Legal Ethics Digest Requirement For Finals.docx

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991 RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents. PARAS, J.:

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

ISSUE: Does respondent posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years?

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

RULING: YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993 MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.: Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law." The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows: Annex A SECRET MARRIAGE? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767 It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted. In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla. Annex B GUAM DIVORCE. DON PARKINSON an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

EN BANC [B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, RANA, respondent.

vs. EDWIN

L.

CARPIO, J.:

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

The Facts:

ISSUE: is respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar?

DECISION

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now. Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan). On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

RULING: YES. In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3] True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9] WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015 ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA, Respondents. DECISION PERALTA, J.: FACTS: On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in suspending Atty. Lozada for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's motion for reconsideration.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction where complainant was one of the respondents, complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings of the case. To prove his allegation, complainant submitted certified true copies of the minutes of the hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007 and July 6, 2007, wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the counsels,6 as well as the transcript of stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada conducted direct examination and cross-examination of the witnesses during the trial proceedings.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still suspended from the practice of law constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the Court which suspended her from the practice of law for two (2) years. In her comment, Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed

that she believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending her husband and not a client. She insisted that her husband is a victim of grave injustice, and his reputation and honor are at stake; thus, she has no choice but to give him legal assistance.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary issue: WHETHER Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is engaged in an unauthorized practice of law.

Ruling: yes.

The practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.”14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of her husband, conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and crossexamination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the findings of the IBP would disclose that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007 were done within the period of her two (2)year suspension considering that she was suspended from the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at the very least, Atty. Lozada cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf of her husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively participated in the

proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within the two (2)year suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the time she represented her husband, she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to inform the court about it. Neither did she seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she can represent her husband. While we understand her devotion and desire to defend her husband whom she believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she is first and foremost, an officer of the court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution with the following findings and recommendations: Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using, apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. ISSUE: Is Atty. Pablito Castillo guilty of unjust and unethical conduct?

THIRD DIVISION [ CBD Case No. 176, January 20, 1995 ] SALLY D. BONGALONTA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO AND ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, RESPONDENTS. RESOLUTION MELO, J.: In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain.

RULING: Yes. The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. Atty. Pablito M. Castillo is guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATHTAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner. FELICIANO, J.: FACTS: A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years. on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office. On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order. Issue: Should Mr. Argosino be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath? RULING: Yes. the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above good moral character is a

requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office. Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned. Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Baguio City

friend of a part y litigant. The petitioner furt her more avers that THIRD DIVISION

his appearance was with the prior confor mit y of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointin g

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 154207

Present:

hi m to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case. However , in an Order dated Februar y 1, 2002, the MeTC denied per mission for petitioner to appear as privat e prosecutor on the

- versus -

YNARES -SANT IAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA -MART INEZ, CALLEJO, SR., CHICO -NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ.

ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO and HON. Promul gated: ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents. April 27, 2007 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x D E C I S I O N

ground that Circular No. 19 governing l imited law student practice in conj unction with Rule 138 -A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial. [ 3 ] ISSUE: whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant. RULING: YES. In a Resolution Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

AUSTRIA -MART INEZ, J.: FACTS: On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a for mal Entry of Appearance, as pri vate prosecutor, in a Cri mi nal Case for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cr uz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner, describing hi mself as a thir d year law student, j ustifies his appearance as private prosecut or on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr . [ 2 ] that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace , a part y may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by hi m for t hat purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In an y other court, a part y may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a dul y authorized member of the bar. Thus, a law student may appear bef ore an inf erior court as an agent or f riend of a party

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

w ithout the supervision of a member of the bar. [ 7 ] which is the prevailing rule at the ti me the petitioner filed his Entry

of

Appearance

with

the MeTC on September

2000. There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138 -A. In the former, the appearance of a non -lawyer , as an agent or friend of a part y litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a part y litigant, may appear before the courts. Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Sect ion 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to hi mself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138 -A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying per mission to act as pri vate prosec utor against petitioner for the si mple reason that Rule 138 -A is not the basis for the petitioners appearance.

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]

DECISION

25, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: petitioner, Atty. Cecilio Arevalo, sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA. On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.[2] the IBP submitted its comment[3] maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. In his reply, petitioner contends that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.

ISSUE: Is petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent. DECISION MENDOZA, J.:

Ruling: NO. The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,[9] thus: For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction. Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in. There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued. As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP. SECOND DIVISION [A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]

FACTS: Soliman Santos filed a complaint for misrepresentation and nonpayment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas. In a letter-complaint, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that: Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys." On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution[6] adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondents suspension for three months. Petitioner cited that Atty. Llamas was dismissed as Pasay City Judge. But later revealed that the decision was reversed and he was subsequently promoted as RTC Judge of Makati. He also had criminal case involving estafabut was appealed pending in the Court of Appeals. In the numerous violations of the

Code of Professional Responsibility, he expressed willingness to settle the IBP dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law.

ISSUES: Did atty. Francisco Llamas misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions?

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate. Respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.

Is Atty. Llamas exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of law and for being a senior citizen? RULING: Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension ofmembership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover, While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does not include payment of membershipor association dues.

EN BANC PETITION FOR LEAVE TO B.M. No. 1678 RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, Petitioner, CASTRO, JJ.

RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: Facts: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.[1] On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.

applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and (d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance

Issue: Did petitioner lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship?

to the Republic of the Philippines. Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a

Ruling: NO. member of the Philippine bar. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions (he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.[18] Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: (a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP; (b) the payment of professional tax; (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the

EN BANC A.C. No. 11113, August 09, 2016 CLEO B. DONGGA-AS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROSE BEATRIX CRUZ-ANGELES, ATTY. WYLIE M. PALER, AND ATTY. ANGELES GRANDEA, OF THE ANGELES, GRANDEA & PALER LAW OFFICE, Respondent. DECISION PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: FACTS: Complainant, Cleo Dongga-as alleged that sometime in May 2004, he engaged the law firm of respondents to handle the annulment of his marriage with his wife, Mutya Filipinas Puno-Dongga-as (Mutya). In his meeting with Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler, complainant was told that: (a) the case would cost him P300,000.00, with the first P100,000.00 payable immediately and the remaining P200,000.00 payable after the final hearing of the case; (b) respondents will start working on the case upon receipt of PI00,000.00, which will

cover the acceptance fee, psychologist fee, and filing fees; and (c) the time-frame for the resolution of the case will be around three (3) to four (4) months from filing. Accordingly, complainant paid respondents P100,000.00 which was duly received by Atty. Cruz-Angeles.2chanrobleslaw From then on, complainant constantly followed-up his case with Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler. However, despite his constant prodding, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler could not present any petition and instead, offered excuses for the delay, saying that: (a) they still had to look for a psychologist to examine Mutya; (b) they were still looking for a "friendly" court and public prosecutor; and (c) they were still deliberating where to file the case.3 They promised that the petition would be filed on or before the end of June 2004, but such date passed without any petition being filed. As an excuse, they reasoned out that the petition could not be filed since they have yet to talk to the judge who they insinuated will favorably resolve complainant's petition.4chanrobleslaw

To the complainant's surprise, they responded by sending two (2) billingstatements in the amounts of P258,000.00 and P324,000.00. Thus, he filed acomplaint. ISSUE : Whether or not the respondents should be held administratively liable forviolating the CPR. HELD . Yes. Despite the passage of more than five (5) months from the engagement,respondents failed to file the appropriate pleading to initiate the case before theproper court. Such neglect of the legal matter entrusted to them by their clientconstitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit: CANON18-A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule18.03 -A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligencein connection therewith shall render him liable

DIZON V. LAMBINO FACTS: The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of University of the Philippines (UP) graduating student Dennis Venturina, the chairperson of the UP College of Public Administration Student Council, drew the then Chancellor of UP Diliman Roger Posadas to seek the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Acting on the request of Chancellor Posadas, Atty. Orlando Dizon, together with his men, repaired to the Office of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of the UP Security Force on December 12, 1994. As

two

student-suspects

in

the

killing,

Francis

Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, were at the time in the office of Col. Bentain,

Atty. Dizon requested

to

take

them

into

his

custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino, Legal Counsel of UP Diliman advised against Atty. Dizons move, however, he not being armed with a warrant for their arrest. After what appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty. Dizon and the UP officials, the students were allowed to go back to their dormitories, with

Atty. Villamor undertaking to accompany them to the NBI the following morning.

2. is the act of Atty. Dizon in trying to arrest the studentsuspects constitutes violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

The two student-suspects were eventually indicted in court. RULING: 1. No. Atty. Lambino acted within her official duties as she Hence, spawned the filing of a complaint by Atty. Dizon against

safeguarded the rights of the students in accordance with the schools substitute

Atty. Lambino before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for violation

parental authority and within the bounds of the law as the NBI agents had no

of Canon 1, Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

warrants of arrest.

docketed as CBD Case No. 346. Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a criminal complaint also against Atty. Lambino, together with Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor TorresYu and Col. Bentain, before the Ombudsman, for violation of P.D. 1829 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenses.

2. YES. By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students without a warrant, Atty. Dizon violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Atty. Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules 6.01 and 6.02; and Canon 8, Rule 8.01, docketed as CBD Case No. 373.

xxxx Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. (Emphasis supplied).

The administrative cases were, on motion of Atty. Lambino, consolidated. Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Atty. Orlando V. Dizon is, in CBD Case No. 373, found guilty of violation of Canon 1 of Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ISSUES: is the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon constitutes violation of Code of

A.C. No. 3232 September 27, 1994

Professional Responsibility.

ROSITA C. NADAYAG, complainant, vs. ATTY JOSE A. GRAGEDA, respondent.

MELO, J.: FACTS: In a letter-complaint dated April 15, 1988, Rosita C. Nadayag charged respondent Atty. A. Grageda, a practicing attorney and notary public in Iligan City, with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in connection with a "Pacto de Retro" transaction wherein complainant was the vendee. In her letter-complaint, Nadayag alleged that Grageda prepared and notarized the sale using a stolen Original Certificate of Land Title, as a result of which she was swindled P108,000 because the land was already sold ahead of her using the owner’s duplicate copy of the title. Suspicious of the OCT’s appearance, she had brought the matter to Grageda’s attention, to which he simply answered that the title was all right told her not to worry as he is an attorney and knew very well the Vendor-a- Retro whose business transactions especially notarial matter has been and in fact always handled by him. However, the OCT was confiscated by the Iligan ROD, Atty. Baguio when the complainant applied for registration of the pacto de retro. Nadayag filed a complaint against the vendor-a-retro and accomplices, including Grageda coursed through the local Brgy. Captain and city fiscal, but the information did not include Grageda, hence this report. In his counter-affidavit, Grageda claimed that he notarization was based on the documents presented. ISSUE: Whether Atty. Grageda should be disciplined. RULING: Yes. Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., supra). In the case at bar, respondent should have been conscientious in seeing to it that justice permeated every aspect of a transaction for which his services had been engaged, in conformity with the avowed duties of a worthy member of the Bar. He should have fully explained the legal intricacies and consequences of the subject transaction as would aid the parties in making an informed decision. Such

responsibility was plainly incumbent upon him, and failing therein, he must now face the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. After all, notarization is not an empty routine. Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Atty. Jose A. Grageda from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months commencing from receipt of this Resolution, with the warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

EN BA NC JOSELANO GUEVARRA, Complainant,

A.C. No. 7136

versus ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Facts: on March 4, 2002 Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed a Complaint for Disbarment[1] before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyers oath.

Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) then-fiancee

parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn

Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married

sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later

to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann) Tantoco with whom he had three

that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with

children.

respondent during a concert, she was pregnant. ISSUE: Is responedent guilty of gross immoral conduct and in

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you at Megamall. Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she

violation of the lawyer’s oath? RULING: YES. Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on the surrounding circumstances.[35] The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.

slept at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36] In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances. Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words I Love You on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene

xxxx While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extramarital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the

sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.[37](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission to practice law which states that he will support the Constitution and obey the laws Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution. Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. A.C. No. 6490 July 9, 2013 (Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1054) LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION TABANG, Complainants, vs. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, Respondent. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: FACTS: a complaint for disbarment directly filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott of engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).1 Complainant Lilia Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast tracts of agricultural land as she already owned other parcels. Hence, Judge

Gacott advised her to put the titles of the parcels under the names of fictitious persons, thus she purchased 7 lands under his advice. Later, Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels for their medication and other expenses. Atty. Glenn Gaccot offered the parcels to prospective buyers to help her sell thus he borrowed from Tabang the TCTs. Respondent then caused the annotation of these documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels and caused the publication of notices where he represented himself as the owner of the parcels and announced that these were for sale and succeeded in selling the seven parcels. He received a total of P3,773,675.00 from the proceeds of the sales. Hence, pettioners alleged that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit filed a case before the IBP. Respondent, contended that the names were not fictitious and petitioners only demanded a balato of 20% from the proceeds which in his refusal, he was threatened to be defamed and disbarred. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment. RULING: Yes, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of Governors. While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities, the complainant’s own complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of respondent’s offense. Quite the contrary, his offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action, he instigated it. Not only did he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, the Court imposes upon respondent the supreme penalty of disbarment. A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995

WELLINGTON REYES, complainant, vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.

Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was found guilty as charged and was recommended for suspension; and Administrative Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was pending resolution.

PER CURIAM: Facts: An administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant City Fiscal of manila, with malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an attorney.

In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent. Issue: Did respondent violated his oath of attorney?

On March 30, 1971 complainant reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office at the City Hall. An entrapment was set up by the NBI When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter would not return until around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the NBI agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business with respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to see respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang umaga." To which respondent replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant then handed to respondent the marked money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two other cases were earlier filed against respondent: namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct filed by one Angel

Ruling:Yes. In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked money from complainant during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent filing of administrative and criminal cases against him. Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]). The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 [1983]). WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent.

A.C. No. 2033 May 9, 1990 E. CONRAD and VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN, complainants, vs. ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.

Facts: On the basis of the foregoing report, the Solicitor General filed a complaint with Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as complainant, praying that respondent Navarro be disbarred, that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys, and that his certificate of admission to the bar be recalled. On May 23, 1980, respondent Navarro filed his answer with prayer to lift the order of suspension. 5 Complainant Ortigas, Jr. filed an opposition to said motion to lift suspension .6 Respondent Navarro reiterated his plea in his manifestation dated August 8, 1980. 7 In a resolution dated September 2, 1980, this Court denied the motion to lift the order of suspension. 8 On October 29, 1980, respondent Navarro filed an urgent ex parte motion praying for the lifting of the order of suspension 9 which was denied by this Court on November 13, 1980. 10 He reiterated his prayer in another motion filed on January 5, 1981 11 but the same was likewise denied in our resolution of January 22, 1981. 12 II. Administrative Case No. 2033 arose from a letter-complaint, dated March 13, 1979, filed by the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Geeslin with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, charging respondent Navarro with deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath. Said letter was thereafter referred to this Court by Integrated Bar of the Philippines President (now Chief Justice) Marcelo B. Fernan for appropriate action. 13 Pursuant to our resolution of June 4, 1979, 14 respondent Navarro filed his answer with motion to dismiss on June 29, 1979. 15 The corresponding

reply 16 and rejoinder 17 were subsequently filed. In a resolution of this Court dated October 1, 1985, the case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 18 On August 28, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its report, with the following findings and recommendation: No justiciable issue was raised in Administrative Case No. 2033 as respondent Navarro failed to deny the material allegations in the complaint of the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin. The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in Administrative Case No. 2148 are: ISSUE:

1. Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the names of other persons without the consent of the latter; and 2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute sufficient grounds for suspension or disbarment. RULING: & Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer) covered by Decree No. 1425, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which was declared null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970 of Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 20 Furthermore, he asserts ownership over the subject properties as payment for his legal services rendered in the ejectment cases filed against his clients in Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal. 1. To clarify, Civil Case No. 7-M(10339)filed before Branch XV of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal directly assailed the nullity of the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917 by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 was issued, as well as the original certificates of title issued as a consequence thereof. These original certificates of title include the properties belonging to Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. On March 31, 1970, Judge

Vivencio M. Ruiz then presiding over said Branch XV rendered a decision declaring Decree No. 1425, as well as the original certificates of title issued pursuant thereto, null and void. Ortigas appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals which set the same aside and remanded the case to Branch XV for new trial. On November 3, 1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who replaced Judge Ruiz, rendered a decision confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles emanating therefrom. The said decision was pending appeal with the Court of Appeals when the investigation of respondent by the Solicitor General was conducted. We take judicial notice of the fact that on December 29, 1983, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming in toto the November 3, 1973 decision of Judge Alcantara, which became final and executory on May 25, 1984 insofar as plaintiffs-appellants Pascual Santos, et al. are concerned. The plaintiffs-appellants Pedro del Rosario, et al. appealed to the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari which was, however, denied on February 18, 1985. The denial became final and executory on April 10, 1985. Thereafter, the records of the case were remanded to Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal for execution. The records further show that the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) became the basis of the decision rendered by Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II on May 21, 1971 which dismissed the complaint for ejectment filed by Haberer against the clients of respondent Navarro. However, Judge Navarro in his decision categorically stated that "it is the considered opinion of this court that until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this court is reversed or set aside by final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven defendants in these eleven cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy and on which their respective houses are built has become premature." This condition was reiterated in Judge Navarro's order of September 15, 1972 wherein he stated that: In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate that its decision in this case was mainly predicated on the decision of Branch XV of this Court that the certificate of title emanating from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null and void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The Court opined that until said decision is reversed the

actual occupants had better be maintained in their possessions of the land. 21 However, to repeat, the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV was set aside by the Court of Appeals which remanded the case for new trial and another one was rendered, this time by a different judge on November 3, 1973 upholding the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles issued as a consequence thereof. Respondent cannot feign ignorance of the November 3, 1973 decision, which superseded the March 31, 1970 decision, for the simple reason that it was his clients who appealed the former decision to the Court of Appeals. In spite thereof and indicative of his bad faith, he stubbornly continues to invoke the decision of March 31, 1970 as the source of his alleged ownership rights over the Ortigas properties. 2. In the order of June 21, 1971, Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued in the name of Haberer and the issuance of new titles in the name of the defendants, subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of respondent pursuant to the terms of the contract for his legal services. However, the same judge issued an amendatory order dated September 15, 1972, which provides in part that: It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered insofar as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of other persons and entities like the Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, which is not a party herein, because the certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders of decisions are made in this case cannot be made to affect the said company. Decisions and orders can only affect parties to the case. The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June 21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is now

