T1 B26 Matt Levitt Fdr- Draft Mfrs- Emails- Notes- Withdrawal Notice 628

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Page 1 of 4

Yoel Tobin From:

Yoel Tobin [[email protected]]

Sent:

Friday, November 07, 2003 1:34 PM

To:

'[email protected]'

Subject: Levitt MFR

I have made a few additional changes. I have shown deletions by using strikeout, and additions by using bold. Let me know if you are ok with these changes. Thanks! MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: Interview of Matthew Levitt Date: October 28, 2003 Classification: Unclassified Prepared by: Yoel Tobin & Dan Byrnan Team numbers: 1 and 3 Location: K Street, Conference Room Participant: Matthew Levitt, Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Participants - Commission: Dan Byman & Yoel Tobin Background Mr. Levitt is currently a Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies at the Washington Institute for Near Policy. Before that, he served as a counterterrorism analyst at the FBI from November 1998 through November 2001. At the FBI, he focused primarily on Palestinian terrorist groups, but also worked on issues relating to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Combating Terrorist Financing Mr. Levitt commented on the efforts by the United States Government (USG) to combat terrorist financing. He said that the USG has "a far way to go," although the situation has improved somewhat since 9/11. Mr. Levitt said that there should be no distinction between material supporters of terrorism and those who pull the trigger or activate the bomb, i.e., there they are all equally culpable. Mr. Levitt emphasized the permeable borders between terrorist groups and the need to crack down on terrorist financing across the board, rather than restricting our efforts to Al Qaeda. He believes that support networks for Al Qaeda frequently support other Islamic terrorist groups, as well, and gave

11/7/2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Page 2 of 4

examples of overlapping assistance to both Hamas and Al Qaeda. He also believes that it is a moral imperative to have a consistent, across-the-board counterterrorism policy against groups that target civilians. The FBI Levitt was critical of the FBI in several respects. He said disapprovingly that before 9/11 DOJ and FBI management would only prosecute persons who gave money to terrorist groups if there was proof that the donor knowingly intended to finance a terrorist attack. He also stated that the FBI is poorly organized and that for bureaucratic reasons it insists on pigeonholing cases into discreet categories by terrorist group, when in fact the boundaries between groups are often fluid. He noted that the information sharing problems of the FBI missed the point: the FBI often did not share information with itself, let alone with the rest of the government. In addition, he asserted that the FBI sometimes withheld relevant information from its analysts, and that there was a dearth of strategic analysis because good analysts were often pulled into operational units. During crisis periods, senior analysts were sometimes assigned secretarial duties because managers were reluctant to ask secretaries to work late at night. He believes that many of these problems persist today. With regard to the Government's post-9/11 efforts against terrorist financing, Mr. Levitt praised the efforts of Treasury's outgoing General Counsel David Aufhauser. At the same time, he criticized the USG's structure as cumbersome (e.g., persistence of different terrorist lists) and said that the USG needs a senior official who focuses on terrorist financing and chairs the PCC dealing with that issue. Also, the USG needs a culture change so that everyone is working to contribute to the overall interagency effort. Mr. Levitt also thought that there were additional entities that should have been shut down, even allowing for the fact that in some cases nonaction was justified because of ongoing intelligence investigations. In addition, many of the terrorism lists are not complimentary, with radicals on one list but not another. Saudi Arabia Mr. Levitt also addressed the role of Saudi Arabia in financing terrorist groups. He stated that the Kingdom is not doing everything it can and should be doing to choke off terrorist financing. Much of the Kingdom's clerical elite is sympathetic to Bin Ladin. He singled out Prince Nayef, the Saudi Interior Minister, as a major problem. He charged that Prince Nayef does not cooperate with the USG, that he is aware of some extremist financing, and that he consciously shields himself from information that he does not agree with or want to hear. Mr. Levitt also asserted that much of Saudi Arabia's religious establishment was sympathetic to parts of Bin Laden's agenda, and that Saudi diplomats have been linked to charities that operate as fronts for terrorist groups. Mr. Levitt gave examples of inadequate Saudi action against terrorist financing. Although the Saudis shut down two branches of the Al-Haramain charity, those branches later reopened, and in any case the Saudis should have taken action against the entire organization. He also expressed concern about the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the Muslim World League (MWL), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), and Saudi businessman Wael Jalaidan. (Jalaidan was apparently the subject of a joint U.S.-Saudi terrorist designation, which Prince Nayef then disavowed). Mr. Levitt also criticized other Saudi actions, including alleged Saudi funding of mosques used by terrorists, Saudi efforts to spread Wahabi ideology, and what he said were proactive efforts by Saudi officials to undermine counterterrorism investigations in other countries through, e.g., the issuance of

