Phoenicians - Chapter 23

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Phoenicians Chapter 23 At this point in I would (again) step back and look for the driving motivation and actions behind all the politics of the French in the Middle East. At the end of WWI, the Ottoman Empire ceased to exist. Their immediate lands remained, and renamed (Anatolia) Turkey. But their holdings in the Arab provinces in historical Mesopotamia and Syria were lost, and divided between the British and the French (as mandated territories), with the world influenced provision that they must be prepared as soon as possible for independence. In Central and Eastern Europe new states were formed, states that had historically known traditions and a sense of nationality amongst them, and formed (in most cases) with well-defined expectations in their establishment. This was not the case in the Arab part of the Ottoman domain, where national consciousness (to the extent that it existed) was blurred and conflicted by traditional loyalties of other kinds which in many cased were in direct disagreement with each other. The Allies felt (and firmly believed) that they could “ignore” such rudimentary and confused national sentiments and set out to reorganize them into states, in effect redrawing the political map of the Arab world in a manner which they (the Allies) thought suited them best, disregarding the tribal and nationalistic norms. In the spring of 1920 an agreement had been reached between the British and French at San Remo1 on the distribution of the Arab territories, with the principle considerations being taken into account, that of oil and communications.

It is

well noted that during the onset of war oil had risen to the forefront as being of strategic importance, the British already had command over the vast oil resources of Iran, and were determined to prevent the Germans (who were major shareholder in the Turkish Petroleum Company, from gaining access to the proven Mesopotamian oil fields at “Kirkuk”. In 1916, an agreement negotiated between “Mark Sykes” on behalf of Britain, and “Francois Georges-Picot” representing France (Sykes-Picot Agreement), had assigned the Ottoman province of “Mosul”, in northern Mesopotamia to the French, and the provinces of Baghdad and Basra (central and southern Mesopotamia) to the 1

San Remo Conference, representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, and Belgium

British. In Syria, France received the province of “Aleppo” and the northern parts of the provinces of “Beirut” and “Damascus”, leaving the southern parts of these two provinces essentially to Britain, with the clear understanding that the “Holy Land” of Palestine having an International Status. However, the last months of the war the British took occupation of Palestine, so in consequence the entire wartime Sykes-Picot Agreement was thrown out the window. In the terms of the “new” agreement, France gave up her claims to the province of “Mosul” in return for a major share in the Turkish Petroleum Company, which had been reorganized by the Allies and was now the Iraq Petroleum Company (“IPC”) and whereas the “older” agreement had specified that France would have “direct” control over the coastal parts of the province of “Aleppo” and its share of the province of Beirut, but only a sphere of influence in inland Syria, where an Arab state (or) states or independent status would be established. The “new” agreement stated they were to have a “free hand” in the entire area which they were to hold as a “mandate” under the League of Nations – a continuous stretch of territory extending from the Euphrates River to the Mediterranean coast. On the other hand, the British in addition to “keeping” the whole of Mesopotamia as a mandate were “also” to have the mandate over all the southern parts of the provinces of Damascus and Beirut – a territory which they first called the Palestine east and west of the Jordan (or) simply, “Transjordan” and “Palestine”. So on effect, the British came to control a stretch of north Arabian Desert territory which secured the required land routes between its Mesopotamian and Palestine mandates, in other words, an uninterrupted overland route all the way from the border of Iran to the Mediterranean. The British aside from their agreement(s) with the French had made promises during the war to others concerning the same region. In central Arabia they had a long-standing alliance with “Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud”, the Wahhabi Emir of Riyad, who would later be the founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism was a movement of militant Islamic religious revival which had appeared in central Arabia in the middle decades of the 18th century and the House of Saud had been politically associated with it since that time. In conflict with this British-Saudi alliance was the wartime “alliance” reached between Britain and “Sharif Husayn”, the Emir of Mecca, who enjoyed a special

