Rule 1.01.docx

EN BA NC JOSELANO GUEVARRA, Complainant,

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that

A.C. No. 7136 PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, VELASCO, JR., and NACHURA, JJ. Promulgated: August 1, 2007

versus

ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, Respondent.

from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you at Megamall.

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday

DECISION

celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue

PER CURIAM: Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for

immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled

Disbarment[1] before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar

off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household

Discipline

appliances.

(CBD)

against

M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent)

Atty. for

grossly

Jose immoral

Emmanuel conduct

and

unmitigated violation of the lawyers oath.

Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words I Love You on its face, which card when unfolded contained a

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) thenfiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann) Tantoco with whom he had three children.

My everdearest Irene, By the time you open this, youll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what youre about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because theres a bigger plan for the two of us? I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU! I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are together again. Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading: 14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the Wine All You Can promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala. A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.[4] (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their adulterous relationship supplied),

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO! BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE! I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS IM LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL BE![2] Eternally yours, NOLI

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated: 4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading: Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.

15. Respondents adulterous conduct with the complainants wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a piece of paper. Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainants bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her until we are together again, as now they are.[6] (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows: 5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondents relationship with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family: 5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondents special friendship with Irene. xxxx 5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

complainants wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainants marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated: 7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,[12] alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girls father. Complainant attached to the REPLY, as Annex A, a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth[13] bearing Irenes signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Lukes Hospital.

Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading: 18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).[9]

Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS[14] dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainants Reply.[15] Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.

19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in the original)

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainants ComplaintAffidavit and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as his testimony on direct examination.[16]Respondents counsel did not cross-examine complainant.[17]

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION[18] dated October

Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139[22] of the Rules of Court.

26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven. The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule

1.01

of

Canon

1

of

the

Code

of

The petition is impressed with merit.

Professional

Responsibility reading:

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows. Respondent contends, in his Comment[23] on the present petition of

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading: Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading: RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06 CBD Case No. 02-936 Joselano C. Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala

complainant, that there is no evidence against him.[24] The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed: While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. C) and the news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. D), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainants wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against respondent. It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made the following statements to wit: Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being

that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . .

otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.[27] (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a special relationship between him and complainants wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex H-1) sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child Samantha. In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that complainants wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.[25] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having personal knowledge of Irenes daughter Samantha Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a lawyer, 38 years old as the childs father. And the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the desired information on DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate[28] with her signature on the Marriage Certificate[29] shows

that

person. Notatu dignum is Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an

they

were

that,

as

affixed the

by

one

Investigating

and

the

same

Commissioner

noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.

adulterous relationship with Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that committed by any married woman who shall have

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes Medical Center,

sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal

in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness stand,

knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently

declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the

declared

void.[26] (Italics

supplied) What

respondent

denies

is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was low profile and

childs father is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years old and a lawyer.[31]

known only to the immediate members of their respective families. Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant,

has been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated

the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other[32] which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. . . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is required.[33] (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous circumstances.Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading: ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated. The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.[34]

x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.

Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on the surrounding circumstances.[35] The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36] On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree. xxxx

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.[37](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38] The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.[39] (Underscoring supplied)

same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading: Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.[40]

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation[41] on March 22,

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the

2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainants petition for nullity of his (complainants) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case, which was pending review before the Department of

Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant,

reversing

withdrawn.

Simeon Datumanong held:

The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainants Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads: Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared

void ab initio is

immaterial. The

acts

place before the marriage was declared null and void.

complained [43]

of

took

As a lawyer, respondent

should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[44] In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutors Office of complainants complaint for adultery. In

the

City

Prosecutors

Resolution,

DOJ

Secretary

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about Ealas frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Mojes subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with complainant. It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Ealas vehicle and that of Mojes were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondents love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Lukes Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainants supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any

categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part

prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants

of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of

motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were

the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of

to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in

the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint. This Decision takes effect immediately. Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz: x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case[47] (Italics in the original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held: Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-200606 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippinesis ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

4. TCT No. 12791 – Leonor Petronio;

EN BANC

6. TCT No. 12793 – Elizabeth Dungan; and

A.C. No. 6490 July 9, 2013 (Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1054)

7. TCT No. 12794 – Andes Estoy.3

LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION TABANG, Complainants, vs. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, Respondent.

5. TCT No. 12792 – Wilfredo Gomez;

Later, complainants Lilia and Concepcion Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels as they were in need of funds for their medication and other expenses. Claiming that he would help complainants by offering the parcels to prospective buyers, respondent Glenn Gacott borrowed from Lilia Tabang the TCTs covering the parcels.4

RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: This case involves a complaint for disbarment directly filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott of engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).1 Complainants alleged that sometime in 1984 and 1985, complainant Lilia Tabang sought the advice of Judge Eustaquio Gacott, respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott’s father. Lilia Tabang intended to purchase a total of thirty (30) hectares of agricultural land located in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, which consisted of several parcels belonging to different owners. Judge Gacott noted that under the government’s agrarian reform program, Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast tracts of agricultural land as she already owned other parcels. Thus, Judge Gacott advised her to put the titles of the parcels under the names of fictitious persons.2 Eventually, Lilia Tabang was able to purchase seven parcels and obtained the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) under the names of fictitious persons, as follows: 1. TCT No. 12475 – Amelia Andes; 2. TCT No. 12476 – Wilfredo Ondoy; 3. TCT No. 12790 – Agnes Camilla;

About a year after respondent borrowed the titles and after he failed to negotiate any sale, complainants confronted respondent. Respondent then told the complainants that he had lost all seven titles.5 On the pretext of offering a remedy to complainants, respondent advised them to file petitions in court for re-issuance of titles. Pretending to be the "authorized agent-representative" of the fictitious owners of the seven parcels, Lilia Tabang filed petitions for re-issuance of titles.6 In the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed similarities in the signatures of the supposed owners that were affixed on the Special Powers of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed in favor of Lilia Tabang. The public prosecutor, acting on his observation, asked the court to have the supposed owners summoned.7 Seeking to avoid embarrassment, Lilia Tabang had the petitions voluntarily dismissed without prejudice to their being re-filed.8 Subsequently, Lilia Tabang filed a new set of petitions. This time, she changed the fictitious owners’ signatures in the hope of making them look more varied.9 Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a new set of petitions, respondent executed several documents that included revocations of SPAs and various affidavits of recovery purportedly signed by the parcels’ (fictitious) owners. Respondent then caused the annotation of these documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels.10

Also, respondent caused the publication of notices where he represented himself as the owner of the parcels and announced that these were for sale.11 Later, respondent succeeded in selling the seven parcels. He received a total of ?3,773,675.00 from the proceeds of the sales.12 Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit, complainants filed their complaint directly with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on February 3, 2003. The case was docketed as Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Case No. 03-1054. In his defense, respondent alleged that the owners of the seven parcels were not fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. He added that Lilia Tabang had been merely the broker for the seven parcels and that she had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" of twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels. He alleged that after she had been refused to be given a "balato," Lilia Tabang had threatened to defame him and seek his disbarment.13 In her Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2004,14 IBP Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. In a Resolution dated April 16, 2004,15 the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report of Commissioner Navarro. However, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty to disbarment. Thereafter, the case was referred to the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. In a Resolution dated September 29, 2004,16 the Supreme Court remanded the case to the IBP. The Court noted that majority of the pieces of evidence presented by complainants were mere photocopies and affidavits and that the persons who supposedly executed such documents were neither presented nor subpoenaed. Thus, there could not have been adequate basis for sustaining the imposition of a penalty as grave as disbarment. The case was then assigned to Investigating Commissioner Dennis B. Funa. Hearings were conducted on March 22, 2005; October 7, 2005; July 18, 2006; August 29, 2006; November 7, 2006; February 23, 2007; and July 25, 2007.17

The complainants presented several witnesses. One was Dieter Heinze, President of the Swiss American Lending Corporation.18 Heinze testified that in April 2001, a friend introduced him to respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot priced at ₱900,000.00. His company, however, paid only ₱668,000.00. Heinze noted that his company withheld payment upon his realization that Lilia Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse claim and upon respondent’s failure to produce Leonor Petronio, the alleged lot owner. Another of complainants’ witnesses was Atty. Agerico Paras.19 He testified that Heinze introduced him to respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot priced at ₱2,300,000.00. He paid for the said parcel in two (2) installments. Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse claim, he wrote to respondent asking him to either work on the cancellation of the claim or to reimburse him. He added that respondent was unable to produce Amelia Andes, the ostensible owner of the parcel he had purchased. Teodoro Gallinero, another buyer of one of the seven parcels, also testified for complainants.20 He testified that in February 2001, he was introduced to respondent who claimed that several parcels with a total area of thirty (30) hectares were owned by his mother. Gallinero agreed to purchase a parcel for the price of ₱2,000,000.00 which he paid in cash and in kind (L300 van). Complainant Lilia Tabang also testified on the matters stated in the Complaint.21 On July 25, 2007, Commissioner Funa required the complainants to submit their Position Paper. Respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration and the Inhibition of Commissioner Funa who, respondent claimed, deprived him of the chance to cross-examine complainants’ witnesses, and was "bent on prejudicing"22 him. Commissioner Funa then inhibited himself. Following this, the case was reassigned to Investigating Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco. In the meantime, with the Supreme Court En Banc’s approval of the IBPCBD’s Rules of Procedure, it was deemed proper for an Investigating Commissioner to submit his/her Report and Recommendation based on matters discussed during the mandatory conferences, on the parties’

Position Papers (and supporting documents), and on the results of clarificatory questioning (if such questioning was found to be necessary). As such, respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied, and he was required to file his Position Paper.23 On July 30, 2009, respondent filed his Position Paper.24 Subsequently, the case was deemed submitted for Commissioner Limpingco’s Report and Recommendation. In his Position Paper, respondent noted that he filed criminal complaints against Lilia Tabang on account of Tabang’s statement that she had fabricated the identities of the owners of the seven (7) parcels. He claimed that since 1996, he had relied on the Torrens Titles of the seven (7) owners who were introduced to him by Lilia Tabang. He asserted that Lilia Tabang could not have been the owner of the seven (7) parcels since the SPAs executed by the parcels’ owners clearly made her a mere agent and him a sub-agent. He also assailed the authenticity of the public announcements (where he supposedly offered the seven 7 parcels for sale) and Memorandum of Agreement. He surmised that the signatures on such documents appearing above the name "Glenn C. Gacott" had been mere forgeries and crude duplications of his own signature. In his Report and Recommendation dated August 23, 2010,25 Commissioner Limpingco found respondent liable for gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. He likewise noted that respondent was absent in most of the hearings without justifiable reason, in violation of Rule 12.04 of the CPR.26 He recommended that respondent be disbarred and his name, stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. On October 8, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution27 adopting the Report of Investigating Commissioner Limpingco.

respondent filed two (2) more Motions for Extension – the first on September 29, 2011 and the second on November 3, 2011 – both of which were denied by the Court. Despite the Court’s denials of his Motions for Extension, respondent filed on December 14, 2011 a Motion to Admit Petition for Review/Appeal (with attached Petition/Appeal). This Motion was denied by the Court on April 17, 2012. For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment. After a careful examination of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of Governors. It is clear that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR when he executed the revocations of SPAs and affidavits of recovery and in arrogating for himself the ownership of the seven (7) subject parcels. While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities, the complainant’s own complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of respondent’s offense. Quite the contrary, his offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action, he instigated it. Not only did he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, We impose upon respondent the supreme penalty of disbarment. Under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court (Rules), a lawyer may be disbarred for any of the following grounds:

On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.28

deceit;

Respondent then filed his Notice of Appeal with the IBP on August 8, 2011.

malpractice;

On August 17, 2011, respondent filed before the Supreme Court his Urgent Motion for Extension of Time (to file Petition for Review/Appeal). On September 20, 2011, the Court granted respondent’s Motion and gave him an extension of thirty (30) days to file his Appeal. The Supreme Court warned respondent that no further extension will be given. Despite this,

gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;

violation of the lawyer's oath; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and

greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto."36

willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.

Per Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules, a court may consider the following in determining preponderance of evidence:

It is established in Jurisprudence that disbarment is proper when lawyers commit gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in usurping the property rights of other persons. By way of examples: In Brennisen v. Contawi:29 Respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi was disbarred for having used a spurious SPA to mortgage and sell property entrusted to him for administration. 30

In Sabayle v. Tandayag: One of the respondents, Atty. Carmelito B. Gabor, was disbarred for having acknowledged a Deed of Sale in the absence of the purported vendors and for taking advantage of his position as Assistant Clerk of Court by purchasing one-half (1/2) of the land covered by said Deed of Sale knowing that the deed was fictitious. In Daroy v. Legaspi:31 The Court disbarred respondent Atty. Ramon Legaspi for having converted to his personal use the funds that he received for his clients. Nevertheless, recourse to disbarment must be done with utmost caution. As this Court noted in Moran v. Moron:32 Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by his serious misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the bar. Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe – such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end desired.33 Moreover, considering the gravity of disbarment, it has been established that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify its imposition.34 As explained in Aba v. De Guzman,35 "[p]reponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has

All the facts and circumstances of the case; The witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; The witnesses’ interest or want of interest and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and The number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number. In this case, complainants have shown by a preponderance of evidence that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. Specifically, complainants have shown not only through Lilia Tabang’s testimony but more so through the testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero that: respondent misrepresented himself as the owner of or having the right to dispose of the subject parcels; respondent actively sought to sell or otherwise dispose of the subject parcels; respondent perfected the sales and received the proceeds of the sales – whether in cash or in kind – of the subject parcels; such sales were without the consent or authorization of complainants; and respondent never remitted the proceeds of the sales to complainants.

More importantly, complainants’ witnesses showed that when respondent had been confronted with Lilia Tabang’s adverse claims and asked to substantiate the identities of the supposed owners of the subject parcels, he had failed to produce such persons or even show an iota of proof of their existence. In this regard, the testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero are particularly significant in so far as they have been made despite the fact that their interest as buyers is contrary to that of complainants’ interest as adverse claimants.

owner of the seven (7) parcels since her name does not appear on the parcels’ TCTs39 and how he merely respected the title and ownership of the ostensible owners.40 Similarly, he makes much of how Lilia Tabang was named as a mere agent in the SPAs.41However, respondent loses sight of the fact that it is precisely the accuracy of what the TCTs and SPAs indicate and the deception they engender that are the crux of the present controversy. In urging this Court to sustain him, respondent would have us rely on the very documents assailed as fraudulent.

In contrast, respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations.

Apart from these, all that respondent can come up with are generic, sweeping, and self-serving allegations of (1) how he could not have obtained the TCTs from Tabang as "it is a standing policy of his law office not to accept Torrens title [sic] unless it is related to a court case"42 and because "[he] does not borrow any Torrens title from anybody and for whatever purpose;"43 (2) how complainants could not have confronted him to demand the return of the TCTs and how he could not have told them that he lost the TCTs because "[a]s a lawyer, [he] always respects and recognizes the right of an owner to keep in his custody or possession any of his properties of value;"44 and (3) how he could not have met and talked with Lilia Tabang for the engagement of his services only to refuse Lilia Tabang because legal practice constituted his livelihood, and there was no reason for him to refuse an occasion to earn income.45

Respondent’s defense centered on his insistence that the owners of the seven parcels were not fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. Respondent also evaded the allegations against him by flinging counter-allegations. For instance, he alleged that Lilia Tabang had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" from the proceeds of the sale of the subject parcels and that after she had been refused, she threatened to defame respondent and seek his disbarment. In support of this allegation, he pointed out that he had filed criminal complaints against Lilia Tabang. He also surmised that the signatures on the subject documents appearing above the name "Glenn C. Gacott" were mere forgeries and crude duplications of his signature. Court,37

Per Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of the burden of proof is vested upon the party who alleges the truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator v. Gutierrez38 where a party resorts to bare denials and allegations and fails to submit evidence in support of his defense, the determination that he committed the violation is sustained. It was incumbent upon respondent to prove his allegation that the supposed owners of the seven parcels are real persons. Quite the contrary, he failed to produce the slightest proof of their identities and existence, much less produce their actual persons. As to his allegations regarding Lilia Tabang’s supposed extortion and threat and the forgery or crude duplication of his signature, they remain just that – allegations. Respondent failed to aver facts and circumstances which support these claims. At best, respondent merely draws conclusions from the documents which form the very basis of complainants’ own allegations and which are actually being assailed by complainants as inaccurate, unreliable, and fraudulent. Respondent makes much of how Lilia Tabang could not have been the

Rather than responding squarely to complainants’ allegations, respondent merely embarks on conjectures and ascribes motives to complainants. He accuses Lilia Tabang of demanding a "balato" of twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels, and of threatening to defame him and to seek his disbarment after she had been refused.1âwphi1 This evasive posturing notwithstanding, what is clear is that respondent failed to adduce even the slightest proof to substantiate these claims. From all indications, Lilia Tabang had sufficient basis to file the present Complaint and seek sanctions against respondent. Given the glaring disparity between the evidence adduced by complainants and the sheer lack of evidence adduced by respondent, this Court is led to no other reasonable conclusion than that respondent committed the acts of which he is accused and that he acted in a manner that is unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the

State – the administration of justice – as an officer of the court."46 Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."47 Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him. Quite the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well as took advantage of the credulity of petitioners to secure undue gains for himself and to inflict serious damage on others. He did so over the course of several years in a sustained and unrelenting fashion and outdid his previous wrongdoing with even greater, more detestable offenses. He has hardly shown any remorse. From how he has conducted himself in these proceedings, he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and assuaging complainants’ plight. Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court his duplicity by repeatedly absenting himself from the IBP’s hearings without justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court to admit his Appeal despite his own failure to comply with the much extended period given to him, thus inviting the Court to be a party in delaying complainants’ cause. For all his perversity, respondent deserves none of this Court’s clemency. WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, having clearly violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's personal record as attorney. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995 WELLINGTON REYES, complainant, vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent. PER CURIAM: This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant City Fiscal of manila, with malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an attorney. I On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office at the City Hall. An entrapment was set up by the NBI. Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for marking. The paper bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to complainant for the use in the entrapment. When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter would not return until around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the NBI agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business with respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to see respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang umaga." To which respondent replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay."

