Legal Ethics Digest Pool.pdf

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo

5. Competence and diligence People v. Sevilleno G.R. No. 129058, 29 March 1999 FACTS: The accused was charged with the crime of rape with homicide committed against a 9 year old minor. He entered the plea of guilty for the crime charged. When the prosecution rested its case, Atty. Saldavia of the PAO appointed as counsel de oficio for the accused manifested that since his client had already pleaded guilty he would no longer present any evidence. He only invoked the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty. ISSUE: Whether or not the counsel de officio of the accused acted properly as defense counsel. RULING: No. Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matters entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable. In the instant case, the defense lawyer did not protect, much less uphold the fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed their function as counsel de officio to the detriment and prejudice of the accused.

a. Adequate protection Felipe C. Dagala v. Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. and Atty. Amado T. Adquilen A.C. No. 5044, December 2, 2013 FACTS: Complainant Dagala, assisted by Atty. Quesada filed before the National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch No. I, San Fernando City, La Union a Complaint for illegal dismissal, overtime pay, separation pay, damages and attorney’s fees against Capitol Allied Trading & Transport on November 8, 1994. However, the case was dismissed for failure of complainant and Atty. Quesada to appear during the two scheduled mandatory conference hearings despite due notice. Thereafter, complainant engaged the services of Atty. Adquilen, a former Labor Arbiter, who refiled his labor case. Similarly, the case was dismissed due to the parties’ failure to submit their respective position papers. Complainant and Atty. Adquilen refiled the case for a third time on August 27, 1996.

During the pendency of the case, the representative of Capitol allegedly offered the amount of P74,000.00 as settlement of complainant’s claim, conditioned on the submission of the latter’s position paper. Atty. Adquilen, however, failed to submit one, resulting in the dismissal of the complaint for lack of interest and failure to prosecute. On July 11, 1997, complainant this time assisted by Atty. Imelda L. Picar filed a motion for reconsideration from the February 27, 1997 Order, which was treated as an appeal and transmitted to the NLRC-National Capital Region. However, the NLRC-NCR dismissed the same in a Resolution for having been filed out of time, adding that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Due to the foregoing, Atty. Picar sent separate letters dated November 18, 1998 to respondents, informing them that complainant is in the process of pursuing administrative cases against them before the Court. The Court directed respondents to comment on the Complaint within ten days from notice. However, despite notices and the extension granted, Atty. Adquilen failed to comply with the directive and the subsequent show-cause resolutions. He also claimed that when he was informed of the dismissal of the case without prejudice, he advised complainant to re-file the case with the assistance of another lawyer as he had to attend to his duties as Chairman of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino for the Second District of La Union Province. ISSUE: Whether Atty. Quesada should be held administratively liable for gross negligence in handling complainant’s labor case RULING: The Court emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is required to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He is likewise expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially with the courts. These principles are embodied in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code. x x x CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

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Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo In the case at bar, the Court finds Atty. Quesada to have violated the foregoing Rules and Canons. Atty. Quesada acted with less candor and good faith in the proceedings before the IBP- CBD when he denied the existence of any lawyer- client relationship between him and complainant, and claimed that the labor case was handled by another lawyer, despite his previous admission before the Court of having accepted complainant’s case. To add, a perusal of the complaint dated November 8, 1994 in NLRC Case No. RAB-I-111123-94 reveals that Atty. Quesada signed the same as counsel for complainant. Respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. On the other hand, the administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Amado T. Adquilen is hereby dismissed in view of his supervening death.

b. Negligence Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Vicente A. Pichon v. Atty. Amulfo M. Agleron Sr. A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014. FACTS: Complainant Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez was the widow of the late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident in Caraga, Davao Oriental, on October 18, 1995, involving a dump truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga. Aggrieved, complainant decided to file charges against the Municipality of Caraga and engaged the services of respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. On three (3) occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and received from complainant the following amounts for the payment of filing fees and sheriffs fees, to wit: (1) P3,000.00; (2) Pl,800.00; and P5,250.00 or a total of P10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, no complaint was filed by Atty. Agleron against the Municipality of Caraga. Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional service and received the amount of P10,050.00. He, however, explained that their agreement was that complainant would pay the filing fees and other incidental expenses and as soon as the complaint was prepared and ready for filing, complainant would pay 30% of the agreed attorney’s fees of P100,000.00. On June 7, 1996, after the signing of the complaint, he advised complainant to pay in full the amount of the filing fee and sheriff’s fees and the 30% of the attorney’s fee, but complainant failed to do so. Atty. Agleron averred that since the complaint could not be filed in court, the amount of P10,050.00 was deposited in a bank while awaiting the payment of the balance of the filing fee and attorney’s fee.

IBP-Investigating Commissioner: Atty. Agleron violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him; suspended from the practice of law for a period of four (4) months. IBP-BOG: adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Agleron be suspended from the practice of law for a period of only one (1) month. ISSUE: Whether the acts of Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the CPR? RULING: Yes. Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that: Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint against the Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, despite the fact that it was already prepared and signed. He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the attorney's fee. Such justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would exonerate him from liability. Disposition: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt with more severely.

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Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo c. Collaborating counsel d. Duty to apprise client Aurora H. Cabauatan v. Atty. Freddie A. Venida A.C. No. 10043, November 20, 2013 FACTS: The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) received a Complaint filed by Aurora H. Cabauatan (complainant) against respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida for serious misconduct and gross neglect of duty. x x x Complainant alleged that she was the appellant in CA-G.R. [No.] 85024 entitled Aurora Cabauatan, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Philippine National Bank, DefendantAppellee. The case was originally handled by a different lawyer but she decided to change her counsel and engaged the services of the Respondent x x x. Complainant was then furnished by the Respondent of the pleadings he prepared, such as "Appearance as Counsel/Dismissal of the Previous Counsel and a Motion for Extension of time to File a Memorandum. “Complainant made several follow-ups on her case until she lost contact with the Respondent. Complainant alleged the gross, reckless and inexcusable negligence of the Respondent that led to the case is “x x x deemed ABANDONED and DISMISSED on authority of Sec. 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1996 Rules of Civil Procedure. x x x” Certified on March 31, 2006. Respondent did not submit any pleading with the Court of Appeals. It is likewise very noticeable that the Respondent was not among those furnished with a copy of the Entry of Judgment hence it is crystal clear that he never submitted his Entry of Appearance with the Court of Appeals [insofar] as the case of the Complainant is concerned. Respondent assured the Complainant that he was doing his best in dealing with the case, nevertheless, later on Complainant lost contact with him. x x x including the fact that he was not one of the parties furnished with a copy of the Entry of Judgment proved the inaction and negligence of the Respondent. x x x ISSUE: Whether respondent can be held liable for his gross negligence and inaction against his clients’ case RULING: Yes. It is beyond dispute that complainant engaged the services of respondent to handle her case which was then on appeal before the Court of Appeals. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter's rights. Complainant also established that she made several follow-ups with the respondent but the latter merely ignored her or made her believe that he was diligently handling her case. Thus, complainant was surprised when she received a notice from the Court of Appeals informing her that her appeal

had been abandoned and her case dismissed. The dismissal had become final and executory. This is a clear violation of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to keep their clients informed of the status of their case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients' request for information. The Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently provides: o

o o

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Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. x x x x Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective immediately, with WARNING that a similar violation will be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Resolution to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in thecountry.SO ORDERED. Spouses Garcia v. Bala A.C. No. 5039, 25 November 2005 FACTS: Spouses Eduardo and Teresita Garcia filed a complaint against Atty. Bala for his failure in rendering legal service contracted. According to the findings of Investigating IBP Commissioner Herbosa, complainants engaged the services of respondent (sometime in May 1998) to appeal to the CA the adverse Decision of the Department of Agrarian Relations Adjudication Board (DARAB). Instead, he erroneously filed a Notice of Appeal with the DARAB. Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the decisions of the DARAB should be filed with the CA through a verified petition for review. Because of respondent‘s error, the prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, to the prejudice of his clients. Furthermore, Atty. Bala refused to the return the money paid by Spouses Garcia. Thus, the IBP recommended the respondent should be reprimanded and suspended from the practice of law for six 3