Arab and Islamic prestige as a recognized descendent of the Prophet, and whose family were called the “Hashemites.” In return for leading an Arab revolt against the Ottomans, the “Sharif” had been promised recognition as the “head” of an Arab Kingdom the exact nature of which was left undefined. The “Sharif” although, had be “led to understand” that it would include “all” of Mesopotamia, all that is but a “negotiable” strip on the coast of Syria, and the whole of the peninsula of Arabia, except for those parts which were already established as British protectorates. While the British relations with “Ibn Saud” were maintained by the British government via their office in India, those with the “Sharif” were initiated and worked through the “British Arab Bureau” in Cairo and to add to the mix the “British Foreign Office”, in close contact with the World Zionist Organization, which had by 1917 formally committed itself to viewing with favor the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. It was impossible for Britain after the war to honor simultaneously all these as promised, fully --- as a priority they needed to reach a settlement with France over the area, this was addressed by the San Remo agreement. During the last months of the war, as the British drove the Ottoman forces out of Syria, the “Sharif’s” third and most popular son, “Prince Faisal”, was allowed to enter Damascus and establish an Arab government on the behalf of his father. Now as the players met in San Remo to redraw a map of the Arab world, in Damascus “Prince Faisal” was proclaimed the “King of Syria.

This to place in front of the

British and French and already established fact – Syria had a king and therefore it was independent. Once the agreement had been concluded, the French who already occupied Beirut made a “show” of trying to reach an accommodation with “King Faisal”, then proceeded to crush him at the Battle of Maisalun, forcing him to abandon his shortlived Syrian kingdom.

To compensate their gallant wartime ally for his loss, the

British created another Arab kingdom out of one of the old Ottoman provinces of Mesopotamia, the Kingdom of Iraq. The British wartime commitment to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish National Home in the Palestine west of the Jordan, which now had risen to a very high priority --- was formalized in 1920 and included as a special article in the statutes of the British mandate for Palestine, as registered in the League of Nations.

For the Palestine east of the Jordan, or “Transjordan”, a special administrative arrangement was soon made. In 1916, when “Sharif Husayn” solemnly declared the start of the Arab Revolt against the Turks in Mecca, he also proclaimed himself King to the Arabs, and the British “actually” recognized him as the King of the Hijaz, which was the furthest they felt they could go at the time. After the war, “Ibn Saud” with his Wahhabi forces, began to attack the Hijaz, and completed its conquest by putting an end to “Sharifian” rule there in 1925. In the earlier stages of the “Saudi-Sharifian” conflict, the Sharifian forces, led by the Sharif’s second son “Abdallah”, suffered a serious defeat in battle. He (after loosing the battle) left the Hijaz in 1921 and went to “Transjordan”, where soon after his arrival the British soon recognized him as the sovereign emir. With British military support, “Abdullah” succeeded in repelling Wahhabi attempts to extend the Saudi domain northwards in the direction of Syria, thereby securing the extension of Transjordan eastwards continuously beyond the borders of Iraq. In the south, Abdullah’s Transjordanian emirate extended beyond the borders of the old Ottoman province of Damascus to reach the Red Sea at the Gulf of Aqaba, and include the northernmost parts of what had been the Ottoman province of the Hijaz.

In the east, the border of the emirate, in the Jordan valley, set the limits

beyond which the “projected” Jewish National Home in Palestine could not extend. The British at the time knew exactly what they wanted, and they got it: A. control over the oilfields of Iraq: B. unimpeded access from there to the Mediterranean C. control of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf (two critical maritime routes) To secure their interests, they naturally preferred to deal with parties in the region, or deeply concerned with the area, who also knew what they wanted, and who were willing to make “realistic” accommodations to achieve their goals. During the war, the British had made a point of encouraging Arab nationalist activity in Syria against the Ottomans; and it was partly through British intermediaries that the Arab nationalists in Syria were put in touch with “Sharif Husayn” and his sons –which subsequently gave the “Sharifian” revolt to the Hijaz the extra dimension it needed to gain recognition as a “true” Arab Revolt. After the war, it became clear to the British that the claims of Arab nationalism were urgently pushed forward by romantic dreamers who were unwilling to be

taught that politics was the art of the “possible”, or by “unprincipled” schemers who were out to secure “personal” rather than national interests.