Complainant then handed to respondent the marked money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined to give a sworn statement to explain his side of the case, invoking his right against self-incrimination. On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative charges and the institution of disbarment proceedings against him. On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office pending investigation and disposition of his administrative case (Case No. 74). Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two other cases were earlier filed against respondent: namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct filed by one Angel Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was found guilty as charged and was recommended for suspension; and Administrative Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was pending resolution. In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent. He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI at the instance of complainant was still pending preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a criminal complaint for incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted corruption of a public official against complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila. In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against respondent were motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill will. He said

that the investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by respondent against him. In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court., the case was transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition. On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution dated March 26, 1994. II We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked money from complainant during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent filing of administrative and criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent merely denied the charge of extortion and retorted that the marked money was planted by complainant. It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]). When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him (Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]). Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]). The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The

lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 [1983]). WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995 WELLINGTON REYES, complainant, vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.

florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined to give a sworn statement to explain his side of the case, invoking his right against self-incrimination. On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.

PER CURIAM: This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant City Fiscal of manila, with malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an attorney. I On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant's business rival. According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office at the City Hall. An entrapment was set up by the NBI. Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for marking. The paper bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to complainant for the use in the entrapment. When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter would not return until around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the NBI agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business with respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When finally complainant was able to see respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang umaga." To which respondent replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant then handed to respondent the marked money which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow

On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative charges and the institution of disbarment proceedings against him. On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office pending investigation and disposition of his administrative case (Case No. 74). Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two other cases were earlier filed against respondent: namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct filed by one Angel Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was found guilty as charged and was recommended for suspension; and Administrative Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970, which was pending resolution. In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant surreptitiously planted the marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent. He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI at the instance of complainant was still pending preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In connection with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a criminal complaint for incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted corruption of a public official against complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila. In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against respondent were motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill will. He said that the investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by respondent against him. In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and

recommendation. However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court., the case was transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition. On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution dated March 26, 1994. II We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked money from complainant during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the subsequent filing of administrative and criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent merely denied the charge of extortion and retorted that the marked money was planted by complainant. It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]). When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him (Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]). Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]). The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 [1983]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 2033 May 9, 1990 E. CONRAD and VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN, complainants, vs. ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent. A.C. No. 2148 May 9, 1990 ATTY. FRANCISCO ORTIGAS, JR. and ATTY. EULOGIO R. RODRIGUEZ, complainants, vs. ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.

I. The antecedent facts on which Administrative Case No. 2148 is premised are reported by then Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, as follows: PREPATORY STATEMENT This unnumbered administrative case against respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (hereinafter called respondent NAVARRO, for short) originally stemmed from the letter of a certain Angelito B. Cayanan to the Honorable Supreme Court dated January 25, 1975 which reads as follows: xxx

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Peña & Marcos for complainants in AC No. 2033.

xxx

I wish to respectfully inform your good office that I bought a few lots on installment basis from Atty. Felipe C. Navarro of Ruby Hills Subdivision as evidenced by the attached OR Nos. 0512 and 0519 and a "Contract of Sale".

Felipe C. Navarro for and in his own behalf.

Atty. Navarro, some officials and representative of the said company claim that although there is a pending case No. L-39386 under Decree No. 1425 on the property being sold, the case is almost won in their favor and are just waiting for your final decision within a couple of months or even less.

PER CURIAM: We write this finale to the dispiriting charges filed by complainants Francisco Ortigas, Jr. and Eulogio R. Rodriguez in Administrative Case No. 2148 1 and by spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Bewley Geeslin in Administrative Case No. 2033 2 seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for malpractice and gross misconduct. In our resolution dated May 5, 1980, issued consequent to the Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General submitted to this Court on April 21, 1980, we ordered the suspension of respondent Navarro from the practice of law during the pendency of these cases. 3 The investigative phase was conducted by said office pursuant to our resolutions of February 14, 1975 and September 13, 1976 in G.R. Nos. L- 39386 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al." With commendable thoroughness and attention to detail, two reports were submitted which, in order to vividly portray the scope and magnitude of respondent's operations and how he was able to perpetrate the anomalous transactions complained of, we quote extensively from said reports which are sustained by the evidence of record.

xxx

In this connection, I am respectfully writing you this letter in order to bring to your attention this transaction and to protect my rights in the event that any unfavorable circumstances may arise in the future. xxx xxx xxx Acting on the aforesaid letter, the Supreme Court, per Resolution dated February 14, 1975, referred the copy of Mr. Cayanan's letter to the Solicitor General for "investigation of the existence of sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas

District, Quezon City) for suspension or removal from the office of attorney and for appropriate action." The resolution reads as follows: L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) The court NOTED the letter dated January 25, 1975 of Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan with its attachments (copy thereof has been furnished Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, counsel for respondents) and RESOLVED to instruct the Clerk of Court to inform him of the status of the cases at bar. It appearing from said letter that Atty. Felipe C. Navarro has been selling the lots in litigation herein on installment basis to the public (among them, Mr. Cayanan) as "absolute owner by virtue of this contract of legal services in Civil Case No. 8321, etc. of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig" (see Ruby Hills Subdivision Contract of Sale), which lots are titled in the name of herein petitioner and not in Atty. Navarro's name and that the unwarranted claim is made on his behalf that 'the case is almost won in their favor' (see Mr. Cayanan's letter), the Court RESOLVED FURTHER to refer copy of Mr. Cayanan's said letter with its attachments to the Solicitor General under Rule 139, Sections 1, 3, 4 and 5 for investigation of the existence of sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City) for suspension or removal from the office of attorney and for appropriate action. Aside from Mr. Cayanan, the Solicitor General is directed to communicate in the premises with Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez of the law firm of Ortigas & Ortigas (with address at 10th Floor, Ortigas Bldg. Ortigas

Ave., Pasig, Rizal), who under letter of June 10, 1974 on file in Administrative Case No. 1154 has offered to make available documents in their possession showing other sales made by Atty. Navarro of properties titled in the name of other persons, involving a total selling price of P75 million and down payments of almost P 0.6 million. On April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General (now Justice of the Court of Appeals) Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. wrote Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan asking him to submit his affidavit embodying the circumstances surrounding the matters contained in his letter dated January 25, 1975, especially the second paragraph thereof. The letter was sent to Mr. Cayanan by registered mail but the same was returned unserved for the reason that the addressee had moved to another address. On the same date, April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General Gutierrez, Jr. also wrote to Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez requesting him for copies of the documents evidencing the sales made by respondent Navarro. On February 13, 1976, this Honorable Court issued a Resolution in L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) referring the letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 "for investigation of the existence of sufficient grounds for the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for suspension or removal from office and for appropriate action" and directing "Mr. Ortigas, Jr., to furnish the Office of the Solicitor General for the purpose with a copy of said letter and all its pertinent attachments." The aforementioned letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 reads as follows: xxx

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Dear Justice Teehankee,

This is to apprise your Office of the latest activities of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro who has previously been reported to the Supreme Court as selling properties titled in the name of this Company.

ABM Sison Hospital, etc. His modus operandi is described in this Company's letter complaint dated April 8, 1974 to Gen. Prospero Olivas, copy of which is attached hereto for ready reference.

We have just secured a new "subdivision plan" of Atty. Navarro showing that the lots he is now selling to the public include those titled in the names of the heirs of the late Don Vicente Madrigal and this Company in Quezon City. Atty. Navarro has thus expanded his activities despite recent detention by the Military. As could be seen from the attached "plan", Navarro claims to be the owner of that huge property (actually titled in the name of the Madrigals and this Company) bounded by Ortigas Avenue, E. delos Santos Avenue, White Plains Road and R. Rodriguez Avenue, comprising approximately of 260 hectares.

Navarro continues to defy the authorities, for only after a brief lull he is now again openly selling titled properties of other persons. We have provided more than sufficient documentary evidence to the Court and the Solicitor General and we hope that formal administrative charges can now be filed against Navarro to prevent him from further perpetrating a large scale fraud upon the public.

As reported in our previous letters to the Court, Navarro claims to be the owner of some 4,000 hectares of land in the Greater Manila Area in virtue of his handling the case of some squatters on a 1.2-hectare lot in Mandaluyong, Rizal owned by Dona Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. He contends that whereas his squattersclients occupy only about a hectare, he has become, in virtue of his contract of legal services' with them, the owner of thousands of hectares of land as these are allegedly0 covered by void titles. Navarro thus started to openly sell these properties. Navarro's Ruby Hills and Bluehills Subdivisions, for instance, cover properties already with buildings and other improvements. He has nevertheless been quite successful in selling portions thereof, as when he sold lots within the De La Salle College, Wack-Wack Golf & Country Club,

xxx xxx xxx Thereafter, hearings were conducted on various dates. COMPLAINANTS' EVIDENCE The evidence for the complainants consist mainly of documents, most of which were presented in Criminal Cases Nos. 3158 and 3159 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and in the various civil cases before the said court involving Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. Complainants' sole witness, Reynaldo Morallos, merely identified the various documentary exhibits presented by the complainants. From the evidence adduced by the complainants, it appears that a certain Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer (hereinafter called HABERER, for short) filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal twenty-two (22) cases for recovery of possession of her 1.2 hectare property in Mandaluyong, Rizal titled in her name, and to eject the twenty-two (22) families squatting thereat. Eleven (11) of these cases were raffled to Judge Emilio Salas, while the other eleven (11) cases were assigned to Judge Pedro Navarro. All the twenty-two (22) defendants-squatters were represented by respondent NAVARRO. On behalf of his clients,

respondent NAVARRO interposed as principal defense, the alleged nullity of the HABERER'S title, claiming that the mother title from which it emanated actually originated from Decree No. 1425 issued in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which he claims to be non-existent.

Defendants' claim that they became owners of the land in question by adverse possession is without merit considering that title to land becomes non-prescriptible Sec. 42 of Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Corporation de Pp. Agustines vs. Crisostomo, 42 Phil. 427). A title once registered cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession. Registered title under the Torrens System cannot be defeated by prescription. The title, once registered, is notice to the World. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of registration (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 3 Phil. 590, 595).

The two sets of cases were decided differently. In the first set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Salas rendered a decision on August 31, 1970 sustaining the validity of the HABERER'S title and ordering the eviction of the defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO (Exhibit W). In finding for the plaintiff, Judge Salas stated as follows: After due consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court finds that most of the documentary evidence submitted by defendants are irrelevant to the case since they pertain to defendants claim of ownership over 10,000 hectares of land when the area of the property subject matter of the complaint is only 12,700 square meters. This Court also believes that the above-mentioned claims of defendants are untenable. Plaintiffs ownership over the property in question is evidenced by the issuance in her name, since 1929, of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one-year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible (see case of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558; Reyes & Nadres vs. Borbon & Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 791; Manuel Sy Juco, et al. vs. Luis Francisco, 53 O.G., p. 2186, April 15,1957; Brizuela et al. vs. Ciriaco Vda. de Vargas, 53 O.G., p. 2822, May 15, 1957).

Further, defendants recognized plaintiffs ownership over the property in question when they filed a petition with the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation wherein they sought the latter's intervention for the acquisition of the property and for the subdividing thereof into small lots to be sold to them at nominal cost. In said petition defendants not only named the plaintiff as the owner of the property in question but they also indicated therein her title to the land as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. We quote hereunder the pertinent facts and data concerning the property in question in defendants' petition submitted to the General Manager of the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, as follows: xxx

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1) Location of land: Mandaluyong, Rizal

Barrio

Burol,

2) Name of registered owner: Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer

et al. vs. Descallar et al., No. L-12964, Feb. 29,1960).

3) Address of owner: 1288 Burgos St., Paco, Manila, or c/o Bausa, Ampil, & Suarez Law Offices, Madrigal Bldg., Manila

In view of the above-mentioned ruling of the Supreme Court, it is our opinion that there is no need to discuss the merits of the reasons claimed by defendants why Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in the name of plaintiff is null and void. (Exh. W) Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8322, 8323, 8327, 8370, 8375, 8374, 8382, 8691, 8693, 8696 & 8699, at pages 6-7; 9-10).

4) Certificate of Title No. (attach photostatic copy): 15043 5) Area of land, Lot & Block & Survey Nos. 12,700 square meters(Exh G). As regards defendants' claim that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued since 1929 in the name of plaintiff is null and void, this Court is of the opinion that defendants cannot assail the validity of said title in this proceeding, which is for recovery of possession. Any attack on the decree of registration of title must be direct and not by collateral proceeding. The title which may be issued in pursuance of said decree cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished in a collateral proceeding (Legarda, et al. vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590). In the case of Director of Land vs. Gan Tan, G.R. No. L-2664, May 30, 1951, our Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of the trial court where the registered owner was considered disqualified to acquire land under the Constitution and consequently was denied the right to constitute his title, said: "That the disqualification raised by the Court is untenable in the light of the theory that a Torrens title cannot be collateraly attacked. That issue can only be raised in an action instituted expressly for that purpose". (See also Ramon Chua Yu Sun vs. The Hon. Ceferino de los Santos, et al., G.R. No. 4347, November 23,1951; James (sic) G.R. No. L-4013, Dec. 29,1951; Samonte,

In the second set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Pedro Navarro decided in favor of the defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO. In his decision dated May 26, 1971, dismissing the complaints, Judge Navarro stated as follows: Plaintiff claims to be the registered owner of a parcel of land containing an area of 12,000 square meters situated at the corner of A. Luna, Harapin Ang Bukas and J.C. Zuluete Streets, Mandaluyong, Rizal, which is covered by, and more particularly described in, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal and indicated in the sketch plan attached to the complaint as Annex A. xxx

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It likewise appears that ejectment proceedings have been filed in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, and in the City Court of Quezon City against several persons occupying other parcels by Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, where decisions have been rendered in favor of said Partnership. In order to forestall executions of these decisions defendants in said ejectment cases filed class suit before this Court by the occupants of the

land which was heard and tried before Branch XV in which the Director of Lands was impleaded as a party-defendant. The decision of Branch XV in said class suit is made part of the evidence of these defendants in the herein eleven cases for whatever the same may be worth as aid in the determination of the merits of the issues raised herein. As may be gleaned from said decision of Branch XV plaintiff therein assailed the validity of Decree No. 1425 as null and void and or fictitious and the proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917 upon which the decree was based as also null and void. The Court sustained the herein plaintiffs claim and rendered judgment declaring (1) the proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917 null and void; (2) the Decree No. 1425 null and void; (3) all original certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant to the judgment in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 utter nullities; (4) all transfer certificates of title derived from the original certificates of title declared void under No. 3 above, particularly but not exclusively, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 77652 and 77653 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its derivative Transfer Certificate of 'title No. 135879 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, null and void; (5) that the rightful owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the herein plaintiffs . . . and so forth. The Court has read copy of this decision of our Branch XV and observed findings of facts too ponderous to be ignored. That case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the proceedings

leading to the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 and, as an inevitable corollary, the nullity of Decree No. 1425 issue by virtue of such void proceedings as well as the original certificates of title issued as consequence thereof. In said proceeding before Branch XV the Court, among other things, found that while the decision in GLRO 917 was supposedly rendered on April 25, 1905, the survey of the property subject matter of therein application was not made until June 16 to August 16, 1906, or some one year after the decision. It found no proof of initial hearing of the application for registration being published as required by law without which the Land Registration Court could not have acquired jurisdiction over the case. Said decision also made inference that since the survey of the property was not made until a year after the rendition of the judgment the technical descriptions appearing in the original certificates of title issued under GLRO Rec. No. 917 Decree No. 1425, could not have been those appearing in the notice of initial hearing, if any. Publication of accurate technical description being an essential jurisdictional requirement which cannot be dispensed with and non-compliance with this requirement renders the proceedings and the decision and decree and titles issued arising therefrom null and void. The same decision of Branch XV also made its findings that James Ross who was said to have penned the decision in GLRO Rec. No. 917, never was a judge of the Court of Land Registration at the time the decision was supposedly rendered because the Gaceta Official for the year 1905 does not show that James Ross was listed as Judge of the Land Registration

Court or that he was ever appointed in that capacity. Furthermore, the Court found that while J.C. Welson was the Clerk of Court on April 26, 1905, one A.K. Jones issued the decree and he signed it as Clerk of Court. The Court even found the supposed decision in that proceedings missing and made its conclusion that since the decree which was supposedly issued by a person who was not the Clerk of Court at the time and which decree did not contain the description of the property ordered in the decision to be rendered because the survey of the property was only made some one year later and that said decree cannot now even be found, the decision rendered therein is void for lack of jurisdiction. Now, as we have said, the foregoing findings of facts are too ponderous to be ignored. It is indeed a truism that a void original certificate of title cannot be the source of a valid transfer certificate of title and a void judgment is, in the eyes of the law, inexistent and cannot give source to any legal right. The evidence now shows that the plaintiffs in said Civil Case No. 7-M(10339) before Branch XV of this Court are also the defendants in the herein eleven cases in which their properties are also involved. Since the case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the proceedings by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 and the alleged title of the plaintiff over the parcels of land occupied by the herein eleven defendants is a derivative from such decree, it is the considered opinion of this Court that until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this Court is reversed or set aside by final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven defendants in these eleven cases to vacate the parcels which

they occupy and on which their respective houses are built has become premature. It goes without saying that if said decision of Branch XV will be finally affirmed, or that the same becomes final and executory, all the claims of rights to ownership and possession of properties embraced in the decision in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 shall become absolute nullities. Possessions by actual occupants of all these properties had better be maintained until after final decision in Civil Case No. 7-M(10339) shall have been rendered. (Exh. R, Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, 8379, 8383, 8385, 8386, 8387 and 8700, at pp. 2, 5-9). On June 21, 1971, Judge Navarro, acting on the motion filed by respondent NAVARRO, issued an order cancelling HABERER's title over her property in question and directing the issuance of a new title in lieu thereof in favor of respondent's clients Thus — WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaints in the above-entitled cases (Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8329, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8386, 8685, 8687 and 8700) all with costs against the plaintiff and hereby ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in favor of the plaintiff Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer and in view thereof issue new certificates of title in favor of the defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of Attorney Felipe Navarro in accordance with the terms of the "Kasunduan Hinggil sa Serbisyo ng Abogado" which is quoted in his ex-parte motion for clarification and/or modification of the decision.