being the subject of further proceedings and (2) because it has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not even a party herein. WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present occupants of the land as stated in the decision stands. (Emphasis supplied) 22 It is apparent, therefore, that since the order of June 21, 1971, was set aside, the inescapable conclusion is that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 stands and remains in the name of Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. Consequently, the defendants therein never acquired title to the property covered by the title of Haberer. And, since respondent Navarro merely derives his supposed title to the properties as a mere transferee, with more reason can he not validly become the owner of the above properties. 3. Respondent intransigently relies on his contract for legal services executed with his clients, the defendants in the Haberer case, as another basis of his claim of ownership over the entire property covered by Decree No. 1425. It must be noted that the said contract was executed pursuant to the ejectment cases filed against respondent Navarro's clients which involve only the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 containing an aggregate area of 12,700 square meters, more or less. It appears that the defendants assigned rights to respondent Navarro over properties which they did not actually occupy and which virtually extended to all the properties covered by titles issued under Decree No. 1425. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, said defendants have not presented any document evidencing their ownership of the parcels of land they assigned to their lawyer. From the foregoing considerations, it is incontrovertible that respondent's pretended ownership rights over the parcels of land covered by Decree No. 1425 have no bases whatsoever, either in fact or in law, and it is an assault on credulity to assume that he was not aware of the vacuity of his pretensions and misrepresentations.

In resolving this disbarment case, we must perforce initially focus on the degree of integrity and respectability required and expected of the law profession. There is no denying that membership in the legal profession is achieved only after a long and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of the fact that everyone is deemed an officer of the court. 23 The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been judiciously stated by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in this wise: On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion, ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised. 24 In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the proper administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 25 Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client and to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. 26 As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges until the contrary is proved, and that, as an officer of the court, he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath. 27 Therefore, in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon

the complainant 28, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. 29 We have painstakingly scrutinized and evaluated the records of these two administrative cases and we cannot but find that strong and unassailable evidence exist to render it our irremissible duty to impose the ultimate sanction of disbarment on respondent. Respondent's defense is anchored primarily on the contract for legal services, executed by his clients whom he represented in the twentytwo ejectment cases filed before Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, and quoted in full in the earlier part of this discussion. It is extremely relevant to note that both of the aforesaid two branches of the trial court made no finding as to the validity of the claim of ownership favorable to the defendants therein. On the contrary, Judge Salas of Branch I found for the plaintiff and ordered the defendants, clients of respondent, to vacate the premises. In the case before Judge Navarro of Branch II, the complaint was dismissed merely on the ground that "since the evidence is uncontroverted that the defendants in all these eleven cases have been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of their respective parcels dating back since their predecessors in interest, their possession must be maintained and respected. 30 Thereafter, on June 21, 1971, the aforesaid judgment of dismissal dated May 26, 1971 was modified, and the Register of Deeds was thereafter ordered to cancel the transfer certificate of title issued in favor of plaintiff and to issue new titles in the name of defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of herein respondent in accordance with the contract for legal services hereinbefore discussed. Eventually, however, this subsequent order was reconsidered and set aside in the order of September 15, 1972, "because it has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, which is not even a party herein," but it reinstated the decision of May 26, 1971 insofar as it denied the ejectment of the present occupants.

As earlier noted, there is nothing in the records to show that the defendants in the ejectment cases were declared the true owners of the land subject of said cases. Only the fact of possession was ruled upon, and what the courts recognized was merely the defendants' right of possession. They, therefore, never become the owners of the subject lots in any sense of the word in the absence of any declaration to that effect, by reason of which they could not have legally transmitted any ownership rights or interests to herein respondent. Furthermore, we have seen that any further claim of ownership on their part was finally settled by the order of September 15, 1972, setting aside the order of June 21, 1971, wherein the trial court correctly held that the earlier order unjustifiedly affected adversely the rights of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership. In addition, said court specifically excluded the title of said partnership from the effects of its decision. Pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal services, the defendants-clients agreed to convey to respondent whatever properties may be adjudicated in their favor in the event of their failure to pay the attorney's fees agreed upon. As hereinbefore stated, there was nothing awarded to the said defendants except the right to possess for the nonce the lots they were occupying, nothing more. That respondent acquired no better right than the defendants from whom he supposedly derived his claim is further confirmed in the order of Judge Navarro, dated June 21, 1971, denying the issuance of new certificates of title to herein respondent who, to further stress the obvious, was not even a party but only a lawyer of the defendants therein. It follows that his act of selling the Ortigas properties is patently and indisputably illegal. Respondent admits that he has no Torrens title but insists on the puerile theory that his title is his contract of legal services. 31 Considering that the effectivity of the provisions of that contract is squarely premised on the award of said properties to the therein defendants, and since there was no such adjudication, respondent's pretense is unmasked as an unmitigated deception. Furthermore, it will be recalled that the land involved in the two ejectment cases consists of only 1.2 hectares whereas respondent is claiming ownership over thousands of hectares of land, the sheer absurdity of which he could not be unaware. Respondent further admits that he has been and is continuously selling, up to the present, the entirety of the land covered by Decree No. 1425 32 pursuant to the decision of Branch XV of the then Court of First

