T2 B4 Team 2 Workplan Fdr- Longer List Of Questions- Intelligence Collection- Analysis- Management- Oversight- Resources 572

Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States Team #2 Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Management, Oversight and Resources

Team Members: Kevin Scheid Gordon Lederman Bruce Berkowitz

Tab #1:

Key Questions

Tab #2:

Briefing Plan for Commissioners

Tab #3:

Categories of Documents

Tab #4:

Interviews

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Team #2: Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Management, Oversight and Resources Key Questions of the Investigation Intelligence Collection (1985 to 2003): Was there an effective intelligence collection strategy for global terrorism? 1. How did global terrorism rank among competing collection priorities and who identified these priorities? 2. What was the Intelligence Community's collection strategy for counterterrorism? Who had responsibility and authority for the strategy? Was this strategy approved by the DCI and when? How and when was it reviewed for its effectiveness? 3. What was the role of the NSC Deputies and Principals' committees, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the DCI in reviewing and approving this strategy? 4. Given that the Community's large technical intelligence agencies reside within the Department of Defense, what steps did the Secretary of Defense take to ensure that collection was appropriately focused on the priorities identified by the DCI, particularly counterterrorism? 5. How did the IC's HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT and Open Source collectors implement the counterterrorism collection strategy? How were these implementation strategies for each discipline managed and who was accountable for their execution? Which collection assets have proven effective? 6. How and when was collection focused on al Qaeda? What specific intelligence triggered the establishment of the Usama bin Laden (UBL) Task Force at CIA in 1996? How did this improve collection on this target? What was the collection strategy on UBL? 7. How was the IC's collection strategy coordinated with non-IC departments and agencies, including the Department of State, Treasury, and Justice? Where were the rules for information sharing? How were problems with info sharing addressed, resolved? Who was responsible for fixing problems? How often did the DCI meet with the Attorney General and Director of the FBI to discuss these issues? 8. How did events such as military action in the Balkans, Northern and Southern Watch in Iraq, Rwanda, the Middle East, and peacekeeping missions worldwide impact the IC's collection strategy against global terrorism? Intelligence Analysis (1985 to 2003): Was there an effective intelligence analysis strategy for global terrorism? 1. How did global terrorism rank among competing analytic topics and who made these decisions?

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DRAFT 2. What has been the Intelligence Community's overall analytic approach during the period to identify and analyze global terrorist organizations and individual terrorists? How was "red teaming" employed." What was the role of the National Intelligence Council and the National Intelligence Estimate process? 3. When was al Qaeda identified as an analytic priority and how was this intelligence provided to policymakers? Why were only three analysts assigned to al Qaeda in the Counterterrorism Center prior to 9-11 ? What impact did the DCFs declaration of "war" on al Qaeda have on analytic resources? 4. According to Executive Order 12333, the DCI has explicit authority to receive "...all information relevant to the national intelligence needs of the United States, [and the heads of departments and agencies] shall give due consideration to the requests of the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate support for Intelligence Community activities." What information did the DCI request from the Department of Justice, the FBI, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Treasury, the Secret Service, etc. regarding terrorist activities against the United States? Was this information provided and how was it used in the analysis of the Intelligence Community? 5. One of the DCI's basic responsibilities is to warn of attack upon the United States. How was this responsibility interpreted regarding to terrorist attacks and how was warning performed prior to September 2001? Which senior government officials prior to 9-11 received warning intelligence? Which received warning intelligence after 9-11? 6. What response to terrorism warning was discussed, understood and exercised by the Intelligence Community? 7. Given that the DCI's Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) was intended to be the focal point of all counterterrorism analysis, how has organizational placement of the Center in the Directorate of Operations impacted its ability to perform strategic analysis of global terrorism? How effective has the Center been at coordinating intelligence across the 1C and throughout the government? 8. Did the CTC get the information it needed from across the government to effectively analyze the potential terrorist threats to the United States and how did it use this information? Intelligence Management (1985 to 2003): Who has the responsibility, authority and accountability for the collection, analysis and warning of global terrorist threats in the government? 1. Counterterrorism was one of 13 "Tier One" priorities identified by President Clinton in 1995 that required specific intelligence collection efforts. How did the 1C implement this direction from the President? 2. What has been the role of the National Security Advisor in overseeing that the strategic intelligence provided to the President was focused on the highest