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo months; and that he should return, within thirty days from his receipt of the Decision, the amount of P9, 200, with legal interest from the filing of the present Complaint with this Court. ISSUE: WON Atty. Bala is guilty of negligence and conduct unbecoming a lawyer. RULING:

he and his client observed Justice Veloso’s partiality during the oral arguments but instead of filing an administrative complaint against him, he counselled that his client first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from the case. Upon finding that Judge Veloso refused to inhibit himself, Atty. Adaza’s client repeated his request to file an administrative complaint against Justice Veloso to which Atty. Adaza acceded. Issue: WON Atty. Adaza is guilty of contempt Held:

Yes. Negligence for Wrong Remedy. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients with competence and diligence. Rule 18.02 states that ― a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. Specifically, Rule 18.03 provides that a lawyer ―shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. A client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense authorized by law, and is expected to rely on the lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. Evidently, respondent failed to champion the cause of his clients with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Despite adequate time, he did not familiarize himself with the correct procedural remedy as regards their case. Worse, he repeatedly assured them that the supposed petition had already been filed. Since he effectively waived his right to be heard, the Court can only assume that there was no valid reason for his failure to file a petition for review, and that he was therefore negligent.

Yes, Atty. Adaza is guilty of contempt. While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law. He is also duty-bound to impress upon his client the propriety of the legal action the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with the law and legal processes. In the case at bar, the complaint of Atty. Adaza’s client shows an apparent failure to understand that cases are not always decided in one’s favour and that an allegation of bias must stem from an extrajudicial source other than those attendant to the merits and the developments in the case. Atty. Adaza cannot be helped but be attributed with the failure to impress upon his client the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand of him in acting for his client before the courts. Therefore, in failing to properly perform his duties properly as an officer of the Court and as a professional, Atty. Adaza is found guilty of contempt. a. Use of fair and honest means b. Client's fraud c. Procedure in handling the case

6. Representation with zeal within legal bounds

7. Attorney's fees

Re: Verified Complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against Hon. Vicente S.E. Veloso, etc. /Re: Resolution dated October 8, 2013 in OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J against Atty. Homobono A daza II

Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., et al. G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2013

IPI No. 12-205-CA- J/A.C. No. 10300, December 10, 2013 Facts: In a Resolution dated October 8, 2013, the Court directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II to show cause on why he should not be cited for contempt. In his explanation, Atty. Adaza points out that he was merely performing his duty as counsel when he assisted his client in preparing the administrative complaint against Justice Veloso. He claims that

FACTS: Malvar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against KRAFT (KFPI) and Bautista in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Labor Arbiter found and declared her suspension and dismissal illegal, and ordered her reinstatement, and the payment of her full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, plus attorney’s fees. NLRC and CA affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. After the judgment in her favor became final and executor, Malvar moved for the issuance of a writ of execution but the execution failed due to questionable 4

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo computation of the award. Malvar requested for the 2nd issuance of the writ of execution and was partially complied with but with protest on the part of Kraft by filing TRO for further execution since the computation is incorrect. CA ruled in favor of Kraft. Thus, Malvar appealed. While her appeal was pending in the Court, Malvar and Kraft entered into a compromise agreement. Thereafter, Malvar filed an undated Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, praying that the appeal be immediately dismissed/withdrawn in view of the compromise agreement, and that the case be considered closed and terminated. Before the Court could act on Malvar’s Motion to Dismiss/Wiithdraw Case, the Court received a so-called Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights from Malvar’s counsel. The counsel indicated that Malvar’s precipitat action had baffled, shocked and even embarrassed the Intervenor/counsel, because it had done everything legally possible to serve and protect Malvar’s interest. ISSUE: WON, the Motion for Intervention to protect attorney’s rights prosper? RULING:

to preserve the decorum and respectability of the Law Profession. Hence, the Court must thwart any and every effort of clients already served by their attorneys’ worthy services to deprive them of their hard-earned compensation. WHEREFORE, the Court APPROVES the compromise agreement; GRANTS the Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney's Rights; and ORDERS Czarina T. Malvar and respondents Kraft Food Philippines Inc. and Kraft Foods International to jointly and severally pay to Intervenor Law Firm DOY Mercantile, Inc. v. AMA Computer College G.R. 155311, 31 March 2004 FACTS: Dionisio O. Yap, a Director of Doy Mercantile, Inc., sold two (2) lands of Doy Mercantile, Inc. (DMI) to AMA Computer College without proper authorization from the other members of the Board. Furthermore, DMI questioned the Secretary’s Certificate which was executed by DMI Corporate Secretary Francisco P. Yap, authorizing Dionisio to sell the properties and to sign the contract in behalf of DMI. During pre-trial, AMA proposed to enter into a compromise agreement with DMI, which proposal the parties later agreed to adopt.

YES. A client has an undoubted right to settle her litigation without the intervention of the attorney, for the former is generally conceded to have exclusive control over the subject matter of the litigation and may at any time, if acting in good faith, settle and adjust the cause of action out of court before judgment, even without the attorney’s intervention. It is important for the client to show, however, that the compromise agreement does not adversely affect third persons who are not parties to the agreement. By such, a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship at any time with or without cause. But this right of the client is not unlimited because good faith is required in terminating the relationship. It is basic that an attorney is entitled to have and to receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his client. The attorney who has acted in good faith and honesty in representing and serving the interests of the client should be reasonably compensated for his service.

DMI, however, refused to satisfy Atty. Eduardo P. Gabriel, Jr. (counsel)’s attorney’s fees, prompting the lawyer to file with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Motion to Allow Commensurate Fees. At this point, DMI had already obtained the services of a new counsel to attend to the enforcement of the Judgment of the RTC.

As a final word, it is necessary to state that no court can shirk from enforcing the contractual stipulations in the manner they have agreed upon and written. As a rule, the courts, whether trial or appellate, have no power to make or modify contracts between the parties. Nor can the courts save the parties from disadvantageous provisions. The same precepts hold sway when it comes to enforcing fee arrangements entered into in writing between clients and attorneys. In the exercise of their supervisory authority over attorneys as officers of the Court, the courts are bound to respect and protect the attorney’s lien as a necessary means

The petition has no merit. According to the guidelines:

RTC fixed the attorney’s fees at P200,000, but upon Atty. Gabriel’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC increased the fees to P500,000. DMI filed several petitions with the Court of Appeals (CA) to set aside the RTC Orders involving the award of attorney’s fees. ISSUE: WON the CA Decision is not consistent with the guidelines prescribed by Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. RULING:

Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees.— An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its 5

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees: Rule 20.01 A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees: 1.

The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

2.

The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

3.

The importance of the subject matter;

4.

The skill demanded;

5.

The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;

6.

The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;

7.

The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services;

8.

The contingency or certainty of compensation;

9.

The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

10. The professional standing of the lawyer. In this case, Atty. Gabriel was the counsel of DMI up to the time the compromise agreement was confirmed by the trial court. A perusal of the pleadings enumerated by the plaintiffappellant reveals the competence of Atty. Gabriel, Jr. in handling the case. Thus, the Court held that he trial court’s initial award of P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees of Atty. Gabriel is reasonable. On the other hand, the increased award of cannot be justified, taking into account the recognized parameters of quantum meruit.