In either case, the

nationalist claims, it was believed, where they threatened to “embarrass” British interests could be discounted as negligible cost. There remained one more problem, it seemed that King Husayn was having a fit over some of their decisions, and was demanding fixes they were not ready to commit to or fix. The number one item he wanted to have changed was his title(s), whereas he wanted to be: A. King of all the Arabs B. He also considered himself to be the “Caliphate of Islam” C. Not willing to recognize the arrangements of the Allies in San Remo D. Adamant in refusing to recognize the Jewish claims to Palestine His two sons, Abdullah and Faisal took a more realistic view, as did his rival in Arabia, “Ibn Saud”. Being practical men they were willing to give and take, and settle for what was ultimately achievable in the given circumstances, as they had in their possession arrangements in the parts allotted to them, or where they had a dominant influence --- all three were readily accommodated. The French (in their own mandated territories, known as the Levant) took the same attitude as the British, they were willing to attend to reasoned and concrete demands by parties who knew what they wanted, but had very little (if not none) for the claims or dreams of those who did not. In Mount Lebanon and the adjacent parts of the old province of Beirut, the “Maronites” with a long tradition of union of the Roman Catholic Church, were one party whose demands the French were prepared to listen to. They of all the citizens in the region, barring only a few individuals (or) politically experienced princely dynasties, appeared to be the ones who knew exactly what they wanted, in their case a “Greater Lebanon”, under their paramount control, separate, distinct and independent from the rest of Syria. Riding along with them, although behind them they had a rich and eventful past full of tribulation, successes and the Church. In 1861, with the help of France, the Maronites were instrumental in securing a special political status for their historical homeland of Mount Lebanon as a mutasarrifiyya (or) privileged sanjak (administrative region), within the Ottoman Empire, under an international guaranty. Since the turn of the century they had pushed for the extension of this small Lebanese territory to what they argued were

its natural and historical boundaries, to include the coastal towns of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon and Tyre and their respective region, which belonged to the province of Beirut, in addition to the fertile Beqaa valley, and its four administrative districts of Baalbek, the Bekaa, Rashayya and Hasbayya --- which belonged to the province of Damascus. According to the Maronite argument, this “Greater Lebanon” had always had a special social and historical character, different from that of its surrounding, which made it necessary and indeed imperative for France to assist in its establishment as an independent state. While France has strong sympathies for the Maronites, they did not support their demands without reserve – although in Mount Lebanon the Maronites had formed a majority of the population, in “Greater Lebanon”, they were bound to be outnumbered by the Muslims of the coastal towns and their surrounding region, and by those of the Beqaa valley – and if you added all those other Christian communities in a Greater Lebanon – they would best mount a “bare” minimum. The Maronites, however, were extremely insistent in their demands. Their secular and clerical leaders had pressed for them during the war among the all the Allied powers --- and after the war the same leaders, headed by the Maronite Patriarch Ilias Hoyek himself had pursued the same at the Paris Peach Conference, in the end France had capitulated. On September 1st, 1920 (barely four-months after the conclusion of the San Remo agreement, and just barely two-months after the flight of King “Prince” Faisal (or) Faysal, from Damascus, General Henri Gouraud (from the porch of his official residence as French High Commissioner in Beirut), proclaimed the birth of the “State of Greater Lebanon” with Beirut as its capital.

The flag of this “new”

Lebanon was none other than the French tri-color with a cedar tree, now hailed as the glorious symbol of the ancient country since Biblical times --- centered on the white center of the French flag. After the acknowledgement of the State of Greater Lebanon, the French turned to deal with the rest of their mandated territory in the Levant; mostly they were at a loss to any future actions, whereas in the case of Lebanon, the Maronites had indicated precisely what they wanted. Elsewhere, no community or region seemed willing to speak their mind clearly or to the point, which left the French to any direction they desired.

In Syria they established four states, two of them regional, Aleppo and Damascus, and two of them ethno-religious, State of the Alouites, and the State of Jebel Druze.

Later in the response to strong nationalist demands, the states of

Aleppo and Damascus were merged to form the State of Syria, later becoming the Syrian Republic, to which Jebel Druze and the Alouite country were annexed. On May 23rd, 1926 the State of Greater Lebanon received a “Constitution” which transformed it into the Lebanese Republic. Thus the two sister republics came into being, Lebanon and Syria --- both under French mandates, sharing the same currency and customs service, although flying different flags and run by separate native administrations under a “single” French High Commissioner living in Beirut. Before long, each of the two countries had their own national anthem, but the thinking remained, as separate administrative bureaucracies, a flag and national anthems make a true nation-state out of a given territory, and the people inhabiting those countries true citizens of a country who has its own true nationality? To the Maronites and many other Christians in Lebanon, there was no doubts about the matter --- the Lebanese were Lebanese, and the Syrians were Syrians, just as the Iraqis were Iraqi, the Palestinians, Palestinian and so forth and so on! If others, in comparison to the Lebanese wanted to unite under one nationality, they were free to do so, but the Lebanese remained Lebanese – regardless of the extent to which the outside world might choose to classify them as Arabs, just because their language happened to be Arabic! Their nationality they stated time and time again, was the ancient heritage of the historical Phoenicians, which came way before they had to share it with the Arabs, their heritage was far broader in scope as it covered the entire Mediterranean, whereas they once shared a common bond with the Greeks and Rome --- which they now shared this bond with Europe.

