Phoenicians - Chapter 18

Phoenicians Chapter 18

A soldier with none of the experience his predecessors had, Muzaffer tried hard, (maybe too hard) to please the different groups seeking power and influence within his jurisdiction. Being without

the

provincial

or

imperial

power

experience did not stop him from listening to those close at hand, and do what he believed was good for the Mountain. He soon was drawn into an issue that he soon shared with the Lebanese political elite, the “lack of cultivable land on the Mountain”, and issue he became convinced of that caused many to “drift” to other lands in search of a better living. One of his first acts was to apply to Istanbul and the governor of Damascus for the annexation of the “western” part of the Beqaa (Bekaa) valley to Mount Lebanon, and idea that was snubbed by both Damascus and Istanbul – he kept up his “suggestion” in many letters to Istanbul – they were equally subbed. Another issue which drew his immediate attention was the agreement that Naum had endorsed with the French-controlled “hookah-tobacco” monopoly, whereas he “refused” to renew the agreement under the same terms.

He

supported the efforts of a group of Lebanese businessmen who wanted to form an independent organization for the regulation of the import, export, and distribution of “hookah tobacco” in Mount Lebanon. The organization guaranteed “higher” annuities to the local government, a contribution to the “Hijaz Railroad1” project, and in full compliance with existing Ottoman custom regulations. Naturally the Finance Ministry (Istanbul) objected to the proposal on the ground that the central government’s agreement with the “Debt Administration” (with it heavy control by French bankers), and various other “monopolies – they too being 1

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hejaz_railway

French” affiliated with it, ruled out the formation due to these agreements. Besides (they said), if put into effect the proposal would “rupture” the integrity of the Ottoman import-export and custom regimes, thereby paving the way for the “autonomy” of Lebanese ports. The French replied in the same manner! Muzaffer was informed of the disagreements to his proposal and was “advised” to reach an agreement with the “monopoly”, but they said he really wasn’t obligated to do so – strange way to handle the situation.

The Istanbul “half-

hearted” interference gave Muzaffer the room to negotiate significantly better terms than those that Naum had accepted, he realized that Istanbul’s ambivalence supported Abdulhamid II’s consistent support of “native” interests rather than foreign concerns. On a roll, he next backed Lebanese plans to develop Jounieh2 into an international port in early 19033, an intention that had already being addressed as an attempt to form an autonomous monopoly by the Finance Ministry, not this particular project but that of maintaining general control over the region. Istanbul objected! His support of the measure had little to do with Lebanese business or political aspirations; it was because of the mistreatment of the Lebanese passengers in Beirut, as the “liberalization” of Istanbul’s travel requirements had increased the movement of the citizens of Mount Lebanon. Along with this increase a massive network (business) had developed in conjunction with the operating port of Beirut that had in its makeup, boatmen, porters, guards and officials who exploited the travelers. In his presentation to Istanbul he wrote, “people leaving the Mountain find it impossible to embark without paying a fee to one, or all of those involved – and that to those arriving it is worse.”

Unless they paid a “handsome” fee to the

“middlemen”, supposedly for transportation from the ship to the dock, they would not set foot on the shore. He noted some of the outrageous threats and insults that 2

3

18 km north of Beirut is Jounieh; the playground of the Middle East

Politics elsewhere: Friday January 9, 1903 Venezuelan Crisis Eminent. Washington: Minister Bowen cables that the situation in Venezuela and Caracas is rapidly growing more serious. It is believed here that any hour may bring news that Castro is forced out. Every cent in the Venezuelan treasury is $2400. The department of finance is absolutely prostrate. All revenues have been cut off, all supplies have ceased, the pinch of the blockade is being felt everywhere. The payments to the army are largely in arrears. The soldiers are no longer being fed. Therefore, Castro’s troops, who are for the most part simple peons, ignorant of what they are fighting for, are likely to turn tail and join the insurgents, who are well supplied, it is said, secretly by Germany and England, who are Castro’s enemies.

were commonly employed to “persuade” resistant passengers to accept the “services” offered to people arriving. After his plea falling on deaf ears to Beirut’s governor “Resid Pasha” to end the conditions being imposed on the travelers, he composed a grievance accusing “Resid” of shirking his responsibility towards the citizens of the Ottoman Empire and protecting interests of those making the ill-gotten profits. In addition he appealed to the European consuls (the representatives of the agreement of Mount Lebanon’s autonomy), to “persuade” them to convince the maritime company agencies in Beirut to discontinue their dealings with the “middlemen.” During this process he then contacted a “British” maritime firm and made arrangements for their “steamers” to make port at Jounieh, and also made the same deal available to a French maritime company.