11/7/2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Page 3 of 4

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[deleted last sentence as redundant] There was not a major change in Saudi cooperation after September 11. The Kingdom launched a public relations campaign and denied charges but did not fulfill provinces promises related to a financial intelligence unit or giving FBI and IRS people on the ground direct access to the data the Saudis receive. As a result, we don't know what we are not getting. It focused on its image, not the problem. Mr. Levitt has not seen a marked improvement in Saudi actions since the May 12, 2003 bombings in Riyadh. The FBI needs to be empowered and tasks tasked to run a strategic analytic review of Saudi links to international terrorism cases in the United States. The Bureau needs to know the scope of the problem and the details of groups and institutions with links to the Kingdom. Mr. Levitt suggested that we speak with USG officials Cofer Black, David Aufhauser, and Stephen Hadley to learn more about the lack of Saudi cooperation on terrorist financing. He added that there were no simple answers to the problems with Saudi Arabia since the Saudi government is essentially dysfunctional. HAMAS, PIJ, and the Muslim Brotherhood HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic Jihad are not part of the al-Qa'ida "family," but it is impossible to disentangle their logistics networks. Doth organizations have tremendous legitimacy, and Our Arab partners refuse to delegitimate their use of terrorism by HAMAS and PIJ, focusing instead on the cause itself which is legitimate if peacefully articulated. More broadly, the international community needs to delegitimate terrorist tactics and should help fill the gaps in Palestinian society that HAMAS and PIJ fill meet the social and economic needs in Palestinian society so that Palestinians will not need to rely on HAMAS and PIJ to meet those needs. Levitt believes the Muslim Brotherhood should be designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Brotherhood members call for jihad and otherwise aid violence. Hizballah and Iran Hizballah is an extremely capable terrorist group that gets tremendous support from Iranian intelligence and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as well as from Syria (which is less involved in Hizballah's global network). Some al-Qa'ida members trained with Hizballah and learned about spectacular attacks and how to do prcoccupational preoperational surveillance. There were also meetings - but they did not progress e» to operational cooperation. Hizballah has close ties to the Popular Resistance Committee in Gaza and is otherwise aiding various anti-Israel groups. Today Hizballah is building up its international capacity. This is now latent, but it could be turned on if the group wants to use it. Iran shelters al-Qa'ida leaders, but the relationship is tactical, not intimate. Iraq and Syria Al-Qa'ida and Iraq were always involved, and the current "open door" works well for the organization. For months jihadis have crossed from Syria, and it is documented that money and supplies are coming in. The Syrians are allowing entry into Iraq and perhaps facilitating it. Even before the war, Syria allowed Al Qa'ida operatives to transit Syrian territory on their way to Ansar al-Islam camps in Iraq. Saddam Husayn probably had a liaison with al-Qa'ida but not necessarily sponsorship. The war with Iraq may not have been the best use of resources.

11/7/2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Page 4 of 4

Recommendations U.S. diplomacy in the war on terrorism is poor. The United States cannot do everything on its own cutting off funding or otherwise isolating groups requires worldwide help. The Bush administration is unnecessarily unilateral. The Arab states also are necessary to give cover on the peace process. Public diplomacy is abysmal. The MEPI is a good first step, but small. Domestic intelligence should be made separate from the FBI. DHS' role in intelligence is not clear.

11/7/2003

lYoel Tobin From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

[email protected] Thursday, November 06, 2003 11:11 AM [email protected] [email protected] Re: first part of draft MFR for Levitt

Levitt MFR.doc (35 KB)

Here is the version with my inputs. I'll have it added to the system.

Let me know when you approve, and

Dan

Original Message From: "" Date: Thursday, October 30, 2003 2:42 pm Subject: first part of draft MFR for Levitt

> > > > >

Dan: Below is a partial draft of the MFR for Matt Levitt. Please review what I have done and complete it at your convenience. Also, if you don't mind, I would like to review your portion before we finalize it.

> > > >

By the way, have you seen Matt's Sept. 10, 03 testimony? It fleshes out some of his contentions during the interview, (see http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/levitt/levitt091003.htm)

> Regards, > Yoel >

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

> Event: Interview of Matthew Levitt > Date: October 28, 2003 > Classification: Unclassified > Prepared by: Yoel Tobin & Dan Byman > Team numbers: 1 and 3 > Location: K Street, Conference Room > Participant: Matthew Levitt, Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies at > the > Washington Institute for Near East Policy > Participants - Commission: Dan Byman & Yoel Tobin > Background > Mr. Levitt is currently at the Washington Institute for Near 1

> > > > >

Policy. Before that, he served as a counterterrorism analyst at the FBI from November 1998 through November 2001. At the FBI, he focused primarily on Palestinian terrorist groups, but also worked on issues relating to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda.

> Combating Terrorist Financing > > Mr. Levitt commented on the efforts by the United States > Government (USG) to > combat terrorist financing. He said that the USG has "a far way > to go, " > although the situation has improved somewhat since 9/11. > > Mr. Levitt said that there should be no distinction between > material supporters > of terrorism and those who pull the trigger or activate the bomb, > i.e., there > are all equally culpable. > > Mr. Levitt was critical of the FBI in several respects. He said > disapprovingly > that before 9/11 DOJ and FBI management would only prosecute > persons who gave > money to terrorist groups if there was proof that the donor > knowingly intended > to finance a terrorist attack. He also stated that the FBI is > poorly organized > and that for bureaucratic reasons it insists on pigeonholing cases > into > discreet categories by terrorist group, when in fact the > boundaries between > groups are often fluid. In addition, he asserted that the FBI > sometimes > withheld relevant information from its analysts, and that there > was a dearth of > strategic analysis because good analysts were often pulled into > operational > units. During crisis periods, senior analysts were sometimes > assigned > secretarial duties because managers were reluctant to ask > secretaries to work > late at night. He believes that many of these problems persist today. > > With regard to the Government's post-9/11 efforts against > terrorist financing, > Mr. Levitt praised the efforts of Treasury's outgoing General > Counsel David > Aufhauser. At the same time, he criticized the USG's structure as > cumbersome > (e.g., persistence of different terrorist lists) and said that the > USG needs a > senior official who focuses on terrorist financing and chairs the > PCC dealing > with that issue. Also, the USG needs a culture change so that > everyone is > working to contribute to the overall interagency effort. > > Mr. Levitt also thought that there were additional entities that > should have > been shut down, even allowing for the fact that in some cases > nonaction was