Instance of Rizal, dated March 31, 1970, declaring the said decree null and void as well as the titles derived therefrom. It must nonetheless be remembered that the decision of Judge Navarro recognizing the defendants' right of possession is subject to the final outcome of the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV which nullified Decree No. 1425. The latter decision, at the time the decision of Judge Navarro was rendered, was pending appeal. This is precisely the reason why Judge Navarro had to amend his decision a third time by setting aside the order of registration of the land in the name of the defendants. He could not properly rule on the ownership rights of defendants therein pending a final determination of the validity of said decree, which thus prompted him to find merely on the fact of possession. Besides, a mere declaration of nullity cannot, per se justify the performance of any act of ownership over lands titled in the name of other persons pursuant to said decree. To cap it all, as earlier discussed, that decision dated March 31, 1970 has been reversed and set aside, and a new one entered confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, which latter decision has long become final and executory. In Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership vs. Navarro," herein respondent was enjoined from selling, offering for sale and advertising properties of the plaintiff therein. We have seen that a decision was subsequently rendered therein on December 16, 1972 by Branch XVI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal upholding the validity of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Ortigas and Co., Limited Partnership which became final and executory after respondent's petition for review was denied by this Court. However, respondent continued to sell properties belonging to Ortigas in blatant disregard of said decision. This was categorically admitted by respondent himself during the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General. 33 Respondent avers that the said decision cannot be enforced during the pendency of the appeal therefrom. Even if this were true, the fact that respondent was enjoined by the court from selling portions of the Ortigas properties is compelling reason enough for him to desist from continuing with his illegal transactions. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General:

Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge Vivencio Ruiz declaring as null and void certificates of titles emanating from Decree No. 1425 was reversed and set aside. He knew that Judge Pedro Navarro of the Rizal Court of First Instance exempted Ortigas & Company from the effects of his decision. He also knew that Judge Sergio Apostol of the Rizal Court of First Instance in Quezon City had upheld the validity of the certificates of title of Ortigas & Company. Despite all these pronouncements and his awareness thereof, respondent NAVARRO still continued to sell properties titled in the name of Ortigas & Company and the Madrigals. 34 Lastly, the motion to dismiss filed by respondent should be, as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit. Respondent inexplicably posits that the charges against him should be dismissed on the ground that his suspension was automatically lifted by virtue of our resolution, dated June 30, 1980, which merely reads: The manifestation of counsel for respondent stating among other things that the complaint against respondent could not prosper if respondent's manifestation dated March 3, 1980 in G.R. No. L-4269942709 and his request for certification by the Chief Justice to the effect that the petition in G.R. Nos. L42699-42709 is deemed dismissed pursuant to Sec. 11(2) of Art. X of the Constitution are granted, are NOTED. There is absolutely nothing in the resolution to support respondent's typical distortion of facts. On the contrary, our resolutions dated September 2, 1980, November 8, 1980, and January 22, 1981 repeatedly denied respondent's motions for the lifting of his suspension. It further bears mention at this juncture that despite the suspension of respondent Navarro from the practice of law, he continues to do so in clear violation and open defiance of the original resolution of suspension and the aforestated resolutions reiterating and maintaining the same. Thus, the records of this Court disclose that in G.R. No. L78103, entitled "Jose de Leon, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," a Second Division case filed on April 25, 1987, counsel for private

respondents therein questioned herein respondent Navarro's personality to intervene in the case since he was under suspension, to which respondent Navarro rejoined by insisting that his suspension had allegedly been lifted already. In G.R. No. 85973, entitled "Hilario Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the petition wherein was filed on December 2, 1988 and assigned to the First Division, respondent Navarro also appeared as counsel for therein petitioner. Said petition was denied since the same was prepared, signed and verified by respondent Navarro, a suspended member of the Philippine Bar. Over his expostulation that his suspension had already been lifted, the Court directed the Bar Confidant to take appropriate action to enforce the same. Again, in G.R. No. 90873, entitled "Matilde Cabugwang et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the Second Division, in a resolution dated January 31, 1990, imposed a fine of P1,000.00 upon said respondent for appearing therein as counsel for petitioner which fine he paid on February 5, 1990. In at least three (3) other cases in the Second Division, respondent Navarro appeared before the Court as counsel for petitioners therein, viz: (1) G.R. No. L-74792 (Lorenzo Valdez, et al., vs Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.), filed on June 11, 1986 and decided on December 7, 1986; (2) G.R. No. L-76589 (Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), filed on November 28, 1986 and decided on May 4,1987; and (3) G.R. No. 81482 (Ricardo Rasalan vs. Flaviano Pascua, et al.), filed on January 30, 1988 and decided on February 15, 1988. The rollos in said cases show that he also appeared as counsel for the petitioners in the Court of Appeals, but since the lower courts' original records were not forwarded to this Court, said rollos do not reflect whether he also appeared before the different courts a quo. Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to lawful orders of constituted authority and illustrate his incorrigible despiciency for an attorney's duty to society. Verily, respondent has proven himself unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in him by law and by this Court, through his deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the court.

A.M. No. 3360

January 30, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

Facts: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals. On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez. Consequently, four (4) informations was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in violation of B.P. 22 with a fine and subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant Herminia Marquez. Respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and imposed upon Atty. Fe Tuanda, in addition, the suspension from the practice of law In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states: that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the

offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee. Issue: Whether the imposed suspension for Atty. Tuanda may be lifted.

HELD: NO. Motion to Lift Order of Suspension denied. the crimes of which respondent was convicted import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that: the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character.1âwphi1 This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 5 Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent.

EN BANC G.R. No. L-47431

December 19, 1940

In the matter of the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis, deceased. CONCORDIA CUEVAS ( alias CONCORDIA ABESAMIS), executrix-appellant, vs. PEDRO ABESAMIS, 2. o ET AL., oppositors-appellees. Villasan, Valenton and Santiago for appellant. Angel Cecilio for appellees. LAUREL, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

last will and testament of her deceased natural father,

Facts: On February 11, 1928, Crescenciano Cuevas submitted for probate in the court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija the

Crescenciano Abesamis, which bequeathed three parcels of land, one share of stock in the "Gallera de Peñaranda" of a par value of P100, and two carabaos worth P100 to Concordia Cuevas ( alias Concordia Abesamis), Francisco Abesamis,

Perpetua Abesamis, Isaias Abesamis and Pedro Abesamis in the manner and under the conditions stated therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