As so modified the decision stands in all other respects. SO ORDERED. (Exhibit S, pp. 4-5). On July 23, 1971, HABERER filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order, and on September 15, 1972, Judge Navarro issued the following order: In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate that its decision in this case was mainly predicated on the decision of Branch XV of this Court that the certificate of title emanating from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null and void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The Court opined that until said decision is reversed the actual occupants had better be maintained in their possessions of the land. Pursuant to the same order the motion for reconsideration and new trial was set only for reception of alleged newly discovered evidence. The Court now understands that the decision of Branch XV is now under review by order of our Appellate Court. It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered insofar as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of other persons and entities like the Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not a party herein, because the certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No.

1425 from which Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders or decisions are made in this case cannot be made to affect the said company. Decisions and orders can only affect parties to the case. The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June 21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is now being the subject of further proceedings and (2) because it has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not even a party herein. WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present occupants of the land as stated in the decision stands. SO ORDERED. (Exhibit T, at pp. 2-3). HABERER appealed from the decision of Judge Navarro while the defendants-clients of respondent NAVARRO appealed from the decision of Judge Salas. The Navarro order of June 21, 1971 was not appealed by respondent NAVARRO's clients. After the rendition of the Navarro decision which made reference to the decision rendered by Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, respondent NAVARRO published in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971 the following:

LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED: PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF LAW AS INTERPRETED BY OUR SUPREME COURT RESPECTING A VAST TRACT OF LAND LATIFUNDIO COVERING MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY, THE DECISION DATED MAY 26, 1971 REITERATING AND REPEATING THE DECLARATION AND ORDER THAT ALL ORIGINAL AND TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO RENDERED BY THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL IN FAVOR OF THE MYRIAD CLIENTS OF THE UNDERSIGNED HAS AUTOMATICALLY BY MERE LAPSE OF THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD) BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. But to every possessor in good faith there comes a time when he is considered a possessor in bad faith. When the owner or possessor with a better right comes along, when he becomes aware that what he had taken for granted is at least doubtful, and when he learns the grounds in support of the adverse contention, good faith ceases. The possessor may still believe that his right is more secure, because we resign ourselves with difficulty to the sight of our vanishing hopes, but when the final judgment of the court deprives him of the possession, all illusion necessarily disappears. (Tacas vs. Robon, 53 Phil. 356, 361-362 citing Manresa and Articles 528, 545, and 1123 of our present Civil Code). He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,

planted or sown without right to indemnity (Art 449, Civil Code) HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE DESIRE OF THE UNDERSIGNED PREVAILING PARTY AND SUCCESSOR BY TITLE ACQUIRED AFTER THE ACTIONS WERE BEGUN BY VIRTUE OF HIS CONTRACT OF LEGAL SERVICES TO DEMAND FOR THE DEMOLITION OR REMOVAL OF THE IMPROVEMENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH FOR: The Civil Code confirms certain timehonored principles of the law of property. One of those is the principle of accession whereby the owner of property acquires not only that which it produces but that which it united to it either naturally or artificially. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land. Where however, the planter, builder or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced coownership" (Vol. 3, 4th ed., p. 213), the law has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after the payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing." Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 66 Phil. 598, 602; see also

Filipinas Colleges, Inc. vs. Garcia Timbang, et al., 106 Phil. 247, 254). So caveat emptor (buyers beware) of possesors in bad faith as we are ready to ask for the execution of the decision pursuant to law and avoid a scire facias Ordinary prudence requires that those involved may please make some kind of arrangements with the undersigned before execution by calling through the following telephones: xxx

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BY THE WAY, YOU ARE ALL INVITED TO JOIN THEMOTORCADE OF OUR PEOPLE'S VICTORY WHICH WILL PASS THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL STREETS OF MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY FROM 9 A.M. TO 12 NOON TODAY, SUNDAY, JULY 4, 1971, THE MOTORCADE WILL BEGIN FROM NO. 61 AMADO T. REYES STREET, BARRIO BUROL, MANDALUYONG, RIZAL RETURNING TO THE SAME PLACE AT NOON FOR LUNCH CELEBRATING TILL MIDNIGHT. (Sgd.) FELIPE C. NAVARRO

In view of the aforementioned publication, panic ensued among the lot buyers of ORTIGAS and among the property owners whose titles were derived from Decree No. 1425. As a counter measure to allay the fears of the panicky lot buyers and owners, ORTIGAS caused the publication in the Manila Times on July 19 and 17, 1971 the following: WARNING SO THE PUBLIC MAY KNOW In reply to numerous inquiries received by Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership with reference to an advertisement published in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971 supposedly affecting the validity of all original certificates of title and transfer certificates of title derived from Decree No. 1425, Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership wishes to announce that it is not a party to ANY case allegedly decided on May 26, 1971 by the Supreme Court or any other court and therefore ALL ITS TITLES DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NOT IN ANY WAY AFFECTED BY SAID DECISION. The public is hereby requested to be wary of any person selling lands and/or rights to lands belonging to and in the name of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership.

Counsel for the Defense 60 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City (Exhibit D, at pages 6-8). Thereafter, respondent NAVARRO claimed ownership of properties originally covered by Decree 1425 including the parcels of land owned by Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (hereinafter called ORTIGAS, for short), and started selling them.

The public is also warned to be wary of MISLEADING adverstisements and/or persons basing their rights to lands of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership on such "decision" of May 26, 1971 which is claimed to be "final and executory." ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (Exhibit D, at pages 4-5).

After the publication of the foregoing notices, respondent NAVARRO filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII, two (2) complaints for libel against the officers of ORTIGAS and the officials of the defunct Manila 'times. Respondent NAVARRO sought to recover in said cases damages allegedly sustained by him on account of his failure to consummate thousands of sales by reason of the publication of the above notice. In support of his allegation, respondent NAVARRO presented 169 deeds of sale over lots in his various subdivisions, the locations of which overlap the properties owned by ORTIGAS (marked as Exhibit F, F-1 to F-168 in the instant proceedings). On December 13, 1971, Judge Benjamin H. Aquino dismissed these two cases for libel for lack of merit (Exhibit D). Apart from the documents pertaining to the HABERER cases and the libel cases, the complainants also presented documents relating to Civil Case No. 7-M(10339), Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, et al." and Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro." In Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), the plaintiffs therein sought to enjoin ORTIGAS from ejecting them. Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz decided in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that (1) there was no publication for the Notice of Initial Hearing set in 1905; (2) there was no survey of the property sought to be registered; (3) the judge presiding over the defunct Court of Land Registration was fake; and (4) the Clerk of Court of the said Court was also fake. The dispositive portion of the Ruiz decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares and/or orders: 1. That the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917 are null and void;

2. That Decree No. 1425 is null and void and/or fictitious; 3. That all the original certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant to the judgments in G.L.R.0 Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 were utter nullities; 4. That all transfer certificates of title derived from the original certificates of title declared void under No. (3) above, particularly but not exclusively, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 77652 and 77653 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its derivative Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135879 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, were and are null and void; 5. That the rightfully (sic) owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the herein plaintiffs, the portions owned by them being as indicated in Exhibit P; 6. That the defendant Partnership cease and desist from molesting the plaintiffs in the enjoyment and peaceful possession of their respective landholdings; 7. That the Hon. Andres Siochi, as Presiding Judge, Municipal Court, Pasig, Rizal, and Hon. Ricardo Tensuan, as Presiding Judge, Branch II, City Court of Quezon City, and the defendant Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, their agents, representatives and any and all persons acting in their behalves, refrain and desist absolute (sic) and perpetually from proceeding with or taking any action on Civil Cases Nos. 1134, II 13865, II13869, II-13877, II-13913, and II-13921

filed by the herein defendant Partnership against some of the herein plaintiffs; 8. That the case be dismissed as against defendant Director of Lands;

(a) P30.00 per month as rental of the premises occupied by them from the time of the filing of the complaint on October 20, 1967, with legal rate of interest, until they surrender the possession thereof to defendant Company; (b) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.

9. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; 10. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the costs of the suit; and Defendant Partnership's counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

(4) Ordering plaintiff and their successors-in-interest, agents or any person or persons acting in their behalf, who are found to be in possession of defendant company's land to vacate the same and remove and demolish their improvements thereon at plaintiffs expenses; (5) Ordering Atty. Emilio D. Castellanes to return the attorney's fees in the amount of P 1,030.00 he prematurely collected from defendant company, with interest; and

SO ORDERED. (6) To pay the costs. (Exhibit EE at pages 5-6). SO ORDERED. ORTIGAS appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals. On November 21, 1971, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting aside the decision of Judge Ruiz and ordering a new trial to enable the petitioner to introduce newly discovered evidence. The case was then remanded to the lower Court. On November 3, 1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who took the place of Judge Ruiz who was separated from the service by the President of the Philippines, rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant, Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, as against the plaintiffs: 1. Dismissing the amended complaint; 2. Confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, issued in Expediente 917 and all titles emanating therefrom; 3. Directing each of the plaintiffs to individually pay the defendant Company:

(Exhibit DD at pages 44-45). The aforesaid decision was appealed. During the pendency of the approval of the record on appeal, ORTIGAS filed a motion for immediate execution of judgment. After exchange of pleadings by the parties, the trial court presided by Judge Alcantara granted the motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of Ortigas upon filing a bond in the amount of P250,000.00. Del Rosario, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order. Despite opposition by Ortigas, Judge Florellana Castro-Bartolome, who was appointed to Branch XV vice Judge Alcantara, granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside the order of Judge Alcantara. Ortigas contested the order of Judge Bartolome through a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-04060. On September 1, 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in the aforesaid case, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The order of the respondent Judge dated February 25, 1975, is hereby annulled and set aside and the order of Judge Arsenio Alcantara, granting immediate execution, is hereby revived, with instructions to the respondent judge to fully implement the latter order, including the approval of the petitioner's bond and the issuance of the necessary writ or writs of execution. The restraining order issued at the inception of this action is hereby (sic) permanent. No costs. SO ORDERED. (Exhibit EE at pages 50-51). This decision was the subject of a petition for review filed by respondents Del Rosario, et al., but the same was denied. So also with the motion for reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court (Annex "A" of Exhibit FF) In order to stop respondent NAVARRO from selling its titled properties, ORTIGAS also filed Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro. On December 16, 1972, Judge Sergio A.F. Apostol rendered a decision in favor of Ortigas as follows: xxx

xxx

xxx

It having been found that defendant was guilty of bad faith and fraud in claiming and selling plaintiff's land, plaintiff is entitled to attomey's fees. This court finds the amount of attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 to be fair and reasonable considering the

extent and value of the property involved and the nature of the case. Defendant, in his answer and motion to dismiss, alleged that as a result of the issuance of the restraining order, he suffered damages in the amount of Pl,000,000.00 daily. Firstly, the same was not raised as a counterclaim. Therefore, this court can only treat it as an affirmative defense. Secondly, no evidence was submitted to prove this claim of damages. Under the same authorities cited in support of the denial of plaintiffs claim for damages, therefore, he has failed to establish what damages he had suffered. Lastly, the court has found that plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for. It follows, therefore, that the issuance of the restraining order was proper and, hence, can not be the basis for a claim for damages. This court cannot help but end this decision with a note of admonition and hope. The people who will ultimately suffer the most from defendant's acts in question are his buyers, who in all probability are middle class people who themselves wanted to make money out of the apparent sad predicament that defendant had brought upon the plaintiff. It is the fervent hope of this court, therefore, that with the advent of the NEW SOCIETY defendant will turn a new page and make a fresh start in life. WHEREFORE, rendered:

judgment

is

hereby

1. Upholding the validity and indefeasibility of plaintiffs Transfer Certificates of Title over the land in question;

of the complainants; and Arsenio de Guzman, Chief of Section of the Bureau of Lands. His documentary evidence consist of Exhibits 1 to 13, inclusive.

2. As a consequence thereof, forever enjoining and barring the defendant, his successors-in-interest, assigns, agents or any person or persons acting for or in his behalf, from selling and advertising, verbally, or in writing, the sale of the lands in question and from asserting any claim or dominion or possession whatsoever on or over the said property, directly or indirectly, adverse to the plaintiff; and

On direct examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that the present charges are the same as the charges in administrative Case No. 1154, entitled, "In Re: Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, respondent", which was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. He further declared that this Honorable Court deferred action on the said administrative case until such time that G.R. Nos. L42699-42709, the heirs of the late Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al. is terminated. Respondent's direct testimony dwelt only on these two matters and on the identification of his Exhibits 1 to 9.

3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 plus cost of suit. SO ORDERED. (Exhibit II-I-a, at pages 409-411 of Exhibit II). The afore-quoted decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. L-53125-R. On December 13, 1978, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in the aforesaid case affirming the decision of Judge Apostol. Respondent NAVARRO elevated the case to this Honorable Tribunal (G.R. No. L-50156). Again, his petition was denied for lack of merit. His subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. Consequently, the issue brought forth in the sala of Judge Apostol has now been laid to rest. EVIDENCE FOR THE RESPONDENT Respondent NAVARRO presented both testimonial and documentary evidence. His testimonial evidence consist of his testimony and those of Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez, one

On cross-examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that he is the counsel for the defendants in the twenty-two (22) cases before Judge Pedro Navarro and Judge Emilio Salas of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that he became the owner of the lands not occupied by his clients by virtue of his contract of legal services signed by them (pp. 76-78, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; pp. 7-10, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). Said contract for legal services, which appears on pages 224232 of Exhibit "1", reads as follows:

XXX CONTENT DELETED XXX

In the course of the proceedings, respondent NAVARRO admitted that he has sold, and is still selling, properties covered by Torrens titles in the names of ORTIGAS & CO., Madrigal, and others, but he claims that the titles of said parties are null and void because they emanated from Decree No. 1425; that he has no title over the properties

sold by him except the contract of legal services which his clients allegedly signed; that he has no approved plans for the various subdivisions allegedly owned by him; that he has not obtained any certificate of registration or license to sell from the National Housing Authority; that he has not declared for taxation purposes the thousands of hectares of prime lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Quezon City and Marikina, allegedly owned by him; and that he has not filed any case directly attacking the title of ORTIGAS and others (pp. 7-33, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977; Exhibit J).

filed on January 5, 1981 11 but the same was likewise denied in our resolution of January 22, 1981. 12

Respondent NAVARRO also admits that he is the defendant in the "25-Billion-peso-case" before Judge Sergio Apostol, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro's Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City"; that said case covers lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Marikina and Quezon City including those involved in the present case (pp. 8-21, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; Exhibits F, F-I to F-168).

Pursuant to our resolution of June 4, 1979, 14 respondent Navarro filed his answer with motion to dismiss on June 29, 1979. 15 The corresponding reply 16 and rejoinder 17 were subsequently filed. In a resolution of this Court dated October 1, 1985, the case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 18

Despite the decision of Judge Apostol upholding the validity of the Ortigas Transfer Certificate of Title and enjoining respondent NAVARRO from selling lots covered by said title, NAVARRO still continued selling properties covered by the injunction claiming that the said decision is ineffectual because the same has been appealed. (pp. 3334, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). 4 On the basis of the foregoing report, the Solicitor General filed a complaint with Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as complainant, praying that respondent Navarro be disbarred, that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys, and that his certificate of admission to the bar be recalled. On May 23, 1980, respondent Navarro filed his answer with prayer to lift the order of suspension. 5 Complainant Ortigas, Jr. filed an opposition to said motion to lift suspension .6 Respondent Navarro reiterated his plea in his manifestation dated August 8, 1980. 7 In a resolution dated September 2, 1980, this Court denied the motion to lift the order of suspension. 8 On October 29, 1980, respondent Navarro filed an urgent ex parte motion praying for the lifting of the order of suspension 9 which was denied by this Court on November 13, 1980. 10 He reiterated his prayer in another motion

II. Administrative Case No. 2033 arose from a letter-complaint, dated March 13, 1979, filed by the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Geeslin with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, charging respondent Navarro with deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath. Said letter was thereafter referred to this Court by Integrated Bar of the Philippines President (now Chief Justice) Marcelo B. Fernan for appropriate action. 13

On August 28, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its report, with the following findings and recommendation: CHARGES In their Complaint dated March 13, 1979, complainants charged respondent with deceit, malpractice and gross conduct in office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath, for having deliberately misrepresented the facts and the law while acting as counsel for the defendants in the following civil cases: a. His insistence that our clients are no longer owners of the land subject of the cases mentioned above; he falsely alleged that to his personal knowledge the title to the land is in the name of one Leopoldo Cojuangco. This false allegation was made despite the final decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVII, in Civil Case No. Q18221 entitled "E Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin vs. Leopoldo Cojuangco, et al." (1) declaring the transfer of the lot to Leopoldo Cojuangco was fraudulent and had been effected thru falsification; and, (2) ordering the cancellation of the title issued to Cojuangco and the reversion of the title to our clients. Copies of the Complaint and the Decision in said case are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C", respectively.