He had gone beyond his

leadership! He was strongly reprimanded by Istanbul as having called the Ottoman “sovereignty” into question and for being involved in activities not charged to his position, whereas he was “ordered” to take immediate and definitive action to “stop” these international ships from calling at Jounieh and to abstain from, “doing even the minutest harm to the existing status quo in the region.” The status quo, was to uphold the existing contracts with the French companies that operated the “Beirut –to- Damascus” tramline and the Beirut “guildlike” alliance of middlemen. In the mix of all of this an “uneasy” collaboration existed between the parties involved, although the companies viewed their “forced” alliance as a barrier to the maximization of their profits, trying many times to gain control over the middlemen who managed to hold their own, the primary glue being their relationship with “Resid Pasha – the governor of Beirut” and his backing. The companies, when he attempted to improve the conditions on the docks supported him – but when he stood behind the proposal of making Jounieh into an International Port, they cried foul and vehemently turned against him. They did not want to be deprived on what little profits they said they turned in dealing with the Lebanese travelers, and along with this the feeling ran high (in the French circles) that behind these moves by him, lurked the “British” looking for an opportunity to establish a foothold in Jounieh.

This fear led the French Embassy in Istanbul to

throw their weight (along with the bankers in France, I imagine) behind the rejection of the Jounieh project.

Resid Pasha and the director of Beirut “customs” in the meantime assembled a packet of information and shared it with Istanbul that showed how Jounieh would be a mistake.

They noted that it had inadequate port and custom facilities, lacked

quarantine services and could/would be a natural haven for smugglers. In addition they put forward the “thought” that Mount Lebanon “might” lay claim to the customs revenue, on the basis of its privileged status. Muzaffer countered with the argument that all these fears could all be overcome pointing out “again” the issue was not the customs revenue, but the safety, convenience and comfort of the Lebanese passengers. Istanbul in considering all the facts of the status quo or the existing relationships between the Mountain, Beirut, the British and the French, and the companies and the “guilds” on the waterfront, arrived at the decision that Muzaffer’s action “might” threaten the peace and order of the region – hence the rebuke. Muzaffer apologized and reported to Istanbul the measures he had taken to prevent any steamer from calling at Jounieh, but not giving up, he said that as long as the “abuse” of the citizens of Mount Lebanon continued in Beirut, that the Lebanese at home and abroad would eventually exert mounting pressure on the Ottoman government, European powers, and the maritime companies to open Jounieh as an international port. The treatment of the Mount Lebanon travelers improved, not so much as his appeal for better treatment as much as the governor of Beirut’s failure to maintain pubic order. In early September 19034 riots broke out in the southern districts of Beirut, Basta, Mosseitbeh and Mazraa – it was reported that nine people were killed, four Greek Orthodox, four Sunnis and a soldier, with several properties looted and US forces were deployed to protect the American consulate. Noted in records as being deployed from the 7th through the 12th. This series of incidents and the following international condemnation forced Istanbul to pay closer attention to the affairs of Beirut --- whereas the governor

4

At other locations within the Ottoman domain - The Bulgarian agent at Uskub reports that the detachments of Turkish troops sent to garrison the small towns in that valley, have spread destruction all through their route, the villagers have been robbed and beaten, the women violated and the Christian population subjected to every conceivable outrage, while the local authorities appear to be helpless to stop the atrocities. At the village of Drachevo, near Uskub, the soldiers attacked all the peasants without the gendarmes interfering on behalf of the latter. The Bulgarian agents prophecy similar excesses in many villages, and the position of the Bulgarian residents is reported to be terrible, as the cruelties committed by the Turkish authorities exceed all limits. Sept 3rd-1903 and Ten thousand inhabitants of Kastoria are reported to have been slain by Turks.- Sept 24th-1903

Resid was dismissed and the governor of Damascus was ordered to take charge and restore public order. Simultaneously a new governor and a naval squadron dispatched to Beirut with instructions to “improve” the administration and to clean up the operations on the waterfront. Judging by the following reports, initiated by the inspection committee that was charged with the latter, achievements were rapidly made.