FACTS: Atty. Renato Lazaro Bondal was charged by Jayne Y. Yu for gross negligence and violation of Canon 16 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because of his alleged failure to attend to the five cases Yu referred to him and to return, despite demand, the amount of P51,716.54 she has paid him. On 30 March 2000, Yu engaged in the services of Bondal as her counsel in five (5) cases and in the Retainer Agreement of the same date, complainant agreed to pay respondent the amount of P200,000.00 as Acceptance Fee for the said cases, with an Appearance Fee of P1,500.00 pesos per hearing; and in the event that damages are recovered, she would pay respondent 10% thereof as success fee. Complainant later issued two checks, dated 20 February 2001 and 5 April 2001 in the amount of P30,000.00 and P21,716.54, respectively. Despite receipt of above-said amounts, respondent failed to file a case against Swire Realty and Development Corp; due to respondent’s negligence, the case for estafa against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon was dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City and was not timely appealed to the Department of Justice; respondent negligently failed to inform complainant, before she left for abroad, to leave the necessary documents for purposes of the preliminary investigation of the case filed against Julie Teh before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City, which case was eventually dismissed by Resolution dated August 14, 2000; and respondent compelled her to settle the two cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against Mona Lisa San Juan and Elizabeth Chan Ong under unfair and unreasonable terms. On 14 June 2001, complainant demanded from respondent for the return of all the records she had entrusted him bearing on the subject cases. Through her counsel, she sent a letter in which she demands for the return of the records of the cases. Respondent returned only two of the five records (the records bearing on the estafa case against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon and the B.P. Blg. 22 case against Mona Lisa San Juan). On 8 August 2001, she demanded the return of the rest of the files and in the same letter; she also demanded the refund of the amounts covered by the two checks she issued. Respondent failed and continued to refuse to comply with complainant’s valid demands. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether Atty. Bondal violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

a. Acceptance fees Yu v. Bondal A.C. No. 5534, 17 January, 2005

RULING: No. An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer to get paid for his efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation. That complainant was dissatisfied with the outcome of the four cases does not render void the retainer agreement for respondent appears to have represented the interest of 6

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo complainant. Litigants need to be reminded that lawyers are not demi-gods or "magicians" who can always win their cases for their clients no matter the utter lack of merit of the same or how passionate the litigants may feel about their cause. In sum, this Court finds well taken the finding of the Office of the Bar Confidant that complainant failed to establish the guilt of respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. The charges against him must thus be dismissed. However, since respondent had been advised by complainant through Counsel Chavez Laureta and Associates, by letter of July 18, 2001, that she intended to terminate his services, as of said date, he was obliged, under Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to immediately turn over all papers and property which complainant entrusted to his successor. Rule 22.02 – A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.

b . Contingency fee arrangements The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Cadavedo v. Lacaya G.R. No. 173188. 15 January 2014 FACTS: Spouses Cadavedo acquired a homestead grant which they sold to spouses Ames. The spouses Cadavedo filed an action for sum of money and/or voiding the contract of sale of homestead on the ground of non-payment of the purchase price by spouses Ames. The spouses Cadavedo initially engaged the services of Atty. Bandal, who was later substituted by herein respondent Atty. Lacaya due to health concerns. Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity of the sale. The amended complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee basis. The contingency fee stipulation specifically reads: “10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a lawyer on contingent basis and if they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar, they will pay the sum of ₱2,000.00 for attorney’s fees.” The RTC ruled in favor of spouses Ames, upholding the validity of the sale. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, appealed the said decision. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. Spouses Ames filed a petition for review on certiorari but was dismissed by the SC. Atty. Lacaya immediately informed the spouses Cadavedo of the foreclosure sale (DBP) and filed an Affidavit of

Third Party Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff. With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1721, Atty. Lacaya filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was granted. Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fees. He caused the subdivision of the subject lot into two equal portions, based on area, and selected the more valuable and productive half for himself; and assigned the other half to the spouses Cadavedo. Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-inlaw entered the portion assigned to the respondents and ejected them. The latter responded by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry before the MTC. On May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement (compromise agreement), re-adjusting the area and portion obtained by each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the agreement, which was approved by the MTC. On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action against the respondents, assailing the MTCapproved compromise agreement. The RTC declared the contingent fee of 10.5383 hectares as excessive and unconscionable. The RTC reduced the land area to 5.2691 hectares and ordered the respondents to vacate and restore the remaining 5.2692 hectares to the spouses Cadavedo. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, ruling that the time spent and the extent of the services Atty. Lacaya rendered for the spouses Cadavedo in the three cases, the probability of him losing other employment resulting from his engagement, the benefits resulting to the spouses Cadavedo, and the contingency of his fees justified the compromise agreement and rendered the agreed fee under the compromise agreement reasonable. ISSUE: WON the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners. RULING: The Court ruled in the NEGATIVE. An agreement between the lawyer and his client, providing for the former’s compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules governing contracts in general. As the rules stand, controversies involving written and oral agreements on attorney’s fees shall be resolved in favor of the former. Hence, the contingency fee of ₱2,000.00 stipulated in the amended complaint prevails over the alleged oral contingency fee agreement of one-half of the subject lot. Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is nevertheless void for violating Article 1491 of the Civil Code and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Any agreement by a lawyer to "conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law." The 7

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in this case expressly transgresses Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “A lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense of litigation.”

c. Attorney's liens i. Retaining Lien

His compensation should be governed by Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and not Article 111 of the Labor Code. The contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides for a contingent fee which shall control unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. The decree of unconscionability of a stipulated amount in a contingent fee contract will not preclude recovery. It merely justifies the fixing by the court of a reasonable compensation for the lawyer’s services. Rule 20.01, Canon of Profession responsibility set the criteria for assessing the proper amount of compensation that a lawyer should receive: a.

ii. Charging Lien d. Fees and controversies with clients Concepts of attorney's fees i. Ordinary concept ii. Extraordinary concept Masmud v. NLRC G.R. No. 183385, 13 February 2009 FACTS: In 2003, Evangeline Masmud filed a complaint on behalf of her late husband Alexander Masmud against First Victory Shipping Services (Hellas) for non-payment of permanent disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Alexander engaged the services of Atty. Rolando Go as his counsel. In consideration of Atty. Go’s legal services, Alexander agreed to pay on contingent basis: 20% of total monetary claims as settled or paid and an additional 10% in case of appeal. And any award for attorney’s fees shall pertain to respondent’s law firm as compensation. The Labor Arbiter granted monetary claims of Alexander. Hellas appealed to NLRC, during pendency Alexander died, Evangelina as substituted as complainant. NLRC dismissed the appeal of Hellas. After appeals before the CA, the decision the decision of the NLRC eventually became final. The check of P 3454079.00 was granted to Evangelina and P680000 to Atty. Go. Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforce the attorney’s lien alleging that Evangelina only paid the amount equivalent to 20% of the award as attorney’s fees leaving 10% balance, plus the award to the counsel as attorney’s fees. Evangelina manifested that the claim for attorney’s fees of 40% of the total monetary award was null and void based on Art. 111 of the Labor Code.

b. c. d. e.

f.

g.

h. i. j.

The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required; The novelty and difficulty of the question involved; The importance of the subject matter; The skill demanded; The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs; The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service; The contingency or certainty of compensation; The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and The professional standing of the lawyer.

Contingent fee contracts are subject to supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. The court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee contract between Atty. Go and Alexander (Evangelina’s husband). CA committed no error of law when it awarded attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Go’s compensation should be determined under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, or under Article 11 of the Labor Code. RULING: 8

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo

8. Preservation of client's confidences. Siong Yao v. Aurelio A.C. No. 1023, 30 March 2006 FACTS: Atty. Aurelio was the brother-in-Law of Mrs. Yao (Bun Siong Yao’s wife). Mrs. Yao and Atty. Aurelio had a disagreement hence, the latter demanded the return of his investments in the two (2) companies where majority share was held by Bun Siong Yao. However, Bun Siong Yao refused which made Aurelio file these suits to retaliate. Bun Siong Yao challenged these suits, saying that he is abusing the attorneyclient relationship by filing suits against the company in which he is retained as counsel, by using information (for the suits) he obtained in his capacity as counsel and as Bun Siong Yao’s personal lawyer, under the guise of a “concerned stockholder”. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. RULING: Yes. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship and continues until termination of that relationship. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him thus, protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.” In sum, we find that respondent's actuations amount to a breach of his duty to uphold good faith and fairness, sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of this Decision.

fees. “That respondent’s law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his signature on the merits of her case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's professional services.” Atty. Francisco appeared as counsel for defendant and plaintiff did not object to it until (4) months after. Then, plaintiff moved to dismiss the case between her and defendant. ISSUE: Was there an attorney-client relationship between plaintiff and Atty. Francisco? RULING: YES. In order to constitute the relation a professional one and not merely one of principal and agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a legal point, to prosecute or defend an action in court of justice, or to prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the like. To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established. “An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when he is listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating his client's cause in open court. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by the latter.”

a. Prohibited disclosures and use b. Disclosure, when allowed

Hilado v. David G.R. L-961, 21 September 1949 FACTS: Petitioner alleged that she and the counsel for the defendant had an attorney-client relationship with her when, before the trial of the case, she went to defendant’s counsel, gave him the papers of the case and other information relevant thereto, although she was not able to pay him legal

9. Withdrawal of services a. Discharge by the Client i.

With just cause

ii.