b. Mr. Navarro persisted and still persists in representing that our clients' title was rendered null and void by virtue of the expiration of the Parity Amendment and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Quasha vs. Republic, 46 SCRA 160. Our clients' title to the aforesaid property was acquired by hereditary succession from the late Dr. Luther Bewley who acquired said land in 1925. The ownership therefore of our clients is protected both under the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. Any lawyer, even a law student, knows that the Parity Amendment and the decision in the Quasha case, supra, covers cases where property was acquired by virtue of the Parity Amendment. Mr. Navarro is either guilty of abysmal ignorance of the law or of complete and unabashed contempt for facts, the law of the land and for the Courts. c. Mr. Navarro persists in misrepresenting to the Court that the title covering the land subject of the above cases had been declared null and void in the "final and executory" decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II. He deliberately omits to give the title of the case and its docket number for the obvious and malicious reason that the case he relies upon (Heirs of Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42699-42709) is still pending resolution before the Supreme Court and hence cannot be "final and executory." d. He misrepresents to the Court that the land subject of the cases heretofore enumerated is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the Quezon City Court and hence the court has no jurisdiction. Further, that title thereto having described the land to be part of the Municipality of San Juan del Monte, is void. He cannot disclaim knowledge however of the fact that the area in the vicinity of Santolan Road in Quezon City was originally part of the Municipality of San Juan del Monte territory of Quezon City when the latter was created on 14 June 1950. In the light of this fact, Mr. Navarro's representation is false and malicious. e. Mr. Navarro has shown a complete and total disregard for basic norms of honesty and decency in that having prejudiced the interest of his clients because of his gross neglect to appeal in a timely manner from the decision of the court and having adopted the wrong remedy, in

complete ignorance of the law, he had influenced his clients into commencing a case before the Tanod Bayan against the Presiding Judge of the City Court of Quezon City, Branch 1, and Hon. Minerva Genovea The case is obviously calculated to harrass and coerce the Honorable Presiding Judge. Mr. Navarro's conduct speaks ill of his respect for the law and the courts. f. The penchant of Mr. Navarro to misrepresent and deceive did not stop before the City Court of Quezon City. He continues to do so in the petition he filed before the Honorable Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. S.P. 08928 entitled "Adolfo Corpus, et al. 'vs. Hon. Minerva Genovea et al." Copies of the Petition and the undersigned attorney's Comments thereto are hereto attached as Annexes "D" and "E", respectively. (pp. 2-4, Record) RESPONDENTS ANSWER In his Answer dated June 29, 1979, respondent averred: 1. From the face of the Resolution itself showing that the undersigned respondent was never furnished with a copy of the complaint, it can be gathered therefrom that the complaint is clearly intended to prevent the undersigned respondent to proceed in defending his clients' cause in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 (Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon. Minerva C. Genovea, the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.) still pending at this writing before the Court of Appeals. To allow complainants to harass respondent while the case (is) still pending in our courts of justice is an act in contempt of court for which complainants and their counsel is (sic) liable. 2. Undersigned respondent as counsel for the defendants Adolfo Corpuz, et al. gave his entire devotion to the interest of his clients, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from his clients, save by the rules of law, legally applied; for his clients are entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by law as was done by the undersigned respondent in the ejectment case filed by the

complainants Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin against the several clients of the undersigned. (pp. 42-43, Record) After complainants filed a Reply dated July 17, 1979 pointing out that respondent's Answer does not deny any of the six (6) counts of charges specified in the Complaint, respondent filed a Rejoinder dated September 7, 1979, wherein he averred: 1. The complainants alien spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin who are citizens of the United States of America held TCT No. 153657 which was cancelled on December 31, 1970 by TCT No. 180231 issued in the name of Leopoldo A. Cojuangco both of which TCTs are described to be located at Santolan Road, Municipality of San Juan, Province of Rizal, (now part of Metro-Manila) filed ejectment proceedings before the City Court of Quezon City against my clients Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and twenty others in Civil Case Nos. I-29872 to I-29931 which later were elevated to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 entitled Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon. Minerva C.Genovea the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al. 2. Undersigned respondent being retained as counsel for the defendants Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and the twenty (20) other defendants did his bounden duty in defense of their rights and exerted his utmost learning and ability within what the law allows that at this stage, the controversy is still under litigation before the courts as stated above. 3. Under the foregoing circumstances, the administrative action must have been resorted to by the complainants at the instigation of their counsel who failed in wanting to defeat the defendants of their God-given rights to the land in litigation that there can be no other conclusion left but that the administrative complaint against the respondent is 'pure' harassment. (pp. 53-54, Record) FINDINGS

When the case was set for hearing by the Office of the Solicitor General, the parties agreed that there is no dispute as to the fact of the case. Hence, they were granted a period of thirty (30) days within which to file their respective memoranda, if they so desire, after which the case will be considered submitted for resolution. Since respondent did not deny the allegations of the Complaint, and in fact admitted during the hearing of the case set by the Office of the Solicitor General that there is no dispute as to the facts of this case, it follows that the specifications of the charges against him, which are duly supported by documents, are deemed sufficiently proven. The only justification invoked by respondent is that he "gave his entire devotion to the interest of his clients" and that he "did his bounden duty in defense of their rights and exerted his utmost learning and ability. Consequently, respondent is deemed to have committed the misrepresentations specified by complainants, as quoted above. RECOMMENDATION Respondent was also charged in Administrative Case No. 2148 entitled Ortigas vs. Navarro and has been suspended from the practice of law since May 5, 1980. His suspension is still in effect. The acts complained of in the present case also warrant the suspension of respondent from the practice of law. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro be likewise suspended from the practice of law. Makati, for Manila, August 17, 1989. 19 No justiciable issue was raised in Administrative Case No. 2033 as respondent Navarro failed to deny the material allegations in the complaint of the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin.

The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in Administrative Case No. 2148 are: 1. Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the names of other persons without the consent of the latter; and 2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute sufficient grounds for suspension or disbarment. Respondent reiterated in his answer that the transfer certificates of title of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer were declared null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, et al.," and in the order dated June 21, 1971 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8685, 8686 and 8700 entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Federico Martinez, et al." Respondent likewise reiterated his claim of ownership over all parcels of land (including those of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer) covered by Decree No. 1425, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which was declared null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970 of Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 20 Furthermore, he asserts ownership over the subject properties as payment for his legal services rendered in the ejectment cases filed against his clients in Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal. 1. To clarify, Civil Case No. 7-M(10339)filed before Branch XV of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal directly assailed the nullity of the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917 by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 was issued, as well as the original certificates of title issued as a consequence thereof. These original certificates of title include the properties belonging to Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. On March 31, 1970, Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz then presiding over said Branch XV rendered a decision declaring Decree No. 1425, as well as the original certificates of title issued pursuant thereto, null and void. Ortigas appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals which set the same aside and remanded the case to Branch XV for new trial. On November 3, 1973, Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who replaced Judge Ruiz, rendered a decision confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles emanating therefrom. The said decision was pending appeal with the Court of Appeals when the investigation of respondent by the Solicitor General was conducted.

We take judicial notice of the fact that on December 29, 1983, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming in toto the November 3, 1973 decision of Judge Alcantara, which became final and executory on May 25, 1984 insofar as plaintiffs-appellants Pascual Santos, et al. are concerned. The plaintiffs-appellants Pedro del Rosario, et al. appealed to the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari which was, however, denied on February 18, 1985. The denial became final and executory on April 10, 1985. Thereafter, the records of the case were remanded to Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal for execution. The records further show that the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) became the basis of the decision rendered by Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II on May 21, 1971 which dismissed the complaint for ejectment filed by Haberer against the clients of respondent Navarro. However, Judge Navarro in his decision categorically stated that "it is the considered opinion of this court that until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this court is reversed or set aside by final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven defendants in these eleven cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy and on which their respective houses are built has become premature." This condition was reiterated in Judge Navarro's order of September 15, 1972 wherein he stated that: In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate that its decision in this case was mainly predicated on the decision of Branch XV of this Court that the certificate of title emanating from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null and void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The Court opined that until said decision is reversed the actual occupants had better be maintained in their possessions of the land. 21 However, to repeat, the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV was set aside by the Court of Appeals which remanded the case for new trial and another one was rendered, this time by a different judge on November 3, 1973 upholding the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles issued as a consequence thereof. Respondent cannot feign ignorance of the November 3, 1973 decision, which superseded the March 31, 1970 decision, for the simple reason that it was his clients who appealed the former decision to the Court of Appeals. In spite thereof and indicative of his bad faith, he stubbornly continues to invoke the decision of March 31, 1970 as the source of his alleged ownership rights over the Ortigas properties.

2. In the order of June 21, 1971, Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued in the name of Haberer and the issuance of new titles in the name of the defendants, subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of respondent pursuant to the terms of the contract for his legal services. However, the same judge issued an amendatory order dated September 15, 1972, which provides in part that: It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered insofar as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of other persons and entities like the Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, which is not a party herein, because the certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders of decisions are made in this case cannot be made to affect the said company. Decisions and orders can only affect parties to the case. The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June 21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is now being the subject of further proceedings and (2) because it has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not even a party herein. WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present occupants of the land as stated in the decision stands. (Emphasis supplied) 22 It is apparent, therefore, that since the order of June 21, 1971, was set aside, the inescapable conclusion is that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 stands and remains in the name of Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. Consequently, the defendants therein never acquired title to the property covered by the title of Haberer. And, since respondent Navarro merely derives his supposed title to the properties as a mere transferee,

with more reason can he not validly become the owner of the above properties. 3. Respondent intransigently relies on his contract for legal services executed with his clients, the defendants in the Haberer case, as another basis of his claim of ownership over the entire property covered by Decree No. 1425. It must be noted that the said contract was executed pursuant to the ejectment cases filed against respondent Navarro's clients which involve only the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 containing an aggregate area of 12,700 square meters, more or less. It appears that the defendants assigned rights to respondent Navarro over properties which they did not actually occupy and which virtually extended to all the properties covered by titles issued under Decree No. 1425. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, said defendants have not presented any document evidencing their ownership of the parcels of land they assigned to their lawyer. From the foregoing considerations, it is incontrovertible that respondent's pretended ownership rights over the parcels of land covered by Decree No. 1425 have no bases whatsoever, either in fact or in law, and it is an assault on credulity to assume that he was not aware of the vacuity of his pretensions and misrepresentations. In resolving this disbarment case, we must perforce initially focus on the degree of integrity and respectability required and expected of the law profession. There is no denying that membership in the legal profession is achieved only after a long and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of the fact that everyone is deemed an officer of the court. 23 The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been judiciously stated by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in this wise: On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the

bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion, ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised. 24 In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the proper administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 25 Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client and to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. 26 As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges until the contrary is proved, and that, as an officer of the court, he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath. 27 Therefore, in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant 28, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. 29 We have painstakingly scrutinized and evaluated the records of these two administrative cases and we cannot but find that strong and unassailable evidence exist to render it our irremissible duty to impose the ultimate sanction of disbarment on respondent. Respondent's defense is anchored primarily on the contract for legal services, executed by his clients whom he represented in the twenty-two ejectment cases filed before Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, and quoted in full in the earlier part of this discussion. It is extremely relevant to note that both of the aforesaid two branches of the trial court made no finding as to the validity of the claim of ownership favorable to the defendants therein. On the contrary, Judge Salas of Branch I found for the plaintiff and ordered the defendants, clients of respondent, to vacate the premises. In the case before Judge Navarro of Branch II, the complaint was dismissed merely on the ground that "since the evidence is uncontroverted that the defendants in all these eleven cases have been in open,

continuous, and adverse possession of their respective parcels dating back since their predecessors in interest, their possession must be maintained and respected. 30 Thereafter, on June 21, 1971, the aforesaid judgment of dismissal dated May 26, 1971 was modified, and the Register of Deeds was thereafter ordered to cancel the transfer certificate of title issued in favor of plaintiff and to issue new titles in the name of defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of herein respondent in accordance with the contract for legal services hereinbefore discussed. Eventually, however, this subsequent order was reconsidered and set aside in the order of September 15, 1972, "because it has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, which is not even a party herein," but it reinstated the decision of May 26, 1971 insofar as it denied the ejectment of the present occupants. As earlier noted, there is nothing in the records to show that the defendants in the ejectment cases were declared the true owners of the land subject of said cases. Only the fact of possession was ruled upon, and what the courts recognized was merely the defendants' right of possession. They, therefore, never become the owners of the subject lots in any sense of the word in the absence of any declaration to that effect, by reason of which they could not have legally transmitted any ownership rights or interests to herein respondent. Furthermore, we have seen that any further claim of ownership on their part was finally settled by the order of September 15, 1972, setting aside the order of June 21, 1971, wherein the trial court correctly held that the earlier order unjustifiedly affected adversely the rights of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership. In addition, said court specifically excluded the title of said partnership from the effects of its decision. Pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal services, the defendantsclients agreed to convey to respondent whatever properties may be adjudicated in their favor in the event of their failure to pay the attorney's fees agreed upon. As hereinbefore stated, there was nothing awarded to the said defendants except the right to possess for the nonce the lots they were occupying, nothing more. That respondent acquired no better right than the defendants from whom he supposedly derived his claim is further confirmed in the order of Judge Navarro, dated June 21, 1971, denying the issuance of new certificates of title to herein respondent who, to further stress the obvious, was not even a party but only a lawyer of the defendants therein. It follows that his act of selling the Ortigas properties is patently and indisputably illegal.

Respondent admits that he has no Torrens title but insists on the puerile theory that his title is his contract of legal services. 31 Considering that the effectivity of the provisions of that contract is squarely premised on the award of said properties to the therein defendants, and since there was no such adjudication, respondent's pretense is unmasked as an unmitigated deception. Furthermore, it will be recalled that the land involved in the two ejectment cases consists of only 1.2 hectares whereas respondent is claiming ownership over thousands of hectares of land, the sheer absurdity of which he could not be unaware.

investigation General. 33

conducted

by

the

Solicitor

Respondent avers that the said decision cannot be enforced during the pendency of the appeal therefrom. Even if this were true, the fact that respondent was enjoined by the court from selling portions of the Ortigas properties is compelling reason enough for him to desist from continuing with his illegal transactions. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General:

Respondent further admits that he has been and is continuously selling, up to the present, the entirety of the land covered by Decree No. 1425 32 pursuant to the decision of Branch XV of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, dated March 31, 1970, declaring the said decree null and void as well as the titles derived therefrom. It must nonetheless be remembered that the decision of Judge Navarro recognizing the defendants' right of possession is subject to the final outcome of the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV which nullified Decree No. 1425. The latter decision, at the time the decision of Judge Navarro was rendered, was pending appeal. This is precisely the reason why Judge Navarro had to amend his decision a third time by setting aside the order of registration of the land in the name of the defendants. He could not properly rule on the ownership rights of defendants therein pending a final determination of the validity of said decree, which thus prompted him to find merely on the fact of possession. Besides, a mere declaration of nullity cannot, per se justify the performance of any act of ownership over lands titled in the name of other persons pursuant to said decree. To cap it all, as earlier discussed, that decision dated March 31, 1970 has been reversed and set aside, and a new one entered confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, which latter decision has long become final and executory. In Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership vs. Navarro," herein respondent was enjoined from selling, offering for sale and advertising properties of the plaintiff therein. We have seen that a decision was subsequently rendered therein on December 16, 1972 by Branch XVI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal upholding the validity of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Ortigas and Co., Limited Partnership which became final and executory after respondent's petition for review was denied by this Court. However, respondent continued to sell properties belonging to Ortigas in blatant disregard of said decision. This was categorically admitted by respondent himself during the

Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge Vivencio Ruiz declaring as null and void certificates of titles emanating from Decree No. 1425 was reversed and set aside. He knew that Judge Pedro Navarro of the Rizal Court of First Instance exempted Ortigas & Company from the effects of his decision. He also knew that Judge Sergio Apostol of the Rizal Court of First Instance in Quezon City had upheld the validity of the certificates of title of Ortigas & Company. Despite all these pronouncements and his awareness thereof, respondent NAVARRO still continued to sell properties titled in the name of Ortigas & Company and the Madrigals. 34 Lastly, the motion to dismiss filed by respondent should be, as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit. Respondent inexplicably posits that the charges against him should be dismissed on the ground that his suspension was automatically lifted by virtue of our resolution, dated June 30, 1980, which merely reads: The manifestation of counsel for respondent stating among other things that the complaint against respondent could not prosper if respondent's manifestation dated March 3, 1980 in G.R. No. L-42699-42709 and his request for certification by the Chief Justice to the effect that the petition in G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709 is deemed dismissed pursuant to Sec. 11(2) of Art. X of the Constitution are granted, are NOTED. There is absolutely nothing in the resolution to support respondent's typical distortion of facts. On the contrary, our resolutions dated September 2, 1980, November 8, 1980, and January 22, 1981 repeatedly denied respondent's motions for the lifting of his suspension.

It further bears mention at this juncture that despite the suspension of respondent Navarro from the practice of law, he continues to do so in clear violation and open defiance of the original resolution of suspension and the aforestated resolutions reiterating and maintaining the same. Thus, the records of this Court disclose that in G.R. No. L-78103, entitled "Jose de Leon, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," a Second Division case filed on April 25, 1987, counsel for private respondents therein questioned herein respondent Navarro's personality to intervene in the case since he was under suspension, to which respondent Navarro rejoined by insisting that his suspension had allegedly been lifted already. In G.R. No. 85973, entitled "Hilario Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the petition wherein was filed on December 2, 1988 and assigned to the First Division, respondent Navarro also appeared as counsel for therein petitioner. Said petition was denied since the same was prepared, signed and verified by respondent Navarro, a suspended member of the Philippine Bar. Over his expostulation that his suspension had already been lifted, the Court directed the Bar Confidant to take appropriate action to enforce the same. Again, in G.R. No. 90873, entitled "Matilde Cabugwang et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the Second Division, in a resolution dated January 31, 1990, imposed a fine of P1,000.00 upon said respondent for appearing therein as counsel for petitioner which fine he paid on February 5, 1990. In at least three (3) other cases in the Second Division, respondent Navarro appeared before the Court as counsel for petitioners therein, viz: (1) G.R. No. L-74792 (Lorenzo Valdez, et al., vs Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.), filed on June 11, 1986 and decided on December 7, 1986; (2) G.R. No. L-76589 (Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), filed on November 28, 1986 and decided on May 4,1987; and (3) G.R. No. 81482 (Ricardo Rasalan vs. Flaviano Pascua, et al.), filed on January 30, 1988 and decided on February 15, 1988. The rollos in said cases show that he also appeared as counsel for the petitioners in the Court of Appeals, but since the lower courts' original records were not forwarded to this Court, said rollos do not reflect whether he also appeared before the different courts a quo. Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to lawful orders of constituted authority and illustrate his incorrigible despiciency for an attorney's duty to society. Verily, respondent has proven himself unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in him by law and by this Court, through his deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the court. WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of

this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent. This resolution is immediately executory.