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DRAFT priorities? What role did he/she play in reviewing and acting upon counterterrorism intelligence and warning of attack? 3. What are the respective roles of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the DCI regarding to counterterrorism intelligence? How has the bifurcated nature of the Intelligence Community's chain of command affected its management of counterterrorism? 4. How often did the NSC Deputies Committee and/or Principals' Committees review and update PDD-35 and what policy or management recommendations did they make to the Director of Central Intelligence in his management of counter terrorism intelligence efforts? 5. What were the conclusions of the DCI's "Hard Target" study on terrorism? Who performed the study? Who was responsible for implementing its recommendations and taking specific action? What follow-up was performed? 6. What were the respective leadership roles of the DCI, DDCI, DDCI for Community Management, the Assistant DCI for Collection, and the Assistant DCI for Analysis and Production in the conduct of the Intelligence Community's counterterrorism programs and in management? How were their management direction implemented and reviewed? What were their recommendations during this period and how were they implemented? 7. How was the management of terrorism intelligence changed/improved after the World Trade Center bombing in 1993? After the FBI arrests of eight individuals threatening to attack New York landmarks? The bombing of Khobar Towers? The UBL call for jihad against the US? The Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embassy bombings? And the events of September 2001 ? Intelligence Oversight (1985 to 2003): How did congressional oversight affect the Executive Branch's ability to conduct effective counterterrorism programs? 1. What priority did the Congressional leadership give to counterterrorism efforts of the government? 2. What priority did the six congressional oversight committees give to counter terrorism activities of the Intelligence Community? How was this priority manifested in program direction in their report language (and classified annexes) and in their budget marks? 3. How effective were the House and Senate Intelligence Committees in overseeing US Intelligence from 1985 to 2001, particularly in regards to counterterrorism? 4. What findings and recommendations resulted from congressional investigations into the Intelligence Community's counter terrorism efforts prior to the Joint Inquiry investigation? How were these recommendations implemented? What specific direction was given to the DCI, the DDCI, the DDCI for Community Management, the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations and the director of the CTC?

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DRAFT 5. How did the Intelligence Community keep Congress aware of the threats to the United States from terrorism, and how did Congress respond? How was warning intelligence provided to the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate and what actions resulted? Intelligence Resources (1985 to 2003): Did the Intelligence Community have sufficient resources to conduct effective counter terrorism activities? 1. Is there an effective budget process within the Intelligence Community to ensure that resources are allocated to the highest priorities identified by the President, the NSC, the DCI and the Secretary of Defense? 2. What has been the analytic basis for requesting intelligence funding for counterterrorism activities in the intelligence community from 1985 to 2003? How have counterterrorism programs been examined and audited for their effectiveness over the period? What adjustments have been made to improve them? 3. What efforts have been made by the DCI and SecDef to properly balance resources across the Intelligence Community to place align resources for the greatest impact, particularly after the DCI had declared way on al Qaeda in 1998? 4. How have intelligence budget requests for counter terrorism been scrutinized by the Office of Management and Budget? What has been the impact of this scrutiny on the programs? What are the roles of other Executive Office of the President oversight entities? 5. How has counterterrorism funding changed and why? How have CT resources been invested in human source collection? Signals collection? Imagery collection? Open source collection? CT analysis? 6. Did the relevant House and Senate Authorizations and Appropriations Committees uphold the President's request for counterterrorism funding? If not, why? Did the Congress add funding to the President's request for resources? If so, why? 7. Why did the Intelligence Community receive supplemental funding for counterterrorism efforts and not request these funds through the normal budget process? 8. Have resources requested by the Intelligence Community for counterterrorism activities been denied? If so, why and by which oversight entity?

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