justified because of ongoing intelligence investigations. > > Mr. Levitt also addressed the role of Saudi Arabia in financing > terrorist > groups. He stated that the Kingdom is not doing everything it can > and should > be doing to choke off terrorist financing. He singled out Prince > Nayef, the > Saudi Interior Minister, as a major problem. He charged that > Prince Nayef does > not cooperate with the USG, that he is aware of some extremist > financing, and > that he consciously shields himself from information that he does > not agree > with or want to hear. Mr. Levitt also asserted that much of Saudi > Arabia's > religious establishment was sympathetic to parts of Bin Laden's > agenda, and > that Saudi diplomats have been linked to charities that operate as > fronts for > terrorist groups. > > Mr. Levitt gave examples of inadequate Saudi action against > terrorist > financing. Although the Saudis shut down two branches of the Al> Haramain > charity, those branches later reopened, and in any case the Saudis > should have > taken action against the entire organization. He also expressed > concern about > the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the Muslim > World League > (MWL), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), and Saudi > businessman Wael > Jalaidan. (Jalaidan was apparently the subject of a joint U.S.> Saudi terrorist > designation, which Prince Nayef then disavowed). > > Mr. Levitt also criticized other Saudi actions, including alleged > Saudi funding > of mosques used by terrorists, Saudi efforts to spread Wahabi > ideology, and > what he said were proactive efforts by Saudi officials to > undermine > counterterrorism investigations in other countries through, e.g., > the issuance > of visas. > > Mr. Levitt has not seen a marked improvement in Saudi actions > since the May 12, > 2003 bombings in Riyadh. > > Mr. Levitt suggested that we speak with USG officials Gofer Black, > David > Aufhauser, and Stephen Hadley to learn more about the lack of > Saudi cooperation > on terrorist financing. He added that there were no simple > answers to the > problems with Saudi Arabia since the Saudi government is > essentially > dysfunctional. > > Mr. Levitt emphasized the permeable borders between terrorist > groups and the > need to crack down on terrorist financing across the board, rather > than > restricting our efforts to Al Qaeda. He believes that support 3

networks for Al ' Qaeda frequently support other Islamic terrorist groups, as well, '> and gave > examples of overlapping assistance to both Hamas and Al Qaeda. He > also > believes that it is a moral imperative to have a consistent, > across-the-board > counterterrorism policy against groups that target civilians. > > [rest for Dan]

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Page 1 of 1

Yoel Tobin From:

Daniel Byman [[email protected]]

Sent:

Monday, November 03, 2003 10:39 AM

To:

[email protected]

Cc:

[email protected]

Subject: Levitt info

We interviewed Matt Levitt, largely about terrorist logistics, last week. He just sent us this bit of information that he had passed on to the 9/11 Joint Inquiry. I thought it would be of interest to your team. Dan

Original Message Subjectralso FYI DaterMon, 03 Nov2003 10:23:43 -0500 From:"MATT LEVITT" <[email protected]> To:, Thanks for having me in last week to give you the world according to Matt. I apologize for having to run back to the o f f i c e . Thought y o u ' d find the attached interesting and perhaps useful, I submitted it to the Congressional joint inquiry at their request as follow up to the interview I gave them. It still stands true. Matt Matthew A. Levitt Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Tel. 202-452-0650 Fax 202-223-5364 mat11@washingtpninsti tute.org www. washingtoninstitute -_

11/3/2003

Yoel Tobin From: Sent: To: Subject:

MATT LEVITT [[email protected]] Monday, November 03, 2003 10:24 AM [email protected]; [email protected] also FYI

Joint 9-11 inquiry letter.doc...

Thanks for having me in last week to give you the world according to Matt. for having to run back to the office.

I apologize

Thought you'd find the attached interesting and perhaps useful, I submitted it to the Congressional joint inquiry at their request as follow up to the interview I gave them. Tt~

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Matt Matthew A. Levitt Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20036 Tel. 202-452-0650 Fax 202-223-5364 [email protected] www.washingtoninstitute.org

July 23, 2002 Ms. Eleanor Hill, Director of the Joint Inquiry Staff Ford House Office Building, Room H2-167 Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Ms. Hill, In response to your staffs request, I submit to you this statement for the record offering my assessment of the how FBI analysts are trained, used, and regarded. As someone who served as an FBI counterterrorism intelligence analyst (an Intelligence Research Specialist, or IRS) from November 1998 through November 2001, it is my pleasure to provide this first-hand account of some of the central problems hindering the intelligence function and the analytical process at the FBI. I should note that there are a number of positions at the FBI that can be described as "analysts." My statement uses the term to describe the IRS position, which most closely resembles the pure intelligence analyst position common in other US government agencies. How analysts are trained: They are not. Unlike Special Agents, who undergo specialized training prior to assuming their posts, FBI analysts are given no training whatsoever upon entry into the FBI. Training opportunities arise over the course of one's career, including administrative training on the use of FBI and other computer systems, courses on specific area studies, substantive courses on particular fields such as counterterrorism analysis course, but nothing is offered - let alone required - upon entry on duty (EOD) and before assuming responsibility for specific programs. The FBI's database is cumbersome and not user-friendly, but analysts learn to use it on the job. The vast majority of analysts join the bureau with general degrees in International Affairs, but with little substantive knowledge or expertise in international terrorism in general or the specific regions, states, or groups they are assigned to cover. That too is learned on the job. There is no language training offered for analysts, nor is there any travel requirement for area familiarization as there is for analysts in practically every other U.S. intelligence agency. In one instance, analysts who requested such area familiarization were rebuked by FBI management for trying to get the FBI to "pay for their vacation." In another, analysts covering Middle Eastern terrorist groups requested Arabic language training and were similarly rebuked for trying to get the FBI to "pay for their education." Analysts were told - by managers with no understanding or appreciation of analysis - that they had no need for language training to provide analysis, and that any translations they needed could be accomplished by an FBI language specialist (LS). The training that analysts do receive over the course of their careers is provided in nearly every instance by outside agencies such as the CIA, DIA, and others. As such, it is relevant and important, but does not necessarily address FBI-specific issues and circumstances. Analysts should be trained, upon entry into the bureau and throughout their careers, in the art of analytical thinking and writing. They should be provided guidance in the process of absorbing tremendous quantities of information, sifting through it all, picking out the