A.M. No. 3360

January 30, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359; to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and

PER CURIAM: In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093. On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.

to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read as follows: For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification. It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule. SO ORDERED. 1

Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which: (a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and

On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal. In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory

upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period. In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states: that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiffappellee. We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez. The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez,2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms: xxx

xxx

xxx

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order. xxx

xxx

xxx

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. 3(Italics supplied) Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows: Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied) Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied) We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:

the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character.1âwphi1 This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 5 ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent.

EN BANC G.R. No. L-47431

December 19, 1940

In the matter of the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis, deceased. CONCORDIA CUEVAS ( alias CONCORDIA ABESAMIS), executrix-appellant, vs. PEDRO ABESAMIS, 2. o ET AL., oppositors-appellees. Villasan, Valenton and Santiago for appellant. Angel Cecilio for appellees. LAUREL, J.: chanrobles virtual law library This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dated May 27, 1937, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: Wherefore, the court sustains the opposition to the approval of the amended project of partition presented by the executrix and hereby orders the latter to present another inventory and another project of partition which shall include only the property adjudicated to the defendants in the final decision of this court in case No. 4816, consisting of only one-eight (1/8) of the three parcels of land described in the will of the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis. On February 11, 1928, Crescenciano Cuevas submitted for probate in the court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija the last will and testament of her deceased natural father, Crescenciano Abesamis, which bequeathed three parcels of land, one share of stock in the "Gallera de Peñaranda" of a par value of P100, and two carabaos worth P100 to Concordia Cuevas ( alias Concordia Abesamis), Francisco Abesamis, Perpetua Abesamis, Isaias Abesamis and Pedro Abesamis in the manner and under the conditions stated therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On March 15, 1928, however, Pedro Abesamis and twenty-five others entered their opposition to the distribution of the

properties described in the will, for the reason that "a que dichos bienes son de propiedad pro indiviso entre los aqui opositores y la testamentaria," and simultaneously informed the court that they had commenced an action for the partition of said properties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On May 14, 1928, the will was admitted to probate and Concordia Cuevas was appointed executrix with a bond of P1,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On May 13, 1928, Pedro Abesamis and the other oppositors did institute civil case No. 4816 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis, Concordia Nuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias Abesamis for the partition, alleging that said properties belonged, in the first instance, to Anacleto Mercado, their common causante, who entrusted them to Crescenciano Abesamis with the understanding that they were not to be subdivided as long as the minor children of her other deceased son, Teodorico Abesamis, were living with the Crescenciano. A demurrer interposed by the defendants on the ground that there was another pending action involving the same subject matter was sustained after which the plaintiffs were required to amend their complaint, the amendment consisting simply in eliminating therefrom the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis and leaving as party defendants Concordia Cuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias Abesamis. As these defendants failed to answer the amended complaint, they were declared in default and , on July 3, 1930, judgment was rendered adjudicating seven-eights (7/8) of the properties in favor of the plaintiffs and the other one-eight (1/8) for the defendants. On February 7, 1931, the court ordered the commissioners of partition to declare as sole heiress Concordia Cuevas to the exclusion of Francisco and Isaias Abesamis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On March 3, 1931, the partition commissioners submitted their report, upon which the court declared that "no hay lugar a aprobar por ahora el informe de los comisionados partidores hasta que se haya verificado la particion en dicha testamentaria en la cual pueden las partes de esta causa hacer valer los

derechos que pudieran tener sobre los terrenos en cuestion." A motion for reconsideration having been denied on September 15, 1932, plaintiffs, on February 14, 1934, moved for the approval of the project of partition filed by the commissioners . On February 26, 1934, the court ordered the suspension of the approval of the partition of the properties until the termination of the testamentary proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library On January 9, 1937, Concordia Cuevas presented to the probate court a partition plan adjudicating the three lots and the two carabaos in favor of the legatees mentioned in the will. This was rejected by the court for the reason that it was not in conformity with the inventory of the estate and the decision in civil case No. 4816. On January 26, 1937, the executrix submitted an amended inventory and later another project of partition distributing the properties of the estate in accordance with the terms of the will, which were objected by the defendants, because these included their legitimate shares under the decision in civil case No. 4816. The opposition was upheld by the court in kits decision of May 27, 1937, the dispositive part of which is quoted in the beginning of this opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The executrix-appellant assigns the following errors: 1. The court erred in not holding that the decision in civil case No. 4816 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, declaring that the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis is entitled only to oneeight (1/8) of the property described in the will, is a nullity and can not bind the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. The court erred in not approving the amended project of partition presented by the executrix on February 8, 1937, and in not distributing the estate of the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis according to the provision of the will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. The court erred in not finding that it has no jurisdiction as a probate court to decide the question of ownership of the property involved in these proceedings part of which is claimed by the oppositors to be their property not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. The court erred in not holding that the oppositors have no personality to object to the project of partition presented by the executrix on February 8, 1937, which was drafted in accordance with the provision of the will of the deceased Crescenciano Abesamis. Under the first assignment of error, appellant impugns the validity of the decision of the lower court in civil case No. 4816 declaring that the legatees here, defendants in that action, are entitled only to one-eight of the property on the ground that the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis was not a party in said proceeding. It should be noted that all the coheirs, except Perpetua Abesamis, were defendants therein, and that by order of the court, in its instructions to the partition commissioners dated February 7, 1931, the herein executrix-appellant was pronounced by the sole heiress of the deceased. As said defendants were declared in default and are, to be sure, bound by the decision in that case, we are of the opinion that the appellant cannot now be permitted to assail its virtuality not to regard it as totally ineffectual against the testate estate. The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of death(article 657, Civil Code), and where, as in this case the heir is of legal age and the estate is not burdened with any debts, said heir immediately succeeds, by force of law, to the dominio n, ownership and possession of the properties of his predecessor, and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the latter. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Dais vs. Court of First Instance of Capiz, 51 Phil., 396.) In the absence of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate, there is no necessity of a previous declaration of status and the heir or heirs can sue and be sued in that capacity (Arsenio de Vera et al. vs. Cleotilde Galauran, 37 Off. Gaz., 1821). This disposes likewise of the second assignment of error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

With reference to the third assignment of error, it should be observed that the oppositors instituted a separate action (civil case No. 4816) for the partition of the properties described in the will of Crescenciano Abesamis. No question of ownership, therefore, was in fact determined in the testamentary proceedings (civil case No. 4797) by the probate court. It results that when, on February 8, 1937, the court disapproved the project partition filed by the executrix, it did not decide adverse claims of proprietorship but only lent force and effect to the decision rendered in civil case No. 4816.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Under the fourth and last assignment of errors, it is vigorously contended that only heirs or legatees may present an opposition, and that only inasmuch as the oppositors-appellees are not heirs or legatees, they have no legal personality to object to the approval of the project of partition. By virtue of the judgment in civil case No. 4816 adjudicating seven-eights of the property in their favor, the herein oppositors had the right to oppose any project of partition which, in effect, would divest them of their right of ownership. To conclude otherwise would be to permit the executrix to enrich herself at the expense of the oppositors.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A.C. No. 190

September 26, 1964

MARCOS MEDINA, complainant, vs. LORETO U. BAUTISTA, Respondent. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: In a complaint filed on September 15, 1954, Marcos Medina charged respondent Atty. Loreto U. Bautista with the commission of certain acts constituting malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. To this complaint respondent filed an answer on October 19, 1954. The case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. This official in turn referred the case to the provincial fiscal of Cagayan for investigation and report. Later after the reception of the corresponding evidence, the Solicitor General submitted his report to this Court finding respondent guilty of the acts of malpractice complained of and recommending his disbarment. Together with this report he submitted a complaint formally charging respondent with acts constituting the alleged malpractice as found in his investigation with the prayer that the name of respondent be stricken off from the roll of attorneys. A copy of this formal complaint was served on respondent so that he may answer it if he so desires in accordance with the rules. Thereupon, he answered the complaint denying the material allegations thereof and praying that it be dismissed. He, however, also prayed that he be allowed to introduce additional evidence. This was allowed and the case was set for hearing. The first hearing was set on May 4, 1964, which, by agreement of the parties was postponed to June 22, 1964. On this last date, however, no hearing was held, and so it was again postponed to July 22, 1964. And having neither respondent nor his counsel appeared on the last date set, complainant and his counsel submitted additional evidence consisting of several decisions of the Court of Appeals showing that respondent was found guilty of estafa. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision. It appears that sometime in 1953, Maria Ragsac Cabel filed a complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land before the

Court of First Instance of Cagayan against complainant Marcos Medina. In the early of January, 1954, complainant Medina approached the plaintiff seeking a compromise of the case. Plaintiff told him to see her lawyer Loreto Bautista, respondent herein, whereupon he went to see the latter in his office at Aparri, Cagayan. Respondent demanded P500.00 as a consideration for the amicable settlement, and as complainant had no ready cash then, he asked to be allowed to pay the same in small installments paying on that occasion the sum of P35.00. Respondent agreed and thereupon prepared a motion for an extension of time to file his answer in the case. Complainant returned to his hometown. One month later, complainant received an order declaring him in default and so he went to respondent to ask him why in spite of their agreement he was declared in default. Respondent assured him that he had nothing to worry about, and on that occasion respondent again asked for P50.00 which then and there complainant gave. Before complainant left respondent told him to look for more money. It turned out that respondent opposed his own motion for an extension of time to file an answer for, in lieu thereof, he filed a motion to declare complainant in default. Consequently, a decision was rendered detrimental to complainant since the court allowed plaintiff to repurchase the property in litigation for the sum of P1,200.00. On March 2, 1954, complainant again went to the office of respondent in Luna, Mt. Province apparently with the purpose of having the papers for the amicable settlement of the case prepared, but on this occasion respondent prepared two documents, Exhibits C and D, wherein, on one hand, it was made to appear that Maria Ragsac Cabel sold the property to complainant in consideration of the sum of P8,000.00 and, on the other, the latter reconveyed the same property to the former for the sum of P1,200.00. Both documents were witnessed by respondent. Both documents were also found to be fictitious in the sense that the considerations mentioned therein were never received. Maria Ragsac Cabel was asked by respondent to sign Exhibit C without knowing its contents upon the assurance that it was necessary in order that she could recover the land.

Sometime later, complainant received a letter from Atty. Bienvenido Jimenez, co-counsel of respondent in the civil case, requesting him to bring the title of the property pursuant to the decision of the court, and complying with this request complainant went to see Atty. Jimenez but instead of bringing the title he showed him the document which he was made to sign purporting to be a deed of sale by Maria Ragsac Cabel in his favor of the property for the consideration of P8,000.00. Atty. Jimenez asked Mrs. Cabel if she received the amount mentioned therein, which she denied. Instead Mrs. Cabel told Atty. Jimenez that she had given P800.00 to respondent to be deposited in court with the understanding that said respondent would raise the additional P400.00 to complete the sum of P1,200.00 which was fixed by the court as the consideration of the reconveyance of the property. After inquiry, Atty. Jimenez found that there was no such amount deposited in court, and in order to correct the wrong generated by the two fictitious documents, Atty. Jimenez prepared another document embodying the terms of the amicable settlement which they agreed would be submitted in the civil case. This settlement having been carried out, it put an end to the controversy. According to complainant, he paid all in all to respondent the sum of P500.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library From the foregoing narration, the following facts are deemed to have been established: (1) respondent after agreeing with complainant to settle the case amicably prepared a motion for extension of time to file an answer, but instead he filed a motion to declare the latter in default; (2) being fully aware of the decision rendered in the civil case, respondent prepared two fictitious deeds of sale in the sense that the consideration in either was never in fact received; (3) pretending to arrange an amicable settlement of the case, respondent received on different occasions from complainant several sums totalling P500.00. (4) respondent, taking advantage of the ignorance of his client Maria Ragsac Cabel, ask her to sign a document wherein it was made to appear that she received P8,000.00 when in truth and in fact she did not receive said amount; and (5) respondent received from his client Mrs. Cabel the amount of P800.00 with the understanding that the amount was to be deposited in court for the repurchase of the property, but instead of depositing it he

misappropriated the money. These facts constitute malpractice and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. virtual law library In addition, the record shows that in CA-G.R. No. 18560R, respondent was convicted of estafa and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 months of arresto mayor to 1 year and 1 day of prision correccional, with the accessories of the law, and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P800.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. And in CA-G.R. No. 21796-R, the Court of Appeals made the following derogatory comment against respondent: A lengthy discourse of the relationship of attorney and client need not be indulged in. Suffice it to say that a lawyer should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity. A high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted. (Alindogan v. Gerona Adm. Case No. 221, May 21, 1958). Here, appellee (herein respondent Bautista) violated the trust. He was bound to deposit the P800.00 in court. But he did not; he converted it to his own use and benefit to the damage of appellant. Indeed, he was convicted of estafa. Not only that. The confidence reposed in him by appellant was once again infringed when he lent his signature to Exhibits 2 and 3 which he knew to be spurious. Upon these documents, appellant - for nothing - lost the land already won in court. She had to compromise with the defeated suitor. But she got the very short end of the bargain. And yet, appellee had the temerity to come to court for attorney's fees. Good morals and sound public policy bar the portals of justice to him. Guilty of fraud on one count and bad faith on another, he has forfeited all legal claims for services in procuring the judgment in Case No. 634-A of the Cagayan Court (6 C.J. 725; C.J.S. 1025; 5 Am. Jur. 363; Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2nd Ed. [1961], p. 99). There is no question that the crime of estafa is one which involves moral turpitude within the purview of Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court. WHEREFORE, respondent Loreto U. Bautista is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys.

A.C. No. 350

August 7, 1959

In re: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES, respondent. Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Emerito M. Salva for the Government. Dalmacio de los Angeles and Luis F. Gabinete for respondent. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (40 months, and one (1) day of destierro, and to pay a fine of P2,300, with subsidiary destierro in case of insolvency (CA-G.R. No. 11411-R), and under section 1, Rule 128, of the Rules of Court, he was required to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of his profession. In his written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of this Court considering that he has six children to support the eldest being 16 years old and the youngest 4 years who will bear the stigma of dishonor if disciplinary action be taken against him. He made manifest to this Court that if he ever committed what is attributed to him, it was merely due to an error of judgment which he honestly and sincerely deplores. Under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed from his office as attorney if he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude the reason behind this rule being that the continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in the practice of law with the result that the loss of such qualification justifies his disbarment (Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil., 586; 53 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 628). And since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by section 25 of Rule 127. It is therefore ordered that respondent be removed from his office as attorney and that his name be stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered.

VILLASANTA

April 30, 1957

In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality, vs. HILARION M. PERALTA, respondent. Ramon J. Diaz for respondent. PARAS, C. J.: G.R. No. L-9513 has a direct bearing on the present complaint. Said case originated from a criminal action filed in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan by the complainant against the respondent for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code of which the respondent was found guilty. The verdict, when appealed to the Court of Appeals, was affirmed. The appeal by certiorari taken to this Court by the respondent was dismissed for lack of merit. The complaint seeks to disqualify the respondent, a 1954 successful bar candidate, from being admitted to the bar. The basic facts are the same as those found by the Court of Appeals, to wit: On April 16, 1939, the respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951, he courted the complainant who fell in love with him. To have carnal knowledge of her, the respondent procured the preparation of a fake marriage contract which was then a blank document. He made her sign it on March 8, 1951. A week after, the document was brought back by the respondent to the complainant, signed by the Justice of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since then the complainant and the respondent lived together as husband and wife. Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a religious ratification of their marriage and on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was performed in Aparri by the parish priest of said municipality. The priest no longer required the production of a marriage license because of the civil marriage contract shown to him. After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband and wife and lived with some friends. The complainant then discovered that the respondent was previously married to someone else; whereupon, she filed the criminal action for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan and the present complaint for immorality in this court.. Upon consideration of the records of G.R. No. L-9513 and the complaint, this Court is of the opinion that the respondent is immoral. He made mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and

dignity. His conviction in the criminal case involves moral turpitude. The act of respondent in contracting the second marriage (even his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and morality. Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent is hereby declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar. So ordered.

A.M. No. 689-MJ April 13, 1978 FELIX LEYNES, complainant, vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE PEDRO D. VELOSO of General Nakar, Quezon, respondent. A.M. No. 809-MJ April 13, 1978 BENJAMIN H. VIRREY, complainant, vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE PEDRO D. VELOSO of General Nakar, Quezon, respondent.

AQUINO, J: For having illicit relations with a concubine under scandalous circumstances in a house located at the poblacion of General Nakar, Quezon, Pedro D. Veloso, the municipal judge of that town, was charged by Atty. Benjamin H. Virrey with immorality in public office (Complaint dated October 23, 1974, p. 10, Rollo of Administrative Matter No. 809- MJ). Judge Veloso, who is now sixty-eight years old and who was admitted to the bar in 1938, started his judicial career in 1946 as a justice of the peace of Infanta, Quezon. Since 1950, he has been functioning as the incumbent judge of General Nakar. The respondent contracted marriage with Ligaya Veluz at the parish church of Infanta on October 24, 1955. Curiously enough, that was the date (one day after his 46th birthday) when he suffered serious injuries in a vehicular accident at Infanta and when he was brought by plane to Manila and admitted to the V. Luna General Hospital at six- thirty in the evening. Apparently, Judge Veloso married Ligaya Veluz when he had already begotten three children. (In his personal reference sheet of September 10, 1947, he indicated that he was married with two children named Linda and Nonong but he did not mention his wife's name. In his information sheet for GSIS insurance dated November 9, 1960 he named his children as Ulpiano, Evangelina and Asuncion, twelve, ten and six years old, respectively. Again, he did not state his wife's name. See pages 7 and 58 of his personal record).

