Phoenicians - Chapter 20

Phoenicians Chapter 20 The 1908 Revolution did not go unnoticed in Mount Lebanon, assisting in the resurgence of the “liberal” climate whereas Yusuf Pasha who would earlier “not” hesitate to order the arrest and immediate slammer time of a few youths for chanting the “French Marseillaise” and other liberal slogans, now had to live with public demonstrations beneath his balcony, hailing the Revolution. As the mood celebrating the freedoms it promised along with demanding greater power for the people, Yusuf finding no choice but to cooperate with the liberal group had to allow the Administrative Council in taking the lead in decision-making. The Lebanese liberals, being extremely active in the public demonstrations, felt an explicit affinity with the “Young Turks” at this time, although they were more concerned with the future of Mount Lebanon then that of the Ottoman State. This became evident when the Council voted “against” the representation of Mount Lebanon in the Ottoman Parliament, after intensive discussions of the issue at what must have been numerous “tea parties” across Lebanon. Opposition of the Maronite Church and of France to the idea, indifference of the major powers, and uncertainties about the future of the revolutionary movement, not to mention the future of the Empire, persuaded the Lebanese leadership to worry only about their own problems --- with absolute “no” from the Church and the French it comes as no surprise to any student of history. The efforts to open Jounieh to international navigation resumed, this time under the points of “justice, equality and freedom of commerce,” as well as “the promises of the Revolution to liberate the citizens of the Empire from the shackles of the old regime.” Istanbul paid it no mind that is until the usual complaints surfaced from the Beirut merchants, boatmen and the Beirut Customs Office added to by a major shift in the Istanbul Cabinet. The Cabinet created a new policy that briefly sealed off “all” Lebanese ports to sailing vessels as well as steamships. “Talat Pasha”, the prominent Unionist leader who had just joined the Cabinet as the “Interior Minister” was the leading voice against the port of Jounieh.

His argument being that,

additional concessions to the Lebanese would increase their autonomy and further complicate the Ottoman efforts to maintain order in the region.

His overreaction was first blamed on his inexperience as a statesmen, but in the end it was an overall indication of the determination of the more “militant” elements within the Unionists party and their desire to repress the movement of Lebanese politics or administrative power away from the central authority. In the autumn of 1909, however, the Ottoman government moderated its decision concerning the Lebanese ports. Knowing that the excuse of protecting “Beirut’s” revenue could and would pass European scrutiny, they also considered the fact of their overall restriction on the ports would inspire the resistance to additional items and undermine all their governmental authority.

They realized, thinking in this direction, that shifting

“some” of the traffic to Jounieh would appease Mount Lebanon without damaging overall customs revenue.

Agreeing amongst themselves, they did maintain the

prohibition concerning the steamships – obviously the business interests in Beirut (not to mention the French) had much greater influence in Istanbul than the Lebanese and besides, Istanbul suspected the Lebanese saw the deregulation of naval traffic as a preliminary step in bringing control of the coast and revenue from there, under the jurisdiction of the local government (Mount Lebanon). In the meantime, Mount Lebanon’s citizens were becoming increasingly concerned over the “restrictions” placed on their commercial relations with neighboring provinces and beyond, especially as their businesses were doing fairly well and the overall economy seemed to be passing them by. They were not blind to the fact that the restrictions benefited the foreign-controlled Ottoman Debt Administration (which was the major beneficiary of the Beirut customs revenue in 1903), and it affiliates (such as the tobacco and salt-works monopolies), (or) the concessionary “French” companies and various interest groups operating in Beirut. Consequently the Lebanese placed their blame squarely on the Ottoman system for the restrictions and were increasingly vocal about their need to take matters into their own hands.

Their feelings and demands were printed in Lebanese

publications in Mount Lebanon as well as abroad, and it also manifested itself in the conduct of the “majority” of the Administrative Councilor’s who hung steadfast to the thought that it was their responsibility to define what was best for their people. Istanbul viewed these Lebanese moves as a direct challenge to Ottoman sovereignty and was extremely suspicious of moves that might reinforce Mount Lebanon’s autonomy and privileges. In this respect, the British and the French were

equally “wary” of the moves of Mount Lebanon, watching and making sure their “vested” interests and ability to manipulate the affairs of the region did not diminish.

