost.com: Legislators Seek U.S. Intelligence Director

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washingtonpost.com

Legislators Seek U.S. Intelligence Director By Walter Pincus Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, April 2, 2004; Page A09

The Democratic members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence yesterday recommended the establishment of a director of national intelligence who would have both budgetary and operational control over the CIA and the much larger collection of Pentagon and other agencies that collect and analyze intelligence. In offering what would be a major reorganization, Rep. Jane Harman (DCalif.) said: "One of the major deficiencies in our intelligence community is the fact that there are 15 intelligence agencies ~ operating with different rules, cultures and databases ~ that do not work as one integrated intelligence community." The suggestion that there be a single director of national intelligence, or DNI, is not a new one, having been proposed last year by the joint committee that investigated 9/11, and before that by Brent Scowcroft in his role as chairman of President Bush's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

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The DNI would replace the director of central intelligence (DCI), currently George J. Tenet, who also serves as CIA director. Although Tenet has the title and standing as the president's senior intelligence adviser, under current law he has total control only over the CIA. He has advisory status when it comes to operational and budgetary matters involving various Pentagon intelligence agencies that account for 90 percent of the $40 billion spent each year on intelligence.

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Scowcroft's attempt to give the DCI what would have amounted to control over Pentagon money and personnel was blocked two years ago by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and lawmakers, particularly those on the House and Senate armed services committees who did not want to lose control of their portion of intelligence spending.

Rumsfeld, instead, created the post of undersecretary of defense for intelligence, whose occupant serves as the titular head of all Pentagon intelligence agencies, including the National Security Agency, which intercepts electronic messages worldwide; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which collects and analyzes satellite imagery; the National Reconnaissance Office, which develops, builds and operates intelligence satellites; the Defense Intelligence Agency, which analyzes military intelligence; and the intelligence arms of the military services. The Democrats' plan would also establish a deputy director of national intelligence, who would play the role of the Rumsfeld-established undersecretary for intelligence. The plan proposes deputy directors of national intelligence for operations and resources who would develop common classification standards for sensitive information, and would establish uniform rules across the government for gaining access to intelligence.

http://www. washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A43208-2004Aprl ?language=printer

4/2/2004

Assessing the Blame for 9/11

She ;V'rtu J]ork eimcs

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?•« M T E R - F R I E N B i Y FQMMAt

March 25, 2004

Assessing the Blame for 9/11

T

he seminal moment of this week's hearings on 9/11 surely came yesterday when Richard Clarke, the former antiterrorism chief in the Bush and Clinton administrations, opened his testimony by apologizing to the families whose loved ones died in the terror attacks. The government, Mr. Clarke said, had failed them, "and I failed you." He added, "We tried hard, but that doesn't matter because we failed." It suddenly seemed that after the billions of words uttered about that terrible day, Mr. Clarke had found the ones that still needed saying. The two days of hearings by the commission investigating the attacks have been invaluable in helping the American people better understand the chain of miscommunications, wrong guesses and misplaced priorities that left the nation so poorly defended against the terrorists. Mr. Clarke, by accepting responsibility, offered the American people the freedom to hold their leaders accountable for an event most had come to see as an unstoppable bolt from the blue. Mr. Clarke is clearly haunted by the thought that if things had gone differently, the attacks might have been averted. That seems like the longest of long shots. But there are still plenty of questions to be answered about what happened, particularly about the apparent lack of urgency in the Bush administration's antiterrorism efforts before 9/11. The Clinton administration also made mistakes. Although aware of the danger posed by Osama bin Laden, it was somehow unable to create and carry out an effective strategy to deal with him. Bill Clinton, distracted by the threat of impeachment, failed to educate the American people adequately about the nature of the danger, and what it might take to fight it. Senior officials from the Clinton and Bush administration testified, one after another, that in the pre-9/11 world, they could not have gone further in trying to run down Mr. bin Laden because, they believed, the country and our allies would not have supported it. But there was at least no question about the Clinton administration's commitment to combat terrorism, and on occasion, like the December 1999 alert that appears to have averted an attack on the Los Angeles airport, it produced results. The attitude of the Bush administration seems harder to pin down. Mr. Clarke's conclusion was that after George Bush became president, neither he nor the terrorism agenda got the same top-level attention. The Bush administration officials who testified denied that vociferously. Their arguments suffered from the absence of Condoleezza Rice, the person to whom Mr. Clarke reported. Ms. Rice has been doing the rounds of talk shows in an attempt to bolster her argument that the administration had found Mr. Clarke's plans wanting and immediately began a full-bore effort to come up with a new antiterrorism strategy. What the nation deserved to hear her address publicly before the commission is why that process took eight months. A new plan was not approved by the White House until the eve of the terror attack on Sept. 11, 2001. The real impression gleaned from the hearings is not that the Bush administration was indifferent to the

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/25/opimon/25THU 1 .html?pagewanted=print&position=

3/25/2004

C_ Center for the Study of Intelligence

Center for the Study of Intelligence Conference Report

Intelligence for a New Era in American Foreign Policy 10-11 September 2003 Charlottesville, Virginia

Washington, D.C. January 2004

Central Intelligence Agency

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Subject:

[email protected] Thursday, January 29, 2004 1 2:39 PM Alexis Albion; Mike Hurley Re: New York Post on President Clinton's Address to Islamic Summit

FYI:

> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >

NEW YORK POST CLINTON'S TRIUMPH By RALPH PETERS January 19, 2004 -- I NEVER thought I'd give Bill Clinton a standing ovation. But last week in Qatar I did just that. Our former president gave the most perfectly pitched, precisely targeted speech I've ever heard to a hall filled with Muslim intellectuals and officials. And they listened. Clinton's lecture closed a worthwhile, if often exasperating, conference on the future of the Middle East's relations with America. Sponsored by the Emir of Qatar and organized by the Brookings Institution, the event brought together a combination of the usual suspects and outside ringers for vigorous, open discussions. A few of the sessions did manage to move a fragile half -step beyond the "everything that isn't Israel's fault is America's fault" mantras that sedate Middle Eastern societies. Still, by the closing luncheon, I'd had about enough of Muslim "authorities" whose versions of their own history had collapsed into easy myths and for whom the Ko ran had become a document to be used as selectively as the phone book. Enter Bill Clinton. Now, after serving in Washington during the Clinton administration and hearing our former president chatter for checks more recently, my expectations were that he would do no harm, but little good. I was wrong, e world beyond our shores. Ralph Peters is a retired Army officer and a regular Post contributor.

> http: //www.nypost . com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/16081 .htm