The report

detailed the manner in which the passengers had been exploited and praised the “new governor” for the measures take to improve the situation. The report did mention that these changes ran the possibility of being “temporary” measures and more than likely “short-lived” as too many citizens of Beirut depended on the profits from the waterfront, and that the line between “legal” and “illegal” profits had long since become blurred. Muzaffer had similar concerns. Resid’s removal along with the reductions in tensions relieved Muzaffer of “only” a few of his problems, where Istanbul had labeled him as an administrator who could not calculate the affects of his actions. In this respect he lacked only powerful friends in Istanbul and therefore suffered the result of the “tea” parties within the halls of government, along with a minimal support from foreign entities. The French in particular were dissatisfied with his performance, after all he only really supported the people he governed. Without any external support he was obligated to bargain and work with the local forces in operating the show on the Mountain, more so than had any of his predecessors. In a strict sense he resembled Vasa, but without Vasa’s political ability and skills.

And since the days of Vasa, Mount

Lebanon’s citizens had progressed becoming more versed in the ways of the world around them, just as its political elite, they were becoming more self-confident and sophisticated in their ability to use and influence the mutasarrifiyya as well as the Ottoman framework in which they lived under. His weaknesses encouraged a group of Lebanese bureaucrats and politicians (at their core were Vasa’s former protégés who had led the campaign for a new governor, and the one’s who led the anti-Kusa appointment who prepared the way for Muzaffer) who now had different aspirations and had adopted a “liberal” direction similar to that of the “Union and Progress” movement in Istanbul that aimed to end the rule of “Abdulhamid II’s”.

His rule as being authoritarian and

conservative was countered by the newly formed liberal movement.

Incidentally, Muzaffer felt a close relationship with these “young Turks” (Liberals) more than any other group in Istanbul, consequently he appointed “Habid (Basha) Sa’ad” as deputy chairman of the Administrative Council and made “Kan’an Zahir his most trusted district governor.

He also appointed others such as them, like

“Jirjus Zuain” to various administrative positions that had been vacated by the dismissal of some of Naum’s men. Still others managed to “win” their way onto the Administrative Council through a “new” election system based on a secret ballot format introduced by Muzaffer. Muzaffer and his stance on the Jounieh issue, negotiations with the tobacco industry, and his opening up to the influence of the liberals can be argued that he was manipulated in each case. Whereas his inexperience in political matters and business, and other circumstances under his rule allowed the local interests to advance the Mountain as an autonomous entity. One of the items the liberals managed to accomplish was in Muzaffer being persuaded to give the Council full authority over the administration of financial affairs, in this they were able to create new sources of revenue to raise salaries and finance new road constructions. This arrangement made possible the construction over 222 kilometers (138 miles) of roads under the exclusive direction of the Council. During his tenure the Council also acquired an effective veto power over the governor’s authority to dismiss judges --- for all its gains, the “liberal” group never did discontinue responding in the negative (or) reluctantly to the various reform projects that Muzaffer advocated.

Conservative groups, such as the Maronite

Church and other leaders, such as the Arslans and the Khazins, were even less cooperative in regard to his projects. Of interesting note, in my research for the strength of the Khazins tie to the Maronite Church I happened to stumble upon a short book review on the writings of Bernard Heyberger who was on an investigation of the Maronite prioress and mystic Hindiyya ‘Ujaymi (died in 1798) and her affiliation with the Church. According to his research, she is one of the most colorful and certainly the most “controversial” figures in the early Levant. In his investigation of her life, career and mental world, he found her contribution to the Lebanese and Catholic Church history was in-fact important.