Without just cause

b. Withdrawal by the Attorney 9

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo iii. Hot Potato Doctrine

e. SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS In re: Suspension from the practice of law in the territory of Guam of Atty. Maqueras A.M. No. 793, 30 July 2004 Facts: In a Letter dated August 20, 1996, the District Court of Guam informed our courts of the suspension of Atty. Leon G. Mauera from the practice of law in Guam for two years. The Court referred the matter of Maqueras suspension in Guam to the Bar Confidant for comment in its Resolution dated November 19, 1996. In a Memorandum dated February 20, 1997, then Bar Confidant Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa recommended that the Court obtain copies of the record of Maqueras case since the documents transmitted by the Guam District Court do not contain the factual and legal bases for Maqueras suspension and are thus insufficient to enable her to determine whether Maqueras acts or omissions which resulted in his suspension in Guam are likewise violative of his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar. The IBP found out that he was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for having acquired his client’s property as payment for his legal services, sold it, and obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client’s case. Issue: WON a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction can be meted in the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction in the foreign jurisdiction Held: Yes, a member of the Philippine Bar disbarred or suspended from the practice of law abroad can be meted in the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension in this realm, provided the foreign courts action is by reason of an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or a violation of the lawyers oath. In the case at bar, the IBP concluded that although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, there is no evidence to establish that Maquera committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines. The Court must determine whether his acts violated Philippine law or the standards of ethical behaviour for members of the Philippine Bar.

Therefore, a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction can also be disbarred or suspended in the Philippines if it is proven that his acts were violative of Philippine laws or the standards of ethical behaviour for members of the Philippine Bar.

f. READMISSION TO THE BAR i. Lawyers who have been suspended Maniago v. de Dios A.C. No. 7472, 30 March 2010 FACTS: On April 2, 2007, an Affidavit-Complaint was filed by Ligaya Maniago, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios. It alleged that Maniago filed a criminal case against Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 603. The accused was represented by Atty. De Dios. Complainant then learned from the RTC staff that Atty. De Dios had an outstanding suspension order from the Supreme Court since 2001, and was, therefore, prohibited from appearing in court. Complainant further alleges that there is a civil case and another case (special proceeding) filed against Miyata before the RTC in Makati City where Atty. De Dios appeared as his counsel. Complainant averred that Atty. De Dios ought to be disbarred from the practice of law for her flagrant violation and deliberate disobedience of a lawful order of the Supreme Court. Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed against her client, Miyata. She, however, denied that she was under suspension when she appeared as his counsel in the cases. She explained that an administrative case was indeed filed against her by Diana de Guzman where she was meted the penalty of 6-month suspension. She served the suspension immediately upon receipt of the Courts Resolution on May 16, 2001 up to November 16, 2001. In a Manifestation filed on October 19, 2001, respondent formally informed the Court that she was resuming her practice of law on November 17, 2001, which she actually did. A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, erroneously issued a directive ordering respondent to desist from practicing law and revoking her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008. the Court issued a resolution on April 23, 2007 to DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios to have SERVED her six (6) month suspension and her recommencement of law practice on 17 November 2001 as PROPER.

ISSUE: WON, the lifting of the suspension order is automatic. RULING: 10

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo No. It is not automatic. A suspended lawyer must first present proof(s) of his compliance by submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and from the Executive Judge that he has indeed desisted from the practice of law during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the order of suspension and thus allow him to resume the practice of law. Atty. De Dios was able to resume her practice of law without submitting the required certifications and passing through the OBC for evaluation. It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege and, as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities. Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw that privilege. However, as much as the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and right to exercise his profession unreasonably.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.

ii.. Lawyers who have been disbarred iii. Lawyers who have been repatriated Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay, Petitioner B.M. 1678, 17 December 2007 FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. ISSUE: Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship RULING:

iv. Dual Citizens In re: del Rosario 23 September 2014 FACTS: Before moving to the US, Marcos Del Rosario passed the Philippine Bar exams after finishing his law degree from the University of the Philippine in 1995. He then obtained his Master of Laws in International Business from Fordham University in New York, NY, U.S.A in 2003 and was admitted to practice law in the State of New York and the US District Courts for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York after becoming a naturalized American citizen. Del Rosario filed the petition in the SC, saying he wanted to continue practicing law in the country. ISSUE: WON Del Rosario can resume practice of law in the Philippines.

RULING: Yes. The Court resolved to allow petitioner Del Rosario to resume practice of law in the Philippines, subject to the conditions that he re-takes his lawyer’s oath on a date set by the Court. The high court also required petition to pay “the 11

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo appropriate fees, and (submit) the original or certified true copy of the proof of payment of the professional tax for 2013.

the administration of justice” may be punished for indirect contempt.

The SC cited Article XII, Section 14 of the Constitution, which provides that “the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law.

Macasaet testified that the information was received by him from confidential sources, while Delis denied having any knowledge of the bribery. An Investigating Committee was created to investigate the alleged bribery committed by Justice Santiago. The Committee reported that the columns of Macasaet appeared to be just mere hearsays and concluded that the bribery story was “unbelievable” and further recommended that Macasaet be held in indirect contempt.

g. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION Bar Matter No. 850 i.

Purpose

ii.

Requirements

iii.

Compliance

iv.

Exemptions

v.

Sanctions

II. JUDICIAL ETHICS a. Sources i. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01) ii. Code of Judicial Conduct b. Qualities i. Independence 1. Institutional vis-à-vis individual independence In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet Published in Malaya dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007,A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, 8 August 2008

ISSUE: WON Macasaet is liable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. HELD: Yes. While Freedom of Speech and of the Press is a public right to scrutinize and criticize the government, this is, however, not absolute and not without limitations. Many types of criticism become harmful and irresponsible attacks which threaten the judicial independence. A truly independent judiciary is possible only when public confidence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. These kinds of personal attacks damage and threaten the integrity and independence of the judiciary. Upholding the findings stated in the Comprehensive Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee which enumerated the gross inconsistencies and assumptions of the respondent, which lacked veracity and showed the reckless disregard of whether the alleged bribery was false or not, the Court held Macasaet guilty of indirect contempt of Court. Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, A.M. No. R-351-RTJ, 26 September 1986

FACTS: This case resolves a contempt charge against respondent Amado A.P. Macasaet, a newspaper columnist, for authorizing publications imputing bribery to a member of the Supreme Court, namely Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, amounting to P10-million, allegedly received in boxes by Cecilia Delis, who is said to be the secretary of Justice YnaresSantiago, in relation to a criminal case which was decided in favor of the accused Henry T. Go. Justice Santiago denied the accusation and Macasaet was ordered to submit an explanation on why no sanctions should be imposed on him for indirect contempt of court under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which states that a person guilty of “any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade

FACTS Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog, an RTC Judge, stands charged in six separate complaints of various forms of misconduct in the performance of her official duties. One was dismissed for lack of merit where the other five were indeed serious. Taken collectively, they cast a heavy shadow on respondent's moral, intellectual and attitudinal competence to remain a member of the Bench. I.

AM R 351 RTJ and R-621-RTJ: charged having acted arbitrarily or capriciously in causing the arrest; ignorance, graft or deliberate distortion of the law for pecuniary motives for issuing restraining orders without conducting hearings. The release order issued proves the impropriety of her act; while the recall order demonstrates the impetuosity by which the arrest order was issued in the first place. 12

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo II.