The respondent admits that the thirty-seven-year old Gloria Tropicales (his alleged housemaid) is his mistress. Out of their union, two children, named Juana and Paulo, were born in 1970 and 1972 when the respondent was already a sex-agenarian. * Respondent Judge, invoking "the interest of justice" and article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, prays for the dismissal of the immorality charge on the ground that his wife, Rosario V. Veluz (she is named Ligaya in the marriage certificate), condoned his acts of concubinage, as shown in her affidavit of November 21, 1974. In that affidavit, she unabashedly stated that, because her husband's thighbone was broken in a vehicular accident in 1955, she chose Gloria Tropicales to serve her husband, like a real wife ("upang paglingkuran ang aking asawa na ang gagawin niyang paglilingkod ay parang tunay na asawa"). She gave the assurance that she would not prosecute their offspring. The respondent also presented to the Investigating Judge the affidavit dated March 5, 1976 of complainant Virrey wherein the latter withdrew his complaint for immorality (on the condition that he would not incur any liability) because he was convinced that Mrs. Veloso hired her husband's mistress to take care of him (Exh. A). Respondent's counsel in his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument scheduled before the Court en banc on December 9, 1976 made the preposterous contention that the respondent should be exonerated because there was no evidence presented against him since the complainant did not appear at the hearing. Respondent and his counsel should know that since he had admitted the commission of concubinage, that charge is conclusively established and it does not have to be proven anymore. His admission is a confession (Sec. 2, Rule 129 and secs. 22 and 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court). We hold that Judge Veloso should be dismissed by reason of his immoral conduct. His moral delinquency renders him unfit for the office of municipal judge and warrants his removal from office (Sec. 97, Judiciary Law). A lawyer, of course, should have good moral character. He may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct or when he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude such as concubinage (Secs. 2 and 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court; In re Isada, 60 Phil. 915).

If good moral character is required of a lawyer, with more reason that requirement should be exacted of a member of the judiciary who at all times is expected to observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public decency (Canon 3 of Judicial Ethics, Administrative Order No. 162 of the Secretary of Justice, August 1, 1946. 42 O.G. 1803).

of justice, misconduct in office, neglect of duty and failure to hear, try and decide Election Case No. 8.

Judge Veloso, in relying on his wife's condonation of his immorality, erroneously confounded or equated the extinction of his criminal liability with his moral fitness to occupy the position of town magistrate. While the moral stigma connected with concubinage may be tolerated in a private person by those who are not fastifious, it is intolerable when the concubinage is committed by a judge and even if the spouse of the judge allegedly condones the offense. (See marital disqualification rule in section 20, Rule 130, Rules of Court; Ordoño vs. Daquigan, L-39012, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 270, 272-3).

SO ORDERED.

A judge suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality in public office when he labors under the delusion that he can be a judge and at the same time have a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. The absence of criminal liability does not preclude disciplinary action by reason of his highly unconventional and censurable behavior. Nor does the withdrawal by complainant Virrey of his charge render the administrative case moot. This Court may motu proprio investigate a judge for his continuing, grossly immoral conduct. Felix Leynes, who complained against Judge Veloso for acquitting Ricardo Pujeda and Esperidion Pujeda of the charge of having assaulted his son, Juancho Leynes (Criminal Case No. 872), adopted the charge of immorality withdrawn by Virrey. According to Leynes's counsel, the respondent lives with his concubine in a house just across the municipal hall and plaza. Leynes posed a rhetorical question: how can the inhabitants of a town have confidence in the administration of justice by an immoral judge who himself violates the law? (p. 326, Rollo of Administrative Matter No. 489- MJ). In view of the result arrived at in this case, it becomes unnecessary to make any adjudication on the charge of Leynes that Judge Veloso was guilty of partiality in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 872 and the other charges of Virrey imputing to the respondent malicious delay in the administration

WHEREFORE, respondent Veloso is removed from the office as municipal judge. His application for disability retirement is disapproved.

A.C. No. 407

August 15, 1967

On January 21, 1963, Jose Avanceña was committed to prison at the National Penitentiary.

IN RE — ATTORNEY JOSE AVANCEÑA, respondent. J. Gonzales and Orense for respondent. Office of the Solicitor General for complainant.

On September 25, 1963, the President of the Philippines extended conditional pardon to Jose Avanceña. On October 1, 1963, Jose Avanceña was discharged from confinement.

ANGELES, J.: In the decision of the trial court, the following is said: On January 12, 1951, the Supreme Court entered a resolution as follows: In Administrative Case No. 407, In re Atty. Jose Avanceña, it appearing that respondent was convicted in criminal case No. 10220 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Jose Avanceña, of the crime of falsification of public document under Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and that in the decision rendered to that effect the Court has found that said respondent has taken advantage of the law profession in committing said crime to defraud his clients, the Court ordered that respondent be, as he is hereby, provisionally suspended from the practice of law, pending final termination of the criminal case No. 10220, now pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. Jose Avanceña, a member of the Bar, was charged with falsification of public document before the Court of First Instance of Manila, in criminal case No. 10220. After trial, he was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two years to six years of prision correccional, to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The trial court also found that he took advantage of the law profession in committing the crime of falsification of public document to defraud his clients. A copy of the decision was sent to the Supreme Court for whatever the action it may deem appropriate to take in the premises. Conformably thereto, the Supreme Court adopted the resolution hereinabove quoted. From the decision of the lower court, Jose Avanceña appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 28, 1962, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. On a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, the latter Court, on June 13, 1962, dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

The evidence on record conclusively establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt as the author of the falsification of the Power of Attorney (Exhibit A), with grave abuse of confidence. The accused is a lawyer and has taken advantage of the law profession in committing the crime of falsification of a public document to defraud his clients. A lawyer of the type of the accused is a disgrace to the law profession and should be disbarred. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals said: A la vista de los datos expuestos el Juzgado cree y asi concluye que el apelante no ha explicado satisfactoriamente como Ilego a su posesion el poder especial Exhibito A; la presuncion es concluyente que aquel es el autor de la falsification de las firmas de los hermanos Joa que aparecen en el poder especial Exhibito A. (People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338). La conclusion es, pues, que el apelante fue quien preparo el exhibito A; fue quien falsifico las firmas de los hermanos Jao que aparecen en dicho document; y, fue quien Ilevo dicho documento a la oficina del notario Tumblos para su ratificacion. EN SU VIRTUD, habiendose probado fuera de toda duda racional la culpabilidad del apelante, y la decision apelada estando de conformidad con las pruebas y la ley, la misma se confirmation in toto, con las costas contra el apelante. There can, therefore, be no doubt, that Jose Avanceña has committed the crime of falsification of public document against his clients with grave abuse of confidence, having been found guilty thereof by final judgment of competent jurisdiction. His acts amount to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office as an attorney, which constitute grounds for removal

from office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, not to mention conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. The fact that the respondent was extended conditional pardon by the Chief Executive is of no moment. Such conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of the penal consequences of his act, but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment, especially so when he is being disbarred on the ground of professional misconduct for which he had been convicted by final judgment. (Cf. In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.) Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered declaring Jose Avanceña disbarred from the practice of law, and striking his name from the roll of attorneys.

EN BANC

ordered

[December 7, 1928.]

Felipe del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who failed for the second time in 1925. He presented himself for the succeeding bar examination in 1926 and again was unable to obtain the required rating. Then on March 29,1927, he authorized the filing of a motion for the revision of his papers for 1925 based on an alleged mistake in the computation of his grades. The court, acting in good faith, granted this motion, and admitted Felipe del Rosario to the bar, but with two Justices dissenting. Subsequently, during the general investigation of bar examination matters being conducted by the city fiscal, this case was taken up, with the result that a criminal charge was lodged in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Juan Villaflor, a former employee of the court and Felipe del Rosario. Villaflor pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced accordingly. Del Rosario pleaded not guilty, and at the conclusion of the trial was acquitted for lack of evidence.

In re FELIPE DEL ROSARIO Felipe del Rosario, in his own behalf. City Fiscal Guevara, for the Government. SYLLABUS 1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW; PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS. — The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. 2. ID.; ID.; ID. — Acquittal upon a criminal charge is not a bar to proceedings intended to determine if a candidate is worthy to be admitted to the bar.

by

the

court.

MALCOLM, J.:

The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The court is now acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the falsification of public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary. Indeed, the conviction of Juan Villaflor in itself demonstrates that Felipe del Rosario has no legal right to his attorney’s certificate. While to admit Felipe del Rosario again to the bar examination would be tantamount to a declaration of professional purity which we are totally unable to pronounce.

The supplementary report on bar examination irregularities of the fiscal of the City of Manila, dealing with the case of Felipe del Rosario, has been laid before the court for consideration and action. It is recommended by the city fiscal that Felipe del Rosario be ordered to surrender his certificate of attorney and that he be forever prohibited from taking the bar examination. An answer to the report has been permitted to be made, in which the court is asked to disapprove the report and to direct the setting aside of the suspension to practice law by the respondent, heretofore

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar. (In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266; People ex rel. Colorado Bar Association v. Thomas

3. ID.; ID.; ID. — The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. DECISION

[1906], 36 Colo., 126; 10 Ann. Cas., 886 and note; People v. Macauley [1907], 230 Ill., 208; Ex parte Wall [1882], 107 U. S., 265.) The recommendation contained in the special report pertaining to Felipe del Rosario is approved, and within a period of ten days from receipt of notice, the respondent shall surrender his attorney’s certificate to the clerk of this court.

December 7, 1920

the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.

In re CARLOS S. BASA Pedro Guevara for respondent. Attorney-General Feria for the Government. MALCOLM, J.: The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment of Attorney Carlos S. Basa. Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands. Recently he was charged in the Court of Fist Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilt in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. del Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court. 1 The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude . . ." The sole question presented, therefore, is whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude. "Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. (In re Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard vs. Lyon [1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.) When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain

It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be discharged from prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer for one year. So ordered.lawphi1.net

A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981 MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant, vs. SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent. AQUINO, J.: Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang. Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her. Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. They renewed their relationship. After they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said that she was in love with another man and that she had a child with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he did not mind because he loved her very much. Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married.

deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license. Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his child. Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25, 1975. Several days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena also attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan. In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao. Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J). Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an illegitimate child before Michael was born.

In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z).

The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.

When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not really so. Segundino convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding

An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court.

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959). Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896). There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances. This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still prevailed, observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint" has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).

Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases: (1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of marriage, which he refused to fulfill, although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102). (2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256). (3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313). (4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450). (5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get married. She used to give Puno money upon his request. After she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439). (6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in having

sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586). (7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman separated from her husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels. On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that, because of the close intimacy between the complainant and the respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity. According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva. This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91). Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 376

April 30, 1963

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent. BARRERA, J.: In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows: The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).

She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959). The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2). The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960). xxx

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FINDINGS AND COMMENT

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....

disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.

But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him.

RECOMMENDATION

The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.." But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently

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Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys. In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys." In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed. On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of seduction was

committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.

December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the following:.

... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she and respondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."

... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).

Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on

After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his commonlaw wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:

illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed. It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present. The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment. It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the

legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or nonprofessional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared — and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose. Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar. The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court

quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:. The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied). Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be — as the Solicitor General puts it — recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar. The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more revolting. An

immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means he could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735). The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:. SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently. SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. — If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days. The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..

The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.

A.M. No. RTJ-92-904 December 7, 1993 DR. NORBERT L. ALFONSO, complainant, vs. JUDGE MODESTO C. JUANSON, Branch 30, Regional Trial Court of Manila, respondent. Nicanor B. Padilla and Roberto A. Demigillo for complainant. S.N. Barlongay and W.B. Lachica for respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.: On 15 September 1992, the complainant, a doctor of medicine by profession, filed with this Court a sworn complaint charging the respondent with immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. He accuses the respondent of maintaining illicit sexual relations with his wife, Sol Dinglasan Alfonso. The complainant and his wife were married on 10 December 1988 and their union bore them three children, all boys, ages 3 years old, 2 years old, and 4 months old, respectively. He alleges that their married life was peaceful and happy until the discovery of the sordid affair, which came about in this manner: Sometime in February 1991, the complainant received a phone call from the wife of the respondent who informed him that Sol and her husband (respondent) have been carrying on an affair and that she has in her possession the love letters of Sol which she wants to show to the complainant. Although he did not believe the information and even berated Mrs. Juanson for trying to ruin his family, he, nevertheless, told Sol about it. Sol assured him of her love and concern for the family and claimed that the respondent was just a client of her former office, the Banco Filipino (EDSA Cubao Branch). Two weeks later, Mrs. Juanson called him again to inquire if he had received the photocopies of Sol's love letters to the respondent. He again scolded Mrs. Juanson and told her not to call him up anymore. On 12 June 1992, he and Sol left for the United States of America (USA) for a vacation. He stayed there up to 19 July 1992; however, Sol returned ahead of him on 10 July 1992. During his absence, specifically on 17 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson called up his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso, and divulged to the latter the illicit affair between the respondent and Sol. On 20 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson sent to Atty. Alfonso photocopies of Sol's love letters to the

respondent. During their pre-arranged meeting on 25 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson delivered the original copies of Sol's alleged letters to Atty. Alfonso who was accompanied by the complainant's sister, Celestine A. Barreto. When Sol arrived in the Philippines on 10 July 1992, Atty. Alfonso decided to hire a private investigating agency to undertake an inquiry on the alleged illicit affair between Sol and the respondent. Through surveillance conducted by its private investigators, the agency found that Sol had met with the respondent on 11 and 17 July 1992 at Unit 412-A of Citihomes at 130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and that they stayed inside the unit for two to three hours. Complainant further alleges that on 25 July 1992, five days after his arrival from the USA, his sister Celestine told him about the illicit relationship between Sol and the respondent. Celestine showed him the pictures taken by the private investigators and the alleged love letters of Sol. In the evening of the said date, in the presence of their respective parents, the complainant confronted Sol and showed her the proofs; Sol still denied the affair and insisted that she was just discussing some business with the respondent. Later, however, at about 1:30 a.m. in their house, Sol finally admitted to having an illicit affair with the respondent since late 1983 when she was an employee of Banco Filipino (EDSA Cubao Branch) and that before they left for the USA, she met with the respondent at Unit 412-A Citihomes. As a result of this revelation, the complainant sent his wife out of the house. He and Sol have been living separately since 26 July 1992. He also subsequently discovered from the statement of the billing from Pacific Bell for overseas calls which he and Sol made while they were in the USA that on 17 and 25 June 1992 Sol had made calls to the respondent's office at the Manila Regional Trial Court. Complainant submits that the respondent is undeserving of the noble office of the judiciary and prays that he be meted the appropriate administrative sanction for immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. In compliance with this Court's Resolution of 22 October 1992, the respondent filed his Comment on 21 December 1992. He admits that he knows Sol and that "they have been communicating with each other casually and innocently," but denies that they are lovers and were having an illicit affair, that Sol has been sending love letters to him, and that, except for the 11 and 17 July 1992 meetings, he and Sol had been going

to the apartment situated at 130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and staying there for hours. He asserts that he came to know Sol sometime in 1987 when she engaged his professional services in connection with five criminal cases filed by her in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal and the in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. In the course of their attorney-client relationship, Sol sought legal advice from him and during those occasions they usually talked over the phone and not in the office. In June 1992, he received an overseas call from Sol who was then in the USA. Sol asked for advice concerning her problem with her employer, the Security Bank and Trust Co. (Dau Central Branch). They agreed that Sol would see him upon her return to the Philippines. On 11 July 1992, shortly after her arrival from the USA, he ad Sol met at the aforementioned apartment, which was leased not by the respondent but by Celestino Esteban. After discussing her problem, with Celestino and two other persons present, he and Sol left the apartment and took a late lunch at Fastfood, Robinson. He reassures the complainant "that his wife has always been faithful to him and that he would do nothing as would tarnish their warm relationship, much less destroy the complainant's family." On 4 May 1993, the Court referred the case to Associate Justice Lourdes T. Jaguros of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. Justice Jaguros conducted a full-blown investigation. At the hearings on 17, 18, 21 and 29 of June 1993 and 6, 8, 9 and 12 of July 1993, the parties submitted testimonial and documentary evidence. On 4 October 1993, she submitted her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 1993. Pertinent portions of her findings of facts read as follows: As culled from the evidence of this case, Complainant Dr. Norbert L. Alfonso and Sol Dinglasan were married at Sta. Ana Catholic Church on December 10, 1988 as evidenced by a marriage contract (Exh. "N"). Three children were born of this marriage, John Jason, three (3) years old, Jan Norbert, two (2) years old, and the youngest Jan Joseph, four (4) months old. Complainant and his family lived a happy and normal life with their Sundays spent on outings after the Sunday mass. (p. 9, tsn, June 29, 1993). In February, 1991, Complainant received phone calls from a woman introducing herself as a concerned friend telling that complainant's wife is having an illicit affair with her said woman caller's husband. Said caller did not identify herself but only said she was in possession of love letters of

complainant's wife Sol to said caller's husband. After two weeks, said "concerned friend" called up the Complainant again to ask him if he had received said caller's registered mail. Complainant after both calls asked his wife Sol about her having an affair with another man, and in both instances, Sol assured him of her love. Then the calls stopped for the rest of the year 1991 and early part of 1992 although Complainant noticed that his wife Sol used to go out alone every Saturday. On June 12, 1992, Complainant and his wife Sol went to the U.S.A. for a vacation but the latter decided to return to Manila ahead of the former on July 10, 1992 (Exh. "O"). Complainant followed in returning home only on July 19, 1992 (Exh. "O-1"). On July 25, 1992, Complainant was invited by his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso to his sister Celestine Barreto's house, and there his father showed him five (5) love letters written by Complainant's wife Sol with envelopes addressed to Atty. Modesto C. Juanson (Exhs. "A" to "E" and submarking), and pictures taken by private investigators of Complainant's wife and respondent Judge in company of each other (Exhs. "F-5" to "F-22", "G-2" to "G-14"). Complainant recognized the handwriting of his wife Sol in said love letters, specifically the GAIN memo pad paper used by Sol in her love letter (Exh. "D") which is a prescription pad of Complainant to his patients. Likewise, in the pictures, Complainant recognized his wife Sol holding a "Payless" bag (Exh. "F-6") with the Respondent Judge holding the same bag later on (Exh. "F-14"). In practically all the pictures, Complainant identified his wife Sol and the respondent Judge. The Respondent Judge was no stranger to Complainant as the latter knows said Judge personally. Said Judge is one of the best friends of Complainant's parents-in-law and was even a sponsor in the wedding of Complainant's sister-in-law. Both Complainant and Respondent Judge had met thrice and talked with each other. The five love letters, including a picture of the Respondent Judge (Exh. "K") were handed to Complainant's father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso by a lady who introduced herself, as