significant information, and packaging that information in a way that best suits the needs of the recipient audience/s. Analysts should receive language training and incentives to engage in such training, as well as be required to travel to the regions they cover for area familiarization and briefing tours every 1-2 years. And they should receive training in areas studies, issues in intelligence and law enforcement, and substantive training in international terrorism, counterterrorism, specific terrorist groups, fronts and sponsors. Counterintelligence analysts should receive similar training particular to their field. How analysts are used: There is no uniform procedure for using analysts or incorporating their function into the overall operational function of the FBI. The flow of information is controlled by the substantive operational unit, which determines if, and how, to use their analytical counterparts. There is no mandated requirement to include analysts in the team tasked with a specific area of responsibility, and as such some analysts are brought to meetings and given access to information such as asset reporting and FISA wiretaps and others are not. Often there is tension between the purely analytical IRS and the Intelligence Operations Specialist (IOS) sitting in the operational unit. The use of analysts is driven primarily by the individual relationships analysts establish with operational counterparts at FBI headquarters and in FBI field offices. The few attempts to standardize and mandate the terms, responsibilities and requirements of analytical support to operational units, including one effort which I was tasked to help write after the Millennial threat in December 1999 and January 2000, failed miserably after operational units summarily disregarded them. How analysts are regarded: Analysts are considered "support staff," no different than secretaries or other non-specialized personnel. Analysts' professional experience and advanced degrees are resented more than respected among many Special Agents and lOSs, and they are regularly sidelined. Agents frequently choose not to seek the analytical input of the their respective professional analysts, and have been known to reject analysis out of hand when it didn't suit their needs. Asset validations, which are not employed as frequently as required and are often ignored when critical of an Agent's asset, are a critical example of this phenomenon. The FBI in general, and management and operational units in particular, are Agent-driven societies. Individuals with little or no experience in intelligence, terrorism, analysis or the particularly region of world in question are the ones making decisions about the relevance, quality, significance and application of intelligence analysis provided by analytical units. Being an analyst at the FBI is a frequently demeaning and frustrating experience, especially difficult for young professionals with advanced degrees who chose employment in the public sector over more lucrative private sector employment in the hopes of making a difference. Picture of career progression: While the IRS position at FBI headquarters goes up to the GS-14 level (it is lower in the field offices), little distinction is made - if any - between the responsibilities and expectations at different GS levels. In my own experience, I started as a GS-11 and left as a GS-13 and served the same functions, with the same responsibilities and no additional expectations or opportunities throughout. At age 31,1 faced the prospect of earning my GS-14 and plateauing at my own glass ceiling. There are very few management positions for analysts, since the Bureau is so Agent-centric. In

most cases, those management positions available to career analysts are purely administrative, while management positions available to career Agents are substantive. In short, there is no structure, no management, whose sole purpose is to see to the integrity of the intelligence function and the analytical process. There is no mechanism that ensures, or even facilitates, analysts' access to information and their timely analysis of that information. Analysts who ingratiate themselves with their operational counterparts, often by playing by whatever rules the operational unit delineates, may be able to position themselves to analyze source information, highlight intelligence gaps, connect seemingly unrelated pieces of information and give form to the overall picture of a specific case or provide an overall assessment of a terrorist group. Others will not. Analysis needs to be recognized as a critical commodity, not an optional and parenthetical product that can alternatively be recognized or ignored. Intelligence and analysis should not be subservient to operations, nor should they be run or managed by individuals with no or little expertise and exposure to intelligence, analysis and the substantive subject area (counterterrorism, counter-intelligence, etc). I hope you find these comments useful. Please feel free to contact me with any additional questions. Yours,

Matthew A. Levitt Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies The Washington Institute for Near East Studies 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, B.C. 20036 202-452-0650 [email protected]

Mail "Sent Items: first part of draft MFR for Levitt

I

Page 1 of 2

93.14MB /476.84MB (19.53%)

Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2003 14:42:41 -0500 From: "" 4|F To: "" 41 Subject: first part of draft MFR for Levitt

Dan: Below is a partial draft of the MFR for Matt Levitt. Please review what I have done and complete it at your convenience. Also, if you don't mind, I would like to review your portion before we finalize it. By the way, haye you seen Matt's Sept. 10, 03 testimony? it fleshes out some of his contentipns during the interview, (see http://www.washi ngtoni nsti tute.org/medi a/1evi tt/1evi tt091003.htm) Regards, Yoel MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: interview of Matthew Levitt Date: October 28, 2003 Classification: unclassified Prepared by: Yoel Tobin & Dan Byman Team numbers: 1 and 3 Location: K Street, Conference Room Participant: Matthew Levitt, senior Fellow in Terrorism studies at the Washington institute for Near East Policy Participants - commission: Dan Byman & Yoel Tobin Background Mr. Levitt is currently at the Washington Institute for Near Policy. Before that, he served as a counterterrorism analyst at the FBI from November 1998 through November 2001. At the FBI, he focused primarily on Palestinian terrorist groups, but also worked on issues relating to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Combating Terrorist Financing Mr. Levitt commented on the efforts by the united States Government (USG) to combat terrorist financing. He said that the USG has "a far way to go," although the situation has improved somewhat since 9/11. Mr. Levitt said that there should be no distinction between material supporters of terrorism and those who pull the trigger or activate the bomb, i.e., there are all equally culpable. Mr. Levitt was critical of the FBI in several respects. He said disapprovingly that before 9/11 DOJ and FBI management would only prosecute persons who gave money to terrorist groups if there was proof that the donor knowingly intended to finance a terrorist attack. He also stated that the FBI is poorly organized and that for bureaucratic reasons it insists on pigeonholing cases into discreet categories by terrorist group, when in fact the boundaries between groups are often fluid, in addition, he asserted that the FBI sometimes