They also had a long

tradition of proud mountain freedom and independence which was “exclusively” theirs, making a steadfast claim to the hold on that historical experience.

They

were wholly and solely Lebanese! Unfortunately for the Maronites, not everyone in Lebanon thought or even came close to how they felt, actually there were even many Maronites who “dissented” and freely expressed their “divergent” views. After all, who could reasonably deny

that Lebanon, as a political entity, was a new country just as the other “Arab” countries under French or British mandate? Historical reference notes that Lebanon was as much a new country as the others, but with an important difference, it had been willed into existence by a community of its own people, albeit one community among others – moreover, those among its people who had willed it into existence were fully satisfied with what they got, and truly wanted the country to remain forever exactly as it had been, with or without any territory added or subtracted. The Syrian Republic it can be said was finally established in response to “nationalist” demands, as it pointed to when examining the nationalist uprising which overall lasted more than two-years. The revolt against the French began with “Saleh al-Ali’s” uprising in the Alawi 2 state (1919-1921), Ibrahim Hanano in Aleppo (1920-1921), Ramadan Shlash in eastern Syria (1919-1921) and Sultan Pasha al-Atrash in Jebel Druze (1925-1926) – and the revolt for Damascus and its rural areas (1925-1927), and the revolt for Hama (1919-1929) --- the French were eventually able to overcome these uprising throughout Syria --- the “Druze revolt and the Damascus revolt were collectively known as the “Great Syrian” revolution as they were the best organized. Damascus revolutionaries took and captured Damascus in 1925 (with the exception of the Meza area and the Damascus citadel), where the French army centered and attacked the rest of the city with artillery and aircraft bombs.

The remaining

revolutionaries in the city surrendered to the French, and the bombing was stopped. Many sections of the city were destroyed as a result of the bombardment, which lasted over 48-hours.

The last battles of the rural areas of Damascus in 1927

marked the end of the Great Syrian revolution. However, the nationalists were only partly satisfied with what they received and continued to aspire for much, much more. But so much like modern groups not in power (even today in the USA) they knew what they “didn’t want”, but they didn’t make clear, “what they wanted, or how to achieve their goals”, in this it can be said, “they were opposed to more, than what they were in favor of”. Keep in mind for a brief term, they had had an Arab Kingdom, and a national identity with their capital in the historical city of Damascus.

2

A city that was once the seat of the great

until 1920 they were known to the outside world as Nusayris or Ansaris

“Umayyad” caliphs, and the capital of the 1st Arab Empire – now the French had destroyed their kingdom and establish “states” on its territory - including Lebanon. The Syrian nationalists stated, the Maronites were entitled to continue to enjoy the sort of “autonomy” they have enjoyed since the 1860s in the Ottoman established mutasarrifiyah of Mount Lebanon, --- in the same breath they said, they had no real reason in feeling any different from other Syrian or Arabs. With regard to this, (they continued) they had no right securing for their “Greater Lebanon” Syrian territory which had formerly belonged to the provinces of Beirut or Damascus, and which had “never” formed part of their claimed “historical” homeland. In the Arab-Nationalist’s opinion, it was not fair/permissible to accord the Frenchcreated “Greater Lebanon” recognition as a nation-state separate and distinct from Syria – moreover the Syrian Republic itself was “not” acceptable as the final achievement of the its own people. In that, the Syrians (after all) were Arabs, and their territory (historically) had always included Palestine and Transjordan along with Lebanon, was not a “national territory” on its own, but part of a “greater” Arab homeland, a homeland whose ancient heartlands were Syria, Iraq and Arabia, and since Islam had also come to include Egypt and the countries of North Africa all the way to the Atlantic. They felt that during the Great War, the Allies had cheated the Arabs, whereas the British had promised them national independence on their “historical” homelands, but in a large manor had failed to honor their pledges. Instead, they had partitioned this “Arab Territory” with the French, and committed themselves to hand over a particularly “precious” part of it, “Palestine” to the Jews. In this vein they felt to “accept” any part of this --- was high treason.

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