T2 B4 Team 2 Workplan Fdr- Proposed Workplan For Assessing Management Of Intelligence Community 586
This document was uploaded by user and they confirmed that they have the permission to share it. If you are author or own the copyright of this book, please report to us by using this DMCA report form. Report DMCA
Overview
Download & View T2 B4 Team 2 Workplan Fdr- Proposed Workplan For Assessing Management Of Intelligence Community 586 as PDF for free.
More details
- Words: 1,299
- Pages: 6
UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE TEAM #2 WORKPLAN FOR MANAGEMENT Set forth below is a proposed workplan for assessing the management of the Intelligence Community (1C). Section I outlines key questions that must be answered for our inquiry to be complete. Section n presents a research methodology for designed to answer the questions in section I. Section HI discusses the avenues for obtaining information, and section IV contains a timeline for conducting the investigation. I.
Key Questions Regarding 1C Management.
This section sets forth fundamental questions that we must answer for our inquiry to be complete. These questions center on (1) the role of 1C management in the 9/11 attacks, and (2) whether changes to 1C management are needed in order to prevent future terrorist attacks. Pre-9/20.
X,
(1) Did senior Administration officials (e.g., the President, Vice Dresident, and National Security Advisor) exercise-effective leadership and*oversight of the 1C concerning° counterterrorism?*——' <s.o-CQ ,' £U*-~o^\l / cXe' P °ifr-w^ -\ \ ( (2) Did the DCI manage the 1C effectively to counter terrorism? If not, did such ineffectiveness stem from insufficient legal authorities, timidity in exploiting available authorities, personal negligence, or other reasons? (3),How did the fact that many 1C components reside within the Department of Defense affect the IC's conduct of counterterrorism? (4) Was the IC's conduct of counterterrorism obstructed by any of the following factors: (a) particular organizational structures, policies, procedures, or decisions; (b) organizational culture or certain management practices; or (c) specific personal failures? (5) Did the IC's management facilitate or hinder the IC's response in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks? (6) Did Congressional oversight of the 1C improve the IC's performance regarding counterterrorism, and if not, why? ' B.
Post-9/20.
ID
(1) How should-senior Administration officials exercise effective leadership and oversight of the 1C concerning counterterrorism? (2) Does the DCI need strengthened legal authorities or other enhancements in order to manage the 1C effectively to counter terrorism? (3) How should U.S. intelligence capabilities be allocated between the 1C and the Department of Defense? 1 UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE DRAFT
n
7
UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE (4) Is the IC's management adequate for the 1C to counter 21st Century threats such as terrorism? If not, what remedies are needed in (a) management structure, policies, procedures, or decisions, or (b) organizational culture or management practices? (5) How effective is Congressional oversight of the 1C, and how can it be improved? n.
Research Methodology For Answering The Key Questions Regarding 1C Management. In order to answer the fundamental questions
The key questions to guide the assessment of the IC's management fall into several broad categories. The first category concerns the IC's overall management structure. The second category focuses on the management of 1C agencies that play critical roles in counterterrorism. The third category covers Congressional oversight. A.
Management of the Intelligence Community (1C).
1. 2.
What is the IC's mission? Where does counterterrorism fit? What are the history and major themes (e.g., risk perception, successes and failures, denial and deception) of the IC's organizational politics generally and concerning counterterrorism in particular? What is the current state of 1C management - including responsibility, authority, accountability, formal and informal networks, and culture - both generally and concerning counterterrorism in particular? Who sets priorities for the 1C, and how are they set? What was counterterrorism's ranking? How is Executive Branch leadership and oversight of the 1C exercised generally and concerning counterterrorism in particular? Is the 1C organized in order to learn from mistakes, and to what extent did the 1C learn from each of the successive terrorist attacks in the 1990s? How did secrecy affect the IC's ability to perform generally and regarding counterterrorism in particular? Should the IC's management be changed in order to improve the IC's ability to conduct counterterrorism, and if so, how?
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. B.
Management of Individual Agencies.
1.
How successful has the CIA Director been in asserting control over the CIA, and how effective was the CIA Director's leadership of the CIA concerning counterterrorism? How effective was the CIA in counterterrorism? [NSA] [DIA]
2. 3.
2 UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE 4. 5. 6.
[DOD] What are the roles of senior DOD officials (e.g., SecDef, DepSecDef, SDI/C3I, ASD/SOLIC, DOD-IG) regarding intelligence in general and counterterrorism in particular? [INR] [DHS]
C.
Congressional Oversight.
1.
How does Congress conduct oversight of the 1C and determine the 1C' s budget and policy priorities? To what extent did Congress focus on counterterrorism? How effective is Congressional oversight of the 1C? Has Congressional oversight led to better performance of the 1C regarding counterterrorism? What factors limit Congress's ability to conduct effective oversight (e.g., security, Committee membership turnover)? How did the 1C keep Congress aware of terrorist threats to the U.S., and how did Congress respond?