http://kinesis.swishmail.conVwebmail/imp/rnessage.php?actionID=148&mailbox=INBOX.Sent+Items&bo... 10/30/03

it Items:firstpart of draft MFR for Levitt

Page 2 of 2

,iheld relevant information from its analysts, and that there was a dearth of Vategic analysis because good analysts were often pulled into operational nits. During crisis periods, senior analysts were sometimes assigned secretarial duties because managers were reluctant to ask secretaries to work late at night. He believes that many of these problems persist today. with regard to the Government's post-9/11 efforts against terrorist financing, Mr. Levitt praised the efforts of Treasury's outgoing General Counsel David Aufhauser. At the same time, he criticized the use's structure as cumbersome (e.g., persistence of different terrorist lists) and said that the use needs a senior official who focuses on terrorist financing and chairs the PCC dealing with that issue. Also, the USG needs a culture change so that everyone is working to contribute to the overall interagency effort. Mr. Levitt also thought that there were additional entities that should have been shut down, even allowing for the fact that in some cases nonaction was justified because of ongoing intelligence investigations. Mr. Levitt also addressed the role of Saudi Arabia in financing terrorist groups. He stated that the Kingdom is not doing everything it can and should be doing to choke off terrorist financing. He singled out Prince Nayef, the Saudi interior Minister, as a major problem. He charged that Prince Nayef does not cooperate with the USG, that he is aware of some extremist financing, and that he consciously shields himself from information that he does not agree with or want to hear. Mr. Levitt also asserted that much of Saudi Arabia's religious establishment was sympathetic to parts of Bin Laden's agenda, and that Saudi diplomats have been linked to charities that operate as fronts for terrorist groups. Mr. Levitt gave examples of inadequate Saudi action against terrorist financing. Although the Saudis shut down two branches of the Al-Haramain charity, those branches later reopened, and in any case the Saudis should have taken action against the entire organization. He also expressed concern about the international Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the Muslim world League (MWL), the world Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), and Saudi businessman wael Dalaidan. Oalaidan was apparently the subject of a joint U.S.-Saudi terrorist designation, which Prince Nayef then disavowed). Mr. Levitt also criticized other Saudi actions, including alleged Saudi funding of mosques used by terrorists, Saudi efforts to spread wahabi ideology, and what he said were proactive efforts by Saudi officials to undermine counterterrorism investigations in other countries through, e.g., the issuance of visas. Mr. Levitt has not seen a marked improvement in Saudi actions since the May 12, 2003 bombings in Riyadh. Mr. Levitt suggested that we speak with USG officials Cofer Black, David Aufhauser, and Stephen Hadley to learn more about the lack of Saudi cooperation on terrorist financing. He added that there were no simple answers to the problems with Saudi Arabia since the Saudi government is essentially dysfunctional. Mr. Levitt emphasized the permeable borders between terrorist groups and the need to crack down on terrorist financing across the board, rather than restricting our efforts to Al Qaeda. He believes that support networks for Al qaeda frequently support other Islamic terrorist groups, as well, and gave examples of overlapping assistance to both Hamas and Al Qaeda. He also believes that it is a moral imperative to have a consistent, across-the-board counterterrorism policy against groups that target civilians. [rest for Dan]

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QUESTIONS FOR MATT LEVITT You've called Al Qaeda a "network of networks" in one of your articles. Can you elaborate? How do you understand the nature of Al Qaeda pre9/11? Post-9/11? The recent policywatch you authored suggests that Islamic terrorists and their networks cross group lines and that it is a mistake to focus on, say, Al Qaeda, to the exclusion of Hamas or Hezbollah. Can you elaborate? o How do we set priorities under this approach? What would you say to those who assert that Al Qaeda represents the real threat to the US and that we should focus our resources on it? What were the links, if any, between Al Qaeda and Hezbollah prior to 9/11? How have they changed post 9/11? o You wrote in February 2003 that "although Hezbollah and AQ do not appear to share operational support, they have engaged in logistical cooperation on an ad hoc and tactical basis, as well as cooperative training." o How significant was this cooperation? Did Hezbollah contribute significantly to Al Qaeda's capabilities? Did AQ contribute significantly to Hezbollah's capabilities? o How did AQ and Hezbollah bridge the Sunni/Shia divide? Will that divide limit future cooperation? o What can the US do to prevent these groups from cooperating? What about links between Iran and AQ? o Would Iran necessarily have been aware of any AQ-Hezbollah cooperation? o In your May 29, 2003 article on Iran, you cite U.S. intelligence reports that Bin Laden operatives approached Iranian agents in 95 and again in 96, "offering to join forces against the United States." Can you elaborate on this? How did the Iranians respond? o Post 9/11: In your May 29, 2003 article, you accuse Iran of "sheltering" AQ leadership figures. Can you elaborate? Press

reporting has been somewhat inconsistent and uncertain on whether Iran has arrested these men, or whether it is allowing them to operate. Is it possible that these men are in fact sitting in Iranian jails? o If Iran is harboring AQ, is it possible that rogue elements are responsible for this? Or can we assume that such actions would not be taken without the approval of Khameini? o Same question re: past Iranian support. o As with Hezbollah, does Shia/Sunni divide limit cooperation? o What can the US do to pressure/entice Iran to hand over Al Qaeda men within its borders and to end any cooperation with AQ? In your judgment, do US troops in Iraq face a serious threat from groups like Ansar al Islam, Hezbollah, and/or AQ? Or is the primary threat from ex-Baathists? What should the US do to minimize the threat to our troops from Islamic terrorists? Who do you suspect killed the 3 American guards in Gaza recently? AQ? Hizballah? A Palestinian group? Members of a hard-to-categorize informal network? Does this presage a shift in tactics by Islamic extremists in Israel and the territories toward U.S. targets? o Do you see signs that AQ is focusing more on Israeli and/or Jewish targets than it has in the past? If you were serving on the Commission, what policy recommendations would you make?

