Phoenicians - Chapter 22

Phoenicians Chapter 22 The seven Councilors who had endorsed the resolution, then packed their bags and left for Damascus with their intention to conclude the agreement with the Syrian government, following the recognition and endorsement by Syria, go to Europe and onto the United States if necessary, with the goal of presenting their “just claims” to the Peace Conference and in other official circles. All this did not come about, as the French authorities arrested them on the road to Damascus, issued an “official” degree announcing their arrest and accusing the Councilors of “having sold themselves to the Sharifian (Syrian) government and attempting to ‘sell’ the independence of their fatherland to it in renouncing the ‘mandate’ of France, the eternal protector of Lebanon and the Lebanese.” It is true these Councilor accepted financial assistance from “external” sources to cover their travel expenses, but it should be “noted” that the first Lebanese delegation to the Peace Conference accepted willingly the assistance from the French government --- nevertheless, the Councilors and other officials who had thrown in behind them, were put on trial before a “military court” on charges of high treason and conspiracy, convicted, and were sentenced to “deportation” and the “payment” of extremely heavy fines. With seven of the twelve Councilors gone, General Henri Gouraud had an open road concerning the French rule over Lebanon; he soon dissolved the “elected” Council and set a committee in command, naturally a committee whose members consisted of his choice. Shortly thereafter he sent an “ultimatum” to Prince Faisal, which led to the Battle of Maisalun1 between the French and the Arab-Syrian forces on July 24th, 1920, and with the loss of the Arab-Syrian forces led to the occupation of Syria. The Church “openly” rejoiced over the defeat of the Syrian-Arab nationalists. Patriarch Hoyek and his disciples intensified their lobbying in Beirut and in Paris for the creation of as “great” a Lebanon as possible, asking for not only the annexation of Beirut and the Beqaa, but also of “Akka”, Saida (Sidon)”. “Tyre” and “Tripoli”. In order to accomplish this, they convinced “themselves” as well as the French (and the French public), that these locations were inhabited by a largely Christian 1

http://frederickhighland.com/damascus/articles/maisalun.htm

population. Official’s in the know (knowledge) warned their government in Paris, that this claim was not “exactly” the case. Nevertheless, with due support from General Henri Gouraud and the French missionaries, the French government reached a decision to “draw” the boundaries of the “new” Lebanon as desired by the “Church”.

In August, Prime Minister

Millerand announced the decision to the “Lebanese delegation” in Paris, which in fact was Patriarch Huwayyik’s delegation, and on September 1 st, 1920 General Henri Gouraud formally proclaimed the establishment of “Greater Lebanon” in Beirut. In that “ceremony”, Patriarch Huwayyik was 2nd only to the high-commissioner in the event and at this time the happiest person in Lebanon. The mutasarrifiyya had finally become a state with significantly more territory, and it “was not” yet completely independent, that could be accomplished eventually, (he imagined) with due help from France. The results point to an apparent victory for the Maronite Church over the secular2 government of Mount Lebanon, as represented by the Administrative Council and in the same vein a victory of Maronite-Christianity over a more liberal view towards all inhabitants of Lebanon. Granted the military rule imposed by the Ottoman Empire in its last desperate days had facilitated the victory, somewhat. In the end it was the secular, liberal, and democratic government of France (in fact the model used by the Councilors) which had actually delivered the victory, In this case by putting the Patriarch above the “elected” leaders of Mount Lebanon who had overseen the politics of the Mountain throughout the history of the mutasarrifiyya virtually from 1861 to 1920. This “preference” suited the French and their interests in the region, and it was reinforced

by

the

world

(some

major

powers)

in

its

observation

that

confessionalism3 was an innate peculiarity (and accepted view) of Lebanese society and its political establishment. In this regard, the French and their allies, preferred to view and judge Lebanon and Syria through the eyes of the Maronite Patriarch, and with the weight of the world powers behind this decision, his vision ultimately became the dominant historical view of the region as well. To a large number of historians, Lebanon appears to be the finalization of the Maronite Church’s dream --- failing to understand or seek the primary points of their 2 3

ONCE AGAIN: not controlled by a religious body or concerned with religious or spiritual matters strong devotion to a church’s confession of faith

dream (which are still buried in rhetoric and remain vague) in that they worked hard at separating communities from the Christianity of Lebanon, and preached the moral supremacy of the Maronite Church over the traditions and institutions of the “secular” government and the dependence of Lebanon on a “major” power for its internal and external existence and its security. The seven Councilors (condemned as traitors) that had been exiled in 1920 put forth an alternative vision of Lebanon --- please keep in mind that included in this group of exiles was “Sa’adallah Huwayyik”, the Patriarch’s brother and the Maronite representative from Batroun, who himself was a respected and veteran politician. It has been noted, as for his political expertise, of the stabilizing factor he brought to the table many times during critical moments in Mount Lebanon’s fight for independence and freedom of trade across the borders. Another of the exiled was

“Sulaiman

Kan’an”

another

veteran

politician

and

the

Maronite

representative in the Administrative Council, from Jezzine. In a lengthy “memorandum” Sulaiman Kan’an sent (December 1921) to the Conference on the “Limitation of Armaments4 - Nov 12th, 1921 to Feb 6th, 1922” in Washington DC, he explained in detail the position he and his fellow “traitors” had taken. His argument stated, that the Lebanese people deserved “independence” because they were socially, culturally and a politically developed people, already enjoying extensive self-government in that the 1861-1864 “international” treaties and successive protocols had provided Mount Lebanon with an efficient and effective system that was very close (if it did not mimic) the Western democratic model in the entire region.