Mrs. Ceferina Juanson in the presence of Complainant's sister, Celestine Barreto. The three met at the front entrance of the Sto. Domingo Church, Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City and proceeded to the City Diners Restaurant in the same city where the three had a talk and where Mrs. Juanson handed to Atty. Alfonso the five love letters with a picture, at about 10:30 to 11:30 a.m. in late June 1992. Prior to said meeting on June 17, 1992, at about 11:00 a.m. a "concerned woman" had called up Atty. Alfonso at his home and in the vernacular had said "Tinataihan ang ulo ng anak mo ng babaeng iyan" referring to Complainant's wife. To clear Atty. Alfonso's doubt, the woman promised to send proofs which Atty. Alfonso received by LBC in a parcel containing the xerox copies of Complainant's wife's love letters to Atty. Modesto C. Juanson. After the meeting with the lady who identified herself as Mrs. Ceferina Juanson, Atty. Alfonso got an overseas call from Complainant that his wife Sol was coming home to Manila earlier so that Atty. Alfonso engaged the services of a private investigating agency, Truth Verifier System, Inc., to conduct surveillance of the activities of Complainant's wife, Sol upon her arrival from the U.S.A. Sol Alfonso did arrive on July 10, 1992, and on July 11 and 17, 1992, the Truth Verifier System, Inc. through Marjorie Juinio and Edgardo Tamayo, licensed private detectives conducted surveillance operation on Mrs. Sol Dinglasan and respondent Judge Modesto Juanson. On said date of July 17, 1992, said private detectives together with Raymond Tabangcura and Edgar Naquilla, saw, Sol Dinglasan Alfonso go out of her house carrying a bag, take a tricycle and alight at Lamayan St., walk towards Sta. Ana Church then board a taxicab. Following said taxicab, the taxi stopped at City Homes, San Francisco Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Sol went inside Unit 412-A Citihomes, and stayed inside for about three hours. Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson came out first of said unit, wearing blue walking shorts and light colored polo and carrying the plastic bag which Sol was seen carrying earlier, and then followed by Sol. At around 1:00 p.m., the Respondent Judge and Sol were inside said Respondent's Wrangler jeep on their way to Robinson Galeria at EDSA. The two ate at Mongolian Restaurant and at Gusto Unico, then they proceeded to Robinson's Supermarket. Inside

the supermarket, Marjorie Juinio saw the Respondent Judge put his arm on the shoulder of Sol, and they were also seen holding hands (pp. 23-26, tsn, June 21, 1993). Then the two, Respondent Judge and Sol boarded the Wrangler jeep. At about 3:45 p.m., Sol alighted at the corner of Suter and Roxas Streets and then boarded a tricycle while the jeep left. The formal report of the Truth and Verifier System, Inc. has been offered by Complainant as Exhibit "F-1" to "F-4" while the many pictures taken of Respondent Judge and Sol were marked and offered as Exhibits "F-5" to "F-22". The other team of the Truth Verifier System, Inc. led by Edgardo Tamayo practically corroborated the findings of the Marjorie Juinio team. A formal report marked and offered as Exhibit "G" to "G-1", and pictures taken of Respondent Judge and Complainant's wife Sol marked and offered as Exhibits "G-2" to "G-14" were presented before the Investigator. Five days after the arrival of Complainant Dr. Norbert L. Alfonso, he was invited by his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso to Norbert's sister's house in San Juan, Metro Manila. In the house of Celestine Alfonso Barreto, Atty. Alfonso showed his son, Norbert the love letters written by his wife Sol to Respondent Judge (Exhs. "A" to "E"). Complainants recognized the handwritings of his wife Sol and even the GAIN memo stationery which complainant was using as his prescription pad for his patients (Exh. "D"). He recognized his wife Sol and Respondent Judge in the pictures taken by the private detectives. On said day, Complainant Norbert Alfonso experienced the greatest shock of his life and wondered what happened to his life. His father, Atty. Alfonso, however, advised him not to hurt his wife Sol. In that same party, Complainant showed Sol the pictures and the love letters which made Sol turn pale and stammer when talking. Sol's own parents were embarrassed and walked out of the party. On the same night at about 10 in the evening, Complainant Dr. Norbert Alfonso confronted his wife Sol as to the truth of her relationship with Respondent Judge. Before the Investigator said Complainant made the following testimony on direct examination:

xxx xxx xxx

I told my wife, "you do not love me, you love your stupid Judge."

ATTY. DEMIGILLO: Q What else did your wife tell you during that confrontation, her exact words ? xxx

xxx

xxx

A She took a deep breath again and told me, "Sweetheart, I am very, very, very sorry, I made a mistake." I asked, "What mistake is that ?" She replied, "I had sexual intercourse with the Judge." xxx

xxx

xxx

Q What else, if any, happened during that confrontation? A I asked my wife "How many times did you have sexual intercourse with the Judge"? Q Was there any response? A She answered five times and then right away I said, "Putangina mo, five times lang.Alam mo ba kung ilan beses kitang naganyan? Tarantado ka." With my voice not so loud because the door and the windows were opened. If I shout the neighbors will hear and then the yayas will go down right away. Q What was your wife doing at that time? A My wife was crying and saying, "Sweetheart, I am very, very sorry. Forgive me." She was kneeling before me and begging forgiveness. "Forgive me, sweetheart, I love you."

Q Is there anything else that you discussed during that confrontation aside from the admission? A After that admittance of my wife having sexual relationship with the Judge, reminiscing the past events when we were together I told my wife, "That's why pala every Saturday umaalis ka dito. Sinong pinupuntahan mo?" And definitely, she admitted to me, "To the Judge." (pp. 35-41, tsn, June 29, 1993) The confrontation between Complainant and his wife Sol ended at about 5:00 a.m. of the following day, July 16, 1992 with Complainant asking Sol to leave the house. Sol also admitted to the Complainant that when she went to Hongkong on December 26, 1989 up to December 29, 1989 she was with Respondent Judge, and records of the Commission on Immigration for said dates show that both Sol Alfonso and Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson departed for Hongkong via Cathay Pacific plane on December 26, 1989 and returned to Manila on December 29, 1989 (Exhs. "P" and "P-1"). Also, Complainant received from his sister in California, U.S.A., a Pacific Bell Statement of Telephone Calls reflecting two calls made by his wife Sol to Manila, at numbers 632 476120. Number 632 is the country code while number 476120 is the phone number of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, where Respondent Judge is the Presiding Judge. As of now, Complainant Dr. Norbert Alfonso and his wife Sol live separately, and their three children are alternately in the custody of Complainant or Sol for certain number of days.

Upon the other hand, Respondent Judge main defense is denial as he advances the position that Sol Dinglasan Alfonso was a former client when Respondent Judge was still a practicing lawyer, and that from time to time Sol would consult him regarding her cases. As to the Hongkong trip, Respondent Judge simply accompanied a former client who was looking for a house to buy in Hongkong and as to the visit in the Citihomes unit, Respondent Judge claimed that he was only visiting his godson George Zari who spent a vacation in the Philippines for a month. Some elaboration of the respondent's version is necessary. He is now 56 years old. (TSN, 8 July 1993, 31). He and his wife, Ceferina, were married in 1961 and have two sons. Ceferina is eight years his senior. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 4-5). From 1967 to 1969, he was the Chief Legal Officer in the Office of the City Mayor of Quezon City and from 1969 to 1982 he was the Second Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City. After that and until November 1990, when he was appointed Judge of the Regional Trial Court at Urdaneta Pangasinan, he was in private practice of law. In April 1992, he was assigned to Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. (TSN, 8 July 1993, 32). He first came to know Sol when she hired his services as her counsel in six criminal cases involving dishonored checks she filed against Santiago Maramag and Evangeline Maramag. (Id., 33-39). In 1989, he saw Sol at the wedding of her sister Jennifer to Romeo Dizon; he stood as sponsor for the groom then. In June 1992, Romeo saw him at his office at the City Hall in Manila and sought advice regarding the letter Sol had received from the Security Bank requiring her to explain why she should not be declared absent without leave (AWOL) for leaving her work without an approved leave of absence. He told Romeo that he would not be able to give any advice unless he saw the letter and talked with Sol. A few days later, he received an overseas call from Sol who said that she left the Philippines sometime after 10 June 1992. He told her that he could not give any written or oral advice until he read the letter and talked with her. This overseas call might have been the 17 June 1992 call referred to in the Pacific Bell Statement. (Exhibit "Q"). He was not able to talk to her in the second overseas call referred to in Exhibit "Q." Two or three weeks alter, he received local call from Sol who told him that she was back and that she has the letter. Sol begged to see him at his office. He, however, told her that he was busy; besides, it was already late in the afternoon. She got frantic and so he told her that they could meet the following day at Unit 412-A, Citihomes, at 130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, since he was to meet his godson, George Zari, in the said place. They did meet there at 11:00 o'clock in the morning the following day —

11 July 1992, a Saturday. Sol gave him the letter from the Security Bank and after interviewing her he promised to prepare a draft of a "reply." Present at that time were Celestino Esteban, lessee of the unit who is his friend, George Zari, and his live-in partner, Marissa. Forty-five minutes later, he decided to go home. Sol requested for a ride in his vehicle in order to alight at the place of her employer along EDSA and Shaw Boulevard to which he obliged. While on their way, Sol invited him for lunch and they went to the Mongolian Restaurant at Robinson's where they had lunch. They had coffee nearby and then parted ways. Thereafter, on separate days, Sol called him by phone to ask about the draft of the reply. On the second call, he told her that since he would meet George Zari on the 17th of July at Unit 412-A Citihomes, she might just as well meet him there. She acceded and on that date he left his office at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning and arrived at Unit 412-A thirty minutes later. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 25). Sometime after Sol arrived, he gave to her the draft of the reply and instructed her to type the letter, date and sign it, and then send it to her employer. He also referred her to Atty. Lachica to whom she should henceforth communicate because he, respondent, is busy at his office. When he was about to leave, Sol asked if she might ride in his vehicle in order to alight at EDSA-Shaw Boulevard to which he agreed. After that he did not meet Sol again. (TSN, 9 July 1993, 3-15). Respondent denies having gone to Hongkong with Sol on 26 December 1989 and having seen her in Hongkong. According to him, his traveling companion was Cua Sen. (Id., 16-23). Cua Sen corroborated him on this point. (TSN, 6 July 1993, 5-10). When confronted about the charge of immorality and unethical conduct for having illicit relations with Sol, he answered: "I deny it very strongly, your Honor." (Id., 32). Respondent further suggests that it was impossible for him to have sexual intercourse with Sol because he was suffering from two debilitating diseases — diabetes mellitus, for which he has been "taking insulin" since 1987, and prostatitis — which have seriously affected his sexual potency. In his own words, he "could hardly make it," and that he has "no erection whatsoever." (Id., 29-32; Exhibits "11" and "12"). Justice Jaguros gives full faith and credit to the complainant's version for she finds no reason not to believe the complainant. According to her, "[n]o man in his correct mind would come forward and claim that his honor and good name have been stained by an adulterous wife, doubt the paternity of his children, and in the process destroy his family and home." She ruled

that the testimonies of the witnesses for the respondent — Cua Sen, Celestino Esteban and former Judge Zari — do not inspire belief.

other hand, there is the unrebutted testimony of Mr. Cua Sen that he, a client of the respondent, was the latter's travelling companion.

Justice Jaguros then concludes that the immoral conduct of the respondent has ruined two families — his own and that of the complainant. Respondent "cannot escape from the blame and sin of what he has caused Complainant's once happy family." More pertinently she adds:

From the foregoing, it is clear that their affair began before Sol and the complainant were married on 10 December 1988 and might have blossomed from the attorney-client relationship between respondent and Sol. Her marriage to the complainant did not diminish Sol's love for the respondent, for even after she committed herself to the complainant alone and made a vow of fidelity to him till death at the solemn ceremony of marriage, she still sneaked out her love notes to the respondent.

But beyond the domestic confines of these two families, Respondent Judge is no ordinary mortal who can live the life he pleases having two women at the same time — his wife and worst [sic], another man's wife. He is a Judge who symbolizes the law and the highest degree of morality in the community. The citizens look up to him as the embodiment of justice and decency, as he decides cases brought to his court. He can be no less. And invoking our decision in Leynes vs. Veloso (82 SCRA 325 [1978] ) and Castillo vs. Calanog (199 SCRA 75 [1991] ) as precedent and moral compass, she asserts that she has no other alternative but to find respondent "GUILTY as charged of Immorality and Violation of Judicial Conduct" and to recommend his "DISMISSAL . . . from office." In the light of the conclusions of the Investigating Justice and her recommendation for the imposition upon the respondent of the severest administrative penalty — dismissal from the service — it is all the more imperative to conduct as assiduous examination and evaluation of the records and the evidence. There is no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship existed between the respondent and the complainant's wife. For one, there are the cards or notes, which the complainant and the Investigating Justice described as love letters. These five "love letters" are marked as Exhibits "A." "B," "C," "D," and "E," and dated 3 July 1987, 23 May 1988, 15 February 1988, 11 January 1989, and 7 March 1989, respectively. For another, if we were to give full credit to the complainant's testimony that during their confrontation Sol had admitted having sexual intercourse with the respondent on five occasions (TSN, 29 June 1993, 39-40), it would appear that the relationship had developed into an extra-marital liaison. It was furthermore established that both Sol and the respondent took the same flights of Cathay Pacific aircraft to Hongkong on 26 December 1989 and back to the Philippines on 29 December 1989. There is, however, no evidence that they stayed together in the same hotel in Hongkong. On the

It must, however, be stressed that the respondent is not charged with immorality or misconduct committed before he was appointed to the judiciary. As to the post-appointment period, we find the evidence for the complainant insufficient to prove that the respondent and Sol continued their extramarital affair. No love notes written by her after November 1990 were presented in evidence. If she did, they could have been kept with Exhibits "A" to "E" in some secret place which was not, however, unknown anymore to the respondent's wife. Sol's admission or confession to the complainant that she had carnal knowledge of the respondent on five occasions made no reference to specific dates and is hearsay. In his direct examination, the complainant's counsel exerted no further effort to obtain clarifications as to the dates thereof. He perhaps realized its futility because the narration by the complainant of the information clearly indicated that the complainant did not ask Sol to elaborate on the five illicit sexual acts. On cross-examination, counsel for the respondent carefully avoided any entanglement with the details of the admission not only because it might have provided an occasion for the complainant to elaborate thereon, but because it would have operated as a waiver of his objection to the testimony as hearsay. The transcripts of the stenographic notes discloses that the counsel for the respondent objected and entered a continuing objection to questions directed to elicit or which tended to elicit statements or admissions supposedly made or given by Sol on the grounds that any such statements or admissions would be hearsay or otherwise barred by the res inter alios acta rule. Justice Jaguros recognized the merit of the objection; hence, she allowed the answers to be taken merely as part of the narration nut not as evidence of the truth thereof. Thus: ATTY. DEMIGILLO: Q. What was her response to your exhortation?

A. After a few minutes she took a deep breath and said, "Sweetheart, patawarin mo ako,nagkaroon ako ng kasalanan sa iyo." ATTY. BARLONGAY:

Q. What was the exact statement of your wife? xxx xxx xxx ATTY. BARLONGAY:

At this juncture, Your Honor, we would like to register our objection as to the issue of the truth of the statement as purported to be answered by her wife for two reasons: One, it is hearsay. We have no opportunity to cross-examine the . . .