Questions for Matt Levitt 1. You have been critical of the USG effort to combat terrorist financing. If you were in charge, what concrete steps would you take, and how would those steps improve our efforts. 2. In particular, you have been critical of Saudi Arabia and the USG effort to persuade Saudi Arabia to crack down on terrorist financing. •

Describe your various criticisms?

•

Post-9/11 change?

•

To the extent you have been able to follow the changes in the Saudi's approach to terrorism following the May 12, 03 Riyadh bombings, how do you evaluate those changes?

3. What concrete metrics would you propose for evaluating (1) the success of the efforts to combat terrorist financing; and (2) Saudi Cooperation in those efforts? 4. You have written, "since there is significant overlap between terrorist groups in the area of financing, failure to deal with the financing of groups like Hamas undermines efforts to stem the flow of funds to al-Qaeda." Jerusalem Post, August 03. Although that is certainly true of entities shown to finance both groups, why is that true with respect to entities only funding Hamas? In other words, if we have evidence a person is a Hamas financier but no evidence that person funds al-Qaeda, how does cracking down on that person help combat al-Qaeda [setting aside the independent value in addressing Hamas fundraising]? 5. How do you respond to an argument that addressing Hamas fund-raising actually hurts the effort to maintain a unified international front against al-Qaeda fund-raising because of the support Hamas enjoys in much of Islamic world, and parts of Europe? 6. As a former FBI analyst, you have been critical of the FBI's analytical program. Have you followed the FBI's efforts to improve analytical capability in the terrorist financing area? If so, are they on the right track? 7. How do you target terrorist logistics cells more effectively? Why did the United States not do so pre-911?

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: Background briefing on Afghanistan and the Taliban Type of event: Briefing Date: August 1,2003 Special Access Issues: None—Unclassified Prepared by: A. Albion Team Number: 3 Location: K Street, Conference Room Participants - Dr. Larry Goodson, US Army War College Participants - Commission: Alexis Albion, Scott Allan, Tom Dowling, Nicole Grandrimo, Mike Hurley, Yoel Tobin

Dr. Goodson addressed the following areas: 1. The Rise of the Taliban and al Qaeda • Goodson dates the foundations of the Taliban to the culture wars (Islamism vs. modernization) of the mid-late 1960s at Kabul University, which themselves grew out of two critical points in Afghanistan's history: 1. The struggles of the 1920s between modernizing forces and resistance to modernization; and 2. The period of post-British withdrawal from the region in the early 1950s, and what Goodson characterized as the U.S. decision not to step in but rather to leave Afghanistan to the Soviets. • 1960s sees the emergence of Islamism, spiking again with the Iranian revolution. • After 1979 Islamism and Soviet expansionism into the region are two major regional areas of concern for the U.S. • Afghan-Soviet war leads to a number of transformative factors in the region: 1. Involvement of Arabs in the war: —Arab fighters in Afghanistan seen as "completely useless" and largely disliked by Afghans, mostly kept in camps not far from Pakistan border and kept out of most of the lighting;

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-Influx of Arab money (from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE), tending to fund Islamist projects (mosques & madrasas); Saudi money (through NGOs) continued after the war as they sought to counter Iranian ambitions in Afghanistan. 2. Socioeconomic changes that transform traditional society: --Traditional Afghan social structures disrupted and new, (artificial) structures emerge, eg. tribal elders replaced by younger elites with different sources of authority (mullahs; military leaders); —Refugee camps: an artificial environment; increasingly radical version of Islamic teaching being taught to refugee children; stricter adherence to some tribal practices (eg. veiling of women). • The Taliban itself grows out of both the Afghan-Soviet war (and the involvement in it of Arab radicals) as well as regional factors (rise of Islamism in South Asia and the Middle East), eventually laying the foundation for al Qaeda. • In 1997, Taliban "shifts" to the right, controlled by Mullah Omar.

2. Pakistan as a Critical Factor in the Rise of the Taliban • Afghan-Soviet war changes the strategic calculus for Pakistan with respect to Afghanistan. - Pre-1979, Pakistan views Afghanistan as an area to be denied to India; ISI is only moderately engaged in Afghanistan, conducting small operations (but opening the door for greater engagement); — With start of the war, Pakistan becomes fully engaged, and plays the U.S. for whatever it can get. • Involvement of ISI: "the war is an ISI show": — ISI officers run the resistance in Afgh., fighting, training and distributing CIA weapons; — Individual relationships of trust between ISI, key Afghans and Afghan Arabs develop across the porous Pashtun border over a number of years; familiar connections on both sides of the border; — Unique border relationship continues today: field grade and lower ISI officers probably know where 2nd tier al Qaeda officers are. • By the late 1980s, Pakistan had invested an enormous amount in Afghanistan: ~ shift in geo-strategic thinking (Afgh. as area of direct Pakistani involvement); ~ quiet, forward engagement (training, armed support); — deleterious side-effects on Pakistan politics, economy and society: — deeper sectarianism, - upset of ethnic balance (huge influx of Afgh. refugees),