III.

IV.

AM R-359-RTJ: charged for failure to order the service of summons and copy of the third-party complaint on the third-party defendant. Respondent judge failed to act with reasonable dispatch required of judicial officers. AM R-684-RTJ: failure to decide on a Civil Case despite the case having been submitted for decision for more than 18 months. Respondent judge admitted to have succumbed to pressure in deciding the case in order to promote peace so nobody would call her again by telephone telling her to do so. AM 86-4-9987-RTC: appealed case required to file memorandum within 30 days from notice of the order but plaintiff had done so only at the time of transfer. Referral the case to Respondent Judge was solely for the purpose of acting upon the motion to consolidate and transfer, such referral did not in any manner empower or authorize her to decide the case on the merits.

ISSUE Whether respondent Jude Corpuz-Macandog acted with independence in performance of her duty. HELD No. In view of the disclosure by respondent that the decisions were was rendered under undue pressure and influence, the party aggrieved thereby may take such remedial steps as may be warranted. Judges are required to observe due care in the performance of their official duties. They are likewise charged with the knowledge of internal rules and procedures, especially those which relate to the scope of their authority. The hasty and reckless attitude of respondent judge in taking cognizance of and deciding Cases despite the strong objection against her authority and the reasonable request for referral of the question to this Court, constitutes misconduct in office warranting disciplinary sanction. Respondent Judge Macandog has shown herself to be mentally and morally unfit to remain in her office. Her removal must perforce be effected. She is hereby ordered dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay, and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities.

Libarios v. Dabalos A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, 11 July 1991 2. Principle of Sub-judice; Sec 3, Canon 1 NCJC FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed by Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf of his client Mariano Corvera, Jr. against respondent Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, for grave ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, gross

misconduct and partiality, relative to the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the respondent judge against the accused Tranquilino Calo Jr.and Belarmino Alloco for the crime of murder fixing their bail without any prior hearing. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct. HELD: Yes. As provided by Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan or personal interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. He should not have allowed himself to be swayed into issuing an order fixing bail for the temporary release of the accused charged with murder, without a hearing, which is contrary to established principles of law. It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused. A judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity thus, the respondent judge is imposed of a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) and warned to exercise more care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge, and that the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severally. Sabitsana, Jr. v. Viffamor RTJ No. 90- 474, 4 October 1991 Facts: Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr., a practicing lawyer in Naval, Biliran Sub province, Leyte, charged respondent, Judge Adriano R. Villamor of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, with falsification of his monthly Certificates of Service by making it appear that he had resolved all cases submitted for decision within the ninety day period required by the Judiciary Act of 1948. Complainant further furnished the Court with an Affidavit of Judge Dulcisimo Pitao of the Municipal Trial Court of Maripipi, Leyte, stating that Respondent had intervened for the accused in Criminal Case No.959 then pending with the said Municipal Court. In his Comment filed on 20 December 1990, Respondent claimed that the Complaint was more for harassment and vengeance. That there were other cases not decided within the 90 day rule, including those listed in the Complaint allegedly because the transcripts were incomplete. ISSUE: 13

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo WON the respondent violated Section 3 Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct HELD: Yes. From the Investigative Report of Justice Fermin Martin, the imputation that respondent intervened in Criminal Case No. 959 is sufficiently substantiated. That a letter was sent to judge Pitao by the wife of he accused and that the respondent mentioned the case during their conversation. Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04).Interference by members of the bench in-pending suits with the end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the people’s faith in its integrity and impartiality (Commentaries on the Code of Judicial Conduct). Respondent is dismissed from service. Alfonso v. Alonzo-Legasto A.M. No. MTJ 94-995, 5 September 2002 Facts: Complainants herein were employees of the City Government of Quezon City and were assigned at the Office of the Clerk of Court-Metropolitan Trial Court(OCC-MeTC) and the different branches of the MeTC-Quezon City to assist the organic staff of the judiciary. The instant administrative complaint had its roots from the transfer of complainants to other offices in the City Government made by respondent Judge. Complainants alleged that conspiracy existed between respondents. Complainants alleged that respondent judge favoured some of her “favourite” national employees hence, their arbitrary transfer to other offices and the unfair treatment as shown in the recording of attendance.

of locally-funded employees assigned in the lower courts to determine the necessity of their detail, and that, accordingly, all requests for detail of locally-funded employees including complainants herein must pass the Office of the Court Administrator for review and appropriate action. Therefore, in light of judicial independence, Judge Legasto’s acts were invalid as she did not have the authority to assign personnel in the lower courts.

ii. Integrity Re: Complaint of Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and Her Children against Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, RTC, Br. 20, Cebu City, A.M. No. 97-2-53 RTC, 6 July 2001 FACTS: The case arose from a complaint made by the wife of Judge Marcos, Mrs. Marcos. She alleged that Judge Marcos was not supporting the family properly and that he had a mistress, named Mae Tacaldo. Presenting evidences such as a Islacom Statement of Account, showing that Judge Marcos has been paying the phone bill of his mistress, a birthday card given to him saying -"It is wonderful to share my life with you." -and ending it with -"MT cares a lot, you know.", Paying for a restaurant bill, that the wife has never been to, buying jewellery that was not received by his wife or daughter, buying groceries that was never received by the family. And by living together with his mistress in an apartment. And a testimony of the Chief Justice Davide, that Judge Marcos admitted to him, in a fun run, that he was living with his mistress. Judge Marcos denies the allegations. And said since his wife/complainant, has already made an affidavit of desistance the case should be dismissed. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Judge should be dismissed based on the evidence? 2. W/N the affidavit of desistance would dismiss the case?

Issue: WON Judge Legasto’s acts were valid in light of judicial independence. Ruling: No, Judge Legasto’s acts were not valid in light of judicial independence. In Bagatsing vs. Herrera, it was ruled that for judicial independence to be a reality, the least interference by or influence from other governmental departments is of the essence. In the case at bar, the Court stresses that only the Court itself has the authority to order a personnel accounting

RULING: 1. Yes, the Islacom Statement of Account was addressed to Judge Marcos not in his conjugal dwelling, but at the residence of Mae Tacaldo. While Judge Marcos denied owning a cell phone there is an improbability that Islacom would send a phone bill to him if he were not the real owner thereof. If he did not really own the cell phone was it not expected of him, being a judge and all, to have stood his ground and insisted that as he did not own nor lose a cell phone, it is preposterous of him to execute an Affidavit of Loss. 14

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo Someone with the initials M.T. sent Judge Marcos for his birthday a birthday card. This person could be Mae Tacaldo (mistress) or Monalila Tecson (clerk of court). Although Judge Marcos' Branch Clerk of Court has these initials we, as well as Judge Marcos, do not believe that she would send Judge Marcos a card with the greeting -"It is wonderful to share my life with you." -and ending it with -"MT cares a lot, you know." Only a person who is truly intimate with Judge Marcos would send such a card. We are not swayed by the denials made by respondent judge that he and Ms. Tacaldo were the owners of a Toyota Revo. Judge Marcos and Ms. Tacaldo jointly bought a motor vehicle - a Toyota Revo - and had it registered in their names as co-owners. They obtained insurance for the same vehicle with them as joint beneficiaries. They executed a chattel mortgage over the same in favor of PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. and when they finally sold the same vehicle on September 18, 2000 to Amina Advincula, they both signed the Deed of Sale as joint owners. These actions clearly indicate that they were the joint owners of the Toyota Revo. Marcos wanted us to believe that if his name was put in the motor vehicle's registration, the Tacaldos' entry in the cooperative's business of running public utility vehicles would be assured. He went to extraordinary lengths to help the Tacaldos by having the vehicle registered in his and Ms. Tacaldo's names.

2. Herein respondent cannot find comfort in the "affidavit of desistance" signed by his wife and children. Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought. The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case against herein respondent judge will not necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Once charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the complaint. Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He has violated the code of Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence and to avoid the appearance of impropriety in all activities as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent must be meted out the severest form of disciplinary sanction – dismissal from the service.