2. 3. 4.
V"\
n.
Sources of Information.
m.
Temporal Strategy.
•
The strategy set forth below is based upon the assumption that team members will not receive the requisite clearances until mid-June 2003. A.
June 2003.
1. 2. 3.
Conduct open source reading Read Joint Inquiry report. File requests for information interviews with 1C agencies.
B.
July 2003.
1. 2. 3.
Receive informational briefings. Submit document requests to 1C agencies. Meet with academics and other private-sector individuals to discuss research objectives.
C.
August 2003.
1. 2.
Review documents produced. File requests for interviews. UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE 3.
Make preparations for travel.
D.
September 2003.
1. 2. 3. 4.
Review documents produced. Submit new document requests as needed. Interview lower-level current and former officials. Travel.
E.
October 2003.
1. 2. 3.
Review documents produced. Interview lower/mid-level current and former officials. Travel.
F.
November 2003.
1. 2.
Interview mid/senior-level current and former officials. Ascertain whether any gaps in facts and circumstances of 9/11 need to be filled.
G.
December 2003.
1. 2.
Interview senior current and former officials. Begin drafting.
Ten key questions that we want to have answered at the end of the day: Sources of information Interviews (1) Current community leadership (2) Former community leadership (3) Current CIA officials: DO, DI (2) Former CIA officials: DO, DI (3) Current NSA officials (4) Former NSA officials (5) Current DOD officials (6) Former DOD officials 4 UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE (7)
(1) Interviews of 1C professionals (2) Interviews with senior officials from other agencies concerning their views of the 1C. (3) Interviews with intelligence professionals from other countries. (4) Interviews wit
1. Exhaustive publication / document review — the open literature — the Joint Inquiry's files and report - recent commission reports/studies and their recommendations — documents we request from the intelligence agencies 2. Interviews — 1C officials — former 1C officials — knowledgeable experts outside of government — foreign officials and/or US officials assigned overseas 3. Findings & Commission Briefings - draw some conclusions from the literature and interviews -- brief the other teams and Philip / Chris on initial findings — brief the commissioners on these findings and get feedback - if necessary go back over the materials and conduct additional interviews 4. Recommendations — identify recommendations that are actionable and defensible for the Commission — identify which require Administrative action to implement, which require Executive Orders — identify which require legislation and draft the legislation 5. Draft Final Report / Monograph — prepare a final product for the Commission (10 to 20 pages with analysis, findings, recommendations) — prepare a monograph which is a "scholarly work" that can be published on its own
5 UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE
What roles did the Secretaries of State and Defense play? What role did the NSC play in the day-to-day management of counterterrorism? Principals Committee and Deputies Committee? How often did the NSC Principals Committee meet concerning the effectiveness
6 UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE DRAFT
Key Questions Regarding 1C Management.
This section sets forth fundamental questions that we must answer for our inquiry to be complete. These questions center on (1) the role of 1C management in the 9/11 attacks, and (2) whether changes to 1C management are needed in order to prevent future terrorist attacks. Pre-9/20.
X,
(1) Did senior Administration officials (e.g., the President, Vice Dresident, and National Security Advisor) exercise-effective leadership and*oversight of the 1C concerning° counterterrorism?*——' <s.o-CQ ,' £U*-~o^\l / cXe' P °ifr-w^ -\ \ ( (2) Did the DCI manage the 1C effectively to counter terrorism? If not, did such ineffectiveness stem from insufficient legal authorities, timidity in exploiting available authorities, personal negligence, or other reasons? (3),How did the fact that many 1C components reside within the Department of Defense affect the IC's conduct of counterterrorism? (4) Was the IC's conduct of counterterrorism obstructed by any of the following factors: (a) particular organizational structures, policies, procedures, or decisions; (b) organizational culture or certain management practices; or (c) specific personal failures? (5) Did the IC's management facilitate or hinder the IC's response in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks? (6) Did Congressional oversight of the 1C improve the IC's performance regarding counterterrorism, and if not, why? ' B.
Post-9/20.
ID
(1) How should-senior Administration officials exercise effective leadership and oversight of the 1C concerning counterterrorism? (2) Does the DCI need strengthened legal authorities or other enhancements in order to manage the 1C effectively to counter terrorism? (3) How should U.S. intelligence capabilities be allocated between the 1C and the Department of Defense? 1 UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE DRAFT
n
7
UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE (4) Is the IC's management adequate for the 1C to counter 21st Century threats such as terrorism? If not, what remedies are needed in (a) management structure, policies, procedures, or decisions, or (b) organizational culture or management practices? (5) How effective is Congressional oversight of the 1C, and how can it be improved? n.
Research Methodology For Answering The Key Questions Regarding 1C Management. In order to answer the fundamental questions
The key questions to guide the assessment of the IC's management fall into several broad categories. The first category concerns the IC's overall management structure. The second category focuses on the management of 1C agencies that play critical roles in counterterrorism. The third category covers Congressional oversight. A.