Again, subject to the observation of this Honorable Court, we would register our objections on these two grounds: Hearsay and res inter-alia [sic] rule. xxx xxx xxx

COURT: ATTY. BARLONGAY: As part of the narration. Excuse me, I have some manifestations . . . ATTY. BARLONGAY: COURT: Yes, as part of the narration, but just for the purposes of record we would like to register our objection as to the truth of the statement itself. First, it is hearsay; second ... COURT: Precisely, admitted only as part of his narration. ATTY. BARLONGAY: That is alright. Second, it is . . . on the basis of the inter-alia [sic] rule, the admission of a party should not prejudice the rights of another. xxx xxx xxx ATTY. DEMIGILLO:

You have a continuing objection? ATTY. BARLONGAY: Yes, I am not going to do this at every turn. I just want to say that our objection is a continuing one. (TSN, 29 June 1993, 3639). If they were then allowed by the Investigating Justice as merely "part of the narration," they should only be considered as independently relevant statements, i.e., proof that Sol made statements or admissions, but not as proof of the truth of facts revealed in the said statements or admissions. Elsewise stated, the admission in evidence of the words spoken by Sol is not to be used in determining the issue of their truth. (FRANCISCO, V.J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, vol. VII, Part I, 1973 ed., 438). This being so, the acts of sexual intercourse admitted by Sol cannot, insofar as the respondent is concerned, be deemed proven by the said admission or confession. While it is true that technical rules of evidence should not be applied in administrative cases, however, since the Investigating Justice herself had specifically allowed the hearsay answers

merely as part of the narration, or more specifically as independently relevant statements, it would be unfair and arbitrary to thereafter disregard the ruling. All told, there is in this case no direct and competent evidence against the respondent that he had illicit sex with Sol. But even if the admission of Sol were to be taken as proof of the truth of the facts so admitted, considering, however, that Sol's admission that she engaged in sexual intercourse on five occasions made no reference to specific dates, that their affair antedated Sol's marriage, that their last proven tryst was in Hongkong in 1989, and that there is an absence of positive and competent evidence to show that any of the five acts of sexual intercourse took place after the respondent's appointment to the judiciary , it cannot be safely presumed that the respondent committed any of the sexual indiscretions after he became a judge. Respondent is not charged for immorality committed before his appointment. Accordingly, proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be a basis for his administrative discipline in this case. The respondent may have undergone moral reformation after his appointment, or his appointment could have completely transformed him upon the solemn realization that a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. (Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution). It would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond reformation and redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a high price for that honor — his private and official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. (Jugueta vs. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27 [1974]). And the lawyer who is thereafter appointed thereto must perforce be presumed to have solemnly bound himself to a way of conduct free from any hint or suspicion of impropriety. The imputation of illicit sexual acts upon the incumbent judge must be proven by substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases. This the complainant failed to do. The meetings of the respondent and Sol at Unit 412-A of Citihomes on 11 July and 17 July 1992 do not by themselves prove that these were trysts for libidinal gratification. Evidence was offered by the respondent to prove otherwise. However, considering their prior special relationship, the respondent and Sol's meetings could reasonably incite suspicion of either its continuance or revival and the concomitant intimacies expressive of such relationship. In short, the respondent suddenly became indiscreet; he succumbed to the sweet memories of the past and he was unable to disappoint Sol who asked for his legal advice

on a matter which involved her employment. Such indiscretions indubitably cast upon his conduct an appearance of impropriety. He thus violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates that "[a] judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach," and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that "[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." It has been said that a magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. (Dia-Añonuevo v. Bercacio, 68 SCRA 81 [1975] ). The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the faith of the people in the judiciary. (Candia vs. Tagabucba, 79 SCRA 51 [1977] ). It is to be noted that 17 July 1992 fell on a Friday. On that date, the respondent left his office at the City Hall of Manila at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning and arrived at Unit 412-A Citihomes thirty minutes later. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 25). Per report of the private detectives (Exhibit "G"), the respondent and Sol left the unit as 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon on board a vehicle and that twenty-five minutes later, Sol alighted near the crossing overpass at United Street. It is, therefore, clear that on 17 July 1992 the respondent had left his office during office hours and, considering the distance between Mandaluyong and his office at the City Hall of Manila and the usual traffic condition, it was impossible for him to have reached his office — if at all he did proceed to it — in time for the commencement of the official session hours in the afternoon, i.e., 2:00 p.m. (Paragraph 5, Interim and Transitional Rules and Guidelines Relative to the Implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization of 1981). Thus, for purely personal sessions, he violated the rule regarding the official sentence. Such violation amounted to neglect of duty. Finally, a word on the respondent's defense that he not have sexual congress with Sol because he was suffering from diabetes mellitus and prostatitis. The claim is both self-serving and irrelevant. No expert testimony was presented to prove the stage, extent or degree of seriousness of the diseases and their effects on his capacity to copulate. The physicians who purportedly issued the medical certificates did not testify thereon. Besides, immorality — for which the respondent is charged — is not based alone on illicit sexual intercourse. It is settled that: immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative

of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. (Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth ed., 1990, 751). WHEREFORE, for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, and the rule on official time, respondent JUDGE MODESTO C. JUANSON is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) and, further, sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 266

April 27, 1963

PAZ ARELLANO TOLEDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JESUS B. TOLEDO, respondent. PADILLA, J.: This is a disbarment proceedings under Rule 128 of the Rules of Court. On 9 July 1956 Paz Arellano Toledo filed in this Court a sworn complaint in the form of a letter alleging that she is the wife of Jesus B. Toledo, a member of the Bar;1 that they were married on 27 December 1946 while he was still a second year student of law; that she supported him and spent for his studies; that after passing the bar examination and becoming a fullfledged member of the Bar he abandoned her; that he is at present employed in the Bureau of Mines2 and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City; and that he is cohabiting with another woman who had borne him three children. She prayed that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. On 11, July 1956, this Court directed the respondent to answer the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice and a copy of the complaint.3The respondent mailed his answer in the form of a letter, which was received in this Court on 4, October 1956, averring that the complaint was not in due form because "It does not set out distinctly, clearly and concisely the legal causes for the suspension or disbarment of a member of the Philippine Bar as provided in the Rules of Court hence his "answer could not be made in the logical sequence of a formal pleading;" that there seems to be an irregularity in the filing of the complaint because while the letter-complaint was dated 25, June 1956, and received at the Docket Section of this Court on 2, July 1956, by an employee whose initials are "A.L."4 It was subscribed and sworn to before a notary public on a later date, 5 July 1956; and the alleged information furnished by Esperanza D. Almonte that the respondent was cohabiting with another woman who had borne him three children is not true because her very informant, whose true name is Leoncia D. Almonte, executed an affidavit to the effect that the respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands, not in the Bureau of Mines, and that the three children referred to by the complainant were the children of Mr. and Mrs. Ruperto Ll. Jose, with whom the respondent was boarding. Attached to his answer are the affidavit of Leoncia D. Almonte and a copy of his answer to a complaint filed by the complainant with the Director of Lands for abandonment and immorality. In 9 October 1956, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation and on 11 October 1956 the record of the case was received by the Office of the Solicitor General. On 19 November 1956, 10

December 1956, 7, 8, 14, and 15 February 1957, 18 March 1957 and 5 August 1957, the office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings during which the complainant presented her evidence both oral and documentary and the respondent, who appeared in his own behalf, cross-examined her witnesses. The respondent did not present evidence in his behalf but reserved the right to present it under the provisions of Section 6, Rule 128. After finding that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, on 24 July 1958 the Solicitor General filed a complaint in this Court charging the respondent with abandonment of his wife and immorality for cohabiting with another woman by whom he has a child, and praying that he be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law. On 30 July 1958 the Clerk of Court sent to the respondent by mail a copy of the complaint filed by the Solicitor General and directed him to answer the same within 15 days from receipt thereof, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 128. On 28 August 1958 the respondent filed in this Court a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground "that the charges contained therein are not based on and supported by the facts and evidence adduced at the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General." On 2 September 1958 this Court set the case for hearing on 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning. On 13 September 1958 the respondent filed a motion praying that his motion to dismiss filed on 28 August 1958 be first resolved or, that, should it be denied, he be given a period of ten days within which to file an answer; that upon receipt of his answer the case be returned to the Solicitor General for reception of his evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 128; and that the hearing of the case set for 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning be held in abeyance pending resolution of his motion. At the hearing of the case on 17 September 1958, counsel for the respondent appeared and was given a period of 15 days within which to submit a written memorandum in lieu of oral argument, and the Solicitor General the same period of time from receipt of a copy of the respondent's memorandum within which to reply. On 22 October 1958, within the extension of time previously granted, the respondent filed his memorandum and on 17 November 1958, also within the extension of time previously granted, the Solicitor General, his memorandum in reply. Section 6, Rule 128, provides: The evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation may be considered, by the Supreme Court in the final decision of the case, if the respondent had an opportunity to object and cross-examine. If in the respondent's answer no statement is made as to any intention of introducing additional evidence, the case shall be set down for hearing, upon the filing of such answer

or upon the expiration of the time to file the same. (Emphasis supplied) The above-quoted rule in no uncertain terms requires the respondent in disbarment or suspension proceedings from the practice of law to file an answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General after investigation and, should he desire to present evidence in his behalf, to expressly say so in the answer. Instead of doing what the rule requires, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss without stating that he intended to present evidence in his behalf, thereby waiving his right. The fact that at the close of the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General, he made of record his desire to present evidence in his behalf, is not sufficient. The correct manner and proper time for him to make known his intention is by and in the answer seasonably filed in this Court. The complainant testified as follows: On 27 December 1946 she, a dentist by profession, and the respondent, then a second year law student, were married civilly in Camiling, Tarlac, by the Justice of the Peace (Exhibit A). For a period of two weeks after their wedding, they lived in the house of her parents at No. 76 General del Pilar street in Camiling. After two weeks, the respondent went to Manila to resume his studies at the Far Eastern University,5 and she remained in Camiling to practice her profession. While the respondent was still studying, he either returned to Camiling once a week or she came to Manila twice a week to visit with each other. Sometimes the respondent stayed with her in Camiling for a week, and when she came to Manila to buy dental materials she slept with him at his boarding house or at the house on Economia street where he on lived with his brother Cleto and Aniceto and cousin Felisa Bacera, who cooked their meals for them. They were in good terms until about three or four months before his graduation. On the day of his graduation, he showed her indifference and humiliated and embarrassed her by calling her a "provinciana" and telling her that she was a nuisance whenever she came to see him. Nevertheless, being his wife, she continued to see him while he was reviewing for the bar examinations. She specifically mentioned that three days before the last examination, she came to see him. A week after the bar examinations, she again came to see him. Since then they became actually separated and she never saw him again until the hearing of the case. Through Mrs. Esperanza Almonte, she learned that the respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City. The respondent never wrote to her and asked her to follow him at his place of work and she did not care to either. Marina Payot gave the following testimony: From 28 February to 3 June 1955 she lived and worked as maid, laundress and cook for the

respondent, his family composed of himself, Mrs. Corazon Toledo and their child in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The respondent and Corazon Toledo lived as husband and wife, and have a child named Angie who was less than a year old at the time she lived with them. The couple slept together in the same room with their daughter Angie and ate their meals together although sometimes Corazon ate alone when the respondent was out somewhere. The respondent used to call Corazon "Honey" and Corazon used to call the respondent "Jess". Corazon Toledo is not the same person as the complainant. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët Lino Domingo testified in the following manner: He is employed as operator-mechanic in the Bureau of Public Highways in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and has resided there since 1952. He knows the respondent because he headed a survey party that surveyed public lands in Malaybalay for distribution to the landless. Sometime in March 1955 he went to the respondent's place of residence and office at Moreno street, where his friend Mr. Nieva, an Ilocano, also resided to apply for a parcel of public land, and about ten times he went to the respondent's place of residence and office. Among those who lived with the respondent were Mrs. Corazon Toledo, Mr. Nieva, a maid and Mr. Abad (the latter only slept at the place whenever he was in town). He knew that Corazon Toledo, who is not the same person as Paz Arellano Toledo, was the wife of the respondent. At the respondent's place of residence and office, he saw a room where the respondent, Corazon and a baby slept and where man's pajamas and shirts were hung. One day at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while the respondent and his (the witness') friend Mr. Abad were repairing the front mudguard and seats of a station wagon behind the respondent's place of residence and office, his friend Mr. Abad introduced him to the respondent. He helped Abad place the seats of the station wagon in their proper places and while he was helping Abad, he heard the respondent address Corazon as "Mama" and ask her for money to buy cigarettes. His friends Nieva and Abad used to address Corazon as "Mrs. Toledo." The respondent admits that he is married to the complainant (p. 14, t.s.n.).The fact that he is cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child has been established by the testimony of Marina Payot and Lino Domingo, whose sincerity and truthfulness have been put to a severe and searching test by the investigating Solicitor in the presence of the

respondent who appeared in his own behalf and cross-examined the witnesses during the investigation. Asked by the investigating Solicitor how she came to testify at the investigation, or whether anybody taught or coached her on what to testify or whether she testified because of any promise of reward or consideration, Marina Payot without hesitation and in a straight forward manner answered that the complainant, Mr. Domingo and Mr. Reyes (the latter is the complainant's counsel) spoke to her and told her to tell nothing but the truth about the respondent's affair with his paramour in Malaybalay; that nobody taught or coached her on what to testify at the investigation; and that she was not promised anything by way of reward or consideration or given money for testifying. Going further in his investigation, the Solicitor asked the witness how she was treated by the respondent to find out if she harbors any ill-feeling or grudge against him and his alleged paramour, which could be a motive for falsely testifying against them, and she answered that she was well treated by the Toledos; that they considered her a sister; that they paid regularly her salary of P15 a month; that they bought her a dress during the town fiesta on May 15; that Corazon never scolded her for she was a woman of few words, was kind and did not know how to get angry; and that the reason she left them was because she just felt lonesome for her parents. Further testing her credibility, the Solicitor asked how the respondent's paramour looked, and she described her as a woman of fair complexion. Comparing her (Corazon) to the complainant, she said that the complainant was more beautiful but Corazon was not ugly and that the latter had a nicer figure, because she was stouter and taller than the complainant. To find out if it was another and not the respondent who lived with Corazon, the Solicitor asked her if she had not seen Teodoro Nieva, who lived with the respondent and Corazon in the same house, kiss or embrace Corazon, and she replied that she had not. Testing the credibility of Lino Domingo, the investigating Solicitor asked him whether he was related to Claudio Arellano, brother of the complainant, and Lino readily answered that he is his brother-in-law and added that he (Lino) is the cousin of the wife of Claudio. Asked if he had been asked by the complainant to testify at the hearing, he frankly answered in the affirmative. Questioned as to the description of the respondent's paramour, the witness stated that Corazon is fair in complexion, five feet tall; that she is taller and fairer in complexion, more beautiful and has a nicer figure than the complainant. The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of credence. Marina Payot is a simple girl of eighteen years, a mere maid, scant in education, and understands little English. She did not even finish the sixth grade of the elementary course. The sharp and incisive questions propounded to

her by the investigating Solicitor and the lengthy cross-examination to which she was subjected by the respondent himself would have revealed herself if she was lying. The apparent inconsistencies in her answers may be attributed to her innocence and simple-mindedness and her failure to understand the questions propounded to her. Moreover, she could not be expected to remember the dates asked of her in the same way that a person of more than average intelligence would. Add to this the fact that she was subjected to a thorough examination by three lawyers and her confusion was compounded. Lino Domingo's frank and ready answers to the questions propounded by the Solicitor show sincerity and do not reveal any intention to pervert the truth. And even if his testimony be discarded, still the testimony of Marina Payot stands unrebutted. The annexes attached to the respondent's memorandum cannot be taken into consideration for they were not properly introduced in evidence during the investigation. The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child, has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the Bar.6 THEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred from the practice of law.

Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984 PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant, vs. GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent. Roger Castuciano for complainant. Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.

AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1 This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968. In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, he became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that she was a widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was born on November 27, 1972. He was named John Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting or undissolved. Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December 30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1) The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In the evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he has never returned to the conjugal abode. Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient investigation and surveillance, she discovered that he was living and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car to that place.

The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated by Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed by their testimonies. Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as the head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing eyeglasses. Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he married Preciosa. He admitted that from time to time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the purpose of giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's testimony. He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He claims that they were paid witnesses. He declared that he did not live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home because he could not endure the nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her interference with his professional obligations. The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a complaint for disbarment against the respondent. Obusan did not answer the complaint. He waived the presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer did not file any memorandum. After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained the burden of proof. She has proven his abandonment of her and his adulterous relations with a married woman separated from her own husband. Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman, fails within "that

conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591). Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768). WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10185

March 12, 2014

LICERIO DIZON, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, JR., Respondent. RESOLUTION MENDOZA, J.: On May 14, 2004, complainant Licerio Dizon (complainant) filed a petition against Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. (Atty. Cabucana), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), praying for the disbarment of the latter for falsification of public document. In his petition, complainant alleged that he was one of the would-be-buyers of a parcel of land owned by the heirs of the late Florentino Callangan, namely, Susana, Jun and Angeleta, all surnamed Callangan who were parties in Civil Case No. 1-689 filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch I, Santiago City (MTCC); that on November 6, 2003, a compromise agreement was executed by the parties in the said case and notarized before Atty. Cabucana on the same date it was signed at the MTCC; that at the hearing conducted on December 11, 2003 regarding the due execution and the veracity of the compromise agreement, the signatories therein testified that they signed the instrument in the court room of MTCC but not in the presence of Atty. Cabucana as Notary Public; that because of the irregularity in the due execution of the Compromise Agreement, there was undue delay in the resolution/decision of Civil Case No. 1-689 which caused damage and injury to complainant; that Atty. Cabucana violated the Notarial Law in notarizing the document in the absence of most of the signatories/affiants; and that he should be sanctioned in accordance with Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Code and Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant further alleged that Atty. Cabucana uttered grave threats against him on July 20, 2004 after the hearing of the said case in MTCC. In his Answer, Atty. Cabucana averred that the complaint was intended to harass him because he was the private prosecutor in a criminal case filed against complainant before the MTCC; that complainant had no cause of action as his right was not violated because he was just a "would be" buyer and not a party to the compromise agreement; and that complainant would not suffer any damage by the pendency of the case or by any defects obtaining in the notarization of the compromise agreement.

In its Report and Recommendation,1 dated January 22, 2007, the Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Cabucana violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he notarized the compromise agreement without the presence of all the parties, and recommended that he be suspended as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years and from the practice of law for six (6) months. In its Resolution,2 dated May 31, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Cabucana be suspended for only six (6) months for violation of his obligation as Notary Public. On motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors, in a Resolution,3 modified its earlier resolution and suspended Atty. Cabucana from the practice of law for one (1) month and disqualified him from reappointment as notary public for one (1) year. The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the penalty. Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law states: The acknowledgment shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. The requirement of affiant's personal appearance was further emphasized in Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 which provides that: A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document – (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. As a notary public, Atty. Cabucana should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same person executing it and personally appearing before him to attest to the truth of its contents. This is to enable him to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free and voluntary act and deed. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon l of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1âwphi1 Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for three (3) months, REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any, and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all cou1is throughout the country. SO ORDERED.