7, 1931, the court ordered the commissioners of partition to declare as sole heiress Concordia Cuevas to the exclusion of Francisco and Isaias Abesamis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On March 15, 1928, however, Pedro Abesamis and twenty-five others entered their opposition to the distribution of the properties described in the will, for the reason that "a que dichos bienes son de propiedad pro indiviso entre los aqui opositores y la testamentaria," and simultaneously informed the court that they had commenced an action for the partition of said properties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On March 3, 1931, the partition commissioners submitted their report, upon which the court declared that "no hay lugar a aprobar por ahora el informe de los comisionados partidores hasta que se haya verificado la particion en dicha testamentaria en la cual pueden las partes de esta causa hacer valer los derechos que pudieran tener sobre los terrenos en cuestion." A motion for reconsideration having been denied on September 15, 1932, plaintiffs, on February 14, 1934, moved for the approval of the project of partition filed by the commissioners . On February 26, 1934, the court ordered the suspension of the approval of the partition of the properties until the termination of the testamentary proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On May 14, 1928, the will was admitted to probate and Concordia Cuevas was appointed executrix with a bond of P1,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On May 13, 1928, Pedro Abesamis and the other oppositors did institute civil case No. 4816 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis, Concordia Nuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias Abesamis for the partition, alleging that said properties belonged, in the first instance, to Anacleto Mercado, their common causante, who entrusted them to Crescenciano Abesamis with the understanding that they were not to be subdivided as long as the minor children of her other deceased son, Teodorico Abesamis, were living with the Crescenciano. A demurrer interposed by the defendants on the ground that there was another pending action involving the same subject matter was sustained after which the plaintiffs were required to amend their complaint, the amendment consisting simply in eliminating therefrom the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis and leaving as party defendants Concordia Cuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias Abesamis. As these defendants failed to answer the amended complaint, they were declared in default and , on July 3, 1930, judgment was rendered adjudicating seven-eights (7/8) of the properties in favor of the plaintiffs and the other one-eight (1/8) for the defendants. On February

On January 9, 1937, Concordia Cuevas presented to the probate court a partition plan adjudicating the three lots and the two carabaos in favor of the legatees mentioned in the will. This was rejected by the court for the reason that it was not in conformity with the inventory of the estate and the decision in civil case No. 4816. On January 26, 1937, the executrix submitted an amended inventory and later another project of partition distributing the properties of the estate in accordance with the terms of the will, which were objected by the defendants, because these included their legitimate shares under the decision in civil case No. 4816. The opposition was upheld by the court in kits decision of May 27, 1937, the dispositive part of which is quoted in the beginning of this opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The executrix-appellant assigns the following errors: 1. The court erred in not holding that the decision in civil case No. 4816 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,

declaring that the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis is entitled only to one-eight (1/8) of the property described in the will, is a nullity and can not bind the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. The court erred in not approving the amended project of partition presented by the executrix on February 8, 1937, and in not distributing the estate of the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis according to the provision of the will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. The court erred in not finding that it has no jurisdiction as a probate court to decide the question of ownership of the property involved in these proceedings part of which is claimed by the oppositors to be their property not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. The court erred in not holding that the oppositors have no personality to object to the project of partition presented by the executrix on February 8, 1937, which was drafted in accordance with the provision of the will of the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis. Under the first assignment of error, appellant impugns the validity of the decision of the lower court in civil case No. 4816 declaring that the legatees here, defendants in that action, are entitled only to one-eight of the property on the ground that the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis was not a party in said proceeding. It should be noted that all the coheirs, except Perpetua Abesamis, were defendants therein, and that by order of the court, in its instructions to the partition commissioners dated February 7, 1931, the herein executrixappellant was pronounced by the sole heiress of the deceased. As said defendants were declared in default and are, to be sure, bound by the decision in that case, we are of the opinion that the appellant cannot now be permitted to assail its

virtuality not to regard it as totally ineffectual against the testate estate. The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of death(article 657, Civil Code), and where, as in this case the heir is of legal age and the estate is not burdened with any debts, said heir immediately succeeds, by force of law, to the dominio n, ownership and possession of the properties of his predecessor, and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the latter. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Dais vs. Court of First Instance of Capiz, 51 Phil., 396.) In the absence of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate, there is no necessity of a previous declaration of status and the heir or heirs can sue and be sued in that capacity (Arsenio de Vera et al. vs. Cleotilde Galauran, 37 Off. Gaz., 1821). This disposes likewise of the second assignment of error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library A.C. No. 190

September 26, 1964

MARCOS MEDINA, complainant, vs. LORETO U. BAUTISTA, Respondent. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

to pay the same in small installments paying on that occasion the sum of P35.00. Respondent agreed and thereupon prepared a motion for an extension of time to file his answer in the case. Complainant returned to his hometown. Facts: In a complaint filed on September 15, 1954, Marcos Medina charged respondent Atty. Loreto U. Bautista with the commission of certain acts constituting malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. It appears that sometime in 1953, Maria Ragsac Cabel filed a complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land before the Court of First Instance of Cagayan against complainant Marcos Medina. In the early of January, 1954, complainant Medina approached the plaintiff seeking a compromise of the case. Plaintiff told him to see her lawyer Loreto Bautista, respondent herein, whereupon he went to see the latter in his office at Aparri, Cagayan. Respondent demanded P500.00 as a consideration for the amicable settlement, and as complainant had no ready cash then, he asked to be allowed

One month later, complainant received an order declaring him in default and so he went to respondent to ask him why in spite of their agreement he was declared in default. Respondent assured him that he had nothing to worry about, and on that occasion respondent again asked for P50.00 which then and there complainant gave. Before complainant left respondent told him to look for more money. It turned out that respondent opposed his own motion for an extension of time to file an answer for, in lieu thereof, he filed a motion to declare complainant in default. Consequently, a decision was rendered detrimental to complainant since the court allowed plaintiff to repurchase the property in litigation for the sum of P1,200.00.