Everyone had something to loose if the Lebanese won, except Mount

Lebanon. The attitude of Istanbul and of the European powers gave encouragement to Yusuf Pasha to “resume” his high-handed style of government – in which it is noted that he and the liberal members of the Council spent many of waking moments in constant struggle. Istanbul in “most” cases sided with him, but in doing so showed a very reserved side than the European powers on issues that came to the table, this supported by the documents obtained by Spagnolo on the accounts of both the British and French and their reactions. Istanbul consistently denied “Yusuf” the authority he demanded to “punish promptly those who challenge the right of sovereignty of the Sublime State,” and constantly advised caution and prudence.

Grand Vizier “Ibrahim Hakki Pasha’s”

letter to Yusuf in February 1911 put Istanbul’s feelings to the pen.

We keep receiving requests for equitable justice from people who say that malcontents are repressed and subjected to such treatment as imprisonment and dismissal from office [under your government]. As it has been repeatedly brought to your attention, it is normal to bring charges against a person whose behavior calls for legal action and to implement promptly the legal judgment reached thereby. But recourse to repression in an exaggerated reaction to situations and protests which do not manifestly breach the law estranges and drives away the populace from the government and fans sedition. It is not a secret to your Excellency that, unless considerations of public security render it absolutely necessary, display of power and brute force contradicts governmental wisdom, for obedience obtained by repression is temporary, whereas sagacious government by as magnanimous compassion and understanding as possible within the bounds of law assures success. Consequently, we kindly remind you of the need to handle the problems prudently. Try to do your best to provide the people [of your governorate] with the utmost peace of mind and to see to it that they all benefit equally from the blessings of justice. Abstain from action that contradicts the laws and that invites rightful complaints. We expect from you discerning performance which induces public contentment.[60]

Ibrahim’s “advice” obliged Yusuf to moderate his style of government and to keep it that way until the conclusion of his term in July 1912. Istanbul’s reluctance to give full support to Yusuf’s goal to make the Lebanese comply with “central” authority (which he represented) is seen as the Ottoman policy in Mount Lebanon since 1861 continuing to be relevant in 1912. Ottoman policy (in other words) remained committed first to the establishment and continued maintenance of the social and administrative stability in Mount Lebanon as a critical condition in maintaining and enforcing Ottoman sovereignty in the region. Istanbul (and others) saw Mount Lebanon as the soft under-belly of Syria and did not want foreign intervention if anything went wrong like it did during the 1860s, whereas in its addition to its strategic location overlooking Beirut and the BeirutDamascus road, Mount Lebanon was a stronghold of French influence. And as well understood, by Istanbul, the French had made no secret of their ambitions concerning Syria, and counted on the Maronites, and above all the Maronite Church, to help them use Mount Lebanon as a stepping-stone into Syria. Istanbul knew that a disruption in the order of Mount Lebanon would serve French ambitions, and in the end would initiate a portioning of the region between France and Great Britain. Although the means and ways for the Ottoman government to contain the French challenge were limited, it did not stop them for trying to take advantage of the differences between them and the other major powers, especially the British. One of the “ways” they did was in supporting French investments in other locations throughout their Empire, this in an attempt to interest the French government in the overall “integrity” of the Empire, as opposed to their concentration on Mount Lebanon and Syria. In addition they backed the secular and liberal forces in Mount Lebanon, which was their effort to act as a counterbalance to the political influence of the Maronite Church – that is as far as they could “without” disrupting the social and political peace. Istanbul remained cautious and ready to “intervene” against developments that risked peace and the order of the Mountain. Four-Centuries of Ottoman rule on the Mountain, the consequent impression of legitimacy, which the Reglement provided, and a shared political culture filtered

through the Tanzimat1, which recast the principle of equitable justice into a secular mold --- all these informed and helped Istanbul’s ability to function as a “clearinghouse” for major differences in Mount Lebanon. This situation, along with the intensified relations among Mount Lebanon, Beirut, and Damascus, linked Lebanese politics to Ottoman political networks to a big extent, as such Istanbul’s influence and visibility increased in Mount Lebanon. Influence and visibility do not necessarily equate to popularity – whereas at most times Istanbul being preoccupied with problems elsewhere in their Empire, created a burden for most of the Lebanese. Istanbul was reluctant to alleviate problems related to Mount Lebanon economic independence on Damascus and Beirut for “basic” food supplies and other commercial enterprises including travel. It is clear that Istanbul saw this dependence as a way of keeping them under Ottoman control or at least preventing Mount Lebanon in becoming a foothold of and for France in the region. This authority that Istanbul had on the mountain, as it rested, became a convenient tool for France and other major powers to increase their interests, as adherence to Istanbul involved submission to economic and legal restrictions based on monetary and other concessionary international agreements, which tied Istanbul ever deeper into the mess. Think – if these agreements gave Istanbul more leeway, they must have unlimited the resources at its disposal, making Istanbul (and Mount Lebanon) increasingly vulnerable to “external” manipulations as well as internal unrest and dissension. In Mount Lebanon it was a, “dammed if you do, and dammed if you do,” situation when it came to concessionary legislation and related measures. Failure to implement them both invited external pressure and eroded governmental authority, whereas their forceful imposition alienated the local population, and again eroded the governmental authority. It went without saying that uprisings and separatist movements emerged wherever the local population could organize politically and benefit from an international conjuncture or situation unfavorable to the Ottomans.