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~ rampant heroin problem, ~ corruption in government, -- deepening Islamization. • Post-war conditions lead Pakistan to play the Taliban card: ~ Pakistan gives itself the credit for defeat of Soviets in Afgh. and fall of Soviet empire; ~ But in post-war period Afghanistan is in chaos and Pakistan is not benefiting from the opening of ex-Soviet markets; ~ Taliban emerges as pro-Pakistan, offering a degree of stability that will allow transit trade and possibly a pipeline to go through Afghanistan; • Taliban emerges as a vehicle by which Pakistan can make Afghanistan pay off its huge investment in the region. Oil/gas in Central Asia was a secondary "downstream" issue. • Was the Taliban its own indigenous movement or a creation of Pakistan? According to Goodson, Taliban was an indigenous group (and not an ISI creation—though ISI had ties with groups involved in Taliban). At some point early on, Pakistan made a conscious decision to shift its support to the Taliban, which then grew into something less pliable than anticipated. 3. U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan/Taliban • 1989-1996: U.S. policy of abandonment/disengagement toward Afghanistan (and Pakistan); ~ mid-late 1994, rise of Taliban and continued requests from Pakistan for U.S. engagement in the region; • 1996: U.S. begins to pay attention, because: 1. Taliban looks as if it can bring stability to the region, and consequently seems to have some popular support; 2. Taliban is clearly being backed by the Paks and Saudis. • By 1997, after Pakistan recognizes the Taliban government, U.S. is very close to doing the same (existing predisposition to follow the Pakistan lead), but held back by the 4 issues driving USG policy: 1. human rights issues, especially treatment of women (though Goodson sees this as a symbolic issue only); 2. concern about opium-heroin production (though mainly a European and Pakistan problem); 3. notion of necessity for broad-based government, involving all regional groups; 4. terrorism and UBL: a real strategic concern for the U.S. -- Late 1990s, widely spread and believed rumors throughout the region that the U.S. would target UBL if it could;

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~ 1998-2001, rumors that U.S. had some kind of asset (human or electronic) by which it was keeping its eye on UBL. • 1998-2001, U.S. views Afghanistan/Taliban as a problem best managed by keeping it contained: • USG takes a calculated decision to put UBL in a box unless there are opportunities to target him that involve an acceptable risk (eg. cruise missile attacks); according to Goodson, US population would not have supported "boots on the ground"; — USG uses traditional methods (diplomacy, UN sanctions) to lean on Taliban—Taliban responds to a limited extent. USG also pressures Saudis/ Paks to press the UBL issue with the Taliban. ~ Note regional context: Taliban/UBL threat overshadowed by other South Asian concerns within USG in late 1990s: India-Pakistan rivalry; Pakistan's internal instability; nuclear threat; Kargil crisis. ~ According to Goodson, UNOCAL did not have a decisive influence over US policymakers. 4. Where Did We Go wrong? • Taliban-al Qaeda nexus not fully understood by USG: — UBL primarily seen as financier of terrorism; -- USG did not distinguish al Qaeda message from typical radical Islamic rhetoric; — Importance of internal shift within Taliban not appreciated: > decline of moderate Mullah Rabbani faction and rise of hardline leaders by 2000/1, with regional aspirations (Islamization); > closer relationship between UBL and Mullah Omar; UBL gaining more influence over Taliban leadership. failure to perceive the 'newness' of the Taliban-al Qaeda nexus, ie. a break in the pattern of statesponsored terrorism toward new model of terrorism emerging from failed states. • Afghanistan under the Taliban was not a state (and the Taliban was not a government) in the sense understood by USG: ~ autonomous, sub-state actors—eg. family networks, cross-border tribal ties—incompatible with strong central leadership; ~ U.S. lacked people on the ground in the region, with regional expertise and specialization; range of instruments being used to try to influence the Taliban (eg. UN sanctions) had little influence; were we pushing the levers in the right way? were we pushing the right levers? Eg. traditional approaches in Afghanistan to entice the local population to cooperation with U.S. programs through payment (eg. crop substitution, buy-back Stinger program) hadn't worked in the past—what made us think a bounty on UBL's head would be any more successful? (Goodson thinks the bounty ~$5M—was just too low). was the USG using a box of old tools—geared toward state-sponsorship of terrorism—to dismantle a

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completely new model? COMMISSION SENSITIVE 4 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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WITH DRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Box: 00010 Series: Copies: 1

Folder: 0026 Document: 59 Team 1 Files Pages: 8 ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: Folder Title: Matt Levitt Document Date: 08-01-2003 Document Type: Briefing Slides Special Media: From: To: Subject'

Briefing on Afghanistan and Taliban by Army War Co liege, with notes

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination.

NND: 281 Withdrawn: 06-03-2008

by:

RETRIEVAL #: 281 00010 0026 59 System DocID: 2578 • '

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Mail:: INBOX: Re: Fwd: Interview notices

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85.67MB / 476.84MB (1 7.97%) Date: From: To: Subject:

Wed, 22 Oct 2003 10:13:26 -0400 "" ^ "" 4P Re: Fwd: Interview notices

Yoel :

Conference Call-in # is 1-866-f 541-8377 Participant passcode - 523250 Leader passcode - 370933 Just send an all -staff email out saying you will be using the conference line at that time so that no one else will get on the line. Karen Quoting "" :

> ----- Forwarded message from Daniel Byman > Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2003 08:38:45 -0400 > From: Daniel Byman > Reply-To: Daniel Byman > Subject: interview notices > To: "" <[email protected]> > Marquittia, >

> Could you please send out notices to the other teams for these two > interviews: >

> 1. Matt Levitt, a terrorism expert at the Washington institute for Near > East Policy (Tuesday, October 28, at 9:00 at 2100 K Street). >