On March 2, 1954, complainant again went to the office of respondent in Luna, Mt. Province apparently with the purpose of having the papers for the amicable settlement of the case prepared, but on this occasion respondent prepared two documents, Exhibits C and D, wherein, on one hand, it was made to appear that Maria Ragsac Cabel sold the property to complainant in consideration of the sum of P8,000.00 and, on the other, the latter reconveyed the same property to the former for the sum of P1,200.00. Both documents were witnessed by respondent. Both documents were also found to be fictitious in the sense that the considerations mentioned therein were never received. Maria Ragsac Cabel was asked by respondent to sign Exhibit C without knowing its contents upon the assurance that it was necessary in order that she could recover the land. Sometime later, complainant received a letter from Atty. Bienvenido Jimenez, co-counsel of respondent in the civil case, requesting him to bring the title of the property pursuant to the decision of the court, and complying with this request complainant went to see Atty. Jimenez but instead of bringing the title he showed him the document which he was made to sign purporting to be a deed of sale by Maria Ragsac Cabel in his favor of the property for the consideration of P8,000.00. Atty. Jimenez asked Mrs. Cabel if she received the amount mentioned therein, which she denied. Instead Mrs. Cabel told Atty. Jimenez that she had given P800.00 to respondent to be deposited in court with the understanding that said respondent would raise the additional P400.00 to complete the sum of P1,200.00 which was fixed by the court as the consideration of the reconveyance of the property. After inquiry, Atty. Jimenez found that there was no such amount deposited in court, and in order to correct the wrong generated by the two fictitious documents, Atty. Jimenez prepared another document embodying the terms of the amicable settlement which they agreed would be submitted in the civil case. This settlement having been carried out, it put an end to the controversy. According to complainant, he paid all in all to respondent the sum of

P500.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles library

virtual

law

From the foregoing narration, the following facts are deemed to have been established: (1) respondent after agreeing with complainant to settle the case amicably prepared a motion for extension of time to file an answer, but instead he filed a motion to declare the latter in default; (2) being fully aware of the decision rendered in the civil case, respondent prepared two fictitious deeds of sale in the sense that the consideration in either was never in fact received; (3) pretending to arrange an amicable settlement of the case, respondent received on different occasions from complainant several sums totalling P500.00. (4) respondent, taking advantage of the ignorance of his client Maria Ragsac Cabel, ask her to sign a document wherein it was made to appear that she received P8,000.00 when in truth and in fact she did not receive said amount; and (5) respondent received from his client Mrs. Cabel the amount of P800.00 with the understanding that the amount was to be deposited in court for the repurchase of the property, but instead of depositing it he misappropriated the money. These facts constitute malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. virtual law library In addition, the record shows that in CA-G.R. No. 18560-R, respondent was convicted of estafa and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 months of arresto mayor to 1 year and 1 day of prision correccional, with the accessories of the law, and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P800.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. And in CA-G.R. No. 21796-R, the Court of Appeals made the following derogatory comment against respondent: A lengthy discourse of the relationship of attorney and client need not be indulged in. Suffice it to say that a lawyer should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity. A high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted. (Alindogan v. Gerona Adm. Case No. 221, May 21, 1958). Here, appellee (herein

respondent Bautista) violated the trust. He was bound to deposit the P800.00 in court. But he did not; he converted it to his own use and benefit to the damage of appellant. Indeed, he was convicted of estafa. Not only that. The confidence reposed in him by appellant was once again infringed when he lent his signature to Exhibits 2 and 3 which he knew to be spurious. Upon these documents, appellant - for nothing - lost the land already won in court. She had to compromise with the defeated suitor. But she got the very short end of the bargain. And yet, appellee had the temerity to come to court for attorney's fees. Good morals and sound public policy bar the portals of justice to him. Guilty of fraud on one count and bad faith on another, he has forfeited all legal claims for services in procuring the judgment in Case No. 634-A of the Cagayan Court (6 C.J. 725; C.J.S. 1025; 5 Am. Jur. 363; Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2nd Ed. [1961], p. 99).

In his written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of this Court considering that he has six children to support the eldest being 16 years old and the youngest 4 years who will bear the stigma of dishonor if disciplinary action be taken against him. He made manifest to this Court that if he ever committed what is attributed to him, it was merely due to an error of judgment which he honestly and sincerely deplores. ISSUE: Whether Dalmacio De Los Angeles should be disbarred

There is no question that the crime of estafa is one which involves moral turpitude within the purview of Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court.

Ruling: yes. Under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed from his office as attorney if he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude the reason behind this rule being that the continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in the practice of law with the result that the loss of such qualification justifies his disbarment (Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil., 586; 53 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 628). And since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by section 25 of Rule 127.

WHEREFORE, respondent Loreto U. Bautista is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys.

It is therefore ordered that respondent be removed from his office as attorney and that his name be stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered.

A.C. No. 350

August 7, 1959

In re: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES, respondent. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: FaCTS: Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (40 months, and one (1) day of destierro, and to pay a fine of P2,300, with subsidiary destierro in case of insolvency (CA-G.R. No. 11411-R), and under section 1, Rule 128, of the Rules of Court, he was required to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of his profession.

FACTS: The complaint seeks to disqualify the respondent, a 1954 successful bar candidate, from being admitted to the bar. The respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951, he courted the complainant who fell in love with him. To have carnal knowledge of her, the respondent procured the preparation of a fake marriage contract which was then a blank document. He made her sign it on March 8, 1951. A week after, the document was brought back by the respondent to the complainant, signed by the Justice of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since then the complainant and the respondent lived together as husband and wife. Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a religious ratification of their marriage and on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was performed in Aparri by the parish priest of said municipality. The priest no longer required the production of a marriage license because of the civil marriage contract shown to him. After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband and wife and lived with some friends. The complainant then discovered that the respondent was previously married to someone else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan and the present complaint for immorality in this court.. ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of an immoral conduct EULING: YES. Upon consideration of the records of G.R. No. L-9513 and the complaint, this Court is of the opinion that the respondent is immoral. He made mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in the criminal case involves moral turpitude. The act of respondent in contracting the second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and morality. VILLASANTA

April 30, 1957

In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality, vs. HILARION M. PERALTA, respondent. Ramon J. Diaz for respondent. PARAS, C. J.:

Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent is hereby declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar. So ordered.

AQUINO, J: FACTS: For having illicit relations with a concubine under scandalous circumstances in a house located at the poblacion of General Nakar, Quezon, Pedro D. Veloso, the municipal judge of that town, was charged by Atty. Benjamin H. Virrey with immorality in public office. The respondent contracted marriage with Ligaya Veluz at the parish church of Infanta on October 24, 1955. Curiously enough, that was the date (one day after his 46th birthday) when he suffered serious injuries in a vehicular accident at Infanta and when he was brought by plane to Manila and admitted to the V. Luna General Hospital at six- thirty in the evening. Apparently, Judge Veloso married Ligaya Veluz when he had already begotten three children. The respondent admits that the thirty-sevenyear old Gloria Tropicales (his alleged housemaid) is his mistress.