Chan v. Majaducan A.M. No. RTJ-02-1697 15 October 2003

There is nothing in the records to show that it was essential for respondent to be registered as an owner in order that the motor vehicle could ply the Toledo City -Cebu City routes. A simple phone call/oral request by Judge Marcos to the cooperative officers would have been sufficient, to our mind, to allow the Tacaldos' entry to the cooperative business of transporting passengers. Respondent's posture that Mrs. Marcos is also guilty of immorality does not excuse nor even mitigate his actions. It is respondent's private action that is being investigated not his wife's. The personal behavior of a judge should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only in the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.

FACTS: These are complaints for non-feasance, impropriety, partiality, and inefficiency filed against respondent Jose S. Majaducon, former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City.

If good moral character is required of a lawyer, with more reason is the requirement exacted of a member of the judiciary who at all times is expected to observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public decency. Keeping a mistress is certainly not an act one would expect of a judge who is expected to possess the highest standard of morality and decency. If a judge fails to have high ethical standards, the confidence and high respect for the judiciary diminishes as he represents the judiciary. Jurisprudence is rich in cases where the Court has inflicted on judges the punishment of dismissal for immorality especially when it is committed openly and flagrantly, causing scandal in the place where his court is situated.

2. xxx does not wear his robe despite the requirement of the Supreme Court xxx;

A concerned citizen charged respondent Judge Jose S. Majaducon (respondent judge) with not wearing [a] black robe during court sessions and with being habitually tardy. In another complaint, dated 3 November 2000, complainant Eugenio K. Chan (complainant) charged respondent judge with committing acts of improprieties [and] irregularities. Complainant alleged that respondent judge:

1. xxx starts his hearings at 10:00 oclock in the morning and 2:30-3:00 oclock in the afternoon.

3. xxx entertains lawyer[s] in his sala despite the absence of the opposing lawyer[s]; 4. xxx continued to hear cases despite obvious appearance of impartiality [sic]. He insist [sic] to hear the case despite the fact that her [sic] daughter being [sic] involved in the defendant bank; 5. xxx was already reprimanded by the Honorable Supreme Court and he is a subject of adverse write ups in the newspapers; 15

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo 6. xxx does not prepare or study the cases. He reads the cases during the hearing time ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge committed violations. RULING: Yes, the judge Majaducan committed violations. On Respondent Judges Refusal to Wear the Mandated Judicial Robe Respondent judge admits violating Circular No. 25. Nevertheless, he seeks exculpation from administrative liability for his non-compliance because of his illness. Respondent judge’s plea is futile. The wearing of robes by judges during official proceedings, which harks back to the 14th century, is not an idle ceremony. Such practice serves the dual purpose of heighten[ing] public consciousness on the solemnity of judicial proceedings, as Circular No. 25 states, and of impressing upon the judge the exacting obligations of his office. As well put by an eminent jurist of another jurisdiction: Judges are xxx clothed in robes, not only, that they who witness the administration of justice should be properly advised that the function performed is one different from, and higher, than that which a man discharges as a citizen in the ordinary walks of life; but also, in order to impress the judge himself with the constant consciousness that he is a high priest in the temple of justice and is surrounded with obligations of a sacred character that he cannot escape and that require his utmost care, attention and self-suppression. Consequently, a judge must take care not only to remain true to the high ideals of competence and integrity his robe represents, but also that he wears one in the first place.

On Respondent Judges Practice of Entertaining Lawyers and Litigants with Pending Cases in his Sala The Code of Judicial Conduct (Code) provides: Rule 1.01. A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES. Rule 2.01. A judge should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The Court cannot emphasize enough the pivotal role lower court judges play in the promotion of the peoples faith in the judiciary. Unlike the appellate court justices, they are the

so-called front-liners who give human face to the judicial branch at the grassroots level in their interaction with litigants and those who do business with the courts. The admonition in Canon 2 that judges must not only avoid impropriety [but also] the appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied to them. It is in this light that the Court frowns upon the holding by trial court judges of in-chamber meetings with litigants or their counsels without the presence of the adverse party. Instead of taking heed of this ethical prohibition, respondent judge readily admitted transgressing it. Worse, he reveals his ignorance of the prohibitions purpose by claiming that his in-chamber dealings are above-board as nothing illegal or improper transpires during those meetings. Respondent judge should have realized that his very conduct of entertaining litigants and their counsels in his chamber without the presence of the adverse party or his counsel constitutes an impropriety. While judges are not expected to shun the world, neither are they supposed to make themselves freely accessible under such circumstances as to invite suspicions of impropriety if not bias. Respondent judge should have borne in mind and all those in the bench who are similarly disposed as him are reminded that: No position is more demanding as regards xxx uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench xxx. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, xxx can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. In insulating the Bench from unwarranted criticism, thus preserving our democratic way of life, it is essential that judges, like Caesars wife, should be above suspicion.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Jose S. Majaducon, former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City guilty of violating Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 1989, Rules 1.01 and 2.01 and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent Jose S. Majaducon is ordered to pay a fine of P10,000, the same to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits he is entitled.

In matter of the Charges of Plagiarism etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, 8 February 2011 FACTS: On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition filed by the Malaya Lolas Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et al, questioned the said decision. He raised, among others, that the ponente in said 16

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo case, Justice Mariano del Castillo, plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice “twisted the true intents” of these books to support the assailed decision. These books were: a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan FoxDescent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009); b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005). As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence. Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that their works were used inappropriately by Justice Del Castillo and that the assailed decision is different from what their works advocated.

disadvantageous in cases, like this, where there are reasonable and logical explanations.

On the foreign authors’ claim that their works were used inappropriately According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works were merely used as background facts in establishing the state on international law at various stages of its development. The Supreme Court went on to state that the foreign authors’ works can support conflicting theories. The Supreme Court also stated that since the attributions to said authors were accidentally deleted, it is impossible to conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the advocacies that the works espouse. No Misconduct

ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar. RULING: No. There is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies. No Plagiarism At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another person’s language, thoughts, or ideas. To plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from (another) and pass them off as one’s own. The passing off of the work of another as one’s own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism. According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the “deliberate and knowing presentation of another person’s original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.” This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed decision, there was attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillo’s researcher, the attributions were inadvertently deleted. There is therefore no intent by Justice del Castillo to take these foreign works as his own. Petitioners insist that intent is not material in committing plagiarism since all that a writer has to do, to avoid the charge, is to enclose lifted portions with quotation marks and acknowledge the sources from which these were taken. On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents vs CA, 313 SCRA 404), the Supreme Court never indicated that intent is not material in plagiarism. To adopt a strict rule in applying plagiarism in all cases leaves no room for errors. This would be very

Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud or corruption. No Inexcusable Negligence (explanation of Justice Del Castillo) The error of Justice del Castillo’s researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher is a highly competent one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from reputable educational institutions. The researcher finished third in her class and 4th in the bar examinations. Her error was merely due to the fact that the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to apprise her that certain important portions of her drafts are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part cannot be said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice del Castillo was grossly negligent when he assigned the case to her. Further, assigning cases to researchers has been a long standing practice to assist justices in drafting decisions. It must be emphasized though that prior to assignment, the justice has already spelled out his position to the researcher and in every sense, the justice is in control in the writing of the draft. With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillos researcher also explained, most legal references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes or in internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found items that were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or copied them into her main manuscript, a smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she might need. She electronically cut relevant materials from books and journals in the Westlaw website and pasted these to a main manuscript in her computer that contained the issues for discussion in her proposed report to the Justice. She used the 17

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo Microsoft Word program. Later, after she decided on the general shape that her report would take, she began pruning from that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the positions in the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting paragraphs, sentences, and words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor, demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computer-literate court researchers use every day in their work. The case was DISMISSED.