The proof of this system itself was proof of Mount

Lebanon’s readiness for full independence, reflecting on the fact that the “mandate” in its design and composition, “had been designed for people who have ‘not’ had experience in self-government, and ‘not’ for people who have ruled themselves for centuries and shown their competence and efficiency in so doing.” He also pointed out, that France in order to promote its interests had, in imposing an “oppressive” mandate regime on Lebanon had in fact “violated” the very same treaties they were a signatory to in the past and to the goals those endorsements desired.

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http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pre-war/1922/nav_lim.html

Kan’an attributed the historical clashes between the Muslims and the Christians in the Mountain to the oppressive “Turkish” policies in the first half of the 19 th century --- otherwise (he observed), “religion and sectarianism5 were never in the past a factor in the government or politics of Mount Lebanon. The Christians lived in peace and prosperity under Mohammedan Princes for at least 200-years.” He strongly believed, that Christians and Muslims left to their own devices were perfectly capable of living in peace, this if the adverse effect of the French mandate rule was eliminated. He wrote:

We want to live at peace with our neighbors; but we cannot ever hope to do so while there is a foreign power in Syria, for which the majority of the Mohammedans hold the minority Christians responsible. Thus those who come to protect us only arouse against us the enmity of our neighbors. We are indeed safer with them, as the past has proven, without this European protection. . . . [T]he ambition of France to have a naval base in Syria, and to extend her commerce, should not be realized at the expense of a people who have always admired her own political and social ideals at home and who are now being used as a pretext for occupation. How, in the face of this, can we ever live at peace with the Mohammedans of Syria? Let alone, we the minority Christians will be in no need of protection; for the principal cause of our neighbor's hostility against us will be forever removed. Kan’an’s romantic-nationalistic perspective on Lebanese history concealed from him certain problems facing Lebanese society, and some of the harsh remarks he made in his memorandum about the “French” mandate rule were typically exaggerated (after all they accused him of treason). Nevertheless, his primary view and the stance he and his friends assumed represent a “natural sequel” to the activities of the liberal Councilors and officials since at “least” the turn of the century. The group owed its existence to the rise of a secular government structure in Mount Lebanon.

In turn they had been instrumental in “molding” the

government according to local conditions, and had used it to establish their leadership in the society and its goal to enhance Lebanon’s autonomy. Along their way, they developed an outlook which became an “inseparable” aspect of the

5

ONCE AGAIN: rigidly adhering to a particular set of doctrines and intolerant of other views

political culture of the mutasarrifiyya; his “memorandum” was a total expression of that outlook. In this vision, we find the “emphasis” on the independence of Lebanon, and the ability to live in peace within its borders and with its neighbors. To reconcile the communities (as opposed to varied positions) becomes the guiding principle in the planned political direction and activity. Firmly realizing that “religion” is owned by the individual and his cultural identity becoming separte and distinct from his or her political process concerning the community.

In this they foresaw a participatory

democratic nation that would be molded after the West, but in all means blended with the local political culture and their traditions – this a means to maintain internal peace and progress.

A large part of the success of Lebanon wholly neutral and

seeking guarantees from “several” world powers, as opposed to relying on one in this case France, only then is the position of Lebanon advocated to ensure external security. As it is seen, the advocates of this vision failed to generate much support for their cause, especially against the combined power and influence of France and the Catholic churches in 1920. It is noted that even some of their long-time associates condemned them mercilessly, some with apparent political shrewdness and their survival in the new regime, others who believe no other outcome falling back on the “reality” of the times. In 1920, the weight of a mighty world power had made “Patriarch Elias Huwayyik” the representative of Lebanon, and his brother “Councilor Sa’adallah Huwayyik” a traitor to Lebanon (or at best an insignificant figure), in the record of History. In peering back at these times, it appears that “Sa’adallah’s” outlook may have been more conducive to the formation of a unitary nation-state then his brother’s. This view is not too surprising that where Sa’adallah was a grass-roots politician operating within an inter-sectarian structure, and his brother the Patriarch was a diplomatic cleric whose state was his church and whose nation was his flock, and it is said the Lebanon he inspired could be “at best” a confederation of theocratic mini-states.