A.M. No. 689-MJ April 13, 1978 FELIX LEYNES, complainant, vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE PEDRO D. VELOSO of General Nakar, Quezon, respondent. A.M. No. 809-MJ April 13, 1978 BENJAMIN H. VIRREY, complainant, vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE PEDRO D. VELOSO of General Nakar, Quezon, respondent.

Respondent Judge, invoking "the interest of justice" and article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, prays for the dismissal of the immorality charge on the ground that his wife, Rosario V. Veluz (she is named Ligaya in the marriage certificate), condoned his acts of concubinage, as shown in her affidavit of November 21, 1974. The respondent also presented to the Investigating Judge the affidavit dated March 5, 1976 of complainant Virrey wherein the latter withdrew his complaint for immorality (on the condition that he would not incur any liability) because he was convinced that Mrs. Veloso hired her husband's mistress to take care of him (Exh. A). Respondent's counsel in his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument scheduled before the Court en banc made the preposterous contention that the respondent should be exonerated because there was no evidence presented against him since the complainant did not appear at the hearing. ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENT should be disbarred for grossly IMMORAL CONDUCT

assaulted his son, Juancho Leynes (Criminal Case No. 872), adopted the charge of immorality withdrawn by Virrey. RULING: YES. Respondent and his counsel should know that since he had admitted the commission of concubinage, that charge is conclusively established and it does not have to be proven anymore. His admission is a confession.We hold that Judge Veloso should be dismissed by reason of his immoral conduct. His moral delinquency renders him unfit for the office of municipal judge and warrants his removal from office (Sec. 97, Judiciary Law).

According to Leynes's counsel, the respondent lives with his concubine in a house just across the municipal hall and plaza. Leynes posed a rhetorical question: how can the inhabitants of a town have confidence in the administration of justice by an immoral judge who himself violates the law? (p. 326, Rollo of Administrative Matter No. 489- MJ).

A lawyer, of course, should have good moral character. He may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct or when he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude such as concubinage (Secs. 2 and 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court; In re Isada, 60 Phil. 915).

In view of the result arrived at in this case, it becomes unnecessary to make any adjudication on the charge of Leynes that Judge Veloso was guilty of partiality in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 872 and the other charges of Virrey imputing to the respondent malicious delay in the administration of justice, misconduct in office, neglect of duty and failure to hear, try and decide Election Case No. 8.

Judge Veloso, in relying on his wife's condonation of his immorality, erroneously confounded or equated the extinction of his criminal liability with his moral fitness to occupy the position of town magistrate. While the moral stigma connected with concubinage may be tolerated in a private person by those who are not fastifious, it is intolerable when the concubinage is committed by a judge and even if the spouse of the judge allegedly condones the offense. (See marital disqualification rule in section 20, Rule 130, Rules of Court; Ordoño vs. Daquigan, L-39012, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 270, 272-3). A judge suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality in public office when he labors under the delusion that he can be a judge and at the same time have a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. The absence of criminal liability does not preclude disciplinary action by reason of his highly unconventional and censurable behavior. Nor does the withdrawal by complainant Virrey of his charge render the administrative case moot. This Court may motu proprio investigate a judge for his continuing, grossly immoral conduct. Felix Leynes, who complained against Judge Veloso for acquitting Ricardo Pujeda and Esperidion Pujeda of the charge of having

WHEREFORE, respondent Veloso is removed from the office as municipal judge. His application for disability retirement is disapproved. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 407

August 15, 1967

IN RE — ATTORNEY JOSE AVANCEÑA, respondent. J. Gonzales and Orense for respondent. Office of the Solicitor General for complainant. ANGELES, J.: Facts: On January 12, 1951, the Supreme Court entered a resolution as follows:

EN BANC [December 7, 1928.] In re FELIPE DEL ROSARIO Felipe del Rosario, in his own behalf. City Fiscal Guevara, for the Government. SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW; PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS. — The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. 2. ID.; ID.; ID. — Acquittal upon a criminal charge is not a bar to proceedings intended to determine if a candidate is worthy to be admitted to the bar. 3. ID.; ID.; ID. — The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. DECISION MALCOLM, J.:

In Re: Carlos S. Basa December 7,

1920Facts: Carlos S. Basa, 29 years of age, a member of bars in California, USA and in the Philippines. He wasconvicted by the Court of First Instance the crime of abduction with consent and sentenced for twoyears, eleven months and eleven days of prison correctional. Attorney-General Feria asks for the disbarment from the Phil. Bar of Atty. Basa as a consequence of the court’s conviction to the latter. TheCode of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of the bar may be removed or suspendedfrom his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moralturpitude . Issue: WON the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of the Penal Code, involvesmoral turpitude. Held: No. "Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to justice,honesty, modesty, or good morals." Although no decision can be found which has decided the exactquestion, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this

character involve moral turpitude. The inherentnature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of

right conduct. ( In re Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard vs . Lyon [1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185;decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)

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Magdalena T. Arciga vs. Segundino D. Maniwang AC No. 1608, 106 SCRA 651, August 14, 1981

Issue: 

Facts:  

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Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October 1970 in Cebu City. Magdalena was a medical technology student while Segundino was a law student. On March 1971, Magdalena and Segundino had sexual congress. Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married. In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his studies to Dava City. Magdalena discovered in January 1973 that she was pregnant. The two went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz to apprise Magdalena’s parents that they were married although they were not. The respondent convinced Magdalena’s father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations where he secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license. Segundino reassured Magdalena that he would marry once he passed the bar examinations. The latter gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973. Segundino passed the bar examinations that was released April 25, 1975. After the oathtaking, Segundino stopped corresponding with

Magdalena. Magdalena went to Davao to contat Segundino. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of money. In December 1975 Magdalena followed Segundino in Bukidnon only to find out that their marriage could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang. Segundino followed Magdalena in Davao and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. Magdalena Arciga then filed a disbarment case on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her.

Whether or not Segundino Maniwang should be disbarred on the ground of grossly immoral conduct. Ruling:

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No, Segundino Maniwang shouldn’t be disbarred. The Supreme Court found that respondent’s refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. The complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.