1

The Tanzimat - meaning reorganization of the Ottoman Empire was a period of reformation that began in 1839 and ended with the First Constitutional Era in 1876

Some fifty-years of relatively autonomous and peaceful development in Mount Lebanon had led to the rise of institutions and traditions that assisted its people in launching political actions from time-to-time, and as history had shown over the last 2000 years, was that they were, and are a difficult population to keep behind the curtain. As in past history when their self-confidence grew (as it did time and time again) so did their ability to manage their own affairs. At this particular period of their history, the major contributing force to this outcome was the Ottoman policy that aimed at the preservation of peace in Mount Lebanon, unfortunately it was to diminish the French influence, and not to the betterment of the citizens of Mount Lebanon. Yet, as before, in the eyes of the “Lebanese” the restrictions coming from Istanbul over the years outweighed the constructive aspects of its policy and it matter “little” to them that the restrictive Ottoman legislation and measures were largely immersed in the international agreements, as their status under the Ottoman political system was itself benefited by the virtue of being under the guarantee of the same agreements. These international agreements enabled the Lebanese of Mount Lebanon to develop a political “identity” of their own which encouraged them to dissociate themselves from the problems being experienced by the Empire.

They at more

times than not were in disagreement with each other, but when it was called for, most of them rallied around an opposition to the economic restrictions coming from Istanbul --- as found, they blamed the Ottoman rule for the restrictions and understood their dependence of the Ottoman system, not liking it – they eventually hoped that with due support from the “guarantor powers”, especially France and Britain, they could enhance Mount Lebanon’s autonomy and eliminate the restrictions. The question became just how far would the Brits and the French go to be able to accommodate Lebanese wishes?

They soon found out when the

discussions began for the appointment of a new governor for the Mountain. As history shows the 1911-1912 years were not good years for the Ottomans – they had some major losses militarily and suffered territorial loss, along with over 66% of their “taxable” population base. Realizing that the Ottoman Empire future looked pretty bleak and its split forthcoming, the French government felt the need to interface with the Lebanese (at least the Maronite majority among them) and assure them of their participation in the negotiations for the new governor. As it

turned out the negotiations turned in a talks concerning revisions in the Reglement. Aside from improving the “Maronite” representation on the Administrative Council and changes related to the election of councilors, the European powers and Istanbul agreed to enhance Mount Lebanon’s autonomy in three aspects: 1: Lebanese dependence on Beirut courts in commercial litigation was eliminated 2. Two Lebanese ports were opened to unrestricted international shipping 3. Immunities and authority of the Council vis-à-vis the governor was strengthen However, part of the negotiations included Istanbul’s request that both ports would be subject to the Ottoman customs regime and the customs revenue would belong to the central government and not to Mount Lebanon and the Istanbul would remain the place of appeal in commercial litigation --- in addition that the French harbor and railroad companies and similar enterprises in Beirut would not claim compensation from the Empire for their losses. The “appeal” process remaining with Istanbul demonstrated the hold of Ottoman sovereignty over Mount Lebanon along with the fact (to the French’s interest) that the revenues would be deposited in the fund to clear the public debt, the coffers of the Public Debt Administration --- in other words the Ottomans and the great-power interests had been maintained, and this was a limit that the Brits and the French would not go beyond. Citizens of Mount Lebanon, despite their endorsement of the 1912 protocol remained “resistant” to their restrictions, whereas their struggle with the Customs and Public Debt officials remained on the forefront during the term of the new governor, “Ohannes Kuyumcuyan Pasha”.

The Administrative Council, with its

enhanced powers and effectively under the guidance of “Habib Sa’ad”, was the leading force in this ongoing struggle. The Council made no effort to conceal its aim to win control over the coast of Mount Lebanon, and therefore over the dues and fees they paid to the central government. Their fight in earnest began at a time when a hard and fast group ruled the Istanbul “centrist” government and ran into many problems.