iii. Impartiality Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr. A.M. No. MTJ-04-1535, 12 March 2004 FACTS: The instant administrative case traces its roots from an unlawful detainer case filed by Benjamin and Desmond Montemayor against Lolita Marco. The case was raffled to MeTC Judge, Hon. Juan Bermejo Jr., herein respondent. Dr. Montemayor asserts that respondent Judge failed to decide the case within the period provided under Section 11, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Dr. Montemayor filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) the instant Administrative Complaint charging Judge Bermejo with gross incompetence and inefficiency, gross negligence, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Moreover, Judge Bermejo did not resolve the three Motions for Execution and two Motions to Require Defendant’s Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment. Dr. Montemayor also avers that Judge Bermejo prevented the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court within 15 days from the perfection of the appeal in violation of Section 6, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. According to him, it was only after the respondent Judge received the defendant’s supersede as bond that the former issued the Order dated May 5, 2003 directing the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the records of the case to the appellate court. The respondent Judge maintains that he is not liable for delay in the rendition of judgment. In essence, he argues that since the Order deeming the case submitted for resolution was issued on September 23, 2002, the rendition of judgment on October 10, 2002 was made within the mandatory 30-day period. ISSUE: WON the respondent judge is guilty of partiality, violating the Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: Yes. Under Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety in all activities. Specifically, under Rule 2.01 of the Code, a

judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice. In this case, Judge Bermejo is suppressing proof of the registry return receipts, in which case, he is not only guilty of dragging his feet in the resolution of the motions but, worse, bias in favor of the defendant. As per respondent Judge’s excuse in the delay in acting upon the motions, the registry receipts are indeed missing from the records but Judge Bermejo is denying it to cover up such loss. This conclusion is buttressed by the odd fact that, despite the seriousness of Dr. Montemayor’s allegations, the respondent Judge has not offered in these administrative proceedings any evidence of the existence of the registry receipts. An obvious disregard of keeping records is evidence of incompetence and lack of professionalism. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. By countenancing, permitting, and even creating the many delays in obvious disregard of the letter and the spirit of the Rules of Court and the Rule on Summary Procedure, Judge Bermejo has put in question his partiality. It bears reminding him that a judge must at all times not only be impartial but maintain the appearance of impartiality. ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Judge Juan O. Bermejo, Jr. of delay in the rendition of judgment in violation of Rules 1.02 and 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for which he is fined the amount of P5,000.00. Respondent Judge is also declared guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 of said Code and is fined the amount of P10,000.00.

iv. Propriety Hadap v. Lee A.M. No. 1665-MJ, 29 June 1982 FACTS: A complaint was filed by Hadap and thirty other Barangay Captains, charging Municipal Judge Abelardo Lee, of (1) Dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a Judge; (2) Partiality in the administration of justice; (3) Using prisoners/detailed persons for personal purposes; (4) Using his residence as Municipal Judge's Office instead of the Government Building where a room has been provided for the purpose by the local government; (5) Habitual use of vulgar and obscene words and phrases; and (6) Willful refusal to attend regular flag ceremonies. 18

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo An extensive investigation was performed in which findings led to a recommendation for the dismissal of all charges except on two counts: 1.

Dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a Judge

It was found that the Judge was writing and sending of letters to one Mrs. Tuazon, inviting her to go to his house after office hours, was motivated by an immoral purpose. It may be argued that nobody may ever be held accountable for an immoral intention not coupled with an act to implement the intention but his letters constitute overt acts to open the door for the commission of an immoral purpose. As admitted by the Judge, he is alone in his big house for which reason he had to ask at times the company of detention prisoners to sleep with him. We have to reject as unsatisfactory or unbelievable that the respondent, in sending the two letters was motivated by the good intention of informing Mrs. Tuazon. 2. Habitual use of vulgar and obscene words and phrases on wedding ceremonies. During the Navarro-Jarme wedding, it was alleged that the Judge waid, "You woman, you should satisfy sexually your husband otherwise your husband will look for another woman because the husband is sexually hot and you man, you should continuously satisfy your wife otherwise your wife will look for another man." ISSUE: Whether Judge Lee may be held responsible for such conduct. HELD: Yes, he should be. The Canons of Judicial Ethics, particularly Canon No. 3, provides: "Avoidance of appearance of impropriety. - A judge's official conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." has been thrown to the winds.” Such conduct and gutter-language is even rarely heard in the slums. When used by a judge, respect for the entire judiciary plummets to levels where people begin to doubt the moral standard of judges and their capacity and fitness to dispense justice. Judge Abelardo Lee is hereby DISMISSED as Judge of the Municipal Court of Bacon, Sorsogon, with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any national or local government office or agency, including government owned or controlled corporation or instrumentality. Spouses Cabreana v. Avelino A.M. No. 1733-CFI, 30 September 1981 FACTS: Complainant-spouses were plaintiffs in a complaint for rescission of contract with damages filed with respondent’s court against the defendant who sold them pieces of furniture

which were allegedly not made in accordance with specifications and/or defective. In this administrative complaint, complainants charged respondent judge with "serious misconduct, abuse of authority, prevarications and oppression" in connection with the ocular inspection of the subject furniture which respondent conducted personally at complainants’ residence. Respondent asked for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of basis. Upon manifestation of the parties, the case was submitted for resolution, based solely on complainants’ joint affidavit and the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the ocular inspection, and respondent’s answer. The Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals observed, that during the entire ocular inspection, respondent judge participated most actively, asking question and making comments and observations which conveyed the impression that he was brusque and severe towards the complainants; that he displayed undue interference in the conduct of the inspection or trial and showed unwarranted intolerance and unjustified impatience to the point of almost maliciously distorting facts in the presence of complainants and despite their protest; that he practically charged complainants with planting evidence; and that he went to the residence of complainants for the inspection in the company of and riding in the car of defendant, all of which constitute reprehensible conduct on the part of respondent judge who is supposed to be an impartial person. The Investigating Justice recommended respondent’s suspension for one month. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge’s actuations constitute serious misconduct. RULING: Yes. The observations and conclusions of the Investigating Justice in the case at bar that during the entire ocular inspection, respondent judge participated most actively, asking questions and making comments and observations which conveyed the impression that he was brusque and severe towards complainant; that he displayed undue interference in the conduct of the inspection or trial and showed unwarranted intolerance and unjustified impatience to the point of almost maliciously distorting facts in the presence of complainants and despite their protest; that he practically charged complainants with planting evidence; and that he went to the residence of complainants for the inspection in the company of and riding in the car of the defendant, all of which constitute reprehensible conduct on the part of respondent judge who is supposed to be an impartial person, are fully substantiated and supported by the evidence on record. Indeed, it appears clear that respondent judge falls short of the required judicial norm of conduct. That the acts complained of have been done in the performance of 19

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo official duties, as respondent contends, aggravates his intolerance, lack of restraint, and impatience. The Supreme Court found the Inquest Justice’s observations and conclusions to be supported by the evidence on record and held that respondent Judge falls short of the required judicial norm of conduct, aggravated by the fact that the acts complained of have been done in the performance of his official duties. For his serious misconduct, respondent was ordered to pay a fine equivalent to his three (3) months’ salary and was warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Dionisio v. Escano A.M. No. RTJ-98-1400, 1 February 1999 FACTS: Escano posted an advertisement for waitresses and singers to work at his restaurant at the RTC bulletin board. He also conducted interviews for this in his sala. He was later caught when a reporter from “Hoy Gising!” taped an interview which revealed that he intended to operate a drinking pub with scantily clad waitresses. ISSUE: Whether or not Escano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. RULING: Yes. SUSPENDED. Rules 2.00, 5.02 and 5.03 provide that a judge should avoid impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety. He should also refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers and litigants. He should also manage financial interests so as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification. Finally, the halls of justice should not be used for unrelated purposes. Reyes v. Duque A.M. No. RTJ-08-2136, 21 September 2010 FACTS: Reyes charged respondent Judge Duque of the RTC, Branch 197, Las Piñas City, with Impropriety, Corruption and Gross Misconduct. Reyes alleged that she was a party-inintervention in Land Registration Case No. 06-005 entitled “In re: Petition of Philippine Savings Bank for Issuance of a Writ of Possession under Act No. 3135 over two (2) properties filed by the Philippine Savings Bank against the spouses Choi. Judge Duque granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the bank and ordered the spouses Choi and all those claiming rights under them to vacate the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-85172, T-84848, and T-84847 situated in BF Resort Village, Talon 2, Las Piñas. On August 13, 2007, Reyes filed an Urgent Petition for Lifting and Setting Aside of Writ of Possession and Quashal of Notice to Vacate,