Management of the Intelligence Community (1C).
1. 2.
What is the IC's mission? Where does counterterrorism fit? What are the history and major themes (e.g., risk perception, successes and failures, denial and deception) of the IC's organizational politics generally and concerning counterterrorism in particular? What is the current state of 1C management - including responsibility, authority, accountability, formal and informal networks, and culture - both generally and concerning counterterrorism in particular? Who sets priorities for the 1C, and how are they set? What was counterterrorism's ranking? How is Executive Branch leadership and oversight of the 1C exercised generally and concerning counterterrorism in particular? Is the 1C organized in order to learn from mistakes, and to what extent did the 1C learn from each of the successive terrorist attacks in the 1990s? How did secrecy affect the IC's ability to perform generally and regarding counterterrorism in particular? Should the IC's management be changed in order to improve the IC's ability to conduct counterterrorism, and if so, how?
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. B.
Management of Individual Agencies.
1.
How successful has the CIA Director been in asserting control over the CIA, and how effective was the CIA Director's leadership of the CIA concerning counterterrorism? How effective was the CIA in counterterrorism? [NSA] [DIA]
2. 3.
2 UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE 4. 5. 6.
[DOD] What are the roles of senior DOD officials (e.g., SecDef, DepSecDef, SDI/C3I, ASD/SOLIC, DOD-IG) regarding intelligence in general and counterterrorism in particular? [INR] [DHS]
C.
Congressional Oversight.
1.
How does Congress conduct oversight of the 1C and determine the 1C' s budget and policy priorities? To what extent did Congress focus on counterterrorism? How effective is Congressional oversight of the 1C? Has Congressional oversight led to better performance of the 1C regarding counterterrorism? What factors limit Congress's ability to conduct effective oversight (e.g., security, Committee membership turnover)? How did the 1C keep Congress aware of terrorist threats to the U.S., and how did Congress respond?
2. 3. 4.
V"\
n.
Sources of Information.
m.
Temporal Strategy.
•
The strategy set forth below is based upon the assumption that team members will not receive the requisite clearances until mid-June 2003. A.
June 2003.
1. 2. 3.
Conduct open source reading Read Joint Inquiry report. File requests for information interviews with 1C agencies.
B.
July 2003.
1. 2. 3.
Receive informational briefings. Submit document requests to 1C agencies. Meet with academics and other private-sector individuals to discuss research objectives.
C.
August 2003.
1. 2.
Review documents produced. File requests for interviews. UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE 3.
Make preparations for travel.
D.
September 2003.
1. 2. 3. 4.
Review documents produced. Submit new document requests as needed. Interview lower-level current and former officials. Travel.
E.
October 2003.
1. 2. 3.
Review documents produced. Interview lower/mid-level current and former officials. Travel.
F.
November 2003.
1. 2.
Interview mid/senior-level current and former officials. Ascertain whether any gaps in facts and circumstances of 9/11 need to be filled.
G.
December 2003.
1. 2.
Interview senior current and former officials. Begin drafting.
Ten key questions that we want to have answered at the end of the day: Sources of information Interviews (1) Current community leadership (2) Former community leadership (3) Current CIA officials: DO, DI (2) Former CIA officials: DO, DI (3) Current NSA officials (4) Former NSA officials (5) Current DOD officials (6) Former DOD officials 4 UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE (7)
(1) Interviews of 1C professionals (2) Interviews with senior officials from other agencies concerning their views of the 1C. (3) Interviews with intelligence professionals from other countries. (4) Interviews wit
1. Exhaustive publication / document review — the open literature — the Joint Inquiry's files and report - recent commission reports/studies and their recommendations — documents we request from the intelligence agencies 2. Interviews — 1C officials — former 1C officials — knowledgeable experts outside of government — foreign officials and/or US officials assigned overseas 3. Findings & Commission Briefings - draw some conclusions from the literature and interviews -- brief the other teams and Philip / Chris on initial findings — brief the commissioners on these findings and get feedback - if necessary go back over the materials and conduct additional interviews 4. Recommendations — identify recommendations that are actionable and defensible for the Commission — identify which require Administrative action to implement, which require Executive Orders — identify which require legislation and draft the legislation 5. Draft Final Report / Monograph — prepare a final product for the Commission (10 to 20 pages with analysis, findings, recommendations) — prepare a monograph which is a "scholarly work" that can be published on its own
5 UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE
What roles did the Secretaries of State and Defense play? What role did the NSC play in the day-to-day management of counterterrorism? Principals Committee and Deputies Committee? How often did the NSC Principals Committee meet concerning the effectiveness
6 UNCLASSIFIED COMMISSION SENSITIVE DRAFT
Related Documents
More Documents from "9/11 Document Archive"
Letter To 9/11 Commission About John Kerry
April 2020 0