He also demonstrated a unique gender-based

understanding of the European imperialism on “one” segment of the Ottoman society. His study began with her birth in Aleppo during the first half of the 18 th century, where she was born into an upper middle class “Maronite” family, and it is the profound changes in “oriental Christianity” during this period that moved her into a position later in her career as a “living” saint. It is noted, that since the Catholic Reformation5, Jesuit and other Latin missionaries had increasing brought local Christian society into the sphere of Roman influence, whereas the split within the Orthodox community and the “Melkites’ union to the Catholic Church being the best-known result. He also noted, that in woman in particular (who in the past might have been more sequestered than their Muslim sisters) that the rupture affected their status in Christianity allowing them a more individualistic and affective form of devotion, regardless of their denomination in the city of Aleppo – whereas they felt that by studying under “any” religious order could be a means to avoid early marriage, going on to lead a life of self-determination. He examined her past for “possible” growing “pietism” and “ecstatic” visions and how the European cultural influences, from popular literary writings on saints’ lives to the new realism of “baroque” paintings to an enlightenment almost fascination of anatomy, to her informed “mystical” obsession with the body of Christ. It is said she practiced self-laceration and extreme fasting from an early age, and at one point she divulges her visions of “Jesus” asking for her hand as his spiritual bride. Under the watch of her Jesuit confessor, her claim to sainthood is concretized (made into a solid one) by the appearance of the “stigmata,” and “engagement ring”, and her aptitude for prophecy. Now not only having a religious-charismatic career, she is fought over by the local religious authorities and the Roman Church authorities for control over her. To her Jesuit handlers, (who were already envisaging her eventual death and burial in view of getting her canonized) she at first represented an opportunity to realize their (Jesuit’s) project of opening an inter-denominational “women’s” convent in Mount Lebanon – this was opposed by the “Shuwayr Monastery”, which 5

http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12700b.htm

preferred to see any new order placed under “Melkite” direction. Along with the “Khazin” family, she also opposed this move, and fought and was ultimately able to found her own convent, the “Congregation of the Sacred Heart of Jesus”, on Khazin property in “Bkerke - Bkirki” (the present base of the sitting Patriarch in Lebanon) in 1750. He also goes into dept on the local political history and the growing independence of the Maronites in the 18th century, where backed by the French and the “Shihabi” emirate, it is shown the Khazin family were using their extensive landholdings to patronize the newly established Lebanese Order and other “monastic” groups and thus supersede the “Patriarchate” as the center of power within the Maronite community. The “Holy See” on the other hand was becoming ever more determined at this time to “stamp” its authority on “all” Catholic institutions, and viewed both secular interference in women’s religious orders in Mount Lebanon with increasing suspicion. With “Hindiyya” in particular there indeed (they felt) was cause for concern, as her doctrine of her own “mysterious union” with Christ, which had been “legitimized”

through

frequent

prophetic

visions,

bleeding,

and

demonic

admonitions, began to command the attention (&) obedience of the local population --- and it is said that when a small group of Muslim “Shihabi” women devoted to “Hindiyya” may have been more than influential in the conversion of the “entire” Shihabi dynasty to Christianity. Understandably her vocation of “Sacred-Heart” spiritualism can be compared and seen to be fully in-line with European and especially Italian models of the time, and when a “papal” mission is sent to investigate her order (at the instigation of the Jesuits), in 1753 it yielded “no” evidence of heresy. Despite strong reservations about her honesty and a hatred of women (as a sexually defined group) of charismatic female saints in general, the papal authorities preferred to bypass the issue – a reason (maybe) for the order’s rapid descent into chaos and violence. Enter a black picture of the Maronite history – against the backdrop of her megalomania and the external forces and their campaign to dissolve her order, put the conflict of local Lebanese politics in the later 18th century in focus.

The 1754-1768 “scission” of the Maronite Lebanese Order between the Aleppine (“Halabi”) and Mount Lebanon (“Baladi”) factions was an aspect of this conflict, of which the importance here after was more than likely underestimated. “Hindiyya” being partial to the scattering of the distant authority represented by the Maronite Patriarch (Yusuf Istfan who was in fact under her sway) and the split --- whereas she led the persecution of women at her convent from the “Baladi” families, who along with the local Maronite leaders supported the strong centralized government of the “Shihabi” emirs. Reports of nuns being beater, humiliated and possibly even poisoned at the convent reached a “papal legation” sent to investigate in 1774, it was brushed aside by the Patriarch as being “politically” motivated. Now, in true cult fashion, “Hindiyya” and her acolytes began to perceive any form of opposition as a “satanic” plot, and set themselves above all moral and religious constraints in the name of defending the “mystery of the union.” The full extent of the horror at “Bkerke” --- the systematic use of torture and exorcism to extract confessions from nuns accused of conspiring against “Hindiyya” --- came to light only “after” the beating death of two “Baladi” sisters, a murder the tormentors maintained until the very end had been committed by the “devil” himself. A truly dark episode in the Maronite Church.