> > > > > > > > >

2. Professor Greg cause, a leading expert on Saudi Arabia, Thursday, NOV. 6th, at 2:00. This interview WILL BE DONE BY PHONE. For Matt, I will need to reserve a room (Philip's office would be fine, if the conference room is not available). For Greg, I will also need a room, and an office would be preferred so I can use the phone easily. Thanks. Dan

End forwarded message

Karen Heitkotter Executive Secretary National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the united States khei tkotter@9-llcommi ssi on.gov t-202-331-4060 f-202-296-5545

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85.67MB / 476.84MB (17.97%) Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2003 09:26:43 -0400 From: Daniel Byman 4F To: "" ^ Subject: Re: Interview notices ® 2 unnamed text/html 1.68 KB IH

I'm going to try to come to the office today about 3:00 or so. Can we shoot for a conference call with Matt at 3:30? If that does work, we can try the phone conferencing technology out.

Dan [email protected] wrote: Thanks, Dan. I am still interested in doing the Levitt interview -- do you want to do a joint phone call to him so that he knows what each of us is interested in? Quoting Daniel Byman :

Marquittia, Could you please send out notices to the other teams for these two interviews: 1. Matt Levitt, a terrorism expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Tuesday, October 28, at 9:00 at 2100 K Street). 2. Professor Greg Cause, a leading expert on Saudi Arabia, Thursday, Nov. 6th, at 2:00. This interview WILL BE DONE BY PHONE. For Matt, I will need to reserve a room (Philip's office would be fine, if the conference room is not available). For Greg, I will also need a room, and an office would be preferred so I can use the phone easily. Thanks. Dan

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85. 18MB /476.84MB (17.86%) Date: From: To: Subject:

Tue, 21 Oct2003 18:34:10 -0400 "" 4l Daniel Byman 4P Re: Interview notices

I am told that we do have such capabilities, and I will get the details tomorrow. Quoting Daniel Byman : > > > > > > > > > > >

I'm not going to be in the office this week, unfortunately. Do we have conference call capabilities? [email protected] wrote: >Thanks, Dan. I am still interested in doing the Levitt interview -- do you >want to do a joint phone call to him so that he knows what each of us is interested in? > >Quoting Daniel Byman :

> »Marquittia, > »

> > > > > > > > > > > >

»Could you please send out notices to the other teams for these two »interviews: » »1. Matt Levitt, a terrorism expert at the Washington institute for Near »East Policy (Tuesday, October 28, at 9:00 at 2100 K Street). » »2. Professor Greg Cause, a leading expert on Saudi Arabia, Thursday, »NOV. 6th, at 2:00. This interview WILL BE DONE BY PHONE. » »For Matt, I will need to reserve a room (Philip's office would be fine, »if the conference room is not available). For Greg, I will also need a »room, and an office would be preferred so I can use the phone easily.

>» > »Thanks .

> »Dan

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(ail:: INBOX: Re: Interview notices

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85.18MB /476.84MB (17.86%) Date: Tue, 21 Get 2003 14:15:51 -0400 From: Daniel Byman 4| To: "" <^ Subject: Re: Interview notices ^H 2 unnamed text/html 1.56 KB |g I'm not going to be in the office this week, unfortunately. Do we have conference call capabilities? ytobin® 9-11commission.gov wrote: Thanks, Dan. I am still interested in doing the Levitt interview -- do you want to do a joint phone call to him so that he knows what each of us is interested in?

Quoting Daniel Byman :

Marquittia, Could you please send out notices to the other teams for these two interviews: 1. Matt Levitt, a terrorism expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Tuesday, October 28, at 9:00 at 2100 K Street). 2. Professor Greg Cause, a leading expert on Saudi Arabia, Thursday, Nov. 6th, at 2:00. This interview WILL BE DONE BY PHONE. For Matt, I will need to reserve a room (Philip's office would be fine, if the conference room is not available). For Greg, I will also need a room, and an office would be preferred so I can use the phone easily. Thanks. Dan

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85.09MB /476.84MB (17.85%) Date: From: To: Subject:

Tue, 21 Oct 2003 10:52:29 -0400 "" ^ Daniel Byman <# Re: Interview notices

Thanks, Dan. I am still interested in doing the Levitt interview -- do you want to do a joint phone call to him so that he knows what each of us is interested in? Quoting Daniel Byman : > Marquittia, > Could you please send out notices to the other teams for these two > interviews:

* '"•

> 1. Matt Levitt, a terrorism expert at the Washington Institute for Near > East Policy (Tuesday, October 28, at 9:00 at 2100 K Street). > > 2. Professor Greg cause, a leading expert on Saudi Arabia, Thursday,

"^ /

> NOV. 6th, at 2:00. This interview WILL BE DONE BY PHONE. > > > > > >

For Matt, I will need to reserve a room (Philip's office would be fine, if the conference room is not available). For Greg, I will also need a room, and an office would be preferred so I can use the phone easily.

«*

;

Thanks. Dan

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Tue, 21 Oct 2003 08:38:45-0400 Daniel Byman ^ "" <[email protected]>4P "" 4f,"" 4| Interview notices

Marquittia,

Could you please send out notices to the other teams for these two interviews: 1. Matt Levitt, a terrorism expert at the Washington institute for Near East Policy (Tuesday, October 28, at 9:00 at 2100 K Street). 2. Professor Greg Cause, a leading expert on Saudi Arabia, Thursday, Nov. 6th, at 2:00. This interview WILL BE DONE BY PHONE. For Matt, I will need to reserve a room (Philip's office would be fine, if the conference room is not available). For Greg, I will also need a room, and an office would be preferred so I can use the phone easily. Thanks. Dan

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