claiming that she bought the subject property covered by TCT No. T-85172 from the spouses Choi and that she was in actual possession of the property with full knowledge of the bank. At the hearing of Reyes’ petition, Atty. Herminio Ubana, Sr., the lawyer of Reyes, introduced her to Judge Duque who allegedly gave Reyes 30 days to settle matters with the bank. Reyes was unable to re-negotiate with the bank. On the first week of December 2007, Reyes allegedly received a phone call from Judge Duque and the latter instructed Reyes to go “to his house and bring some money in order that he can deny the pending motion to break open.” As she did not have the money yet, Reyes allegedly told Judge Duque that she would see him the following day as her allotment might arrive by that time. The following day, Reyes went to the PNB Cubao Branch in Quezon City to withdraw P20,000. She, her secretary, and driver went to the house of Judge Duque. The son of Judge Duque opened the gate. At his house, Judge Duque demanded P100,000. Reyes gave him P20,000 and she asked for time to give him the balance. After a week, Atty. Ubana called Reyes telling her that Judge Duque was asking for her and waiting for the balance he demanded. On December 21,2007, Reyes went to the house of Judge Duque with P18,000 on hand. Judge Duque allegedly scolded her for not bringing the whole amount of P80,000. Reyes explained that she had difficulty raising the amount. Judge Duque locked the main door of his house and asked Reyes to step into his office. Judge Duque pointed to a calendar posted on the wall and pointed to December 26 as the date when she should complete the amount. All of a sudden, Judge Duque held the waist of Reyes, embraced and kissed her. Reyes tried to struggle and free herself. Judge Duque raised her skirt, opened her blouse and sucked her breasts. He touched her private parts and attempted to have sexual intercourse with Reyes. Reyes shouted for help, but the TV was too loud. As a desperate move, Reyes appealed to Judge Duque saying: “kung gusto mo, huwag dito. Sa hotel, sasama ako sayo.” Judge Duque suddenly stopped his sexual advances and ordered Reyes to fix her hair. ISSUE: WON Judge Duque is guilty of impropriety and gross misconduct. HELD: Yes. After a thorough investigation conducted by the Investigating Justice, it was established, and Judge Duque admitted, that Reyes went to his house. Substantial evidence also pointed to Judge Duque’s liability for impropriety and gross misconduct when he sexually assaulted Reyes. There is no need to detail again the lewd acts of Judge Duque. The Investigating Justice’s narration was sufficient and thorough. The Investigating Justice likewise observed that Judge Duque merely attempted to destroy the credibility of Reyes when he insinuated that she could be a "woman of ill repute or a high class prostitute" or one whose "moral value is at its lowest 20

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo level." However, no judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from a party litigant even from a woman of loose morals.

violation of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. Judges should conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they should always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge was guilty of the charges imputed to her

The conduct of Judge Duque fell short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary. He failed to behave in a manner that would promote confidence in the judiciary. Considering that a judge is a visible representation of the law and of justice, he is naturally expected to be the epitome of integrity and should be beyond reproach. Judge Duque’s conduct indubitably bore the marks of impropriety and immorality. He failed to live up to the high moral standards of the judiciary and even transgressed the ordinary norms of decency of society. Had Judge Duque not retired, his misconduct would have merited his dismissal from the service. (₱40,000 FINE, to be deducted from his retirement benefits). Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2. Batangas City A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, 2 April 2014 FACTS: Lorenzana was the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the Philippines, a company undergoing rehabilitation proceedings. He filed a verified complaint against Judge Austria, the presiding judge of the proceedings, alleging that the latter committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Responsibility for having biases against SCP and working for her own personal motives, and for posting inappropriate photos of herself on the social networking site, Friendster. Austria denied the claims and asserted that she was only exercising her functions as presiding judge to provide fairness and equity to the parties. She furthermore asserted that her photos were in no way inappropriate as to warrant administrative sanctions. The investigating justice, ruled that the issues were judicial in nature since it involved Austria’s appreciation of evidence, and that the complainant failed to present clear and convincing proof of bias and partiality. However, The investigating justice found that the respondent judge was unnecessarily arrogant in dealing with SCP’s legal counsel, in

RULING Yes. On the matter of conduct unbecoming of a judge, the Court ruled that a judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for himself or herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. The respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. On the ground of impropriety, the Court ruled that while judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, they do not shed off their status as judges. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression so long as they always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. Wherefore, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law for which she is fined Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (P21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise hereby admonished to refrain from further acts of impropriety and to refrain from conduct unbecoming of a judge, with the stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing held on September 26, 2013 Against Associate Justice Gregory S . Ong, Sandiganbayan A.M . No. SB-14-21-J. 23 September 2014 Facts: In the middle of 2013, local media ran an expose on the “pork barrel scam”. In the course of the investigations conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee, names of certain government officials had allegedly transacted with the mastermind of the scam, Mrs. Napoles. One of the names was that of respondent, incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong. Marina Sula, an employee under Ms. Napoles, claims that respondent Justice Ong visited Ms. Napoles. Justifying such visit, respondent admits that he went to Napoles’ office twice saying that at Jinggoy Estrada’s birthday, Napoles approached him and introduced herself. Respondent claims that she talked about charity works and mentioned that Msgr. Ramirez is in possession of the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. Respondent was then interested as 21

Ateneo de Davao University – College of Law Legal Ethics | Atty. Venus A. Cuabo he wanted to be healed so he asked if he could have access to it. Napoles made some arrangements and respondent gained access to the robe, thus, his visit to Napoles’ office to give her his thanks. Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office, but he kept on declining. Then finally after two weeks, he acceded for she might think he is "walang kwentang tao." They just engaged in a small talk for about 30 minutes and had coffee.

the Supreme Being that we all are created equal in His form and substance.

Issue:

ISSUE:

WON respondents acts meet the required propriety of a judge

Whether or not the statements and actions made by Judge Belen during the hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct

Ruling: No, respondent’s acts do not meet the required propriety of a judge. Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. In the case at bar, respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds. The reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help in making it possible for him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. Instead of visiting her, respondent could have extended his gratitude by simply calling her by phone. Worse, he visited her again because she may think he is an unworthy person. This is an extremely frail reason. Therefore, for the display of unconcern for the position he holds, respondent is guilty of impropriety and his acts are violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

v. Equality Atty. Mane v. Judge Belen. A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119, June 30, 2008

Belen further lambasted Mane and lectured him on the latter’s person, seemingly disregarding the case at hand. Subsequently, the OCA, upon evaluation, found that Belen’s insulting remarks were unwarranted and inexcusable and recommended a reprimand of Belen.

HELD The Court held that an alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which the Court administers, taking of the Lawyer’s oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on his alma mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem. A judge must address the merits of the case and not the person of the counsel. If Judge Belen felt that his integrity and dignity were being assaulted, he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse. The Court reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the court.

FACTS: An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law.

vi. Competence and diligence

Petitioner Atty. Melvin Mane filed a letter-complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of demeaning, humiliating, and berating him during a hearing of Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samue Malabanan, et al. where Mane was counsel for the plaintiff. During the proceedings, Belen asked Mane about the latter’s law school. When Mane answered that he came from Manuel L. Quezon University (MLQU), Belen told him: Then you’re not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I know this, not all law students are created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are created equal despite what

i. Members of the Supreme Court

c. Disciple of member of the Judiciary -Constitutional provisions on impeachment ii. Lower court judges and Justices of the Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan -Section 11, Art. VIII, 1986 Constitution -Rule 140, Rules of Court iii. Grounds iv. Sanctions

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